ABSTRACT
This article is the first and introductory article of this special issue. The article gives a societist account of the principles of partnership and recognition as they are encountered and experienced in practices in action research. A societist account of practices requires a social theory for understanding practices. Therefore, the article utilises the resources of a contemporary form of practice theory, the theory of practice architectures and ecologies of practices, to lay down the foundation for conceptualising partnerships and recognition. Specifically, it introduces the theory as a foundation for the other articles in this special issue which, as a collective, examine the cultural-discursive, material-economic and social-political arrangements that enable and constrain particular kinds of partnerships and recognition that exist or evolve in site-based education development. Additionally, the article presents theoretical considerations concerning the principles of partnership and recognition that emerge as enmeshments of one another which mutually form, reform and transform practices in action research.
Partnerships in action research
Action research is a social human endeavour taking shape and being played out differently in different social, political and cultural circumstances (Somekh and Zeichner 2009). As the extensive body of literature describing action research illustrates, changing practices involves communities as well as individuals. People in these communities, described by Wenger (1998) as âcommunities of practiceâ, do not encounter one another in unmediated ways whereby individuals learn to adapt themselves and their individual actions to collective endeavours. Their encounters in communities of practice require partnerships of one kind or another. These partnerships are socialâpolitical forms whereby the roles and relationships between participants are âsufficiently fluid to maximise mutual support and sufficiently differentiate to allow individuals to make appropriate contributions given existing constraintsâ (Somekh 2006, 7).
Partnerships are inherently interactional and transactional whereby individuals do not simply interpret each other on the basis of their sense impressions, and nor do they understand one another only via cognitive information processing (Kemmis et al. 2014). Partnerships therefore involve participants traversing the individualâcollective dialectic. By their nature, partnerships-for-action are not entirely self-serving or individualistic, and nor are participants entering an empty room (so to speak). On the contrary, partnerships are intersubjective spaces. These intersubjective spaces are not neutral or without some pre-existing form; that is to say, they are interactional spaces where the historical meets the present in activities in physical spaceâtime (Schatzki 2010). Intersubjective spaces are somewhat prefigured, although not pre-determined; they are shaped in and through the language, the activities and the particular kinds of relationships that come to inhabit the social world of participants in the actual happeningness of their interactions and actions at particular places and times.
In action research, people meet in these intersubjective spaces that are constituted in open communicative spaces where practitioners reflect together on the character, conduct and consequences of their practices (Kemmis, McTaggart, and Nixon 2014). The act of coming together in itself does not constitute genuine partnerships or communities of practice. Rather, there is a need to move toward partnerships (McAllister 1993); they simply do not exist instantaneously or because oneâs designation is named a partnership. People need time to create conditions for partnerships to emerge. This means that partnerships need to be viewed as a process rather than as defined or bounded entity. Pathways to partnership therefore are formed over historical time (Shier 2001); and time enables the possibility for people to form a close, genuine, renewing relationship (Goodlad 1994; Groundwater-Smith and Mockler 2009). In this sense, partnerships are a lived experience rather than an artificial organisational construct reified by such notions as âcommunities of practiceâ; which when used as a âcatch phraseâ (to nominalise the practices experienced when people engage in professional learning like action research) diminishes the realities, the complexities and lived experiences of participants. Over time partnerships come to exist democratically through interactions and relationships, thus forming enabling ârelational architecturesâ (coined by Edwards-Groves et al. 2010) as necessary conditions for change.
