1Disability studies in the communication ethics classroom
Pedagogies of justice and voice
Joy M. Cypher
Introduction
Disability studies as a field of inquiry has not historically been considered a necessary topic of discussion in the communication ethics classroom. In fact, disability studies has only found its way formally into the discipline of communication studies in general starting in the late 1990s, as evidenced by organizational acknowledgment such as the National Communication Association’s Disability Issues Caucus creation in 1997. As a result, little published material exists for the instructor to use when teaching about disability studies in the communication ethics classroom. The purpose of this chapter is not only to clarify the import of discussing disability studies in the communication ethics curriculum, but also to provide some specific applications to utilize in the classroom.
Why does disability studies matter to communication ethics?
As we have been reminded by scholars like John Dewey (1929), communication is a consequential act of construction, not simply a complex system of labels. Lee Thayer (1997) tells us that through communication, we build worlds of social consequence – worlds for which we regularly deny having responsibility. If we take such fundamental claims (echoed in various theories of communication) to heart, it is clear that ethics is intimately tied to communication and thus worthy of our detailed inquiry. But how does something like disability, or a scholarly area of disability studies, fit into this?
The social model of disability studies uses a constructive lens, much like that invoked above (Oliver, 1996; Shakespeare, 2013). This concept positions disability as not rooted in physical impairment (known as the medical model) 1 as much as in the cultural negotiation of meaning and valuation. Thus, it is in our attribution of meaning, not in some physical “fact” that disability becomes a devalued mode of physical existence. This social model 2 is a perfect introduction to an alternative and cogent discussion of the relation between our bodily experiences and the ways we make sense of them discursively. Our communication shapes the way we see, and live, disabled bodies. This basic claim of disability studies finds its roots among the consequentiality of communication – if we hope to right the wrongs of unjust conceptions of disability, and the consequential policies that those concepts birth, then we must acquire the sensitivity to recognize those constructs in their nascent forms. This is where the link between disability studies and communication ethics is found and where a rich area of classroom debate can be cultivated.
One need only look to common language choices surrounding disability to see the seeds of the medical model sprouting: “confined to a wheelchair,” or “suffering from Autism” are examples of phrases that position the disability itself as the powerful agent, rendering helpless or victimized the people with it. Such assumptions invisibly fortify and embolden the idea that people with disabilities are pitiable and less capable overall than their non-disabled peers. Although the Americans with Disabilities Act was an important step toward undermining the often unspoken policies that resulted from such assumptions, including separate educational arenas like special education classrooms, and even discrimination in hiring, the cultural assumptions at the foundation of those policies are still pervasive. Yet, unjust frames regarding disability are not simply found in policy, but are also prevalent in the everyday arena of popular culture.
Franks (2001) reminds us of the particular enthymemes found in seemingly innocuous nursery rhymes like Grimm’s fairy tales linking disability (physical or mental) to evil, weak or ill-intentioned characters. From the countless ugly villains of Disney films to the amputee, Captain Hook, the trope of the “bad” characters represented by disability is everywhere. To disability studies scholars, such examples of problematic assumptions about disability are seemingly ever present, but to their students, these ideas are often unquestioned and regularly unnoticed as issues of social justice – and the communication ethics classroom offers another setting for beginning a fruitful critical conversation about the world we create in our discourse of disability.
Once the communication ethics’ educator situates disability as a social product of ethical consequence, then more particular applications of ethics can be interrogated. Some texts discuss disability as a social context of communication that requires special sensitivity and uses ethical approaches (e.g., dialogic ethics) to offer solutions. For instance, Neher and Sandin (2007) bring attention to “person-first language” (p. 185) and the ethical utility to avoid giving primary significance to a person’s impairment in language. Thus, Francine would be referred to not as “the blind girl,” but instead “the girl with vision impairment” – or more preferably – simply “Francine.” At the onset, it may seem like simple labeling or word order, but at its foundation, this conscious change reflects which the speaker deems most important: her impairment or her identity. Bringing conscious awareness to our language use, and the assumptions smuggled therein, allows us to choose more fully what we mean to say and why.
Focusing on the linguistic representation of disability is an excellent way to begin reflective conversations on the assumptions commonly brought to the issue (or identity) of disability; however, I argue that a richer set of applications based on and reflecting the ideological commitments of disability studies is needed to begin the conversation. But what would such a thing look like? In the remainder of this chapter, I offer some useful applications that provide exactly such an approach.
Case studies and exemplars to prompt critical reflection
Utilitarianism
Probably the easiest and arguably most incendiary connection between disability studies, the disability rights movement in general and the field of ethics can be seen in the work of Peter Singer. This modern utilitarian provides an excellent starting point for students to see first hand the tenets of utilitarian logic at work, as well as the reason behind the strong opposition from disability activists. Utilitarian ethics argues for the greatest good for the greatest number and that sacrifice of the few to create better conditions for the many is ethically sound (Neher & Sandin, 2007). Singer (2003) along with Kuhse (Kuhse & Singer, 1985) assumes that persons with limited cognitive capabilities are themselves potentially creating more suffering for themselves and their caregiving others – not to mention societies that pay for their care and living costs – than is justified for their continued existence. Thus, to paraphrase simply a utilitarian logic, we should reflect on the valuation of all social participants for the greatest good they present and not their inherent existence within a species. From this perspective, individuals whose tax-subsidized healthcare costs to their families and communities can actually be determined ethically suspect as the minority, represented by those with disabilities, create increased suffering for the many.
