![]()
1 Introduction
Sanjay Lodha, Suhas Palshikar and Sanjay Kumar
The spectacular triumph of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 16th Lok Sabha elections in 2014 gives us an opportunity to revisit the thesis of ‘normalization of the system of political competition’ in India. After the uncertain and unstable nature of coalition politics from 1989 to 1999, political competition in India gained a degree of stability from 1999. Three successive governments completed their full terms, namely the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government from 1999 to 2004 and the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) I and II from 2004 to 2014. Based on this experience, it was felt that a system of competition between the two fronts has stabilized in the polity, and notwithstanding the decline of the Congress, power will oscillate between the two alliances, one led by the Congress and the other by the BJP. In an emerging system, featured by the weakening of the Congress, states were looked upon as the principal arena of political contestation with various shades of competitive politics and two large and loose federal coalitions battling it out at the union level. The essential components of this ‘normalization’ were ‘ideological convergence’ between the principal contestants and also a settling down of their respective social support constituencies. ‘Inevitability of coalitions’ seemed to have become a deciding characteristic of governance system in India.1
As the country approached the 16th Lok Sabha elections in 2014, there was a general perception that a change of guard was a distinct possibility, and keeping the logic of coalition in perspective, an alliance led by the BJP was likely to assume power at the federal level. The Congress-led UPA II government was in a very shaky position due to a number of alleged scams and corruption deals as well as a popular perception of indecisive governance plaguing the system. In marked contrast to this was the positive picture of the BJP, which was brimming with confidence after the anointment of Narendra Modi as the prime ministerial candidate in September 2013. The first outcome of this sentiment was evidenced when the party won crucial assembly elections in a few major states in December 2013 defeating its principal opposition party, the Congress. The BJP retained power for the third successive period in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh, winning handsomely in both the states; it trounced the Congress in Rajasthan by securing more than four-fifths of the seats; the BJP also got maximum seats in Delhi where elections were held simultaneously. Its victory in the north-eastern state of Mizoram was a poor consolation for the Congress. These unexpectedly overwhelming victories were just the boost the BJP needed to place itself in the driver’s seat for the forthcoming general elections. More than that, these electoral successes established the primacy of Narendra Modi within the party, who was the principal campaigner for the BJP in these state assembly elections.
The outcome of the state assembly successes was the belief expressed in the election slogan Ab ki bar Modi Sarkar (this time Modi government). Arguably, this most vociferously used election slogan by the campaign managers of the BJP in the run-up to the 16th Lok Sabha elections sums up the content and context of the outcome of the elections. Ever since the declaration of Narendra Modi as the prime ministerial candidate of the BJP, one of the most high-profile and high-voltage election campaigns was initiated at the behest of some of the best individuals and agencies in the field. The prime ministerial candidate himself engaged in an unprecedented public relation drive addressing 437 public rallies across 25 states covering 3 lakh kilometres besides 1,350 rallies through 3D technology from September 2013 through the end of the campaigning period (The Times of India, 30 April 2014). Complementing the election blitzkrieg by Narendra Modi was the massive campaign launched by the ‘vote mobilizers’ of the extended Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh family and also the aggressive use of the audio-visual and print media. Together these had a tremendous impact on the electorate, which gave one of the most decisive mandates in a span of three decades. Besides, the impact of the sustained campaign on social media remains a critical factor to be investigated further.2
The mandate
Securing 31.1 per cent of the votes, BJP won 282 seats in the Lok Sabha, which was a clear majority of the total strength of the House. It added 12.3 per cent votes and 166 seats to its performance in 2009 elections. The allies of BJP, on their part, added another 7.2 per cent of votes contributing 54 seats, taking the final tally of the NDA to 336 in a House with a maximum strength of 543. Notable partners of the BJP included the Shiv Sena and a few smaller groups in Maharashtra, Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra Pradesh, Lok Janashakti Party and Rashtriya Lok Samata Party in Bihar, Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab and Apna Dal in Uttar Pradesh. For the first time since its inception, the BJP established itself as a party with nationwide influence. With a vote-seat multiplier of 1.67, the BJP bested the 1952 record of the Congress, which was 1.65. The magnitude of the 2014 mandate thus was truly dramatic and unexpected.
