In Dialogue with the Greeks

Volume II: Plato and Dialectic

Rush Rhees, D.Z. Phillips

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9780754639893
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351964548
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This second of two volumes on the Greeks by Rush Rhees takes up the questions bequeathed by the previous volume. If reality does not have the unity of a thing, can it have any kind of unity at all? The alternative seems to be that reality has the unity of a form. In this volume Rhees brings the perspective of a modern Wittgensteinian philosopher to bear on the dialogues of Plato. In his treatment of the Georgias and the Symposium Rhees emphasizes Socrates' claim that it is important to seek understanding although one cannot say, in the form of a theory or philosophical thesis, what that understanding amounts to. In considering the Phaedo, Theaetetus, Parmenides and Timaeus, Rhees pursues these questions in a way which relates them to live issues concerning the relation between logic and discourse. Rhees shows that Plato's Forms can neither be thought of by analogy with 'ultimate' particles in physics, nor as fixed concepts that determine what can and cannot be said. Finally, D. Z. Phillips includes two treatments by Rhees of the Republic separated by fifteen years. In the first he criticises Plato for a fixed view that an order predetermines and makes possible growth in understanding, showing how this is the very antithesis of growth. In the second he returns to the tension in Plato's thought between 'answerability to reality' and the view that understanding and growth can only be achieved through a seeking in dialogue. Rhees concludes that language is not a collection of isolated games, rather we speak in the course of lives that we lead and what we say has its meaning from the place it occupies in the course of a life.

PART 1
GORGIAS

Chapter1

Rhetoric and Discourse¹

Why does Socrates ask about rhetoric? It is easy to speculate on various reasons Socrates might have had. But the first question is, what kind of question is he asking? What is he trying to find out? Socrates and Plato cannot have meant that there is anything wrong in trying to speak forcefully or persuasively – in conversations, for instance. They cannot have suggested that you should always give clear reasons or proofs of what you say, or even that you should be able to.

It might be said that Socrates asks what rhetoric is in order that he might show its inadequacy. In other words, his question was not genuine. But I think it was. Could Gorgias say what it is that he is teaching? What is the relation between the use of speech and understanding? Can anyone gain an understanding of speaking without understanding the subject on which he is speaking?

The objection is to rhetoric as a technê on its own account: speaking without conviction, speaking only for effect, as if what were important were the assent or approval, and not what is being said.

Suppose someone said: ‘Cookery is not an art at all.’ He would not mean that there is no difference between a good cook and an incompetent one, or someone who cannot cook at all. Nor could he deny that cookery has to be learned. The point is in the comparison with medicine, and so with the conception of an art of treating people. And there seem to be no rules which will ensure that cookery will be successful from this angle.

The point was that rhetoric had been praised as a way of influencing people. Socrates’ point is that there is no technique of that sort of influence. Both with cookery and with rhetoric you can ask whether it ‘goes down’. There is no genuine technique of giving the people what they want. This is connected with the general question whether it is a mark of intelligence if you are able to do, or get, what you like. (Compare: Republic; compare also the Greek fear of ridicule.)

Can there be a study or consideration of great oratory apart from the question of whether it is illuminating, or shows concern for the good of those who hear it? – the oratory of Pericles or Burke; the difference between what is great and what is cheap. But it does not seem possible to divorce the ‘art of oratory’ from what is said. That is the point of the Phaedrus, where the idea was that a discourse could be just as ‘skilful’ no matter what the subject. Socrates’ point here is that this is no real skill. Rhetoric as a technê, no matter how brilliant the mastery of it, does not show intelligence.

By the same token, there is no skill, or art, or craft of persuading people. The difference between good or bad journalism is not on those lines. Perhaps the nearest thing to it is advertising. This goes with the further point that ‘any true skill or craft is concerned with the perfection of what it studies’. And there is no art or skill of selfadvancement or self-aggrandisement.

I imagine that this is where Callicles goes wrong. There is a case for the defiance of law and convention, and their association with mediocrity, timidity, and general philistinism: ‘Everybody ought to have the same’; ‘These people ought to be made to toe the line’. And there is a case for saying that this shows greater intelligence. But you confuse the issue if you make it a matter of doing better what everyone else would like to do if they could. There is the confused idea of ‘gratifying desire’, as if ‘gratification’ were some common stuff which could be compared or measured. This is the still more confused idea of cultivating desires for the sake of gratifying them.

But Socrates’ case for ‘discipline’ is not much better. It is true that discipline is important in connection with almost any serious project on which you may be engaged. But this does not suggest that ‘discipline in one’s life’ means much. The argument in favour of ‘lasting satisfaction’ makes it, in reality, servile – a case of bartering pleasures. ‘Conforming to convention’, ‘Conforming to morality’ – the important point is that with goodness, knowledge and understanding, it cannot be a matter of conforming. If you say simply that the art of ‘pleasing people’ is not a genuine art because it is concerned with pleasing, and not with what is good or ill, this is not a reason at all. You need to consider why there cannot be a technique of this sort. It is not a question of whether it would be a reputable one or not.

