Cultivation of Self in East Asian Philosophy of Education

Ruyu Hung

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9780367359348
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000747416
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

This book provides exciting and significant inquiries into the cultivation of self in East Asian philosophy of education.

The contributors to this volume are from different countries or areas in the world, but all share the same interest in exploring what it means to be human and how to cultivate the self. In this book, self-cultivation in classical Chinese philosophies—including Confucianism, neo-Confucianism, and Daoism—is scrutinised and elaborated upon, in order to reveal the significance of ancient wisdom for today's educational issues, and to show the meaningful connections between Eastern and Western educational thoughts. By addressing many issues of contemporary importance including environmental education, equity and justice, critical rationalism, groundlessness of language, and power and governance, this book offers fresh views of self-cultivation illuminated not merely by East Asian philosophy of education but also by Western insights.

For those who are interested in comparative philosophies, intercultural education, and cultural study, this book is both thought-provoking and inspirational.

The chapters in this book were originally published in the Educational Philosophy and Theory journal.

Confucianism and critical rationalism: Friends or foes?

Chi-Ming Lam

ABSTRACT
According to Karl Popper’s critical rationalism, criticism is the only way we have of systematically detecting and learning from our mistakes so as to get nearer to the truth. Meanwhile, it is arguable that the emphasis of Confucianism on creating a hierarchical and harmonious society can easily lead to submission rather than opposition, producing a conformist rather than critical mind. A question arises here as to whether Confucianism tends to denigrate criticism and thus run counter to critical rationalism. In this paper, I fi rst argue that Confucianism prizes criticism and critical discussion, for which ample justifi cation can be found in Confucian classics. Then I compare Confucianism with critical rationalism and assess the compatibility between them.

Introduction

Basically, Popper (1966b) formulates critical rationalism as an attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth’ (p. 225), or an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from our mistakes. Three key concepts can be identified in this formulation, viz. fallibilism (‘I may be wrong’), criticism (the needed ‘effort’), and verisimilitude (‘we may get nearer to the truth’). Among them, the most important one is criticism, which, according to Popper, is the only way we have of systematically detecting and learning from our mistakes so as to get nearer to the truth. Indeed, in his non-justificationist theory of rationality, Popper (2002b) rejects all attempts at the justification of ideas and replaces justification with criticism:

Previously, most philosophers had thought that any claim to rationality meant rational justification (of one’s beliefs); my thesis was, at least since my Open Society, that rationality meant rational criticism (of one’s own theory and of competing theories). (p. 173)

To put such a non-justificationist theory into practice, Popper has been keen to combat various hidden stratagems that reduce or eschew criticism. One example is the demand for precision in concepts as a precondition for criticism. Asserting the non-existence of ‘precise’ concepts, or concepts with ‘sharp boundary lines’, Popper (1989) stresses that words are significant only as instruments for developing theories and do not need to be more precise than our criticisms demand.

By and large, Confucianism refers to the philosophy that comes from the teachings of Confucius in China. Living at a time of widespread civil disorder, Confucius intends his philosophy to introduce morality into the exercise of governmental power, replacing rule by force with rule by virtue. While Confucius characterizes the hierarchical structure of traditional Chinese society as natural, he believes that a harmonious society can be created if everyone fulfills the moral obligations of their social role through conforming to the fundamental principles of humanity, especially benevolence (ren 仁) and ritual (li 禮). Yet, it is arguable that the emphasis of Confucianism on creating a hierarchical and harmonious society can easily lead to submission rather than opposition, producing a conformist rather than critical mind. For example, a review of recent psychological research indicates that the people of China are dominated by authority-minded (Shi & Feng, 2010) and harmony-minded (Ng, 2010) ways of thinking, being willing to take anyone who is the most senior or knowledgeable as the arbiter of truth or morality, and to adopt non-confrontational approaches to conflict resolution, respectively. Here, a question arises as to whether Confucianism tends to denigrate criticism and thus run counter to Popper’s critical rationalism. In the following discussion, I first consider the political and educational implications of critical rationalism. Then I examine the connection between Confucianism and criticism, focusing on whether, and if so how, Confucianism is critical. Finally, I compare Confucianism with critical rationalism and assess the compatibility between them.

