The Diplomacies of New Small States

The Case of Slovenia with Some Comparison from the Baltics

Milan Jazbec

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351891523
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Characterized by new research, this much-needed investigation into the undeveloped field of the sociology of diplomacy offers important new conclusions and suggestions, as well as many new ideas gained from practical diplomatic experience. The book examines the establishment of diplomacies of the new small states that emerged in Europe after the fall of the Iron Curtain. The sociological and organizational application is combined with concepts from the fields of international relations, diplomatic studies, security studies and international public law. A systematic, stringent approach to the subject matter makes this book a substantial contribution to the field, suited to scholars, diplomats, students, civil servants and journalists alike.

1
New Small States in the Changed International Environment After the Fall of the Iron Curtain

1.1 Processes of Integration and Disintegration

Recent¹ European political² history is marked by two processes.

On the one hand, there have been strong integrational tendencies, which sprang up in particular during the decade following the Second World War, when the foundations were laid for the beginnings of the present European Union, which until now has been the most typical example of the European integrational process. But on the other hand, there have been equally pronounced tendencies towards disintegration.

The former trend has encompassed the Western part of the European continent, having grown out of the political desire to eradicate historical Franco-German conflicts and, initially, to establish control over production and the use of the strategic products of heavy industry. The political framework was supported by economic interests and their symbiosis was noticeable over the next few decades. The emergence of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was formed on 18^th April 1951 by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, upon the initiative of the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, was followed by further instances of both successful and unsuccessful attempts at integration during the next few years (Benko, 1997.a: 183-189). These, together with economic initiatives reinforced by politicians and by others concerned with politico-economic practice and theory, led to the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 25^th March 1956, with the adoption of the Treaty of Rome (ratified on 1^st January 1958).

This treaty, which is nowadays considered to be the original manifesto of the EU, was adopted in Rome by France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries. It mapped out the direction of further Western European integration which, with the three ‘European communities’ (ECSC, EEC and EURATOM -the European Atomic Energy Community - founded on 25^th March 1957), led to the formation of the European Community (an expression that has been in use since 1978). According to the Treaty of Rome, the Community set up the four so-called freedoms (free passage of people, goods, capital and services); it also determined the basic goals of European integration (Benko, 1997.a:186).³

In the decades that followed, membership of the European Economic Community or the later European Union enlarged on four occasions: in 1973 with the accession of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark; in 1981 with Greek membership; in 1986 with the accession of Portugal and Spain; and in 1995 with the accession of three neutral European states, Austria, Finland and Sweden. And, following a resolution of the Council of Ministers in Luxembourg in December 1997, the EU is awaiting its fifth and so far, its structurally and quantitatively most demanding expansion: the acceptance of the first group of new members from the thirteen Eastern and Central European candidate countries.⁴

In a political and security sense post-war Western Europe was drawn together by NATO membership. NATO as a “multilateral regional system of collective defence” (Grizold, 1998.a: 124) under the leadership of the USA and with the membership of Canada, added the so-called Atlantic dimension to European security. Its basis lay in the assumption that European security is not possible without the constant presence of the ‘protective umbrella’ provided by the USA, especially in view of the division of Europe into two blocs. The basic defence principle of NATO, which was founded in 1949 by the USA, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom, can be summed up in one simple sentence: an attack on any single member is considered to be an attack on all (Article 5 of the agreement). In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined, in 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany, and in 1982 Spain. In recent years, on the basis of the London and Rome declarations (1990 and 1991 respectively) and in line with the resolution of the Brussels meeting (1994), NATO has been striving to break free from the perception that it represents the Western bloc. This can also be seen in the accession of three new members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary), which was first announced in June 1997 at the Madrid summit and realised in 1999 in Washington, as well as in the declaration that the process of expansion is on-going. The reform of NATO’s defence doctrine, passed in Rome in 1991, is based on the considerably changed geo-political image of Europe at the beginning of the nineties, which resulted in different military relations and in changes to the nature and extent of any possible threats. Another consequence was a need for the preservation of both individual and collective security. (Grizold, 1998.a: 128-132)

In the extensive and complex process of European integration which started, as we have seen, in Western Europe, we can identify a number of important milestones and phases in relation to different areas of interest. Let us consider three examples.

One of the most important elements of European integration is the West European Union (WEU), which was founded on 23^rd October 1954 with the Treaty of Brussels. It was signed by the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries - which had in the years preceding this treaty discussed common solutions to defence questions - plus the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. The idea of a common defence policy, mainly due to the fear of further German aggression, had first been promoted soon after the Second World War. As early as 4^th March 1947 the United Kingdom and France had signed, in Dunkirk, an agreement on military co-operation. The subsequent escalation of the Cold War between East and West led to the Federal Republic of Germany’s inclusion in these discussions. The WEU is now one of the central pillars of collective European defence, even though it has remained in NATO’s shadow as far as its political relevance is concerned (for more on this, see Grizold, 1998.a: 146-172 and Osolnik, 1998). An important and demanding project in the development of European identity in the security and defence field is the incorporation of the WEU into the EU, which is the result of the relevant agreements reached at both EU (Amsterdam 1997, Cologne 1999) and NATO (Washington 1999) summits. Events and activities, which took place after the EU Helsinki Summit and during year 2000 have added a strong mark on the future development of security and defence processes and cooperation in Europe.

