Strategic Interests in the Middle East

Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy

Jack Covarrubias, Tom Lansford

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9780754670339
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351897761
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

As a cultural centre for Islamic interests across the world and as a focus point for increasing levels of economic and security interdependence, the Middle East remains a stage on which international politics will be played for the foreseeable future. This comprehensive study looks at the important international and regional actors and their interaction with, and reaction to, US foreign policy toward the region. The volume elucidates the trends in great power interest and interaction in the Middle East and studies the impact of the United States as the region's foremost military power. It highlights the changing nature of actors' relationships with the US and each other as their interests and policies evolve in response to changes in the region. Scholars, graduate and undergraduate students and the interested public will find this volume a useful guide and an ideal companion work for courses on the Middle East, US foreign policy and international security issues.

SECTION I
Europe and the US in the Middle East

Chapter 1
Britain and the Middle East: In Pursuit of Eternal Interests

Mark Sedgwick

“The national interest is clearly defined by the government”

—Sir Steven Wall, ca 2005

“We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

—Lord Palmerston, ca 1848

Two broad interests have dominated Britain's approach to the Middle East from the colonial era to the current day, and most likely they will continue to do so for decades to come: the control of oil and the desire for regional stability. However, cursory research into the contours of the United Kingdom's foreign policy towards the region reveals a variety of other “interests” that either encourage, temper, or conflict with the two time-honored, overarching goals concerning oil and stability. If ensuring the free flow of oil and keeping regional instability to a minimum are Britain's primary interests in the Middle East, where do other “interests”—such as generating political and economic reform in the region—fit into the grand scheme of UK foreign policy?

Guided by the premise that both exogenous and endogenous factors influence the definition of interests as defined here, the goal of this chapter is to look both outside and inside the “black box” of the state in order to examine what factors shape UK interests in the Middle East. First, however, understanding which actors make British foreign policy and what forces are at play is the goal of the next section.

The Architects of British Policy

Both formal and informal factors have animated the institutional actors whose combined activities have produced British foreign policy. Such formal factors have included the bureaucratic structure, institutional mindset, and leadership of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), other pertinent ministries (i.e., Treasury, Ministry of Defence, Board of Trade, and various intelligence services), the Prime Minister's office, and the Cabinet. Parliaments have put their mark on foreign policy formation as well. John Young has also pointed to particular values prevalent in British policy making circles that stress defense of liberal democracy, the rights of individuals, and property rights. Mingled with these altruistic notions are those that are perhaps more self-serving, for instance, the drive for prestige on the world stage (not unlike the post-colonial French fixation on rank and grandeur) and belief in the efficacy of British pragmatism.¹

Many a pundit and quite a few academics have posed the rhetorical question: Who makes Britain's foreign policy? Despite John Young's depiction of a host of critical actors, the short answer to this question is that today the Office of the Prime Minister has usurped the job of foreign policymaking, with the Foreign Office and Parliament trailing behind. Critics of the Blair Government have even accused the Prime Minister of introducing presidentialism to British politics, whereby 10 Downing Street makes major policy decisions with little oversight from the legislative body, and creates a serious point of friction between Parliament and the Prime Minister.² Likewise, observers have noted that even in the relationship between the Cabinet and the Prime Minister's office, department heads—such as the Foreign Secretary—tend to protect their departmental independence while the PM and his staff strive to centralize the making of foreign policy in a way that maximizes executive autonomy. The resulting contest between various parts of Government leads to, what Paul Williams has called, “multiple foreign policies,” where the government uses varying combinations of actors, institutions, and external leverage devices while pursuing several—sometimes contradictory—policy paths simultaneously.³

Traditional British Interests

From the Colonial Era through the end of the Second World War, the UK favored a balance of global power in order to achieve the goal of international stability. In the minds of British statesmen, stability made it easier to protect the homeland and the Commonwealth, as well as to ensure continued economic prosperity. The use of British military and commercial power was understood as appropriate to protect Britain's global “prestige, markets, strategic outposts, and lines of communication.”⁴ Gaynor Johnson has pointed out that the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was the most consistent advocate of balance of power politics and the strategy of limited involvement, the preferred means by which to ensure Britain's vested interests in the period leading up to the Second World War.⁵

