The Paradox of Myanmar's Regime Change

Roger Huang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000063585
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Controllo degli armamenti

This book analyzes Myanmar's contemporary political history, arguing that Myanmar's so-called "democratization" has always been a calculated regime transition, planned by the military, with every intention that the military to remain the key permanent political actor in Myanmar's political regime.

Using the period since Myanmar's regime change in 2011 as an extended case study, this book offers an original theory of regime transition. The author argues that Myanmar's ongoing regime transition has not diverged from its authoritarian military roots and explains how the military has long planned its voluntary partial withdrawal from direct politics. Therefore, Myanmar's "disciplined democracy" contains features of democratic politics, but at its core remains authoritarian. Providing an original contribution to the theoretical literature on regime change by developing a theory of trial and error regime transition, the book engages with and challenges the popular democratization theory by arguing that this theory does not sufficiently explain hybrid regimes or authoritarian durability. Additionally, the book adds to an alternative understanding of how the regime transition was initiated by examining the historical evolution of Myanmar's post-colonial regime and offers a fresh perspective on contemporary political developments in Myanmar.

An important contribution to the study of authoritarian durability and the dynamics of regime change in Southeast Asia, this book will be of interest to academic researchers of comparative politics, international relations, and Southeast Asian studies.

1
Introduction

Myanmar’s puzzling transition

Ever since the military coup of 1962, Myanmar’s tatmadaw (armed forces) has consistently deflected challenges to its rule and maintained repressive military control over the state apparatus. When the military-backed Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP) government (1962–1988)¹ collapsed at the height of anti-government protests in 1988, the result was an internal coup that returned the tatmadaw to the forefront of direct governance under the State Law and Restoration Council (SLORC), renamed as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in 1997. During this prolonged period of direct military rule (1988–2011), the tatmadaw promised a multiparty “democratic” political system, while all the while expanding the military’s capacity and scope both as an institution and as government. Despite the tatmadaw’s consolidation of power over the state apparatus and national politics, the military regime nevertheless continued to push a transitional plan for the “flourishing of a genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system” (Ministry of Information 2008: 3). Following through with its seven-step roadmap to a disciplined democracy, first declared publicly in August 2003, the military junta voluntarily dissolved itself on March 30, 2011. The nominal election of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) government ended more than two decades of direct military rule. However, the first notionally elected president of the new “disciplined democracy” was Thein Sein, a recently retired general who had also happened to be the last prime minister of the SPDC.

Many critics initially perceived the military’s seven-step roadmap to a disciplined democracy as a cosmetic attempt to disguise and civilianize military rule (i.e., Maung Zarni 2012). Yet, the dissolution of the SPDC led to real, albeit limited, regime change in post-junta Myanmar. In line with the military-drafted Constitution, new political institutions emerged during the Thein Sein’s administration (2011–2016), leading to the diffusion of power, greater pluralism, and new opportunities for civilians to participate in formal politics (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2012: 206–210). This military-driven regime transition has led a number of observers to suggest that the once highly authoritarian regime is undergoing what Samuel Huntington refers to as regime “transformation” (1991: 114; e.g., Ganesan 2017: 196). Other commentators observe that the elite-led “nascent democracy” (Holliday 2013: 100) is moving “beyond electoral authoritarianism” (Farrelly 2015).

Myanmar’s so-called “democratization” gained further traction after the Thein Sein administration, in accordance with the 2008 Constitution, held a relatively fair general election on November 8, 2015. The result was a landslide electoral victory for Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD). With the advent of a popularly elected NLD-led coalition government in 2016 under President Htin Kyaw,² a Suu Kyi loyalist, Myanmar entered a new era of genuine power sharing, albeit an asymmetrical relationship where the military is constitutionally guaranteed expansive powers including institutional autonomy, free from civilian oversight.

The 2015 election marked the first time since the 1962 coup that a military outsider had been able to hold the country’s top office and form a government in conjunction with the tatmadaw. Just days after the start of the new NLD-dominated parliament, a fast-tracked bill established a new post of State Counsellor and appointed NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi to the post. The new post circumvented constitutional restrictions barring Aung San Suu from the presidency, while giving her prime minister-like powers as the de facto head of the civilian government. Despite the military’s protest against the bill, the NLD’s defiance did not lead to the tatmadaw unraveling the disciplined democratic system of its own design. Myanmar’s regime change therefore cannot simply be explained as “the menu” for institutional manipulation to sustain authoritarian rule (Schedler 2002). While under the military’s disciplined democracy, the army remains independently powerful with control of the security apparatus, in the civilian sphere of politics, the elected NLD leads the executive and legislative branches of government.

Robert Taylor, an expert on Myanmar’s political economy, has consistently argued that there is a “long-term continuity and logic to the course taken by the military” (2012a: 221). That is, the military has consistently viewed itself as being the responsible, non-partisan guardian and builder of the contemporary Myanmar state (Taylor 2009: 498). Even under the “greatly liberalized political atmosphere” in post-junta Myanmar, Taylor maintains that there is “more continuity than change in Myanmar’s political system” (Taylor 2013: 394–395). If one considers the tatmadaw’s rule as being uninterrupted since 1962,³ Myanmar’s military regime has lasted for nearly half a century, and remains to this day only partially civilianized. Why then would the powerful tatmadaw, coming from a position of strength, voluntarily dissolve the junta in 2011, and critically, allow its political adversary to form a government in 2016? Further, is Taylor’s account of continuity rather than change accurate, given that since the implementation of the country’s new Constitution in 2011, there have been dramatic policy reversals and a genuine sharing of power between elected civilians and the military?