Critical rationalism

Popper’s critical rationalism, which promotes the adoption of a critical attitude towards our theories, has profound implications for politics and education. On a political level, it is necessary to build an open society in which individuals live by a humanitarian faith in the importance of maximizing their freedom to live as they want by minimizing avoidable suffering for all (Popper, 1966a). More specifically, an open society implies such social values and practices as rationalism, equalitarianism, and democracy. By ‘rationalism’ Popper (1966b) means a social theory of reason that rationalists have a respect for reason and owe their reason to social interaction, or rather critical discussion, with others. The growth of reason requires not only a careful consideration of the argument rather than the person arguing, but a conscious attitude of openness to criticism and of learning from mistakes. With regard to equalitarianism, Popper asserts that it has a close affinity with rationalism. And a key principle of it is equal treatment of citizens before the law: ‘Equalitarianism proper is the demand that the citizens of the state should be treated impartially. It is the demand that birth, family connection, or wealth must not influence those who administer the law to the citizens’ (Popper, 1966a, p. 95). For Popper, a political practice that is essential for an open society is democracy. For one thing, democracy secures the freedoms of thought and expression that are indispensable for intellectual progress (Popper, 2002a). For another, democracy provides an institutional framework that allows the exercise of reason without violence in political matters, particularly the implementation of reforms and the change of governments (Popper, 1966a). Recognizing that rulers are fallible regardless of how good or wise they are, Popper suggests that democracy should rest on a theory of checks and balances, which endeavors to exercise institutional control over rulers by balancing their powers against that of others.

On an educational level, Popper’s critical rationalism requires teachers to do at least three things. First, the teacher should help students develop good discussion skills in the classroom, enabling them to discover different perspectives and interpretations, as well as to participate as effective discussants in other public places – a core component of democratic living. As Hess (2009) puts it, ‘A healthy democracy requires necessary and ongoing political discussion among citizens. … But not just any talk will do. To cultivate democracy, students need to learn how to engage in high-quality public talk’. (p. 29) Second, the teacher should initiate students into both what Popper (1989) calls the ‘first-order tradition’ (i.e. the dominant traditional knowledge, values, and practices of the society) and ‘second-order tradition’ (i.e. the tradition of critically discussing the first-order tradition). Although an open society is mainly characterized by the second-order tradition of a critical attitude, which is a tradition of not accepting a certain idea as true simply because it comes from a certain dominant tradition, Popper maintains that it is practically impossible to build this tradition of critical discussion without the first-order tradition, or something to criticize. Third, the teacher should help students detect and correct their mistakes by creating thought-provoking situations where their ideas are challenged and criticized. And a critical teacher should be able to force students into reexamining their ideas through demonstrating that and how their ideas are contradictory, thereby making them conscious that they really do not know what they thought they knew.

Confucianism and criticism

Is Confucianism critical?

It’s true that when evoking the norm of ritual (li 禮), Confucianism emphasizes affirmative thinking in the sense that this thinking complies with established institutions, norms, and values. Yet, it doesn’t imply that Confucianism is simply affirmative and not critical at all. For one thing, it is arguable that Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi, the three representatives of Confucianism in ancient China, are exemplars of critical thinking, considering that all of them constantly reflect on the cultures of their times and do not shrink from criticizing what they view as flaws in them. But more importantly, Confucianism prizes criticism and critical discussion, for which sufficient justification can be found in such Confucian classics as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi (Paul, 1990).

In the case of the Analects, criticism and critical discussion are considered as instruments for achieving benevolence (ren仁), which involves cultivating oneself and helping others to cultivate themselves through learning (xue學). Stressing the role of xue in realizing ren, the Analects (Lau, 1992) asserts that ‘To love benevolence without loving learning is liable to lead to foolishness’ (p. 173), and that ‘Learn widely and be steadfast in your purpose, inquire earnestly and reflect on what is at hand, and there is no need for you to look for benevolence elsewhere’ (p. 191). For Confucius, xue entails participation in critical discussion, demanding the readiness of learners not only to seek opinions from others and take justified criticisms, but also to give opinions to others and express justified criticisms. As an illustration of the former, consider the following two comments made by Confucius on his favorite disciple, Yen Hui: ‘Hui is no help to me at all. He is pleased with everything I say’ (Lau, 1992, p. 97); and ‘I can speak to Hui all day without his disagreeing with me in any way. Thus he would seem to be stupid’ (Lau, 1992, p. 13). They reveal that Confucius welcomes criticism from his disciples as a means for self-improvement, expecting them to challenge his teachings and seeing the absence of disagreement as a prima facie indication of stupidity. After all, it is hard, even for a sage, to improve without disagreement or criticism from other people, intelligent ones in particular. In Book XVII, Chapter 1 of the Analects (Lau, 1992), Confucius sets an example of taking justified criticism by changing his decision not to take office after being criticized for behaving inconsistently. With regard to the latter, Confucius highlights the importance of government officials in expressing justified criticism. For Confucius, they should remonstrate with their ruler when s/he deviates from ren and thus imperils the state. Confucius believes that a government is doomed to ruin the state if it makes bad mistakes and does not listen to criticism or lacks critical officials, as shown in the following passage:

Duke Ting asked, … ‘Is there such a thing as a saying that can ruin a state?’