In the Gorgias Plato is asking two questions which he thinks are closely related: is life a technê? Is discourse a technê? Socrates is raising difficulties about speaking of discourse in general. ‘What discourse?’ There is no such thing as the ‘art of speaking’ in general, as though this would do for any subject matter whatsoever. There are not any general principles of language in this sense.

For any general consideration of discourse you have to bring it into connection with understanding, just as learning to speak is learning to understand and learning to make yourself understood. Learning what it makes sense to say.

The notion of sham discourse is connected with the question of what discussion is, and in this way with what investigation is and what learning is (seeking an answer, seeking understanding).

Pseudo-discussion: why is there something false about the disputant who is unwilling to admit that there is something he does not understand, or does not know? It is connected with the kind of evil Socrates took himself to be combating: ignorance of one’s own ignorance. And for Socrates this is also connected with love. Compare the Christian conception of the evil of a man without charity. Phariseeism makes charity impossible: therein lies its evil. For Socrates, to be incapable of love and charity is to be incapable of learning. If you know all the answers, know how things have to go, you will be incapable of charity. As Heraclitus said, unless they expect the unexpected, they will never learn. They will live in a world of their own. To talk to such a pseudodisputant is like talking, in Heraclitus’ terms, to one who is asleep.

The ‘being without love’ which Socrates would have emphasised was a being without love of the subject, or without love of learning. The sham culture which goes with this is no accident. This is shown in the discussion with Callicles – the difference between seeking learning and seeking ‘satisfaction’ or pleasure, even when the latter is combined with what seems, at any rate, like sincerity and determination to have a life which was genuine and without sham.

Socrates argues that there is something wrong with this sincerity, that it was a false sincerity, and that even here Callicles is deceiving himself as long as it has a self-centredness which prevents him from recognising his own ignorance. This is what is wrong with any idea that you can foster the growth of understanding, or further learning, in terms of seeking ‘satisfaction’, or seeking ‘pleasure’.

Why is there ignorance and deception in seeking to satisfy the desire which is uppermost? Why should one heed Heraclitus and replace this desire by understanding? Socrates would say that Callicles was deceived in thinking that this desire is his. He does not recognise what he is seeking in his desires. For example, he does not realise that he distinguishes between good and bad pleasures.

In this way, sophistry went together with a kind of ignorance. Plato has reasons for calling this a distrust of discourse. A distrust of discourse is a distrust of reason. The self-deception in the Sophists is in their conviction that they were trusting reason, argument and discussion in thinking that discourse could be treated as a reliable instrument. (Polus and company.)

Plato is recognising the way in which the practice of apparent reasoning and discussion can corrupt. The anti-intellectualism which some people adopt just because they believe that the intellect and discussion lead to counterfeit and sham.

How would you teach someone or show him that he is ignorant of his own ignorance, especially when you know that you are ignorant of any answers here yourself? Or again, what would you take as a sign that a man was aware of his own ignorance? Perhaps: that he is ready to discuss. The Gorgias emphasises the readiness to submit oneself to examination.

The distinction between genuine discourse and sham discourse is suggested by the example of the rhetorician who could speak convincingly about medicine only when his hearers did not understand the subject. Consider the difference between being convinced by a rhetorician and learning from an explanation or a discussion.

Rhetoric appeals to prejudices. For example, the appeal to numbers; Polus’ appeal: ‘Ask anyone, am I not right?’, Callicles’ reference to certain views as ‘unworthy of mature men’. Again, ‘If you hold that view, you are courting disaster.’ Or, ‘Plato’s views may have been all right in his day, but they hardly commend themselves to the modern mind’ – without saying what is wrong with them. Polus asserts that the value of rhetoric is not that it leads to a knowledge of justice, or a better understanding of it, or that it enables a man to secure justice, but that it enables a man to secure power. Any art which helps a man to power is more valuable than anything else.

For Plato, to enquire into the nature of reality is to enquire into the reality of discourse. Someone may say: ‘I am not puzzled about language. I am puzzled about reality. I do not so much care whether there be language or not.’ But being ‘puzzled about reality’ (compare ‘What is real?’ ‘What is ultimate reality?’) is not like wondering what physical objects are here or there, or wondering whether the sewer goes underground, or wondering whether there is water between where I stand now and the mountain. It is not a question I can answer by going and looking, nor by performing an experiment. And if there is reality or illusion in our ideas of things, this is not like mistaking one physical object for another, mistaking a mirage for water, or a tree for an animal.

Plato wants to bring out the difference between persuasion, producing opinion, and teaching. Gorgias claims to be a teacher. Socrates seemed to think that rhetoric or oratory ought to be used for teaching. This would be one reason for insisting that the proper sense of it requires understanding of what you are saying, but also, for example, understanding the difference between a genuine reason and a sham one. Understanding involves reflection on the difference between opinion and knowledge. (Incidentally, would the historical Socrates have supposed you could teach by oratory? It seems to be part of Plato’s puzzlement about the role of a statesman, and the relation between politics and philosophy.) Compare the later view of the way in which a demagogue misuses language or discussion. Using the methods of persuasion is contrasted with submitting oneself to examination in discussion. Compare the objections to Socrates because he criticised.