Regime change fundamentally concerns the reconfiguration of political power, and the transformation of existing institutions or the creation of new ones. Under the military’s disciplined democracy, new political institutions have been established, while the political role of an existing one – the tatmadaw – is institutionalized by the new Constitution. Post-junta Myanmar is no longer the same type of repressive, highly authoritarian military regime of its recent past. The relatively rapid changes taking place since 2011, in particular the ascent of the NLD opposition into government following a relatively fair⁴ 2015 general election, has been characterized by some observers as a “failure of authoritarian learning” (Dukalskis and Raymond 2018). This line of reasoning assumes that the post-junta reforms have superseded the transitional plan of the ancien régime, with the military effectively losing control of the political processes. Therefore in this view, Myanmar as a “hybrid regime,” with the co-existence of democratic practices and the old legacy of authoritarian military politics is assumed to be an ongoing, incomplete process of democratic transition (Egreteau 2016: 15).

This book challenges this conventional democratization account. It argues that the liberalization of socio-political space during the Thein Sein years can best be understood as a non-democratic regime transition that has thus far followed a trial-and-error regime logic, shaped by the corporate interests and vision of the tatmadaw. The advent of the NLD-led administration in 2016 may not be the preferred or expected outcome of the military designers, yet it does not signal the beginning of democratization. Myanmar’s unconventional political trajectory may have allowed outsiders access to the corridors of power, yet politicians can only access the civilian sphere of politics that the military has voluntarily relinquished direct control of. By design, the tatmadaw’s disciplined democracy is a bona fide hybrid regime. Therefore, any political actor that wishes to engage in and participate in formal politics must abide by the military’s pre-determined rules of the game, as set out by the military-drafted Constitution. The tatmadaw remain the final arbiters of decisions and powers related to the structural foundations of Myanmar’s disciplined democracy

Regime change under the Thein Sein administration (2011–2016)

For over two decades, the tatmadaw ruled over Myanmar as a highly authoritarian military regime, where formal regime power was monopolized by a small group of high ranking military officials with a clear hierarchical chain of command (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2008: 163–173). Socio-political pluralism was exceptionally limited, and the repressive government did not tolerate public dissent. Prior to the dissolution of the SPDC, Freedom House described Myanmar in 2011 as one of the “worst of the worst” regimes, where citizens were denied even the most basic civil and political rights. After more than two decades of direct junta rule however, the military imposed a restructuring of its regime, and through a deeply flawed electoral process installed a new hybrid civilian–military government under the notionally elected Thein Sein presidency in 2011.

From the onset of his presidency, Thein Sein signaled that politics under the new government would be different from its recent repressive past. At his inaugural address, President Thein Sein signaled a renegotiation of state-societal relations. Thein Sein not only spoke positively about the role of non-state actors but also openly appealed for civic participation and assistance from intellectuals, NGOs, and even international organizations, to contribute to the development of a modern, democratic Myanmar (NLM 2011a). This immediate tonal shift would later help shape Thein Sein’s reputation both domestically and abroad as a reformist president, with one foreign correspondent dubbing him as the “listener-in-chief” (Robinson 2013). Many observers and activists at the time were convinced that the new government would indeed govern differently, and their faith seemed justified when Thein Sein unilaterally suspended the controversial Myitsone Dam on September 30, 2011, ostensibly as a response to public demand (Interviews and discussions with activists in 2012). The China-backed hydro-electricity project had long faced opposition from affected communities, as well as from a small circle of environmentalists. However, it was only in the more relaxed political environment under new administration that activists became emboldened to mobilize a nationwide “Save the Ayeyarwady,” anti-Myitsone Dam campaign (Chan 2017: 680–683).

Within a year of the implementation of the military’s disciplined democracy, the Thein Sein administration has pushed through a series of legal reforms, which significantly altered state-societal relations. Many basic civil and political liberties, long denied to Myanmar citizens, were suddenly legal and tolerated. Citizens begin to form labor unions, participate in industrial actions, and mobilize in protest against unpopular government decisions. Previously taboo subjects – talk of human rights, public discussion of politics, and criticism of the government – became acceptable, albeit within limits. The new government also introduced economic reforms to encourage foreign investments and private sector growth. The liberalization of the telecommunications sector significantly changed how the general populace accessed and exchanged information. By the latter half of 2011, a series of presidential amnesties had released hundreds of political prisoners (Nakanishi 2013: 314). In early 2013, the government also created the Remaining Political Prisoner Scrutiny Committee to address the issue of political prisoners, leading to the President’s (dubious) declaration at the end of the same year that political prisoners no longer remain incarcerated (Mathieson 2015).⁵ The viability and credibility of disciplined democracy was further bolstered by Aung San Suu Kyi’s entry into parliament after the April 2012 by-election. This development convinced many observers that Myanmar was on a trajectory toward democratic transition.⁶ By the end of Thein Sein’s tenure, socio-political space has expanded significantly, with partisan politics normalized and the country’s international reputation largely rehabilitated. The military backed Thein Sein administration evidently felt comfortable enough with the socio-political changes, that it oversaw a relatively fair and open electoral contest in 2015. This allowed the longtime opposition to win in a landslide, and the formation of the NLD-led government, thus further demonstrating that Myanmar was certainly no longer the same type of regime of yesteryear.