Singer makes similar arguments about the ethicality of abortion, suggesting that rather than debate the beginning of life (such as birth or conception) as the basis for our decisions, we instead should start the debate at when the fetus becomes human – particularly considering the rational and reflective abilities of the child (Watt, 1989). This same criteria is applied by Singer to persons with severe mental or intellectual impairments, leading to a conclusion that those without self-consciousness, or self-reflection do not warrant the same rights and protections as those who do. And yes, those protections include the “right” to live. Thus, for Singer, selective abortion and euthanasia both rest on choices made for the advantages of the majority of reflective and self-aware community members, not for the persons with disabilities or even costly impairments with no hope for improvement.
Although Singer does not represent a communicative example directly, his claims introduce a key ethical debate within disability studies: the role of utilitarian approaches in disenfranchizing the experiences and opportunities of persons with disabilities. This is aptly and accessibly shown in the published debate, which is short and easy for classroom readers to dissect, between Christopher Newell (2002), the disability rights scholar and Christopher Reeve (2002), the paralyzed actor. This debate challenges common, able-bodied assumptions that some bodies are just not worth living and uses a utilitarian logic as fortification of that position. This published debate further brings to the forefront ableist assumptions of the medical model of disability inherent in some ethical arguments.
Beginning the disability studies section of a communication Ethics class with the hotly contested debate over utilitarian ethics not only opens the conversation with a relatively easy to grasp ethical theory, but it also sets the stage for the very real issues of injustice, discrimination and stigma lived by people with disabilities. To forefront the idea that well respected ethicists argue for euthanizing severely disabled infants forces students to recognize injustice as it applies daily to people with disability and hopefully prepares them for communication ethics dilemmas in particular.
Egalitarianism and Kantian deontology
One area of disability studies commonly studied in the communication field has been communicating with people with disabilities. Works like many in the noted Handbook of communication and people with disabilities (Braithwaite & Thompson, 2000) showcase strategies and potential downfalls in the interpersonal, organizational and professional arenas of interaction with persons with disabilities. One common ethical dilemma, and one that fits well with concerns often voiced by persons with disabilities, is that of accessing full and equal participation in interpersonal engagement. For instance, persons with severe physical impairments that limit communicability (either linguistically or physically), face ethical dilemmas surrounding responsibility, voice and autonomy. Specifically, if Nancy has difficulty speaking quickly, or enunciating her words with precision, then the question arises of who is responsible for Nancy’s full participation in the conversation at hand. Some, in an attempt to avoid awkwardness and embarrassment avoid the situation entirely, thereby completely eliminating interaction with persons with disabilities. So, ignoring or avoiding conversations with Nancy provides one solution, albeit seemingly cowardly and unkind to Nancy. Another possible option is to engage Nancy, but to do so quickly, often times finishing her sentences, frequently interrupting or second guessing her comments, all for the sake of efficiency and speed. This response puts at the center of the interaction the norms and expectations of able-bodied speakers – or at least not Nancy’s.
Another alternative, as suggested by Stephen von Tetzchner and Karen Jensen (1999), is that we can define the relational responsibility as falling more heavily on the able-bodied participant to create a more equitable communicative environment. This could happen through the changing of context, perhaps to a quieter space, adapting the speed of the conversation, or even the means, through written or facilitated communication, so that everyone in the interaction can fully participate. Such options reflect a simple application of Rawls’ Egalitarian concept of the Difference Principle (1971), where balance between people, situations and contexts are evened out by those who can do so, for the equitable benefit of all. Thus, in the case of Nancy, an approach using Rawls would put primacy on Nancy’s role as a valuable contributor to the interaction, not an obstacle toward achieving a goal of information gathering. I also make a point with my students that Rawls’ original ethic conspicuously avoided applications to disability – and use this to open a discussion about why that might be the case and whether or not one can extend an ethical theory beyond the philosopher’s original intention.
Nancy’s example can be used as a journaling exercise for students to write perspective-based responses to the issue. Teachers can assign students to write on various threads: “What concerns would you have when interacting with Nancy? What is your inclination in this interaction? How do you imagine Nancy’s concerns might be? What do you think she would choose and why? Are there interactional options for you and Nancy that would not be acceptable – and if so why? Does Rawls’ Difference Principle give Nancy necessary assistance or an unfair advantage in these interactions?” Using a journal for this exercise is crucial since, even in the most open of classrooms, students are often concerned that they might be judged by teachers and peers alike for insensitive or even “unethical” choices. Journaling allows students to think through their own reactions and motives without face threat, while still getting feedback from a teacher later and in private.
This example of Nancy and her communicative partner can highlight further the ethical concern for treating human beings as ends in themselves – a thought reflected in Kant’s deontology (Kant, 1993). This component of the Categorical Imperative can further open the application of deontology to contexts like that with Nancy and allow students to reflect on what can be argued, in opposition to utilitarianism, is the inherent value of human beings as human beings.
Dialogical ethics
Dialogic ethics, as seen in the work of Martin Buber in particular, allows for a further discussion of persons with disabilities and the social/cultural interpretations of their/our relational roles. Specific to dialogic ethics is the claim that one’s humanity is more fully expressed by what Buber (2004) calls the I-Thou relation; this relation is inherently interdependent and non-hierarchical and it depends upon the openness of relational partners to a rare engagement with the oneness of unity. This interdependence is nicely exemplified by the ethical conundrum surrounding facilitated communication.
Facilitated communication is the use of a facilitator to aid persons with severe communicative disabilities in expressing themselves using image or letter boards that the facilitator interprets to others (Biklen...