War in the History of Economic Thought

Economists and the Question of War

Yukihiro Ikeda, Annalisa Rosselli, Yukihiro Ikeda, Annalisa Rosselli

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN:
  9781138244733
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351997003
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic History
• Index: Economics

Even after the experience of WWII and despite the existence of various institutions such as United Nations to avoid conflict between nations, we have not succeeded in making a world free from war. The Cold War, the Vietnam War, the intervention of the superpowers in local conflicts and the spread of terrorism have made this all too clear.

This volume brings together contributions by leading international scholars of various countries and reconstructs how economists have dealt with issues that have been puzzling them for nearly three centuries: Can a war be 'rational'? Does international commerce complement or substitute war? Who are the real winners and losers of wars? How are military expenses to be funded?

The book offers a refreshing approach to the subject and how we think about the relations between economics and war.

Part I

Before the two world wars

1 The food weapon

Milestones in the history of a concept (17th–19th centuries)

Alain Clément and Riccardo Soliani

Access to food is humankind’s most basic need, and the “food weapon” refers to all the means employed to voluntarily starve a population. When a country has an export monopoly on an agricultural food staple or a dominant position on such a foodstuff’s market, it can use its management and storage resources to place political pressure on countries importing that product. The food weapon can also be utilized by a central power or a faction, against all or part of a population, in which the pressure that is exerted is an internal one. The different forms of use of the food weapon have been observed countless times in history and, since the middle of the 1970s, contemporary authors interested in development issues have analysed the subject at great length (Ó Gráda 2009; Charlton 1997; Bertrand et al. 1997; Maxwell 1996; Labbé 1994; Macrae and Zwi 1992; Bessis 1985; Wallensteen 1976). The subject of the present chapter is to see how, between the 17th and the 19th centuries, the period when the question of food became of central importance (Clément 1999), the first economists addressed the issue. This analysis will examine the various forms that the food weapon can take, the economic conditions for its implementation, its consequences, and the means of protection against it when countries are threatened by that weapon. The first part of this chapter will study the mercantilist texts that focused largely on questions of food security and self-sufficiency, precisely to reduce – or even neutralize – the potentially dangerous effects that they perceived in the food weapon. The second part will turn to the coverage of the subject during the 18th century. Although less centred on international economic relations, the 18th century attended to the question from a more internal perspective (the food weapon used by leaders or private actors against the people or against a segment of the people). In the third part, the chapter will analyse the 19th century as the period that gave renewed importance to this weapon wielded by and against States at a time when France had orchestrated a continental blockade of the United Kingdom. That analysis will be based primarily on the debates on the Corn Laws, debates that incorporated that “warring” dimension.

Part I: Multiplicity of “mercantilist” analyses of the food weapon

In respect of the theme of the food weapon, which was addressed in a large number of 16th and 17th century writings, two stages can be identified. The first ranges from Bodin to the first English mercantilists, through the middle of the 17th century, and gives special attention to international economic relations, and to economic conflicts in particular. The second period, which concerns the latter half of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, shows little interest in international matters and therefore little interest in the classic food weapon. And yet, the food weapon had not been dismissed from the list of economic concerns. However, it was perceived more as a means of placing economic pressure on a country’s citizens.

1 The “first” mercantilists and the food weapon

Economic war vs. military war

In a recent article dedicated to the links between war and trade in mercantilist thought, Shovlin (2014: 305–327) reconsidered the place of war in international relations during the “mercantilist period”. Although he observed that war was omnipresent in inter-State relations, it was rarely declared for the purpose of attaining economic goals. However, commercial competition was a form of confrontation between States. Trade was perceived as the new battleground between States, and war was no longer a means of seizing riches. Commercial wars were one of the concrete forms of such clashes: for example, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–1667), with its conflicts along the West Coast of Africa, between the forces of the Dutch East India Company and the forces of the English Company of Royal Adventurers, the latter attempting to break off Dutch trade in gold and slaves (Shovlin 2014: 308–309). This example provided a strong illustration of the new type of warfare between nations. The consequence of this evolution was a desire to establish political power on a solid domestic economic base. Obtaining trade surplus was a priority and became a mean of asserting country’s superiority. An illustration of this pursuit of economic power was the quest for national economic independence.

