This chapter provides an overview of the conceptualization of civil society, as well as its history and definition in different contexts. The term Taiwanese CSOs is operationalized for the purposes of the present research to be able to look for the evidence of activities of Taiwanese CSOs in cross-strait relations. In the second part of the chapter the multi-track and multi-level approaches are introduced. These approaches offer an explanation of the ways CSOs may participate in the transformation of conflicts. In the third part of the chapter, the literature dealing with the role of CSOs in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is critically evaluated and on the basis of this literature review, two basic ideal-typical roles CSOs may play in transformation of conflicts are defined: the role of peace- and confidence-builder, and the role of conflict-booster and peace-spoiler. These roles are in turn further investigated in chapters 3 and 4 to find out the roles Taiwanese CSOs may play in the transformation of cross-strait relations.
Civil society: contemporary understanding and how the concept is operationalized and used in this book
A useful starting point for the discussion about the role of TCSOs in conflict transformation and peacebuilding is recognition of the enormous importance that civil society and CSOs have assumed throughout the world. The history of CSOs stretches back to the middle of the nineteenth century. Civil society as a concept gained more momentum at the beginning of the 1990s, as a means of improving governance and democratization. Through the development of cooperation, civil society began to be understood as a pillar of good governance, respect for human rights and the rule of law. As indicated above, in post-communist Central Europe, in post-Soviet regions and post-Yugoslav spaces, a vibrant civil society was considered to be an important pillar for establishing democracy, and a dynamic force in the push for social, economic and political change. In various regions including the Balkans, Africa or South East Asia civil society has been understood and supported as a peacebuilding force. Today, CSOs as well as other non-state actors are an inherent part of world politics. The contemporary “problem” of the terms civil society and civil society organizations is that these are complex concepts, there is no commonly-agreed definition, and these concepts are sometimes used as analytical concepts, while other times as normative concepts (see for example White 2004). These terms have even different meanings in peacebuilding discourse than in the discourse of democratization.
Before creating from the concept the operational definition, it is necessary to say, that hardly any review of related literature would render a comprehensive account of the different meanings of the concepts of civil society and civil society organizations, and even the best efforts fail to reconcile the different understandings of the concepts into a meaningful and useful definition. The term civil society organizations covers a wide range of entities. Less commonly applied designations have included non-profit organizations, the third sector, private voluntary organizations, civil society groups, and even new social movements and activists beyond borders (Putnam 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998). When using the term “civil society organizations” people usually subsumed in the notion of CSOs that they include non-governmental organizations, human rights groups, associations advocating for social justice, collective interest groups (faith-based organizations, trade unions, women’s groups, youth and professional associations), community-based organizations or information/education-based groups (journalist associations, academic and research institutions and think tanks) (Forster and Mattner 2006). Discussions have also been led about negative actors such as mafia, protest movements, organized crime or groups promoting illiberal ideas, such as extreme-right and extreme-left wing movements, questioning whether to subsume them under the term non-state actors, civil society or even under the term civil society organizations (see for example Cox 1999).
Despite the variety of definitions and actors subsumed under CSOs, CSOs are generally understood to be social bodies that are 1) private, i.e., not part of the institutions of government; 2) not for profit; 3) self-governing, and 4) non-compulsory, voluntary associations. This study proceeds under this characterization of the term, and also in agreement of Habermas’ (2006), who associated the notion of civil society with the space of the public sphere, a place where associations, organizations and movements can be created spontaneously, and where institutionalization or formal legal existence is not necessarily imperative to the pursuit of the issues at hand.
For the purposes of this work, civil society is conceptualized as an arena or sphere that provides a space for diverse societal values and interests to interact, where people can come together to debate, discuss, associate and seek to influence society and political process. Civil society is a political space, where governance and development (including conflict transformation) goals are contested. A civil society organization is understood to be an entity that is independent of the stricter realm of state power and market interests, that does not represent state interests or act on the state’s behalf1 and that does not seek to control state power;2 i.e. it is a non-state and not-for-profit group, organization, association or movement. This is the operational definition based on the concept, but throughout the research I was—as many other researchers have been in different cases—challenged by the cases of organizations, which were legally registered as non-governmental, but whose budget has been filled mainly by governmental agencies or political parties, and by organizations that were connected with state through political personalities (when political figures or high ranking officials manage the organization or supervise it) or that were affiliated to state bodies or political parties. According to the operational definition set up above, these entities are civil society organizations. But it is clear that these entities are more or less deviations. In cases, where the entity fulfilled the operational definition of CSO but has had a particular deviated feature, I considered these entities for CSO but to be as transparent as possible, I always took note of this fact and analyzed that particular deviation of the particular organization.
