Geography and Economy in South Africa and its Neighbours

Christian M. Rogerson, Anthony Lemon

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351934121
• Subtopic: Geography
• Index: Geography

The dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa caused massive transformation in both geographical and economic terms, not only in this country but also in the region as a whole. As the post-apartheid government enters its second term, this captivating volume assesses its progress in unravelling the geography of apartheid, both in South Africa itself and in its relationships with other countries in Southern Africa and Africa. It also considers the ways in which South Africa, now that it is no longer a pariah state, has begun to position itself within the current global economy. Examining South Africa's land and agriculture, mining and minerals, manufacturing, tourism, corporate finance, the labour market and transport, the volume discusses the challenges of balancing growth and redistribution, the extent and nature of progress, change and relationships within the regional and global economy. A compelling investigation into the economics of South Africa's neighbouring states in relation to their natural resources, colonialism and inter-relationships with themselves and with South Africa leads to a focus on the region as a whole and its relations with the global economy.

Part 1
South Africa

1 Land Reform and Agriculture

CHARLES MATHER

Introduction

The year 1999 marked a significant change in land and agrarian reform policy in South Africa. In his opening to parliament new president Thabo Mbeki announced the beginning of a strategy for the 'integrated rural development' of South Africa's most poverty-stricken regions. Although no formal document was released in 1999, Mbeki's state of the nation address in the following year provided additional details on the new policy: he declared that the state had 'carried out extensive and intensive work to elaborate an Integrated and Sustainable Rural Development Programme' (Mbeki, 2000). The focus of the new programme is rural areas in both former homelands and former white commercial farming areas; in the latter areas the goal is to de-racialise the platteland and introduce black farmers as equal participants in modern commercial agriculture. Land reform is regarded as one of the cornerstones of Mbeki's integrated rural development programme and recent far-reaching policy changes announced by the Department of Land Affairs are designed to support the programme.

The context for these changes in policy has been increasing concern over the slow pace of land reform, the spectre of what the local media calls 'Zimbabwe-style' land invasions and persistent and probably worsening poverty levels in South Africa's rural areas. In the period since 1994 the ANC has fallen well short of its promise to redistribute 30 per cent of the country's land to black people. Although the speed of delivery improved after 1998 by the end of 2000 less than 1 per cent of land had been redistributed. Restitution was equally slow: of the more than 25,000 restitution cases, only 9 had been finalised by June 1998. A year later the figure was comparatively better at 237 but still unsatisfactory. Budget constraints are not to blame for these disappointing figures as the Department of Land Affairs has consistently under-spent its progressively smaller share of the national budget. A more recent concern has been the escalation of land invasions in Zimbabwe and a smaller number of similar acts in South Africa. Although the DLA has remained firm on its policy against land invasions, in mid-2000, Gilingwe Mayende, Director General of Land Affairs, admitted that the situation in Zimbabwe had 'sharpened focus on the importance of land reform' (cited in Business Day, 5 July 2000). The number of land invasions that have occurred in South Africa is, however, not comparable with that in Zimbabwe, and the state has taken action swiftly against such invasions. A second difference in the South African context is that the most well-publicised land invasions have been urban, a stark reminder that tenure insecurity is not restricted to the country's rural areas. Finally, several important and ongoing poverty studies have added urgency to a land reform policy that effectively addresses the legacy of apartheid. The studies have found that poverty in South Africa is an overwhelmingly rural phenomenon: the percentage of the country's poor living in rural areas (poverty share) and the poverty rate in these areas are both over 70 per cent.

This chapter begins by outlining, very briefly, the land reform policy that was established in the period between 1994 and 1999. Recent assessments of this programme, in particular the redistribution component of land reform, are considered. The second section explores how this assessment has re-shaped land reform policy in the context of a new integrated development initiative. In the third section this new approach is considered in the light of previous debates on land and agrarian reform. The final section reviews changes in the regulatory environment and assesses their impact on agriculture in both commercial areas and former homelands.