It is possible to compile a broad list of UK foreign policy goals for the period immediately following the end of the Second World War that is equally applicable to the present day. One goal was to stimulate economic growth through protection and expansion of trade. Another set of goals was to secure global interests, protect the near abroad, and cultivate strategic alliances. A final goal was to manage integration in an increasingly integrated world. This refers to cultivation of—and dedication to—a rules-based international order built upon law, institutions, and other fora that demand increasing levels of cooperation between states. Under this heading falls Britain's membership in, for instance, the European Union and NATO. Based on the imperatives generated by these overarching foreign policy goals, the UK found the promotion of peace and stability—rooted in non-interventionist beliefs—a public good that not only appealed to an international audience, but also served narrow British interests as well.⁶ Before delving into a discussion of current British interests in the Middle East, however, it is helpful to become acquainted with the history of the UK's interests there.

Britain's Middle Eastern Interests: an Historical Overview

After the First World War, British statesmen favored territorial expansion in order to provide greater security for the Empire. The downside of expansion was an increase in both commitments and potential problems—the experience in the Middle East highlighted this caveat. Even in the 1920s, British officials were concerned that their administration in the region could cause an Islamic counter-revolution capable of spreading all the way to Muslim populations in British India (the Punjab). Decades later, Churchill saw that the Middle East was vital to securing Britain's war aims, and would become increasingly important to Britain after the Second World War for both strategic and economic reasons. The British decision to grant independence to India in 1947—a major step on the road to decolonization—had the ironic effect of causing Britain to perceive the Middle East as more important to the last vestiges of empire than ever. Its military bases in the region allowed it to simultaneously project British power and thwart Soviet expansion. Part of Britain's security plan for the region included guarantees to Gulf States such as Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain, although Egypt, home to the largest collection of British military assets outside of Europe, continued to be the center of Britain's focus.⁷ After the Second World War, British interests in the Middle East became increasingly intertwined with American interests.

In the immediate post-war era, British policymakers placed great emphasis on the Middle East since it appeared the region was the last piece of the old empire where British influence remained relatively strong. Despite the philosophical divisions between the two countries caused by the UK's reluctance to give up the remnants of colonialism—especially the UK's self-fabricated favored trading status in the region—Britain and the US produced joint statements that indicated the “the objectives of the two countries [in the Middle East] were identical.”⁸ These objectives took into account British interests from the past—unfettered access to the Suez Canal; the fundamental nature of oil financially, strategically, politically, and militarily; and protection of commercial interests in banking, insurance, and mining—as well as new goals, such as the deterrence of communism. To ensure their common interests and promote regional prosperity, both states sought to maintain regional stability. Meanwhile, the rising threat of communist expansion—assessed with greater apprehension in Washington than in London—made oil more important to foreign policy strategists than ever. In addition to making sure their access to Middle Eastern oil was guaranteed, US and British officials wanted to deny the Soviet Union access to it.⁹

Strategic cooperation between Her Majesty's Government and British oil companies was an ingredient of UK foreign policy as well, and nowhere was this more evident than in Iran. Britain refused to accept its loss of control over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) after Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized that entity in 1952. In the early days of the Eisenhower administration, the British appealed to the new president to help topple Mossadegh because of the Iranian leader's supposed communist sympathies. Examining the result of Operation Ajax, the covert coup staged by the British and Americans that brought down Mossadegh's Government, one finds a sterling example of the US ascending the ladder of Middle Eastern hegemonic pre-eminence while Britain was descending. On the one hand, the coup appeared to produce an outcome in line with Britain's desires, since Mossadegh had been eliminated and the Westward-leaning Shah was returned to power. On the other hand, US oil companies ended up winning major concessions when the Shah allowed new oil contract negotiations. The end result of the joint intervention was that the UK experienced a net loss of access to Iranian oil.¹⁰

A general consensus among historians is that the Suez Crisis, which occurred later in the Eisenhower era, taught Britain that it could not afford to affront directly US preferences in the region, and that its post-colonial aspirations of exercising significant power in the Middle East would not be realized.¹¹ However, the US relied on at least partial British management of the region up to—and even after—the Labor government started withdrawal of its military from the area in 1968.¹² Even though the British willingly chose to reduce their obligations in the Middle East, they still had interests in the region that necessitated ongoing concern and management. Naturally, Britain's leaders wanted to retain as much i...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• PART I Europe and the US in the Middle East
• PART II The Far East and the US in the Middle East
• PART III The Middle East and the US
• PART IV International Organizations and the US in the Middle East
• Index