The party strongly consolidated its domination in the northern, central and western parts of the country. More than three-fourths of its total tally of 282 parliamentary seats came from these three regions. The staggering nature of BJP’s victory is further vindicated by the fact that the party won more than 50 per cent votes in 137 constituencies and more than 40 per cent votes in another 132 constituencies. In states marked by two-party political competition, the BJP captured 50 per cent of the total votes polled and cent percent seats in Rajasthan, Gujarat, Uttarakhand, Delhi and Himachal Pradesh. In Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Haryana and Jharkhand, the party emerged victorious in most of the places. Without belittling the significance of BJP’s resounding triumph in these states, we can argue that these have been the traditional strongholds of the BJP described as ‘primary states’ of the party’s influence.
What makes the mandate of 2014 Lok Sabha elections unusual as compared to previous elections is the remarkable outcome in states like Bihar, Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh, which together account for more than 30 per cent of the total seats in the Lok Sabha. A few of these states fall in the category of ‘secondary states’, where the influence of the BJP has been not as emphatic as it has been in the primary states. In these states which are featured by multi-party competition, the BJP in tandem with junior allies emerged triumphant in as many as four-fifths of the seats (146/168 seats). At the same time, benefitting from the support of its allies, the BJP performed well in states like Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. No less impressive was the performance of the party in states where till these elections, its presence was marginal and which falls in the category of ‘peripheral’ or ‘tertiary’ influence. Thus, it won a few seats and a large share of votes in states like Jammu and Kashmir (36.4% votes), West Bengal (16.8%), Assam (36.5%), Odisha (21.5%) and Kerala (11%). The BJP also expanded its influence in the north-eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland and Mizoram by winning seats and considerable support. It won all but one of the 14 seats in the seven union territories of the country. In states like Kerala, Odisha, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Telangana, the BJP raised its vote share although it could not win too many seats. It was only in Punjab that the party and its long-time ally, the Akali Dal, suffered a reverse, losing both votes and seats compared to the 2009 elections.
The 2014 outcome resulted in a severe setback for the oldest political party of India, the Congress. The party was reduced to its lowest tally of 44 seats, receiving only 19.3 per cent of the votes cast. It suffered an erosion of 9.3 per cent votes and a loss of as many as 162 seats over the 2009 election outcome. The humiliating defeat of the party is proved by the fact that it failed to open its account in 13 states and all the 7 union territories. Its debacle was a phenomenon experienced all over the country so much so that almost 40 per cent of the party’s official candidates forfeited their security deposits. Thus, the outcome of the 16th Lok Sabha elections has further consolidated the post-Congress polity in India. But the Congress is not the only party that was vanquished by the BJP onslaught. The political ‘untouchability’ of the party became evident as all its major allies suffered huge reverses in their respective states.
In a similar vein, the 2014 elections hardly changed the fortunes of the Left as the combined strength of the communist parties went below 5 per cent (4.83%) and their seat strength was reduced to 12 from 24 in 2009. The Samajwadi Party managed to win 5 seats in Uttar Pradesh but in the process lost 18 seats over its last performance. Even worse was the fate of the Bahujan Samaj Party which drew a cipher in Uttar Pradesh, suffering a loss of 21 seats since 2009. Thus, most of the regional political parties that contested against the BJP and its allies suffered heavy losses in parts of north and west India.
