1 The Plight of Minorities in the Middle East
The Underlying Institutional and Ideological Causes
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
āW. B. Yeats
The Arab Spring did not deliver on its initial promises: rosy dreams of a new and democratic Middle East have faded into oblivion for now. Yet one of the very few virtues of the Arab Spring has been the shining of light on the predicament of minorities. The sweeping changes all across the region were bound to have a deep impact on minorities, who are the most susceptible to the current turbulence. One of the gravest deficiencies of the Arab Spring is its failure to address the enduring question of minoritiesāthe Shiāa, Alawites, Druze, Christians, Kurds, Yazidis, Zaydis, and others. Instead of ushering in a new era of democracy and inclusive politics, the Arab Spring has brought chaos and reinforced the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism by injecting new blood into what seemed like the ossified veins of a decaying ideology.
Revolutions across the Arab world created new fears and exacerbated older ones among several minority groups. Initially, minorities entertained some hope for change, but as the upheavals progressed, those hopes vanished. In this book, I take up the question of minorities in the region, examine the roots of their communal fears, and analyze their attitudes toward the Arab Spring, showing how each minority either availed itself of opportunities the Arab Spring presented or suffered further from the risks it posed. I examine such questions as: How did various minorities react to revolutions? What strategies did they use to deal with the shattering upheavals? And above all, what are the deeper institutional and ideological causes underlying their enduring plight and their relationship with the majority?
Why Study Minorities?
Why research the fate of minorities in the region when the majority is suffering even more? Why make a big deal of a car explosion in a Christian neighborhood in Damascus or of the murder of twenty or so Druze civilians in Qalb-al-Lawzah village in Idlib, when tens of thousands of Sunni Muslims have been killed and millions more have been displaced? I focus on minorities for the simple reason that they are targeted precisely because they are minorities. Stakes for minorities in this region are existential: whereas majorities might suffer, minorities could potentially vanish. Whoever targeted the tiny Druze community in Syria did it for sectarian or religious reasons rather than political expediency. From a purely pragmatic perspective, the rebels should never target minorities since they could be potential allies in a common cause. But ideology and passions in this case trump rational calculations. In hindsight, targeting the tiny Yazidi community in Iraq, for example, looks like a disastrous move on the part of ISIS, which brought their enemies together and triggered direct military intervention. Missing from this analysis, however, is the fact that the Yazidis were not targeted for utilitarian purposes but rather for their religious beliefs and cultural identity. Massacring, enslaving, and coercively converting the Yazidi community fulfilled ideological fantasies, produced psychological satisfaction, and endowed ISIS with a sense of Islamist omnipotence. The same logic applies to the persecution of Copts, Assyrians, Shiāa, Zaydis, and others.
Furthermore, minorities are indispensable for the survival of pluralism and diversity in this embattled region. The fate of minorities during and after the revolutionary upheavals is a measure of the decency of the revolutions and a sure sign of their political trajectory. As the Lebanese scholar and human rights activist Habib Malik put it, ā[i]t would be supremely ironic as well as historically tragic if the movements currently underway to liberate the Arab peoples from tyrannical rule were in some twisted fashion to result in a curtailing of freedom of religion for precisely those groups whose presence in the region offers hope for sustained pluralism and communal diversity.ā1
The third reason is that conflict between majority and minority populations is a major fault line in countries currently afflicted by revolution. In Syria, it is the Alawites, Druze, Christians, and other minorities versus the Sunni majority. In Bahrain, it is the ruling Sunni minority versus the aggrieved Shiite majority. In Iraq, it is the Shiite majority versus a rebellious Sunni minority. In Yemen, while keeping all its complexities in mind, it is the Zaydi minority versus the Sunni majority. Although Egypt is not necessarily on the cusp of civil war, the Arab Spring and the subsequent upheavals uncovered how vulnerable the Coptic minority is. Tunisia, so far a success story, and Libya, a failed state, are the only countries where rifts were not aligned along majority/minority divides. Finally and equally important, the repercussions of the upheavals significantly sharpened minority/majority discord in other countries, particularly in Lebanon and in the Gulf region.