Confucius answered, ‘A saying cannot quite do that. There is a saying amongst men: “I do not at all enjoy being a ruler, except for the fact that there is no one to go against what I say.” If what he says is good and no one goes against him, good. But if what he says is not good and no one goes against him, then is this not almost a case of a saying ruining a state?’ (Lau, 1992, pp. 125, 127)

Here, criticism is seen as part of an impersonal concept of loyalty (zhong 忠): zhong, which literally means ‘doing one’s best’, is conceptualized as loyalty to ren – the realization of which is the ultimate goal of criticism – rather than people. With a view to serving ren, loyal officials should voice justified criticism, even at the risk of losing their lives. As Confucius puts it implicitly, ‘For Gentlemen of purpose and men of benevolence while it is inconceivable that they should seek to stay alive at the expense of benevolence, it may happen that they have to accept death in order to have benevolence accomplished’ (Lau, 1992, p. 151).

As regards the Mencius, criticism and critical discussion are viewed in a similar vein as a way of achieving fundamental human virtues, especially benevolence (ren 仁) and righteousness (yi 義). Indeed, ren and yi are deemed the only virtues a great person should pursue and realize. In Book VII, Part A, Chapter 33 of the Mencius (Lau, 2003), Mencius asserts that a great person should set their mind on high principles, by which he means setting it merely on ren and yi. For Mencius, whatever endangers these two virtues must be fought; therefore, teachings that dispute them must be critically discussed and resolutely opposed. The quotation below serves to illustrate this point.

The teachings current in the Empire are those of the school of Yang or of the school of Mo. Yang advocates everyone for himself [weiwo 為我], which amounts to a denial of one’s prince; Mo advocates love without discrimination [jianai 兼愛], which amounts to a denial of one’s father. To ignore one’s father on the one hand, and one’s prince on the other, is to be no different from the beasts. … If the way of Yang and Mo does not subside and the way of Confucius does not shine forth, the people will be deceived by heresies and the path of morality will be blocked [chongse renyi 充塞仁義]. When the path of morality is blocked, then we show animals the way to devour men, and sooner or later it will come to men devouring men [renjiang-xiangshi 人將相食]. … I, too, wish to follow in the footsteps of the three sages in rectifying the hearts of men, laying heresies to rest, opposing extreme action, and banishing excessive views. I am not fond of disputation [bian 辯]. I have no alternative. (Lau, 2003, pp. 141, 143)

Mencius here argues that it is unavoidable to criticize and critically discuss (bian) certain teachings (e.g. weiwo and jianai) if one wants to prevent or stop their dangerous consequences (e.g. chongse renyi and renjiang-xiangshi) so as to establish or maintain ren and yi. And it is through criticism that excessive thoughts and extreme behaviors can be rectified.

Following the lines of argument in the Analects and Mencius, the Xunzi provides justification for criticism and critical discussion in terms of teaching and learning. Based on his belief...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Introduction: Cultivation of self in East Asian philosophy of education
• 1 Confucianism and critical rationalism: Friends or foes?
• 2 Is filial piety a virtue? A reading of the Xiao Jing (Classic of Filial Piety) from the perspective of ideology critique
• 3 ‘Keep off the lawn; grass has a life too!’: Re-invoking a Daoist ecological sensibility for moral education in China’s primary schools
• 4 The illusion of teaching and learning: Zhuangzi, Wittgenstein, and the groundlessness of language
• 5 Donghak (Eastern Learning), Self-cultivation, and Social Transformation: Towards diverse curriculum discourses on equity and justice
• 6 Acting without regarding: Daoist self-cultivation as education for non-dichotomous thinking
• 7 The purpose of the MBA degree: The opportunity for a Confucian MBA to overcome neoliberalism
• 8 Agency and social capital in Chinese international doctoral students’ conversion to Christianity
• 9 Continue the dialogue – symposium of cultivation of self in east asian philosophy of education
• 10 Confucius’s view of learning
• 11 Self-cultivation and the legitimation of power: Governing China through education
• 12 Integrative ethical education: Narvaez’s project and Xunzi’s insight
• 13 Confucius’ Junzi (君子): The conceptions of self in Confucian
• Index