Reassessing Land Reform

There are three key elements to South Africa's land reform programme: tenure reform, restitution and land redistribution. Tenure reform aims to address the insecurity of households living in a range of different situations including former homelands, informal settlements around urban areas and farm workers on white-owned farms. This aspect of land reform is not only the most complex, it also has the potential to affect as many as 13 million black South Africans. Measures to improve security of tenure in former 'white' South Africa are aimed at protecting the rights of labour tenants and farm workers. However, the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act of 1996 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act (1997) have had contradictory impacts (Williams, 1996b). While both were drafted with a view to securing tenure on white-owned farms, the unintended consequence has been the illegal eviction of many households by white landowners attempting to pre-empt claims. The Department of Land Affairs' (DLA) efforts to secure tenure in the former homelands represented its most carefully considered effort in land reform (Lemon, 1998). Aware of the complexity and political sensitivity of addressing tenure in the former homelands given the demands of individuals and of traditional authorities, the DLA spent two years (1996-98) drafting a land rights bill, which would then be subject to comment and form the basis for legislation. In the meantime Minister of Land Affairs Derek Hanekom enacted an interim measure to protect existing rights in former homelands, and refused to sign any transfer of land within these areas. According to individuals involved in the process, the draft land rights bill would protect individual tenure while at the same time allowing for groups to control and allocate land where there was sufficient consensus (Claasens, 2000). Unfortunately, the new Minister of Land Affairs Thoko Didiza shelved the bill shortly after being appointed to cabinet. Although a new proposal is imminent, at the time of writing no concrete plans on tenure reform have been released. Of great concern to those involved in the land rights bill is that the new approach appears to favour the transfer of land to 'tribes' at the expense of individual demands for security of tenure (Cousins, 2000a). The delay in presenting a comprehensive policy on tenure reform in the former homelands is costly in that insecurity in these areas is 'an underlying cause of poverty and rural conflict' (Adams et al., 2000, p. 111).

The second and third components of land reform - restitution and redistribution - are at first glance less complex (but see du Toit, 2000). Restitution targets households who were forcibly removed since 1913 and claims are handled through the Land Claims Court and Commission. A very high percentage of these claims are for land in urban areas and most of these have been settled by cash compensation (Cliffe, 2000). Land redistribution targets households who could not prove that they were forcibly displaced and allows those who can prove that they earn less than R1,500 a month to acquire land through a R16,000 grant. As noted earlier, both of these aspects of land reform have progressed slowly in the face of increasing pressure from claimants.

From 1997 onwards the DLA attempted to monitor the impact and effectiveness of land reform through its monitoring and evaluation programme. The focus was on how the policy had affected the 'quality of life' of beneficiaries. The result was a more streamlined process and one that was also in line with the World Bank's living standards measurement surveys (for details see May et al., 2000). The results of the survey based on the new framework were assessed by several local researchers and by the World Bank's land reform experts. The assessment - which has been presented in various published and draft documents (Deininger, 1999; Deininger and May, 2000; Deininger et al., 1999; May et al., 2000)- has revealed both positive and negative aspects of land reform. A positive finding is that land reform beneficiaries were found to be poorer than the average for rural South Africa; in other words, a relatively wealthier rural elite had not benefited from the programme at the expense of the rural poor. A second positive finding was that land reform grants had generated a 'significant number of economically successful projects' (Deininger et al., 1999). Indeed, in one of the projects beneficiaries were earning upwards of R 10,000 each. Yet the overall assessment of the land reform programme, and in particular the land redistribution component, was overwhelmingly negative. These negative findings, and the recommendations that have emerged from them, have played a key role in reformulating not only land redistribution, but also tenure reform and restitution.

