Czech Democracy in the New Millennium

Andrew L. Roberts

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781032400105
• eBook ISBN: 9781000051940
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book assesses the quality of Czech democracy relative to both its postcommunist peers and older EU members. Motivated by the authoritarian tendencies and illiberal outcomes in the postcommunist region, it explores the extent to which the Czech Republic is genuinely an outlier within the region and why.

The book elaborates on an original conception of democratic quality that emphasizes three aspects of governance: citizen rule, political equality, and good citizenship. The authors show that while the Czech Republic falls short of Western democracies on these standards, it does perform better than most of its peers. The book includes original data on campaign promises, dual mandates, legislative productivity, the wealth of MPs, the opinions of millionaires, women's representation, and the stability of public preferences along with comparative analyses of a host of other indicators.

The book will appeal to those interested in the politics of Eastern Europe and new democracies, those working in the rapidly growing fields of democratic quality and populism, and NGOs concerned with the development of new democracies around the world.

1 Introduction

In May 2010 Victor Orbán’s Fidesz party decisively won parliamentary elections in Hungary and systematically set out to change the constitution in order to maximize its power and limit the independence of the judiciary, the press, the bureaucracy, and the opposition. The Polish Law and Justice Party similarly won power in Poland in 2005 and attempted similar purges which ended poorly until they more successfully resumed their campaign after returning to power in 2015. Both governments have been taken to task by the EU for their anti-democratic and illiberal policies with some observers worrying about the fate of liberal democracy in the region.

Why begin a book about Czech politics with a description of current politics in two of its closest peers? The reason is that the Czech Republic to date seems to have avoided these problems. Czech politics is far from perfect and many would say that it suffers serious problems, but actions to limit the independence of state institutions or the press or restrict basic human rights have not yet even been contemplated. One of the tasks of this book is to see what developments put the country in this position. Why have democracy and liberalism survived in the Czech Republic even as they come under threat in the two countries who were once viewed as fellow leaders in the democratic transition? And has this changed with the election victory of the billionaire-turned-politician, Andrej Babiš?

Not long ago, observers were optimistic about the state of democracy in East-Central Europe, which here refers to the states of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (sometimes with the addition of the Baltic states and Slovenia). As these countries overcame initial obstacles like creating new institutions and reforming the economy and then entered NATO and the EU, it seemed that they had put their troubled past behind them and joined the ranks of the consolidated democracies. The theoretical challenge was less to explain this progress (though scholars of course did this as well) than to understand why some postcommunist countries were not living up to the example of the leaders, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland notable among them.

Today such optimism is thin on the ground and some have doubted whether it was ever justified. Hungary and Poland are viewed as among the most problematic members of the EU and if not for their defense of each other might have been on the receiving end of sanctions. As the optimistic projections of the 1990s start to peter out, it may thus be worthwhile to switch gears and see why some countries have to a degree avoided this regression. The Czech Republic serves that purpose in this volume.

This book takes on two questions. The first is whether the country really is an outlier within the region. Czech scholars and citizens have expressed doubts about the quality of their country’s democracy. We thus ask how democracy actually works in the Czech Republic. What are its high and low points? And have things in fact got worse in recent years amid the rise of new populist parties? We take seriously the doubts of critics by providing some systematic tests of their worries.

The second question is the proper standards to make an assessment of Czech democratic quality. We thus develop a conception of democratic quality based on three elements. The first is citizen control over the actions of politicians. Citizen rule is reputedly missing in the Czech Republic as politicians lie, obfuscate, and pursue their own interests or simply do not accomplish anything. The second element is the extent of political equality. It assesses whether all citizens are equally represented, or more to the point whether groups like women, the young, and the poor are underrepresented as well as the possibility that the rich or the superrich control Czech politics. The third is good citizenship. If citizens are to rule, then it is essential that they possess the knowledge and skills to govern well. Thus, they should not be uninformed or misinformed or intolerant.

We would note upfront that this conception does not capture all of the problems that plague democracies. In particular, we leave out those issues which threaten democracy itself like restrictions on free speech or manipulation of elections (Schedler 2002). We are interested in democratic quality more than democracy itself which has been well-theorized elsewhere. Chapter 2 expands on this distinction.