It is the Council of Europe (CE), founded in 1949 by Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom in London, upon the initiative of Winston Churchill, which is responsible for the general development of democratic values and legislation, as well as for the protection of basic human rights. The CE acts on the basis of recommendations on these questions made in the national legislatures and its activities operate on three levels (parliamentary, inter-governmental and local-regional). The Council sets the long-term, politically binding standards, which are passed in its parliament.

A key manifestation of European integration is the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was established in 1972. With the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 on East-West relations and by expanding the areas of competence by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990⁵ it has transformed itself from an ad hoc forum to an organisation with permanent institutions. This is presently the only international governmental organisation which includes every European state (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia /Serbia and Montenegro/was suspended in July 1992 - as one of five successor states to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavi it was accepted as a new state in the OSCE in November 2000), as well as the USA, Canada and all the successor states to the former Soviet Union. It thus encompasses the area from ‘Vancouver to Vladivostok’. OSCE functions on the principle of consensus and determines and supervises democratic standards, striving for the strengthening of democratic institutions, supporting them and giving them suitable assistance. In particular, it strives to achieve friendly relations and co-operation among its members, using numerous contemporary methods of multilateral political activity (early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, etc.). It also pays special attention to “the linkage of human rights to general security and co-operation” (OSCE, 1996:7). The same document lists the following as the current priority tasks of OSCE: “a) to consolidate common values and build civil societies; b) to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn areas: c) to overcome real and perceived security deficits and to avoid the creation of new divisions by promoting a co-operative system of security.” (p.9) The OSCE Millennium Summit Meeting in December 1999 in Istanbul adopted several important documents and in the Summit Declaration reaffirmed several essential elements that make up a new type of security system in Europe.

In the divided Europe, which was a consequence of history and the situation at the end of the Second World War, we can also discern a strong integrational process in Eastern Europe, too. It was led by the former Soviet Union in both the political and economic spheres, and it was based on the ideological unification of all socialist countries into one bloc (with political, security and economic links), in opposition to the Western European bloc.

Ideologically, the states of Eastern Europe were connected via the Cominform (Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers’ Parties), founded in 1947; economically, they were linked by the CMEA (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, known unofficially as Comecon); whilst in the political and security sense they were united by the Warsaw Pact, signed in Warsaw in 1959. Within all three organisations, the Soviet Union, as the then self-appointed world centre of socialism, had a dominant role, whilst also securing for itself a position of overall hegemony.

At the state level, the unification of the two Germanies is the most typical manifestation of European integration. It happened in October 1990, a year after the fall of the Iron Curtain, which represented a symbolic break-down of communism⁶ in Europe, resulting in the destruction of the bi-polar world order, which had probably been most pronounced in Europe. With it, came the end of the Cold War.

Because of the complexity and prevalence of this integrational process in Europe its counterpart, the process of disintegration, remained in the background for a time, even though “the simultaneity of integration and disintegration” could be discerned (Langer, Pöllauer, 1995:7),⁷ i.e. their parallel development.⁸ At state level, the earliest example of disintegration (pertaining to the period discussed, i.e. after the Second World War) is the artificial partitioning of Germany into two parts, the Western Federal Republic of Germany and the Eastern German Democratic Republic. The Allies thus established two separate political and ideological protectorates in the partitioned country. And at the same time, the main protagonists within the victorious coalition, i.e. the USA and the Soviet Union, being also ideological opponents, symbolically established dominance over their respective parts of Europe. In the wider context, this also ensured stability and drew a border line, which was at the same time a line of demarcation between their respective spheres of interest in Europe.

On the same level as the partitioning of Germany, we can also cite a few most dramatic attempted movements towards disintegration in Eastern Europe. In Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 the social and political desire to break away from the socialist bloc became so intense that the Soviet Union could resist the process of disintegration only by using its armed forces. A similar situation occurred for example in 1980 in Poland when the Soviet Union again, for the same reason, had to intervene militarily in the country’s internal politics in order to set up a puppet military regime.

From the same viewpoint, the first example of a successful ‘normal’ step towards disintegration in post-War socialist Europe happened in 1948, when Yugoslavia resisted Stalin’s pressure and refused to accept his Cominform dictate. The result of this action was a political and economic isolation which, however, did not have the desired effect. In the subsequent development of the thus isolated Yugoslavia and of the pressure exerted on it from within the socialist bloc, we can identify at least three important political consequences.