Besides these definitional criteria it is important to stress that when speaking about CSOs in this book so-called “good civil society organizations” or “civil civil society organizations” are meant. Good or civil CSOs are organizations that promote liberal and democratic values and are based on pluralism and the value of reciprocity, i.e. recognize other citizens, even those whom one deeply disagrees with, and do not monopolize a functional or political space within society (Chambers and Kopstein 2001, Chambers 2002, Kopecký 2003).
The last task is to operationalize “Taiwanese” CSOs, but it is not an easy one. Civic organizations and NGOs in the ROC are now highly multiform and divergent in terms of their missions, organizational structure, degree of autonomy and influence. Even organizations in the same category vary significantly between different regions or different levels. Taiwan’s civil society is a mix of state-sponsored or semi-official bodies, former dissident groups, professional- or academia-based NGOs, sister groups of Western NGOs managed by the Taiwanese, groups of Mainland Chinese political opposition and groups grown from spontaneous activity. When speaking about “Taiwanese CSOs” in this book, organizations, movements and groups working in Taiwan and from Taiwan managed by people living in Taiwan—i.e. not necessarily by people with Taiwanese citizenship—are meant. The term “Taiwanese CSO” includes Taiwanese branches of international non-governmental organizations as well as for example CSOs established by non-Taiwanese citizens living in Taiwan including Mainland Chinese.
Civil society involvement in conflict transformation and peacebuilding
The international relations and conflict resolution literature widely works with terms such as “conflict management”, “conflict transformation”, “conflict resolution” and “peacebuilding”. These terms—when speaking about the discipline of conflict resolution—are used to distinguish different approaches to solve the conflict (see for example in Miall 2004). But in reality these terms and approaches overlap and there is no possibility to delineate a strong boundary between them.3 In this book as in many others all these terms will be used together.
Conflict transformation is a complex, multi-level and open-ended process. When speaking about it I mean the process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and if it is necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of conflict (Miall 2004). Conflict transformation is a pioneering approach that started to be used a decade ago and is still in the process of formation. For transformation of conflicts four types of intervention are mentioned: actors’ transformations, issue transformations, rule transformations and structural transformations (see for example Miall 2004). The conflict transformation may include change in power structures, changes of leadership, changes of goals, de-linking or re-linking issues, changes of heart and mind and gestures of conciliation.
Peacebuilding may be understood as a part of conflict transformation; while conflict transformation may describe the process of transforming conflict into peace as well as into violence, peacebuilding clearly indicates that the goal of the transformation is to reach peace. Peacebuilding is generally understood as an overarching term describing a long-term process covering all activities with the overall objective (including socio-economic ones) of preventing violent outbreaks of conflict, or of sustainably transforming armed conflicts into constructive, peacefully-managed affairs. Peacebuilding is aimed to create conditions conducive to economic reconstruction, development and democratization, but should not be equated and thus confused with these concepts (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006). Peacebuilding includes also confidence building.4 Confidence building is a process between (potential) adversaries and in its broadest terms can refer to any gesture made by one adversary toward another that indicates goodwill or relieves tensions (Spears 2000). It focuses on changing perceptions, on improving relations between adversaries and on the restoration of trust through human contact and institutional practices that replace suspicion with mutual understanding (Emamjomehzadeh and Jahanshahrad 2003). The short-term purpose of confidence building is the creation of sufficient trust to prevent the dangerous consequences of misunderstandings between adversaries. Its long-term purpose is fundamental resolution of conflicts and increased predictability.
