Theory and Methods

Critical Essays in Human Geography

Chris Philo

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9780754627098
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351879583
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology

This volume tackles the complex terrain of theory and methods, seeking to exemplify the major philosophical, social-theoretic and methodological developments - some with clear political and ethical implications - that have traversed human geography since the era of the 1960s when spatial science came to the fore. Coverage includes Marxist and humanistic geographies, and their many variations over the years, as well as ongoing debates about agency-structure and the concepts of time, space, place and scale. Feminist and other 'positioned' geographies, alongside poststructuralist and posthumanist geographies, are all evidenced, as well as writings that push against the very 'limits' of what human geography has embraced over these fifty plus years. The volume combines readings that are well-known and widely accepted as 'classic', with readings that, while less familiar, are valuable in how they illustrate different possibilities for theory and method within the discipline. The volume also includes a substantial introduction by the editor, contextualising the readings, and in the process providing a new interpretation of the last half-century of change within the thoughts and practices of human geography.

Part I
Spatial Science and its Critics

[1]
A GEOGRAPHIC METHODOLOGY

William Bunge

The discussion of methodology presented here attempts to relate geography to science. The province of the discussion extends past the consideration of scientific theory alone since it is necessary to establish the relationships between theory and other aspects of science, especially between theory and fact (description) and theory and logic (mathematics). The first section introduces a general philosophy of science with emphasis on the place of theory. The next section discusses two problems involved in considering geography as a science. These two problems concern the role of description in geography and the predictability of geographic phenomena. The third and last section, which draws heavily from Schaefer,¹ suggests a scientific methodology for geography and outlines the relationships between regional and descriptive, systematic and theoretical, and cartographic and mathematical geography.

In order to view the methodology in the perspective intended, certain ground rules should be kept in mind. Historical arguments supporting or attacking methodological positions are not utilized. Contemporary rather than earlier geographic literature is cited because it contains the accumulated wisdom of geography. In addition, the earlier geographic literature is not cited because the great men of our past might now, in view of more recent events, hold opinions different from those they held. Though contemporary literature is useful, the ultimate test of a methodological position is its ability to produce substantive results. The iron question is, “Does the methodology lead to fruitful geographic research?” a question to be answered in part in subsequent chapters, not here.

I. A GENERAL PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE — THE ESSENTIAL ROLE OF THEORY

It is useful to divide science into three elements: logic, observable fact, and theory. Logic includes mathematics and has to do with the relations between symbols. Logical systems make no statements about the real or factual world. Observable facts must be designated operationally, because it is only by exact description of how an observation is made that we can identify a particular fact. A theory is formed by the union of logical system with operationally defined facts. Theory is the heart of science because scientific theory is a key to the puzzles of reality. It is discovered, not blindly as Columbus discovered America, but with great ingenuity and inventiveness, as one discovers a rule to escape from a maze. It has the power, indeed requirement, to predict. If a theory can not predict it has not discovered a rule of reality. The creation of theory is difficult because the scientist must successfully identify the purely logical symbols of mathematics with a set of observable facts.

A. Standards a Theory Must Meet

To be effective, a theory must meet certain standards including clarity, simplicity, generality, and accuracy. Clarity is achieved when a theory is presented in a mathematical form because the mathematical form assures explicitness as well as freedom from contradiction. Language has a logical structure and can provide a frame for sensible statements. However, verbalized theory tends to be incomplete-explicitness and freedom from contradiction is not assured. Thus, science, striving for clarity, ultimately is forced to use mathematical forms. As Richardson states:

The magnificent conception of mathematics as the study of all abstract logical systems or abstract mathematical sciences and their concrete interpretations or applications really justifies the statement that mathematics is basic to every subject forming part of the search for truth. In fact, mathematics, thus conceived, includes all subjects into which one injects logical structure. “To mathematize a subject does not mean merely to introduce equations and formulas into it, but rather to mould and fuse it into a coherent whole, with its postulates and assumptions clearly recognized, its definitions faultlessly drawn, and its conclusions scrupulously exact.”²

Kemeny makes the same essential point from a different vantage. He says:

CAN ALL SCIENCES USE MATHEMATICS? The answer is “Yes.” What is more, they must use Mathematics.