After considering how Czech politics is working according to this conception, we then turn to the question mentioned at the start. Insofar as the Czech Republic differs from its postcommunist peers not to mention older EU members, why? What explains the difference? Is the illiberal and anti-democratic wave that has hit its closest peers on the way? Or does the country possess some characteristics or reserves that make it at least partially immune to these trends?

What do we find? Overall, the Czech Republic is a leader among laggards. It is a positive outlier among its postcommunist peers, but still lags behind the established democracies. This applies to some areas more than others. Political inequality is a relative bright spot (at least insofar as we can measure it), while citizen rule functions less well. Citizenship lies somewhere in the middle. However, trends are more negative than positive; accession to the EU and the great recession do seem to have dealt a blow to democratic politics, though not to the extent of Hungary and Poland.

In explaining these trends and the country’s relative success compared to its peers, our work relies more on speculation. We argue that history matters. The absence of a strong nationalist and religious cleavage in Czech politics has helped to prevent the emergence of the sort of right-wing populist parties that have plagued its neighbors. The presence of an unreconstructed Communist Party which is usually thought of as a hindrance to democracy may actually be a positive. It seems to attract and disperse the emotions and dissatisfactions that in other countries are turned against democratic parties and promotes some cooperation between democratic parties. The country’s political institutions which are often criticized may also provide a backstop as they tend to disperse and fragment power, preventing any leader or party from dominating politics. Finally, the country’s success has bred complacency among its politicians who now lack a motivating mission like reforming the economy or joining the EU. The public meanwhile may not provide the liberal ballast that it used to. The Czech Republic may thus be spending down its initial advantages.

In the remainder of this chapter, we will pursue a number of issues. We take up the general issue of democratic recession in the contemporary world – whether it is happening and why. We then turn to domestic critics of Czech politics and break down their diagnoses. Finally, we outline the areas of focus in this volume and our reasons for considering them.

Democratic recession in the twenty-first century

The problems in Hungary and Poland mentioned at the start of the book may not be one-off events related to unique domestic problems. Indeed, Diamond (2008, 2015; also Kurlantzick 2013) has claimed that they are simply examples of a more general worldwide trend away from democracy. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the number of democracies in the world grew rapidly. By Diamond’s calculations this growth ended in the early 2000s and since at least 2006 we have seen movement backward. Democratic failure has become more common than it was.

There is something new about this recession as well. These democratic failures do not take the traditional path of military coups or seizures of power by armed rebels (Bermeo 2016). Rather, in a number of cases, freely elected executives have gradually concentrated their power and squeezed out the opposition. The current democratic recession comes from within. Hungary and Poland are good examples of the way that elected parties can limit checks on their power and hamstring the opposition. Fidesz and Law and Justice after all both won free elections before attempting to dismantle institutional means of accountability.

Four different explanations have been prominent in accounting for these developments: governance, representation, citizenship, and migration. Diamond (2008, 2015) attributes the democratic recession to poor governance. Governments are not doing right by citizens, especially in terms of corruption and transparency. This creates distrust and pushes citizens to embrace authoritarian leaders who promise to clean house and make things better. He sees weak institutions and external rents (oil revenues or foreign aid) as partially accounting for the problems of bad governance. Krastev (2007, 2016) agrees that liberalism in general has failed in delivering the goods, though he adds that it also failed to provide real choices to citizens.

Mair (2013) expands on this focus on representation. He argues that the problem is that traditional forms of representation are breaking down, a syndrome that he calls “ruling the void.” On the one hand, voters are not as connected to parties as they once were and party leaders do not need members as they once did. On the other, democracy has lost much of its meaning due to globalization and the EU which take many decisions out of the hands of elected politicians. As a result, citizens have turned toward non-traditional and extremist options that promise to return control to them.

Greskovits (2015) helpfully combines these explanations and distinguishes between backsliding (a la Diamond) and hollowing (a la Mair). Backsliding refers to radicalization of sizeable groups and the weakening loyalty of elites to democracy. Hollowing means low identification with parties, low electoral turnout, and weak civil society. He argues that right-wing elite ideologies lead to backsliding in East Central Europe, while weak welfare states contribute to hollowing.