Historically, political conflict transformation and peacebuilding have been initiated top-down by elites, but in the last two or three decades we have observed that political conflict transformation and peacebuilding can be initiated also bottom-up, by affected communities (often with support from foreign governments or international organizations). During the last decade, the importance of civil society actors’ involvement in conflict transformation, peace- and confidence building has been increasingly stressed and recognized (see for example Anderson and Olson 2003), and states, research institutes, think tanks and international organizations support and organize programs and introduce grant schemes to support the development of civil society in conflict-prone and post-conflict areas believing that it will help restore and/or build peace and democracy (see for example World Bank 2006, OSCE 2012, SIPRI 2015). Civil society actors are generally expected to provide popular support for peace and to promote dialogue and reconciliation between polarized groups, and are believed to be uniquely placed to address some of the key problems that are usually ignored by governments. It is believed that civil society organizations can reach out to the most affected communities, challenge stereotypes and enemy images and build bridges between communities in conflict, stimulate new creative thinking needed for compromise and have the ability to include the conflict’s key stakeholders.5 Civil society actors are also believed to have the ability and willingness to take risks that governments lack; they may be able not only to move ahead of governments in engaging with the other side, but also in advocating for internal policy change and in bringing new ideas to both the negotiating table and to the conversation about the social transformation needed for peace. They are believed to help to mitigate societal differences, create civic virtues, foster social cohesion, create channels of communication in the form of dialogue projects, exchange programs or joint vision-building workshops, strengthen bonds among citizens, and build social capital. Furthermore, it is believed that the positive actions of CSOs can have a multiplier effect and thus stimulate others to follow the examples given (Putnam 1995, Carey and Richmond eds. 2003, Lederach 2003, Paffenholz and Spurk 2006, Behrendt 2011, Miall 2014). Today the question has shifted from whether or not to involve civil society actors in conflict transformation and peacebuilding, to how.
The vast literature on conflict resolution, management and conflict transformation contains two—widely used and citied—models of participation of CSOs in transformation of conflicts. Both models have had in the last two decades considerable influence on the inclusion of civil society into conflict transformation and peacebuilding.6 The first of these two models is an actor oriented model (called multi-level approach) presented by John Paul Lederach. The second is the multi-track model put forward by former US Ambassador John McDonald and Dr. Louise Diamond. Both these models, when speaking about transformation of conflicts and the role of CSOs in the transformation, deal with the CSOs as with the important participants of the process and argue that CSOs may build bridges between various levels of society and connect communities and thus can be positive forces and peace-builders in the process.
Lederach (2001 and 2003) believes that there are three levels of actors participating on conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes and that at each level the tasks in which these actors are engaged are distinct. These levels are presented in pyramid form and include: top political, military and religious leaders (level 1); respected mid-level leaders from various sectors, such as influential academic, religious and NGO leaders and other civil society actors (level 2); and grassroots authorities (level 3) such as local leaders, community developers or heads of indigenous and local NGOs. The actions of top leaders are more visible but typically affect fewer people, whereas the actions of leaders at a grassroots level can affect many more. Lederach (2001 and 2003) argues that true conflict transformation and peacebuilding in fact begins at the mid-level and micro level of social, economic, socio-psychological and spiritual changes in the lives of the affected populations. These changes are most effectively ushered in by grassroots leaders, local groups and NGOs and mid-level actors who are able to influence both the macro and grassroots levels. He also argues that sustainable peace can be built only by involving all actors from all strata of the societies concerned.
Diamond and McDonald (1996) based their multi-track model as a metaphor through the image of a steering wheel. Their idea is that there exist nine tracks (integral segments of the wheel) that represent particular groups of different types of actors who should collaborate to transform conflict and reach peace. These are, 1) governments, inter-governmental organizations and official diplomats; 2) conflict resolution professionals; 3) businesses; 4) private citizens; 5) professionals dealing with research, training and education; 6) activists; 7) churches; 8) non-governmental organizations such as foundations and policy oriented entities; and 9) public opinion and media outlets. Governments transform relations through diplomacy. Non-governmental conflict-resolution professionals transform relations through conflict resolution, business through commerce, private citizens through personal involvement, research, training and education through learning, activists through advocacy, religion through faith in action, foundations through the provision of resources, NGOs through the community work and media through information (Diamond and McDonald 1996). Also in this construct, non-state actors, especially CSOs from all walks of life and sectors of society are important for finding ways to promote peace in settings of conflict.
Both Lederach’s pyramid and Diamond and McDonald’s steering wheel originated from the debate about inefficiency of pure government action. Each argues for the necessity of a more interpersonal approach to such processes, for the inclusion of all actors, especially CSOs, from within a conflict country and from all levels of society when determining needs, and for the facilitation of communication between all social strata. The shared aim of both models is to create a framework for building or rebuilding broken relationships across lines of division among ordinary citizens and between institutions and divided communities. They enable various actors to create structured networks, enter negotiations, formulate demands and generally influence conflict resolution decision-making. According to both models, peace and confidence are best built up by combining several measures in a cumulative process at diverse levels of society, with reciprocity and local non-state and non-elite ownership as essential elements. Each model rests not only on the argument that CSOs and grassroots leaders affect large parts of a society’s population, but also that local levels are microcosms of a larger conflict, and that top-level agreements are too d...