But you will often find the claim that the physical sciences are mathematical and the Social Sciences are nonmathematical. The reason for this misunderstanding is that people associate Mathematics with numbers. While I am quite certain that numbers will play a fundamental role in all these sciences soon, I want to maintain more, namely, that all scientific theories — numerical or other — are mathematical. This fact rests on the nature of Mathematics, on its identity with advanced logic.³

The other three standards — simplicity, generality, and accuracy — are intimately related; Simplicity is gained by minimizing the variables. Generality is produced by broadening the scope of the information contained. Accuracy is achieved by becoming wholly specific. Tension arises in that simplicity and generality tend to produce inaccuracy. In fact, no theory conforms exactly to observed facts. The constant dissatisfaction with the simplicity, generality, and accuracy of present theory leads to new theoretical work. A theory, no matter how deficient, is not abandoned, however, until a better one is produced.

B. Plausibility — A False Theoretical Standard

Contrary to widely held opinion, the plausibility or intuitive reality of a theory is not a valid basis for judging a theory. The discarding of this common-sense notion has had a vital effect on the acceleration of progress in both modern science and mathematics. As Frank writes:

. . . setting up principles from which we can derive observable facts and applications of observed facts — is what we call “science” today. “Science” is not much interested in whether these principles are plausible or not.⁴

This concept is difficult to grasp since it contradicts everyday experience. Perhaps it can be more easily grasped if some additional characteristics of theory are examined. Multiple theories that deal with a single phenomenon can coexist in science if they match the observable world. Which one of several theories is more plausible is a question that is never asked.

This difficulty regarding the plausibility — the intuitive reality — of theories trapped Kant. He claimed that humans are born with certain powers to discern the real from the unreal. He used as his prime example the alleged irrefutable and exclusive reality of Euclidean geometry! In spite of the rejection of Kant’s view concerning plausibility, the notion still lingers. Plausibility appears to be no more than familiarity since standards vary from generation to generation. Newton’s theories are considered real and plausible in our day, but they were thought to be unreal and implausible in his own time.

The essential pragmatic question regarding plausibility is, ‘”Can scientists hope to borrow successfully theories originally invented in foreign fields of knowledge?” Certainly, implausible though it may appear. It is an observed fact that once theory is produced it often can be applied to a variety of subjects. In this sense, there is a unity to knowledge. To give this assertion substance, some examples appropriate to geography are offered.

Consider Enke’s paper, “Equilibrium among Spatially Separated Markets: Solution by Electric Analogue.”⁵ Can electricity be expected to behave like a spatial economic system, as he insists? Yes, because it has been found that the underlying mathematics can be translated into certain carefully selected aspects of both subjects. A second illustration of the borrowing of theories is available from Beckmann’s “A Continuous Model of Transportation.”⁶ It is suggested by hydrodynamics. Can water be expected to behave like a spatial economic system? Again, it is the mathematics that can be made to fit features of both sets of phenomena. If social scientists are somewhat defensive because they have been borrowing heavily from mathematics and from theory first used in other fields, they can draw some comfort from the knowledge that there is reciprocity. Programming, first applied in social science, is now being used in designing electric networks.