Foa and Mounk (2016) have provided another perspective on democratic decline. They see the roots of the problems in the citizenry. Specifically, they argue that recent generations – so-called millennials – have become less supportive of democracy than their parents and grandparents. Democracy in this view depends on the support of its citizens.

A final diagnosis focuses on immigrants and foreigners. Rodrik (2017), for example, has linked the rise of populism in Western Europe and the US to increases in the arrival of migrants, in particular, migrants of different races and religions. Indeed, numerous studies link voting for populists less to economic distress than to cultural threat. This connection may be even stronger in postcommunist Europe due to lack of exposure to foreigners, lack of societal trust, and revolutions linked to national liberation (Carl 2018; Milanovic 2018).

Not all observers have signed on to these diagnoses. Norris (2017) tries to break down the potential sources of democratic backsliding according to Linz and Stepan’s (1996) institutional, behavioral, and cultural aspects of democratic consolidation. Institutionally, Norris argues that it is difficult to see a decline in democratic institutions in the first place. Looking at Freedom House and Polity ratings of democracy does not reveal any major shift away from democracy (see also Ulfelder 2011).

Behaviorally, she does recognize the increase in support for authoritarian populist alternatives – Brexit, the French National Front, Geert Wilders, Donald Trump, and Norbert Hofer are the standard examples – but she attributes this to a specific set of events. In particular, terrorist attacks have damaged feelings of security and led to support for populist forces. This, however, has happened more among the old than the young. The millennials are not to blame.

Culturally, she, like a number of other authors (for example, Voeten 2017; Alexander and Welzel 2017), finds that the decline in support for democracy, especially among the young, is overstated and does not appear in all countries. Instead, generational differences are related to lifecycle effects – people become more supportive of democracy as they age – and dissatisfaction with democracy is related to the capacity of government.

Alexander and Welzel (2017) even put a positive spin on recent changes. Although they recognize the recent rise in populism, they portray it more as a last gasp of older citizens and marginalized social classes. They argue that the meaning of democracy has in fact changed for the better. While in the past democracy meant something illiberal even for its supporters, for example, by not recognizing sexual freedom, citizens today embrace a more liberal conception of democracy. This is an improvement and it is widespread.

In sum, there is some controversy over whether we are seeing a general retreat from democracy and liberalism, though it is clear that places like Hungary and Poland have become less democratic and right-wing populists have gained ground in many countries. Even more speculative is the roots of what is happening. Poor governance, representational problems, generational shifts, and external forces are a few of the explanatory factors singled out.

Is the Czech Republic an outlier?

Where does the Czech Republic fit within these trends? Has it fallen victim to democratic recession or does it stand out as a consolidated democracy surrounded by backsliders? While this assessment is the purpose of this book, it is worth providing some illustrative data at the start to whet the reader’s appetite and make a prima facie case for the importance of this case study.

We thus look at three major initiatives that provide quantitative assessments of the functioning of democracy in the region. While their conceptualizations take a different view than the one that we justify in the next sections, they do share enough commonalities to make them worth considering. Freedom House’s Nations in Transit focuses on the postcommunist region, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index looks more broadly at new democracies, and the Varieties of Democracy project evaluates the entire world. According to their measures, the Czech Republic does stand out in its neighborhood.

Figure 1.1 shows the Czech Republic’s ratings according to Freedom House’s Nations in Transit scores which take a more nuanced view than their better-known democracy scores. These assessments aggregate individual ratings of national democratic governance, the electoral process, civil society, independence of the media, local democratic governance, the judicial framework, and corruption. What we see is almost a straight line for the country at a relatively high level even as first Hungary, then Poland have experienced significant declines and Slovakia has declined and plateaued at a lower level.

Looking at the individual elements of this index, the Czech Republic performs best on the electoral process, local democratic governance, judicial framework, and civil society. Its weak spots are national democratic governance, independence of the media, and especially corruption, a concern that will reappear below.

The Bertelsmann Transformation Index, which aggregates ratings of stateness, political participation, rule of law, the stability of democratic institutions, and political and social integration, reveals similar trends (Bühlmann et al. 2011). As Figure 1.2 shows, the Czech ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A theory of democratic quality
• 3 Citizen rule
• 4 Political inequality
• 5 Citizenship
• 6 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index