While war had become economic in nature, the food weapon was the favourite armament amongst economic leaders and theorists. This relies first and foremost on a clash between nations’ respective agricultural and food powers. But over and above the forces present – somewhat akin to an army of soldiers lined up face-to-face – there was also the use that could be made of the food weapon. Like most of the weapons, the food weapon had two modes, which were clearly perceived by the mercantilists: a defensive dimension and an offensive one.

Food dependence vs. independence

If a nation’s economic power was a new form of political rivalry, its agricultural and food power was one of the methods for achieving that sought-after, proclaimed power. A number of examples taken from French and British texts provide excellent illustrations of how that economic power was viewed. In his Mémoires des sages et royalles oéconomies, Sully enthusiastically recalled that

France is better stocked than any other kingdom in the world (with the exception of Egypt), and those products that consist of grains, vegetables, wines, dyes, oils, cider, salt, hemp, wool, linen, etc., are the cause of all the gold and silver entering France and, consequently, those products are far better that all the silks produced in Sicily, Spain and Italy.

(Sully 1942 [1638]: xvi)

Montchrétien also wrote about the riches of France in glowing terms, with its “five inexhaustible sources of natural wealth […] wheat, wine, salt, woollens, cloths” (Montchrétien 1889 [1615]: 239). Similar analyses emerged in English writings. According to Mun, England was endowed with “great plentie of natural riches, both in the sea for fish, and on the land for wooll, cattle, corne, lead, tin, iron, and many other things for food, rayment and munition” (Mun 1971 [1621]: 50). Thus supplied, the country could survive without the assistance of other nations (Mun 1971 [1621]: 73). In these quotations, it can be seen that one of the forms of a State’s political power was based on its ability to feed its people and, conversely, that a country unable to feed its population through its own means was in a position of fragility and vulnerability.

The defensive weapon, or how the country must feed the country

According to mercantilist analyses, agricultural potential should make it possible to feed the entire population and enable demographic growth, which is a source of military and economic power. It is in the country’s interest to preserve that advantage: the policy of self-sufficiency was particularly touted by Montchrétien and Bodin, who mentioned it in La République. Food self-sufficiency was given priority over the accumulation of gold and silver earned by trade in those same products. Montchrétien was the first to speak of autarky:

no society must borrow from elsewhere anything that it holds necessary because, being able to have it only at the mercy of another, it weakens itself accordingly […] there is only the sole necessity that compels the taking from elsewhere of what one has not.

(Montchrétien 1889 [1615]: 66)

This point of view was reinforced by the fact that “in trade, we have as many losses as the foreigner has gains” (Montchrétien 1889 [1615]: 154). Therefore, trade with foreigners should be avoided wherever possible, such that “the country supplies the country” (Montchrétien 1889 [1615]: 112). In parallel, he would not have found it surprising if “the Spanish could also produce wheat to feed themselves, we would be right in complaining that they no longer wanted to buy ours” (Montchrétien 1889 [1615]:155). Mun shared a more moderate version of that point of view. Above all, it appeared important not to be dependent on foreign powers when it came to the procurement of food staples, in particular. The sale of manufactured goods should not be used to satisfy vital needs. It would be useful that

We may peradventure employ our selves with better safety, plenty, and profit in using more tillage and fishing, than to trust so wholly to the making of cloth; for in times of war, or by other occasions, if some forraign Princes should prohibit the use thereof in their dominions, it might suddenly cause much poverty and dangerous uproars, especially by our poor people.

(Mun 1965 [1664]: 73)

It was essential to prioritize the home nation and trade with other countries as a last resort. This domestic priority placed on food procurement and independence constituted a strength and helped to reinforce one nation’s domination over the others: “A kingdom that can supply its own necessities itself is always richer, stronger and more formidable” (Montchrétien 1889 [1615]: 131–132).

How to develop the defensive weapon?