I contend that three deep social and political factors underpin the predicament of minorities and their political behavior: the persistent nation-state crisis; the bleak ideological landscape prevailing in the region; and hostile majority/minority dynamics. First, the entire region suffers from a nationhood crisis that has bedeviled it since the Sykes-Picot Agreements. Territorial entities that were created do not reflect the sentiments and loyalties of the population inhabiting those entities. Core questions of national identity and national boundaries have been left unresolved. Deeply entrenched ethnic, religious, and sectarian fault lines remain a powerful source of loyalty and identification. States in the region have failed in establishing an all-inclusive national identity that recognizes difference and diversity. This failure leaves minorities more vulnerable as it invites and stimulates majoritarian transnational ideologies. Furthermore, contrary to stereotypical depictions of the region as Arab-Islamic, the Middle East and North Africa are a showcase of diversity of ethnicities, religions, and sects. Research shows that diversity takes a toll on the prospects of democratization, as political groups dig in along sectarian lines.2 This is especially true in a post-revolution era of uncertainty and turbulence.
Second, the landscape of political ideologies is notable for its bleakness: the decay of secular nationalism; the weakness of liberal forces; the feebleness of the left; and the hegemony of Islamic fundamentalismāin both its moderate and radical varieties. Islamic fundamentalism, which proved to be the most potent political and ideological force in the region, provokes fears of majoritarian rule among minorities. At any rate, Islam has not resolved the question of minorities and the hegemony of political Islam, particularly its currently prevalent and vociferous reactionary form, inflames minoritiesā fears of communal victimization and oppression.
Third, given this institutional and ideational context, majority/minority dynamics generate mutual distrust. Variation in the numerical status generates variations in expectations, discourses, self-narratives, and political objectives of both groups. A numerical majority is structurally favored to become a dominant group whereas minorities are destined to accept their numerically inferior position and the concessions that come with it. In times of crises and decline, majorities find minorities a suitable target for the projection of their hatreds and fears. Those projections become even more intense when minorities are linked to a previous trauma that struck the majority. Majorities tend to view minorities, especially those who have demands, in a hostile manner and as an obstacle to the realization of their ultimate goals. Minorities favor multiculturalism, which permits them to preserve their unique culture and identity, whereas majorities prefer integration, assimilation, or submission.
The weakness of the idea of the nation-state, the fluidity of state borders, and the lack of a coherent national identity has made the region susceptible to minority-threatening transnational ideologies, particularly Islamic fundamentalism. A bleak ideational landscape has prevailed in the region: secular pan-Arabism has long faded away, liberalism discredited itself with the compromises it made, and leftist and socialist movements have achieved marginal gains at best. In that vacuum of power, Islamic fundamentalism has stepped up. With the rise of fundamentalist movements, it shouldnāt be surprising that the faith of minority populations in the revolutionary upheavals was slim. Indeed, the trajectory that the revolutions quickly took vindicated minoritiesā suspicions and fears.
Opportunities and Risks: The Historical Record
Revolutions created uncertainty and fear of the future but also provided opportunities for minorities to assert themselves, to voice their anxieties, and to search for a place in the emerging Middle East. This duality characterized the attitudes of minorities and shaped their coping strategies in the wake of the Arab Spring.
Revolutions, as Arno J. Mayer eloquently maintained, are fraught with contradictions as they evoke āliberation and oppression; salvation and damnation; hope and disillusion.ā3 Minoritiesā attitudes should not be taken for granted given that revolutionary outcomes could either benefit or harm them. History provides many examples of revolutions that favored minorities and others that affected their standing. It is thus easy to understand the ambivalence with which most minority populations view the idea of revolution.
Not all revolutions stir minoritiesā fears of oppression or evoke memories of terrible times: some do indeed improve the status of minorities by integrating them into the polity and granting them full rights. Revolutions create opportunities, especially for those minorities that have historically suffered from discrimination and persecution. This should hold particularly true in the Arab world where discrimination has been integral to the prevailing political order. Revolutions raise hopes and awaken aspirations. In pre-revolutionary times, minoritiesā expectations are not lofty; maintaining the status quo might be the ideal. But with revolutions in full swing, expectations soar high: the oppressive old regime might be decaying and, minorities hope, a new egalitarian, democratic order will be born.
A case in point is the 1989 Revolutions in Eastern and Central Europe. Except for those few cases that were marred by ethnic disputes (Romanian and Hungarian ethnic groups in Transylvania and the Gypsies), minorities felt more secure and generally supported those revolutions as they eventually created more democratic political orders than the one-party...