The only state-based political parties that showed enough resilience to check the BJP juggernaut were the Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Odisha, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) in Tamil Nadu, the Trinamool Congress (TMC) in West Bengal, the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) in Telangana and to some extent the newly formed Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) in Punjab. The BJD continued to hold its fort strongly in Odisha securing more than 44 per cent of the votes polled and winning 20 of the 21 seats. The AIADMK pocketed 37 of the 39 seats in Tamil Nadu wresting 44.27 per cent of the votes. The TRS secured nearly 35 per cent votes and 11 of the 17 seats. Contesting Lok Sabha elections for the first time, the AAP won four seats and nearly one-fourth of the votes polled in Punjab. But compared to its promise, the party achieved too little. The TMC in West Bengal again stumped all the other political parties, winning 34 of the 42 constituencies and almost 40 per cent of the votes. Together these states make an interesting analysis, as the state-based political parties zealously protected their spheres of influence. The BJP increased its vote share in most of these states, but the social alliances that it sought to cultivate were not strong enough to convert votes into seats.
Explaining the mandate
How does one explain the unprecedented outcome of the 16th Lok Sabha elections? What are the factors that contributed to the phenomenal victory of the BJP establishing it as a dominant national party of India? Why is it that the Congress was confronted with such a humiliating debacle? What strategies enabled some state-based political parties to thwart the ambitions of the BJP while some others failed to stop the rightist political party from spreading its influence in their strongholds?
There can never be a single-factor explanation of the mandate. A multiplicity of variables worked in tandem to unleash the final outcome. One cannot deny a strong anti-incumbency sentiment prevailing among the people against the poor performance of the UPA II government. There was double anti-incumbency in states where the Congress was in power. That the Congress had lost miserably in the assembly elections held in late 2013 in the states of Rajasthan, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh did not augur too well for the party. A series of scams and corrupt deals, inefficient delivery of welfare services, rise in the prices of essential commodities and an ineffective leadership worked together to make the central government extremely unpopular.
Sensing the anti-UPA mood of the people, the BJP put its best foot forward a little before the elections by projecting Narendra Modi as its prime ministerial candidate. This made the election plebiscitary in nature goading people to make a choice between two brands of leadership: Narendra Modi as a successful chief minister of ‘a model state’ on the one hand and Rahul Gandhi as a leader who had yet to establish his political and administrative credentials. The two leaders had diametrically opposite impact on their respective party machineries. Narendra Modi, helped by a very effective publicity campaign, infused fresh blood in the BJP cadre and various organizations of the Sangh Parivar, making it a high-voltage election campaign all over the country. The Congress, on the other hand, lacked a popular face that could carry the party workers together and establish a rapport with the people. As campaigning progressed, the gap between the two leaders and their political parties became wider, making it an unequal race. The BJP presented a better and credible alternative to the Congress. Its state governments were perceived as better performers than Congress-led governments; the party had a better organizational machinery and a political programme that appeared to be vigorous, and above all these was the dynamic leadership of Narendra Modi, who could galvanize people by his oratorical skills infusing hopes and aspirations. The slogan achhe din anne waale hain (good days are about to come) jelled well with the electorate. Another campaign ploy that enabled Modi to reach out to people through 3D projection was the chai pe charcha (chat over a cup of tea) programme. The Congress had no convincing answers to these electoral strategies of the BJP. Over the years and especially since the smooth running of the NDA government from 1999 to 2004, as an organization the BJP had clearly understood the logic of expanding its social base from a political party dependent on upper castes and urban-based rich class to the socially backward and underprivileged groups. Its majoritarian framework was held sacrosanct to keep its traditional vote bank intact. But to reach out to the other backward classes (OBCs), the party successfully crafted out new social coalitions through promises of protective discrimination and policy mechanisms. Within its organization, a new set of leaders who belonged to lesser social groups were accommodated. To include the Dalits under its umbrella, the party changed its stance towards the biggest Dalit icon of India, that is Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. No one could have been a better craftsman to do this than Narendra Modi, who discovered his backward class roots during the parliamentary election. He encashed this fact utmost in all his election rallies in different parts of the country. Social justice became a favourite election issue for Modi and his party men. These election ploys helped the party in clinging on to its traditional vote bank while reaching out to new social groups among the backwards, Dalits and the tribals.