This policy included two main axes: the encouragement of domestic production on the one hand and the protection and limitation – or even prohibition – of exports of those products on the other. The encouragement of the agricultural sector was due in particular to public figures like Sully, who opposed the development of luxury goods industries.

Controlling the movement of agricultural products toward other countries was the second aspect of this policy. Fulfilling the people’s dietary needs at the lowest price possible, not only does it require the development of the agricultural sector, but also a protectionist policy toward foreign countries. This policy was long applied in France and then abandoned during the Restoration; in England, it was instituted at the end of the 14th century and permanently relinquished only in 1846.

According to Bodin, political authorities should allow foreign trade in agricultural products if, and only if, people have sufficient food supply: the institution of export duties should prevent cereals from exiting the country and foster the full satisfaction of all domestic needs, because “France […] has largely enough to feed its people, even during bad years, so long as foreigners do not empty its granaries” (Bodin 1986 [1568]: VI, 432). This policy of domestic priority was also lauded in England for the same reasons. For Mun, for example, “Victuals and munition for war are so pretious in a Commonwealth, that either it seemeth necessary to restrain the exportation altogether, or (if the plenty permits it) to require the return thereof in so much treasure” (Mun 1965 [1664]: 37). Whilst remaining highly favourable to trade and industry, which represented a great source of wealth for his country, he above all wished for his country to be self-sufficient.¹

The offensive weapon, or how to weaken others

Production not only embodies the wealth and power of the members of a national community; it also embodies the power of the nation, measured in relation to the wealth of other countries (Fourquet 1989: 157). This assessment had already been expressed by Bodin. In La République, he wrote that a country’s wealth was dependent on its agricultural resources: “The greatest treasures will come where there are more of life’s necessities, although there are no gold or silver mines, as there are few in this kingdom that nonetheless feeds a large proportion of Europe” (Bodin 1986 [1576]: I, 65). That wealth created a situation of domination: “wine, salt and wheat are three elements on which the life of the foreigner depends, after God” (Bodin 1986 [1568]: VI, 456). This was, for example, the case with Spain, which “owes its life to France” (Bodin 1986 [1568]: VI, 428). Reaping the benefits of this vital advance, France could always apply heavy taxes on export, because demand was relatively inelastic in relation to price, to use a contemporary expression. “It is therefore expedient to similarly raise foreign taxation for goods without which the foreigner cannot live and, by that means, increase finances and relieve the burden of the nation’s subjects” (Bodin 1986 [1576]: I, 65–66). This analysis was shared in full by Montchrétien, who considered need as source of weakness and root of possible domination. It is this weakness that Richelieu also wanted to exploit, because

France is so fertile in wheat […] that Spain, England and all our neighbours must recourse to it. And, so long as we know how to help ourselves to the advantages that nature has given us, we can derive money from those who want our goods that are so necessary to them.

(Richelieu 1947 [1632–1638]: 418)

For Mun, the possession of the goods necessary for food supply and warfare constituted the highest degree of power for all countries. The existence of large stores of wheat “will make them to be feared abroad” (Mun 1965 [1664]: 70).

The limitations of the food weapon

Contemporary historians have underscored the first limitation on this power. International trade in cereals only concerned a small proportion of the products consumed. Braudel estimated that, in the 17th century, European trade in cereals accounted for approximately 6 million quintals, compared to the 240 consumed by Europeans, representing just 2.5 per cent, with maritime trade in wheat being assessed at 1 per cent (Braudel 1979: I, 99–104). The food power was all the more limited to the imported products coming from Poland, Sardinia, Sicily, Sweden, the Ottoman Empire and so forth, that is, from countries that exported foodstuffs to the detriment of their local populations.² Although such a trade appeared to be relatively low with respect to the total quantity of cereals consumed, the fact remained that, given the existence of cities and towns that were often on the very limits of survival, that 2 per cent of production could be enough to tip the scale one way or the other (Tilly 1975: 409–412).

The “Dutch model” represented a second limit to the exercise of the food weapon. The Netherlands, a rich and powerful nation, d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Introduction
• Part I Before the two world wars
• Part II Japan and World War II
• Part III Lessons from the 20th century world wars
• Index