Firstly, Yugoslavia as a member of the winning coalition in the Second World War, began to form considerable economic links with Western European states, in spite of their ideological differences. Secondly, it never became a formal, institutionalised member of the three already mentioned vehicles of Soviet socialist integration, even though it remained a socialist country throughout this period. But this had important consequences for its internal politics and economic development, as well as for the deepening of the differences among its constituent republics, which manifested themselves as growing internal tendencies towards disintegration that could be kept under control only by strong political force. (This enabled an administration to be formed in the Republic of Slovenia, part of which dealt with international contacts. This later represented an important element in the setting-up of Slovenian diplomacy. A similar result was the development of a territorial defence force, which were considerably less developed in the other Yugoslav republics, as well as Slovenian police units, which both represented a good basis for the creation of the manoeuvre structure units, from which later emerged the Slovenian army.) Thirdly, just under ten years later, this isolated position led Yugoslavia’s foreign politics to follow the direction of non-alignment. This movement had already been recognisable since the Bandung Conference of 1955, and was formally established at the first conference of non-aligned states in Belgrade in 1961 (Benko, 1987:164-166). The three founding states were Egypt, India and Yugoslavia.

We can find disintegrational tendencies of varying types, degrees and intensities, but of a less formal nature, in Western Europe too. “Demands for autonomy are getting stronger right across Europe” (Botcher, 1995). This is true, for example, of relations within individual Western European countries between their central authorities and individual parts (the United Kingdom -Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland; Spain - the Basque country, Catalonia; the Federal Republic of Germany - Bavaria).

At the same time, it is possible to observe in Europe and other continents a growing tendency towards regional co-operation and association. Bučar (1993,1995) thus notes a number of different forms of regional co-operation, even though there is no unified definition of these by different authors. We can, however, talk about three different basic forms: a) a smaller number of countries co-operating in a particular geographic area (e.g.: the Central European Initiative, the Central European Free Trade Agreement; the Community of Independent States; the Council of Baltic Sea States); b) cross-border co-operation of geographically connected parts of individual countries (e.g. the Alps-Adriatic Working Community; the Danube Region Working Community); and c) co-operation between individual parts of individual countries, irrespective of geographic proximity (technological-research cooperation of the Lombardy, Baden-Wiirttenberg, Rhone-Alpes and Catalonia regions, which is institutionalised with a special declaration and encouraged by their exceptional development in this area).

Bučar (1995:6) gives the political definition of a region as a unit which seems to require “at least some degree of social and political institutionalisation, so that it may be identified politically.” Traditionally, the concept of regionalism derives from the state and the concept of its effective authority, which is why the Congress of European Border Regions held in Strasbourg in 1992 defined a region as “the largest territorial unit within a country directly subordinated to central authorities (and above local authorities), with or without legal personality.” (ibid.) An understanding of regionalism, especially in the second of the two senses described above, i.e. international co-operation of regions as parts of countries, influences our understanding of the contemporary nation state and our concept of its sovereignty. Therefore we could say that such international co-operation of countries, as well as of parts of countries, with the aim of fulfilling certain common interests, affects the sovereignty of a state as a political institution, thus changing it.

If the beginning of this work stated that Europe is defined by two processes, which Bray and Packer (1993:xxiv) call “amalgamation” and “fragmentation”, we can now, before continuing, repeat the same thought in a more structured manner after Höll (1989:68): “The situation in Europe thus, on the one hand, in the West, moves towards stronger integration (and stability) and on the other hand, in the East, in the direction of greater heterogeneousness (and with it, greater instability). The traditional bi-polar power structure in Europe, yes, even the division of Europe, has been superseded.” Geser too (1995:35) comes to the same conclusion, adding that “in recent decades - especially since the upheavals of 1989 - there have been many signs of the emergence of a two-tier system, consisting of potentially increasingly smaller and introverted states and potentially increasingly more extensive and cosmopolitan international organisations.”

We can say that the integrational processes in Europe are continuing and probably intensifying, i.e. their quantitative and qualitative internal dynamics are increasing, which means that they become more complex. This in turn leads to more and more noticeable “inter-dependence of the structural elements in the international community, which expresses itself in both institutionalised and non-institutionalised links” (Benko, 1997.a: 17). We can certainly conclude that the processes of disintegration have reached their peak, though “definitely not their conclusion” (Benčina, Simoniti, 1994:7).

How these processes of disintegration might continue, especially in the sense of the further e...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgements
• Part One: New Small States in the Changed International Environment After the Fall of the Iron Curtain
• Part Two: Some Sociological Characteristics and Limitations of the Diplomacies of New Small States
• Part Three: The Challenges and Problems of Setting Up Diplomatic Organisations of New Small States
• Part Four: Diplomacies of New Small States and the Challenges of Globalisation (An Outlook)
• Notes
• Bibliography