War Economies and Post-war Crime

Sabine Kurtenbach, Angelika Rettberg

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781032089577
• eBook ISBN: 9780429536533
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Even when armed conflicts formally end, the transition to peace is not clear-cut. This comprehensive volume explores the mounting evidence which suggests that it is rather 'unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability'. The authors analyse the complex endeavour of transitioning out of war, studying how it is often interrelated with other transformations such as changes in the political regime (democratisation) and in the economy (opening of markets to globalisation). They explore how, in the same way as wars and conflicts reflect the societies they befall, post-war orders may replicate and perpetuate some of the drivers of war-related violence, such as high levels of instability, institutional fragility, corruption, and inequality. This book thus suggests that, even in the absence of a formal relapse into war and the re-mobilisation of former insurgents, many transitional contexts are marked by the steady and ongoing reconfiguration of criminal and illegal groups and practices.

This book will be of great interest to students and researchers of political science and peace studies. It was originally published as an online special issue of Third World Thematics.

OPEN ACCESS

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the relation between war economies and post-war crime

Sabine Kurtenbacn and Angelika Rettberg

ABSTRACT

Even when armed conflicts formally end, the transition to peace is not clear-cut. Mounting evidence suggests that it is rather'unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability'. The transition out of war is a complex endeavour, interrelated in many cases with other transformations such as changes in the political regime (democratisation) and in the economy (opening of markets to globalisation). In addition, in the same way as wars and conflicts reflect the societies they befall, post-war orders may replicate and perpetuate some of the drivers of war-related violence, such as high levels of instability, institutional fragility, corruption, and inequality. Thus, even in the absence of a formal relapse into war and the re-mobilisation of former insurgents, many transitional contexts are marked by the steady and ongoing reconfiguration of criminal and illegal groups and practices.

Even when armed conflicts formally end, the transition to peace is not clear-cut. Mounting evidence suggests that it is rather 'unlikely to see a clean break from violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, or from impunity to accountability'.¹ The transition out of war is a complex endeavour, interrelated in many cases with other transformations such as changes in the political regime (democratisation) and in the economy (opening of markets to globalisation). In addition, in the same way as wars and conflicts reflect the societies they befall, post-war orders may replicate and perpetuate some of the drivers of war-related violence, such as high levels of instability, institutional fragility, corruption, and inequality.² Thus, even in the absence of a formal relapse into war and the re-mobilisation of former insurgents, many transitional contexts are marked by the steady and ongoing reconfiguration of criminal and illegal groups and practices.

At the same time, there Is variation in post-war crime and violence. In some countries, violence effectively decreases, in others it increases, in yet others it remains constant. Even within these large categories, violence and crime may assume new forms and combinations, for example, a decline in conflict-related homicides, massacres, and kidnappings, but a rise in street crime and thefts, illicit markets, corruption, sexual, and domestic violence, or environmental crime.³

This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

This collection explores the links between different manifestations of violence during and following war, as well as variation In form and intensity. Also referred to as the'crime-conflict nexus'⁴ - understood as the extent to which armed conflict patterns and mechanisms shape post-war crime.⁵ The implications for international peace, cooperation, and development are significant as post-war crime, violence, and corruption produce insecurity. They endanger or undermine trust in fragile and incipient reform processes or they divert funds necessary for reconstruction and development either to private pockets or to different priorities such as to enforce security. The direct or indirect links and interactions between wartime and post-war violence are rarely visible and obvious. The same holds true for the relations between armed actors, criminal actors, and the state.⁶ This calls for a connected understanding of conflict and post-war periods as well as for the design of policies and monitoring mechanisms bridging both.

Post-war crime and war economies

This collection focuses on an understudied factor in shaping post-war crime: war economies. This encompasses the organisation and development of a society's legal and illegal resource flows in support or as a result of conflict and violence. In recent decades there has been a vibrant debate on war economies as a major explanatory factor for the onset, continuation, and transformation of dynamics of violence.⁷The link between war economies and post-war crime has been analysed mostly in relation to three aspects: (1) persistently low levels of state capacities regarding the regulation of violence and the provision of public goods; (2) the ongoing control of licit and illicit flows of resources and weapons by non-state armed actors; and (3) changing patterns of violence.⁸ Of course, these three elements are connected, suggesting a relationship of mutual reinforcement.