Relational architectures function as a conceptual resource to help us understand the socialâpolitical arrangements that influence and help researchers examine and critique the existence of agency, solidarity and power in practice and practice development (Edwards-Groves et al. 2010). Furthermore, the concept of relational architectures addresses the presence of the plurality, democracy, agency and solidarity through particular socialâpolitical arrangements that shape the partnerships encountered and developed in any change endeavour. It reflects the web of complexity, contestedness and connectedness between multiple practice architectures that impact on the daily lives of those involved in educational change and development. As Seddon, Billett, and Clemans argue:
Partnerships, their character and consequences are forged at the contested interface between localised networks and central agencies, and they are framed by the broader relations that play through partnerships as well as between partnerships and the wider political order. Like schools, partnerships are sites of struggle. They cannot be dismissed as simple neo-liberal policy instruments. (2005, 582)
Therefore, no matter where an educator or researcher finds himself or herself working, there will always be multiple practices and practice architectures enabling and constraining partnerships and so the consequent courses of action. As Groundwater-Smith and Mockler remind us, âwhat we need is the capacity to establish genuine communities of practice based on mutual respect and authentic partnerships in order to develop networks of learningâ (2009, 53). This is necessary so that members can navigate the necessary sites of struggle, tension, complexity and challenge which are the engine room for learning, transformation and change in action research.
Recognition in action research
Action research brings with it practical, philosophical, social, cultural, analytical and theoretical struggles. Among these struggles is how the participants are both positioned (McNiff 2013) and recognised in the different types of partnerships involved in action research and what this means for the intersubjective spaces in which they meet. How, and in what ways, research participants recognise each other in the discourse and language used in their encounters, the kinds of activities they do with one another and the ways they relate to one another interpersonally, is a genuine praxis-oriented concern for all persons entering the change endeavour.
Theorising recognition has been a developing interest for the academy for some years. Following initial work on recognition in the context of multiculturalism by Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1992), German philosopher Axel Honneth showed that understanding the identity, history, suffering, contemporary situation and unmet needs of a subaltern group, like for instance the Australian Indigenous people, involves a âstruggle for recognitionâ (Honneth 1995). This struggle for recognition involves two reciprocal processes: one within the subaltern group itself, and another in its relations with other groups. Both of these processes are conducted, in reality, as processes of dialogue: one within the subaltern group, and the other in conversations with other groups. The purpose of the dialogue is the same in both cases, however: to understand the history, the experiences, the sufferings and challenges, and the unmet needs of the subaltern group.
Within the subaltern group, the dialogue is aimed at self-understanding of the groupâs current situation, sense of identity and agency, sufferings and unmet needs as the product of the specific histories that have shaped them. Thus, for example, following Iris Marion Youngâs (1990) notion that there are only two forms of injustice, domination and oppression, a subaltern group might want to analyse and understand how its sense of identity and its contemporary situation have been historically formed and shaped by structures and practices that have historically limited its powers and capacities for self-determination (domination), and its powers and capacities for self-expression and self-development (oppression1). The subaltern group might discover, in the process, how its history has included moments both of resistance and compliance (or collusion with oppressors), and yet how a sense of the groupâs distinctive identity has persisted through both these kinds of moments. The internal dialogue is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for recognition, in the struggle for recognition. It must be complemented by external dialogues with other groups.
The struggle for recognition becomes âcompleteâ, however, only when the internal dialogue is matched, and in some ways validated, by an external dialogue with other groups. In these external dialogues, the subaltern group articulates and presents its developing self-understanding to other groups who then confer their recognition on the subaltern group. What this means is that, through the dialogues, other groups come to recognise, acknowledge and empathise with the distinctive historical experience, suffering, contemporary situation and unmet needs of the subaltern group. That is, they see the claims and the self-analysis of the subaltern group as valid in the sense that they are comprehensible, true (in the sense of accurate), sincerely stated (not deceptively) and morally right and appropriate (to use the criteria of Habermasâs [1984] four validity claims). This is to acknowledge that the subaltern group is a group that is, in one special sense, just like oneâs own group â namely, the product of its own distinctive history â and for that reason alone worthy of recognition and respect. This form of recognition is nothing more than the recognition of the uniqueness of the other â a uniqueness precisely equivalent to oneâs own. In this process of recognition, there can be no âsubalternsâ, only equals.
This, then, is the struggle for...