The transition to a discussion of justice as the administration of the law may seem puzzling in the dialogue. The administration of the law is taken at first, anyway, to be a genuine art. What is the relation between administering this art and living justly? Prima facie it would seem that the first could be done justly without one’s own life being just. Socrates would deny this, and to understand why, one must remember his attitude to law as expressed in the Crito. The importance of language in the relations between people is, in a sense, what the dialogue is about.

Sham and falsity in the use of language and discussion must lead to a falsity between people. In particular, it prevents them from learning from one another. And in this way it prevents the growth of justice and understanding. Undermining discussion of the megista, the greatest things, is particularly harmful.

The relation between politics and teaching, the relation between politics and living justly, the conception of the care of the soul (which is philosophy) as politikê – all this goes with the point that understanding does not come to man alone, which means, partly, that it comes through discussion. But Plato recognised the limited conditions under which discussion is possible. This was emphasised by Socrates’ fate, and was one reason for his linking of philosophy and politics. In a more important sense, you cannot understand life, you cannot understand your own problems, without some understanding of the lives of other people. This is connected with the question of what sort of life is worth living. It may be that we cannot seek any one answer to this; but if the question is thought to have no sense, this leads to a decline in communication. It is questions of this kind that make it possible for discourse to have sense, no less than for life to have sense. In fact, they are much the same question.

You might say that in the Crito Socrates recognises a certain relativity in the conception of justice, since, presumably, anyone must depend on the laws under which he was brought up for his understanding of it. Thus a Persian’s conception may be different from an Athenian’s. Similarly with regard to arguments and methods of discussion. This means that what you learn from the laws and from discussion will be limited. Yet it does not mean that you simply learn from the laws what the legal customs are, nor that from discussions you simply learn how people speak. The teachings of the Sophists pretended to give understanding of the customs and ways of the city. What you can learn from these, allegedly, is a sense of knowing how to use them to your own advantage. Socrates’ contention is that this cannot be taught, since it depends on seeming to act in a way that brings popular approval, which means, again, the art of pleasing people. The Sophists were taking the soul, the seriousness, out of the community, as they did out of discussion and out of education.

Plato would argue that both discourse and law are rooted in something deep in the lives of men (aspiration towards the good). And in that I think he was right. Certainly, ‘wish for domination’ could not explain either of them. Plato recognised the possibility of misusing justice, hence his repeated distinction between being just and seeming to be just. At the beginning of the Republic, Book II, he speaks of those who have the reputation for justice and practise injustice. There is the view of justice as a kind of hindrance which is accepted as a lesser evil. ‘No man would choose injustice on its own account.’ (Compare: ‘No man does evil voluntarily.’) Contrast this with: ‘Better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice’.

Must we then understand what justice is in itself, without qualification? Do we need an unqualified distinction between justice and injustice before we can see or show that justice is to be preferred on its own account? Socrates does not adopt this method in his discussion with Callicles. In the Republic it is not clear that he thinks this aim of ‘saying what justice is’ could ever be achieved. There is always the difficulty or danger of accepting the current views of justice as the nearest approximation we can get. Compare Protagoras’ claim that we cannot say what ‘being’ is in itself, nor what logos is either. None can judge except within his own feelings, his own customs, his own ideas.

Socrates, it may be thought, does not distinguish between ‘end’ and ‘means’ in the sense that he does not seem to have thought of a separate study of the means of achieving or living a just life, once the nature of the just life itself was clear. But I doubt if he thought this, that the notion of a just life was clear or complete. Rather, it was something which one had continually to learn. Each new problem had to be solved anew. The answers to earlier ones do not provide an answer. In the Gorgias, in discussing suffering injustice and committing injustice, he does not seek to provide a measure by which one could decide when one was suffering injustice or when one was committing injustice.

The emphasis, rather, is on methods of enquiry into the distinction between reality and illusion. This is characteristic of en tois logois skepsis (enquiry into discourse). The counterfeit technai are rejected because they are connected with what is ‘contradictory’, with something where it makes no sense to speak of reaching the right answer. Hence the speech in the Phaedo against ‘misology’. Discussion is the only way of guarding against ‘the lie in the soul’; testing your opinion against the opinions of others, and so against the opinions which you yourself hold. One of the evils which come from the teaching and practice of rhetoric as Gorgias and his pupils took it was that more and more people were not taken in by ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part 1 Gorgias
• Part 2 Symposium
• Part 3 Phaedo
• Part 4 Republic
• Part 5 Parmenides
• Part 6 Theaetetus
• Part 7 Sophist
• Part 8 Timaeus
• Index