Political Trials in Ancient Greece (Routledge Revivals)

Richard Bauman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780415749589
• eBook ISBN: 9781000082937
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Ancient History
• Index: History

During the inspired years of the Athenian empire, through the tragedy of its collapse, to the more prosaic era that followed, most of the great names in Athenian history were involved in the procedures of criminal law. Political Trials in Ancient Greece, first published in 1990, explores the relationships between historical process, constitution, law, political machinations and foreign policy, concentrating on fifth and fourth century Athens and on Macedonia.

These trials contribute significant details to our knowledge of such towering figures as Aeschylus, Pericles, Thucydides, Alcibiades, Socrates, Demosthenes and Aristotle, as well as a diverse collection of Macedonian defendants. The jurisdiction of the Areopagus, trials of communities, and the personal jurisdiction of the Macedonian king are also examined. Richard Bauman's original account broadens our understanding of Greek legal institutions and of the ancient Greek approach to the law, as well as the general ethos of Athenian and Macedonian society.

NOTES

I INTRODUCTION

1 Macedonian law will be discussed when dealing with Macedonian trials.

2 Hansen 1975, 9.

3 See AP 3.6, 4.4. On the authorship of that work see Rhodes 1981, 58–63. I assume Aristotle’s authorship but am not dogmatic about it. On the Areopagus generally see Lipsius 1905, 121–9; Bonner and Smith 1938, vol. 1 passim; MacDowell 1971, passim; Rhodes 1981, passim. See also Chapter III 1, p. 32.

4 On these jurisdictions see Lipsius 1905, 11, 68, 374, 627; Bonner and Smith 1938, vol. 1 passim; Harrison 1971, 8–9, 12–17; MacDowell 1971, 24–6; Hansen 1987, 60–1, 63–4, 225.

5 Lipsius 1905, passim; Calhoun 1927, passim; Bonner and Smith 1938, vol. 1 passim; MacDowell 1978, passim; von Wedel 1971, passim; Hansen 1987, 215; Sealey 1987, 60–70, 118–9; Sinclair 1988, 19–20. See also AP 9.1 with Rhodes 1981 ad loc.

6 The distribution of sovereignty between the Ecclesia and the dicasteries has been assiduously investigated by M.H. Hansen. See for example Hansen 1987, 94–124; also his ‘The political powers of the people’s court in fourth century Athens’ (advance copy kindly supplied by the author). His proposal is that in the fourth century ultimate sovereignty rested with the dikastēria rather than with the Ecclesia. I need not express a final opinion on this proposition here, and therefore reserve judgment.

7 AP 68.1. See also Antiphon Chor. 21, Andoc. 1.27. M.H. Hansen, Class, et Med. 33 (1981–2), 9–47 would deny Heliaea any meaning other than ‘the unambiguous old designation for the people’s court’. Thus to him ‘the heliastic courts’ means only the dikastēria manned by jurors, membership of whose panel was restricted to citizens over thirty who took a solemn oath. The alternative understanding of Heliaea as the Ecclesia as a whole in its judicial mode is ruled out by Hansen. But there is considerable support for the view that the Heliaea was, at least originally, the Ecclesia sitting as a court. See MacDowell, 1978, 30 and the citations by Hansen himself, Class, et Med. 33, n. 83. See also Chapter V n. 8.

8 Bauman 1967, passim.

9 Thonissen 1875, 196-201; Lipsius 1905, 374–7; Bonner and Smith 1938, 1.298; Harrison 1971, 53–5; MacDowell 1978, 175–6. Also AP 8.4, 16.10; Plut. Solon 19.4.

10 Xenophon speaks of ἐάν τις τὸν τῶν ᾽ΑΘηναίων δήμον ἀδίκῃ and adds that the wrongdoer is to make his defence before the people in chains, and if convicted of doing wrong (adikein) is to suffer execution and confiscation. Thonissen 1875, 169–70 and MacDowell 1978, 180–1, do no more than cite the passage. Lipsius 1905, 43, discusses it but does not ask what ‘doing wrong’ means.

11 See Lipsius 1905, 105–10, 176–211, 286–98; Bonner and Smith 1938, 1.294–309, 170–2; MacDowell 1978, 56–65, 170–2 and passim; Sealey 1987, 82–90; Hansen 1975, passim, 1987, 212, 215.

12 In the fourth century a distinction was drawn between a nomos (‘a law’) and a psēphisma (‘a decree’), the former a general and permanent enactment, the latter one of limited scope and duration. Sealey 1987, 32–52; Hansen 1987, 219–20; Sinclair 1988, 84. Whether the distinction was always observed is a moot point, and whether it is fully understood today is even more debatable. The Romans carefully preserved separate terminology for the lex and the plebi scitum, but the only distinction observable in the developed law is a technical difference in the composition of the assembly enacting the two types.

13 Lipsius 1905, 931 and n.3 distinguishes between being at risk peri tou sōmatos (‘in life and limb’) and peri tēs ousias (‘in property’). A third category was peri tēs epitimias (‘in civic rights’). Aeschin. 3.210. Cf. MacDowell 1978, 176–7.

14 Quintilian Inst. Orat. 2.15.30 says of Socrates’ trial that the law forbade representation – (ius) quo non licebat pro altero agere – but the use of ius rather than l...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• I Introduction
• II Fifth-Century Athens: Early Empire-Builders and the Courts
• III Fifth-Century Athens: The Judicial Sovereignty of the Demos
• IV Fifth-Century Athens: ‘Whom the Gods Wish to Destroy’
• V Fourth-Century Athens: Law Reform, Scrutiny, and Illegality
• VI Fourth-Century Athens: Asebeia, the Willing Work-Horse
• VII Alexander in Asia
• VIII From Perdiccas to Poliorcetes
• Abbreviations
• Notes
• Select bibliography
• Index