Narendra Modi’s rich experience of developmental politics in the state of Gujarat enabled the BJP to make use of the development card to enlist the support of a growing class of Indians, mostly youth who wanted to benefit from the triumvirate of liberalization, privatization and globalization. For the youth and the middle class, Gujarat was a model of industrial growth as well as in trade, business and the service sector. Not only this, the corporate houses were also impressed by Modi’s no-nonsense approach while dealing with the bureaucracy to push industrial development. All this was in stark contrast to the halting and half-hearted approach of the UPA II government. The promise of unencumbered development and infrastructural growth attracted a whole section of the urban middle class and youth who needed job opportunities and business facilities. This pro-market, pro-industry image of Modi was bank-rolled by the rich corporate houses which had vested designs to benefit from a pro-corporate government. He soon became the first choice of the corporate-driven media as well, receiving maximum coverage.
Thus, the BJP under the stewardship of Narendra Modi had something to offer to everyone. Neither the Congress nor any other political force was in a condition to match this package and its brand ambassador. The media for a long time had nothing like this to capture. All its arms lapped up Narendra Modi and his campaign trail, making him a heavy draw across the length and breadth of the subcontinent. In the event, the mandate was obvious.
Impact of the mandate
The question that confronts us now is, how has the 2014 mandate changed the nature of competitive politics in India? Is the advent of the BJP as a dominant national political party going to be a long-term feature? With this landslide victory of the BJP, will the coalition era come to an end? Are we truly in a post-Congress polity, with the Congress possessing no chance of reviving its standing as the central pole of political contest in India? What will happen now to the prognosis that politics at the state level determines the nature of political competition in India? A long list of such questions can be raised by a keen student of Indian politics.
We cannot dispute the fact that the Congress is long past its prime and its leadership today has hardly evinced any vision that may resurrect the party. The party appears to be short of innovative ideas and any concrete game plan to counter the BJP. Events and elections since 2014 hustings have at best allowed the Congress to play the role of a second or even third fiddle to regional forces. The BJP, enjoying power in the centre and in a number of states, is the pivot around which alliances and counter-coalitions are emerging. It is now looked upon as the ‘system-defining party’. The party has to deliver its promises to disprove the perception that it is easy to win elections in India but difficult to govern. The party has had mixed fortunes in different elections held since 2014 general elections. It suffered humiliating reverses in Delhi and Bihar but did well in Maharashtra, Haryana and Assam. Taking on from the Lok Sabha performance, the party has further expanded its influence in the states of Kerala, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu where assembly elections were held during April–May 2016. It has pushed the Congress to isolated pockets of India and seeks to achieve Congress -mukt Bharat or ‘India free from Congress’. However, the other mission of the BJP to have kshetriya dal mukt Bharat or ‘India free from regional parties’ appears to be a distant dream at present.
About this volume
The outcome of the 16th Lok Sabha elections has received considerable academic attention both at national and at international levels. There have been significant journalistic interventions (Khare 2014; Sardesai 2014) besides academic analyses of BJP victory and the electoral rout of the Congress and its partners (Krishna and Laxman 2014; Varshney 2014; Wallace 2015). The present volume is a humble addition to this list of academic interpretations of 2014. Given the importance of the 2014 elections and the long-term impact that the outcome is likely to have, it is only natural that many analytical works would come out explaining the elections of 2014.
This growing literature on the 2014 elections would still leave us with some curiosity and some discomfort. Curiosity is about how the BJP staged major electoral upsets in states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra. One also wonders as to why despite best efforts and consequent expansion of political influence in states such as West Bengal, Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Odisha, the BJP could not do too well in terms of winning a respectable number of parliamentary seats. At the same time, the discomfort is that although literature has given space to factors such as leadership, support of youth, middle class, media and locality in crafting the BJP success, most of the explanations are not rooted in empirical evidence. Finally, there is als...