A key concern of the recent assessment of land reform has been the failure to 'activate the productive potential of the rural sector'. Judging from the reports cited earlier, 'productive potential' is defined in terms of agricultural production. Deininger et al. (1999) argue that despite the liberalisation of agricultural markets, which has lowered barriers to entry and increased the amount of land available on the market while at the same time depressing land prices, the transfer of land to successful black small-scale farmers has been disappointingly slow. Several reasons for the failure of land reform project to reach a satisfactory 'productivity potential' were identified. First, the absence of a beneficiary contribution to the R16,000 grant appeared to play a determining role in the economic success of land reform projects. The 'top group of projects' and those with higher profits were also those where beneficiaries made regular cash or in-kind contributions to the land reform initiative. The absence of such a co-participation requirement 'has given rise to a whole generation of generally unsuccessful large-scale projects where enterprising individuals managed to enlist hundreds of beneficiaries who were neither interested in agricultural cultivation nor had much knowledge about the land reform process' (Deininger et al., 2000, p. 14). Based on these findings they conclude that co-participation would play an important role in improving the economic success rate of individual projects and the overall productivity potential of land reform.

A second criticism of the land redistribution programme, which also emerges from the 1999 survey, is concerned with the single R 16,000 grant. The survey results indicate that beneficiary projects may be divided into two broad types: there are 'productive' projects, which are economically successful and sustainable, and there are 'subsistence' projects that assist the poor. A single undifferentiated grant of R16,000 is not appropriate for either group: while 'subsistence' beneficiaries were hampered by a great deal of bureaucratic red tape in accessing the relatively small amount of R 16,000, this same amount was insufficient for individuals or groups attempting to use land reform to become productive farmers. Agricultural economists have pointed out how the nature of the grant system has not supported the needs of small-scale farmers. Thus Kirsten (2000) comments that it is 'doubtful whether the programme, as implemented until recently, has the ability to create the class of independent and small-scale family farms that was initially envisaged'. Based on this observation Deinenger and May (2000) recommend that the grant system be restructured to the needs of different beneficiaries.

The final criticism of land reform - the overly centralised and bureaucratic nature of the application and approval process - has been recognised for some time. Claims for land redistribution have had to start with Provincial Departments of Land Affairs who assist in developing a business plan. If a provincial land affairs committee approves the project, they are sent to the Minister of Land Affairs for a final decision. The bureaucratic requirements involved, and in particular the need for central ministerial approval, have meant that the average approval period is more than fourteen months. An obvious remedy to this problem is the decentralisation of decision-making to the local level to improve both delivery and the 'after-care' of land reform projects.

The recommendations for policy change in land reform flow in a relatively straightforward way from the survey of living standards of land reform beneficiaries. A restructured land redistribution programme should require a beneficiary contribution, it should be sensitive to the different needs of beneficiaries and the bureaucratic processes involved in applying for grants should be streamlined and decentralised. As we shall see in the next section, these recommendations have played an important part in reshaping the role that land reform will play in a broader rural development initiative.

Towards a ‘Productionist’ Land Reform

The transfer of power from Nelson Mandela to Thabo Mbeki in 1999 marked an important shift in the African National Congress' approach to rural development and land reform. The decision to prioritise rural areas for special attention was partly a response to the various poverty studies undertaken during the 1990s which all painted a depressing picture of the state of underdevelopment in rural South Africa. Increased pressure from civil society, most notably through the Rural Development Initiative (RDI), which was launched in Bloemfontein in early 1999, may have also played a role in the new priority towards rural development. Comprised of a group of rural NGOs the RDI's goal was to push rural development issues more forcefully on to the national agenda (Greenberg, 2000).

To the frustration of NGOs, details on the integrated development programme remained unclear during most of 1999 and 2000 (Greenberg, 2000). Although Mbeki provided some additional detail on the programme in his state of the nation address in 2000, the release of the policy document was delayed until November 2000. Titled the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development Strategy (ISRDS) it is described as an ambitious policy to kick-start development in rural areas based on the government's own experience since the end of apartheid as well as international lessons on tackling rural poverty.

Supported by a reformul...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART 1: SOUTH AFRICA
• PART 2: NEIGHBOURING STATES
• PART 3: SOUTHERN AFRICA AND BEYOND
• Index