Institutional weakness

Regarding institutional weakness, it has been widely documented that both the formation of grievances and of illegal organisations is strongly related to the opportunity provided by domestic and international institutions incapable of, or unwilling to, respond to structural inequality and illicit markets. At the same time, it has been shown that conflict and crime further weaken existing state and development institutions.⁹This is reflected in the growth of military budgets to the detriment of investments in health, education, and infrastructure, as well as inertia in policy approaches or in practices developed during and in function of war. These practices are difficult to modify and adapt to changing circumstances. Not surprisingly, the literature on building sustainable peace tends to put state-building front and centre.¹⁰

Several articles in this collection illustrate the legacies of war-related institutional adaptations and particularities for post-war crime. Jayasundara-Smits,¹¹ for example, illustrates the links between war economies and current crime in Sri Lanka. Similarly,Thernnér¹² focuses on former command structures and their relation to the ongoing post-war drug trade in Liberia. Nussio¹³ addresses ongoing institutional incapacity as a source of recruitment for members of new criminal groups in Colombia. Finally, Cockayne¹⁴ provides a historical perspective to demonstrate that post-cold war conflicts have brought little that is new despite some of the claims made in the 'new war' debate.¹⁵ A look at the evolution of the Sicilian mafia illustrates how weak institutions and iilicit markets remain mutually dependent for generations.

Flow of licit and illicit resources

Weak resource governance not only accounts for the onset of violence, but also for the resilience of crime after war's end.¹⁶ Illicit markets thrive in and fuel conflict contexts, but also remain a challenge once formal fighting has ceased. They are difficult to dismantle, enduringly lucrative, and at the disposal of new actors once the previous controllers have demobilised. In addition, most illicit markets escape the control of and weaken domestic institutions, due to their shifting patterns as well as to international networks of weapons, drugs, and other resources. Demand arises mainly from beyond national borders. It has been shown that different forms of domestic crime and war-related violence depend on and are shaped by participation in international networks, as globalisation blurs the lines between the domestic and the international.¹⁷ However, attention to the role of international markets, governments, and networks is often only explored during war, and ceases at war's end. Yet, integration into international networks may intensify the impact of illicit resources on domestic stability, especially in the volatile contexts of transitional countries.¹⁸

In this collection, Vorrath's¹⁹ text on illicit economies and post-war crime in Liberia and Sierra Leone illustrates illicit markets' resilience and capacity to adapt, causing new sources of instability and unrest. Nussio²⁰ points to the ongoing drug trade as a critical point of vulnerability for the recently demobilised members of the Colombian FARC guerrilla. Masse and Le Billon ²¹ complement the look at the drug trade with a focus on illegal gold mining, also in Colombia. Kuhn²² tackles the seemingly intractable issue of land, and asks whether large-scale land acquisitions stimulate or dampen prospects of peace in post-war contexts.

Of course, the question of resources cannot be limited to tradeables alone and crime is not necessarily violent.²³ Corruption, or the use of public resources for private good, has also been analysed under the lens of war economies contributing to post-war crime. In any context, corruption erodes confidence, deviates resources, and affects institutional strengthening.²⁴ In the aftermath of war, these effects are a result of the windows of opportunity provided by the authority gap between the retreat of illegal groups and the slow and uncertain presence of state authorities, as well as by the inflow of domestic and international resources in institutionally weak contexts. This compromises the stability and progress of post-war societies....

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction: Understanding the relation between war economies and post-war crime
• 2. Can organised crime shape post-war transitions? Evidence from Sicily
• 3. What drives post-war crime? Evidence from illicit economies in Liberia and Sierra Leone
• 4. Commanding abuse or abusing command? Ex-command structures and drugs in Liberia
• 5. Lost in transition: linking war, war economy and post-war crime in Sri Lanka
• 6. Peacebuilding and white-collar crime in post-war natural resource sectors
• 7. Large-scale land acquisitions and violence in post-war societies
• 8. Gold mining in Colombia, post-war crime and the peace agreement with the FARC
• 9. Ex-combatants and violence in Colombia: are yesterday's villains today's principal threat?
• Index