A theory originally formulated in one field is usually modified when it is applied in another field. For instance, Richards in “Shock Waves on the Highway”⁷ makes a radical departure from the Newtonian theory that directly inspired his theory. He eliminates the concept of mass and defines velocity as being inversely related to density; i.e., the more crowded the vehicles on the highway, the more slowly they move. In spite of such radical alterations it may be easier for the scientist to imagine new theory to be an aspect of an old theory, even to the point of retaining the vocabulary of the original. Actually, in doing so he is attempting to relate the implicit abstract logic of one theory to another where he believes their realities are similar. All is fair in theory construction. Researchers who refuse to borrow at least parts of theories from other fields put themselves at an unfortunate disadvantage. Only the world’s greatest intellects are able to discover a radically new approach. It can even be argued that analogous theories are superior since they simplify our knowledge and therefore should be deliberately sought.⁸ This does not give researchers license to argue loosely through verbalized analogy. Certainly theory ultimately must weld observable facts rigorously to mathematics so that the theory is sufficiently explicit to be testable, and tests against the world of facts must be performed to determine the theory’s merit.

Scientific theory, the heart of science, is an exchange between concept and percept. Scientists seek convenient generalizations that match the observable world, and any notion of plausibility is considered metaphysical.

II. TWO PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CONSIDERING GEOGRAPHY AS A SCIENCE

Methodological analysis is centered on the question of the relationship between geography and science. There is no dispute here with what appears to be the concensus of American geographers over confining the subject matter of geography to the earth’s surface⁹ and to phenomena of human significance. This agreement immediately lends vast unity to geography. The arguments presented deal with how the subject is to be treated.

There are two particularly bothersome problems in treating geography as a science. The first problem is concerned with the role of description in geography and the second with the predictability of geographic phenomena.

A. The Role of Description in Geography

A methodological issue frequently raised in geography concerns the function of description. The issue takes two forms. First, is description scientific? And second, is description peculiarly geographic?

Some take the position that description is non-scientific.¹⁰ This position cannot stand. There is an infinitude of facts around us and any description of them is highly selective. This selection can be made at random, but geographers are always seeking facts they judge to be significant. Significance can be judged only in relation to some other phenomenon. The establishment of this relationship means that theory has been formulated. The so-called “mere describers” in geography do not go out into the world with empty heads. They have the feel of an area and a well-developed spatial intuition. This means that they possess theory, though it might be vaguely formed, implicit, and perhaps subconscious. Out of this process of describing has come increasingly explicit and rigorous theory. There is no escape. Description, by its very nature, is scientific.

Still there are real operational differences between those interested in description and those interested in “science.” While the former, thinking through classificatory schemes, spend some effort on implicit theory, they spend more of their effort on inventory, completing their classification. Their work becomes repetitious. They will, of course, discover as many categories and classes in their classification as they seek. Their expectation is that some day, some way, someone will find these results invaluable. In contrast, the “scientists” concentrate their efforts more on ideas and imagination. Ironically, they are much less interested in statistics, in the sense of the World Almanac, than the “describers.” The “scientists” are, however, heavily involved with mathematics — often highly abstract mathematics — which they use as framework for their theories. They imagine more and repeat less.

Lukermann and others feel that geography is peculiarly descriptive and description deserves a favored place in geographic research. He writes:

A more geographic economic geography would start from observations with the recording of data on maps. Research in geography would begin with the description of the geographic phenomena and associations so arranged and ordered....

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Contemporary Foundations of Space and Place
• Acknowledgments
• Series Preface
• Introduction
• PART I SPATIAL SCIENCE and ITS CRITICS
• PART II MARXIST GEOGRAPHY AND ITS EARLY RECONSTRUCTIONS
• PART III HUMANISTIC GEOGRAPHY AND ITS EARLY RECONSTRUCTIONS
• PART IV AGENCY AND STRUCTURE
• PART V TIME, SPACE, PLACE AND SPACE-TIME
• PART VI SCALING HUMAN GEOGRAPHIES
• PART VII FEMINIST AND OTHER ‘POSITIONED’ GEOGRAPHIES
• PART VIII POSTSTRUCTURALIST GEOGRAPHIES
• PART IX POSTHUMANIST GEOGRAPHIES
• PART X LIMITS TO HUMAN GEOGRAPHY
• Name Index