Myanmar’s perplexing regime change

Regime change is a complicated issue that has been one of the most challenging puzzles explored in the social sciences (Bermeo 1990; Bunce 1995; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Teorell 2010). Despite the wealth of literature, political scientists often find themselves unable to sufficiently explain – let alone predict – the rise, fall, and evolution of political regimes (Howard and Walters 2014). In particular, Myanmar’s unusually durable military authoritarianism has long been characterized as an anomaly in the so-called era of democracy (Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2009). It is generally assumed that when the military foray into the realm of formal politics and direct governance beyond its defensive duties, they often fragment into distinct cliques, forming centrifugal forces that lead to the ultimate collapse of the military regime. That is why military regimes are considered the least durable type of non-democratic regimes (Geddes et al. 2014: 159). The tatmadaw however, has long dominated Myanmar’s politics, and even after enduring several internal purges, which have at times included the removal of senior members and whole branches of the tatmadaw, the military continues to maintain its institutional unity and remains the most coherent political force in the country (Win Min 2008b: 1018–1037).

The speed and direction of liberalization introduced under the civilianized Thein Sein government has been described by Dan Slater as a “sudden transformation” that has caught some scholars, policymakers, and the popular press by surprise (Slater 2014: 172). Although the civilianization of military governments, and the return of the military to the barracks is by itself not a unique phenomenon, the case of Myanmar stands out, as it is a top-down initiated, planned voluntary regime change that has been undertaken by a remarkably unified military regime, from a position of strength. Conventional explanations such as internal pressure (elite defection, factionalism within the state, a restive society that could challenge regime survival) or exogenous shocks (international pressure or threats, societal mobilization against the state, natural disasters) fail to explain the rationale behind the elite-led transformation in Myanmar (Taylor 2013; Jones 2014b, 2015).

Prior to the advent of Thein Sein’s presidency in 2011, most political science literature on Myanmar was generally pessimistic about the chances of regime transition, or change. For example, much has been written about the persistence of military rule over the state apparatus (Callahan 2009; ICG 2001), and by most pre-2011 accounts, the prospects for regime change in Myanmar, especially with a weak, factionalized opposition appeared bleak (Casper and Taylor 1996: 88–90; Kyaw Yin Hlaing 2008).

In the aftermath of the so-called 2007 “Saffron Revolution,” Win Min, an expert on the Myanmar military, suggested that after the 2010 elections, military hardliners were expected to hold on to power, and the SPDC leaders Than Shwe and Maung Aye would likely remain as active members of the tatmadaw (2008a: 45). Since the dissolution of the SPDC in 2011, neither retired generals remain in government. Sussane Prager-Nyein (2009) correctly argued that the 2008 Constitution and the 2010 general election would allow the tatmadaw to institutionalize its dominant role over its state and society, but she assumed this would come at the expanse of “shrinking citizenry.” These earlier works provided excellent accounts of why the tatmadaw remains in control and is resistant to change, but their focus was to explain authoritarian durability, and as such, they did not account for the rationale behind regime change in the absence of any exogenous shocks or regime failures.

The limits of democratization theory and Myanmar’s regime change

Given the significant reconfiguration of political power following the advent of the NLD government in 2016, most observers have explained post-junta politics from the perspective of democratization theory (e.g., Barany 2018; Egreteau 2016; Kipgen 2016; Ganesan 2017). As an extension of the ideological debates from the Cold War, democratization theory often conceptualizes regimes based on two broadly polarized ideal-types – ones that are authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning as opposed to their more liberal-leaning democratic counterparts (Schmitter and Karl 1991). In the democratic transitions literature, the process of change is generally examined as a linear transition from an authoritarian form of governance to a more “democratic” one (Gans-Morse 2004).

This book challenges the applicability of this theory to Myanmar and argues that the end of direct military rule does not make Myanmar a democracy in transition. The main limitation of the democratization literature is the way in which regimes that choose to liberalize are conceptualized as pursuing democratization, while regimes that persist with authoritarian rule are seen as anomalies in the “an age of democratization” (Brownlee 2007). This democratic transitions approach reduces regime change to two opposite poles and conceptualizes regime change as a linear process. The transitions paradigm perpetuates the view that when autocrats liberalize they are necessarily moving their regimes toward democratization, and that any illiberal backsliding during the transition should be understood as democratic regression. In this manner, democratization studies view durable authoritarian regimes as puzzles; but their preoccupation with understanding why these non-democratic regimes have failed to democratize do not suff...