Japan and the shaping of post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia

Japanese diplomacy and the Cambodian conflict, 1978-1993

Andrea Pressello

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781315514918
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 and the consequent outbreak of the Cambodian conflict brought Southeast Asia into instability and deteriorated relations between Vietnam and the subsequently established Vietnam-backed government in Cambodia on the one hand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries on the other. As a result of the conflict, the Soviet Union established a foothold in Southeast Asia while China, through its support of the anti-Vietnam Cambodian resistance, improved relations with Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand. Japan's Fukuda Doctrine - it's declared priorities of promoting cooperative and friendly relations between Communist Indochinese nations and non-Communist ASEAN countries – became increas¬ingly at odds with Japan's role as a member of the Free World in the broader Cold War confrontation. Tokyo had to steer a path between Washington's hard-line policy of isolating Vietnam and its own desire to prevent regional destabilization.  Against this background, this book addresses the following questions: what was Japan's response to the challenges to its objectives and interests in Southeast Asia and to the Fukuda Doctrine? What role did Japan play for the settlement of the conflict in Cambodia? How did Japan's diplomacy on the Cambodian problem affect the Japanese role in the region? It argues that Japan's contribution was more active than has widely been recognized.

1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy, 1950s–1960s

Japan’s postwar economic recovery and Southeast Asia: the Yoshida administration

In November 1954, Yoshida Shigeru, who served as Japanese prime minister from 1946 to 1947 and again from 1948 to 1954, wrote that “Japan’s own existence […] depends on the economic development of, and the maintenance of stability in, the Southeast Asian countries.”¹ Why did the Japanese prime minister put so much emphasis on the importance of this region for Japan? Before this question is addressed in the following sections, it is necessary to briefly mention the role of Japan in Southeast Asia during the Pacific War. One of the factors that escalated tension between Japan and the United States and that led to the outbreak of war between them in December 1941, was Japan’s decision to move southward in order to ensure access to oil reserves in the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia). After Japan’s occupation of the whole of French Indochina in the summer of 1941, the United States, which was the main supplier of oil to Japan, joined hands with Britain and the Netherlands to impose a total oil embargo on Japan. Gaining access to Southeast Asian oil and raw materials, which were crucial for the continuation of Japan’s industrial production in support of the Japanese war effort, became a main and vital goal for Imperial Japan. However, an expansion into Southeast Asia meant war, in the first place, with the United States and Britain. As the Japanese carried out the Pearl Harbor attack on the United States on December 7, 1941, they rapidly took control of Southeast Asian territories. Two observations can be made about Japan’s military invasion of this region during the Pacific War. First, it shows the strategic value that Southeast Asia had for Japan. Second, the legacy of the suffering and damages provoked in this region by the Japanese military was to affect Japan’s postwar relations with Southeast Asia as well as Tokyo’s diplomatic posture and policies, resulting in the Japanese adoption of an often-cautious approach when dealing with the region. After the end of the Pacific War, Southeast Asia re-emerged in Japanese and American planning for Japan’s recovery. The victory of Maoist forces in China led, in 1949, to the formation of the People’s Republic of China. In the context of the intensification of the Cold War confrontation in Asia, the establishment of a communist regime in China complicated the future of Japanese relations with that country. In fact, under pressure from the United States, in April 1952, Japan signed a treaty of peace with the nationalist government of the Republic of China. This move precluded the establishment of relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. It also meant that Japan lost access to mainland China’s markets and natural resources from which it had benefited until the end of war.

It is in this context that, after the end of the war, the importance of Southeast Asia for Japan once again grew and this region was identified as a replacement for Chinese markets and natural resources. Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had a clear idea of how Southeast Asia fitted in Japan’s postwar recovery. In a speech he gave in November 1954 in Washington, he pointed out that Japan largely linked its economic recovery to the development of cooperative relations with Asia – and in particular with Southeast Asia. He explained that, “[a]s an island nation, entirely dependent on trade, Japan knows she cannot survive unless the free nations of the Asian community also survive, and unless there is free trade and friendly cooperation among us.” However, because of the unavailability of trade with China, “in order to be self-supporting, Japan must develop its trade with Southeast Asia.”² He later elaborated on this point asserting that “[w]e had lost through the war our sources of raw materials in Manchuria, Korea and elsewhere, and it was my wish to see the loss replaced by closer economic relations with the countries of Southeast Asia.” Indeed, as Yoshida made clear, “[i]t has been my conviction that the economic future of Japan lies in the expansion of trade with the countries of Southeast Asia.”³

The Japanese MOFA shared Yoshida’s views. In May 1954, MOFA made the point that considering the scarcity of natural resources in Japan, the country had no choice but to import raw materials and food; finding markets for Japanese products was also imperative for the survival of the country. However, as observed by MOFA, Japan had lost “her once tight hold on China” and was “no longer in a position to import Chinese resources as she wishes or to monopolize China as her export market.” Moreover, the gradual industrialization of China was “turning her steadily into Japan’s competitor.” In contrast, the nations of Southeast Asia were “not likely to become Japan’s competitor in the near future and promise to remain complementary to Japan.” According to MOFA, this factor, combined with the geographical proximity of the region to Japan, indicated “the need and wisdom for Japan to make all-out efforts in the direction of tighter economic relations with the Southeast Asian countries.”⁴

However, there were doubts about the extent to which Southeast Asia could be a valid replacement for China. The doubts stemmed from the small size of the Southeast Asian countries’ economies. Therefore, Japanese policymakers considered it necessary to increase those nations’ capacity “to sell and buy.” For that purpose, support had to be given to development projects in mining, agriculture, hydroelectric power, and transportation infrastructure which “would make their [Southeast Asian] products more accessible, increase their income and thereby their purchasing power and raise their standards of living.”⁵ In other words, as Yoshida put it, developing Southeast Asia was “a vital issue to Japan” if Japan wanted to make it a substitute of China for the provision of food and raw materials.⁶

Japan and the threat of communism in the region

The idea of Southeast Asia as critical for Japan’s economic recovery was linked to another key objective of the Yoshida administration’s policy toward this region: to prevent the loss of Southeast Asia to communist forces. This region’s political instability and economic difficulties worried the Japanese. MOFA warned that as long as such a situation continued, “there always exists a danger that they [Southeast Asian countries] may fall an easy prey to communist infiltration.”⁷ If such an outcome materialized, Yoshida believed that “Japan would find it impossible to stand alone.”⁸ For the Japanese, Indochina was the most problematic area in Southeast Asia in consideration of the fact that it “stands astride our line of trade with Southeast Asia upon which our economy depends to no small extent […].”⁹ In May 1954, MOFA’s Asia Affairs Bureau (hereafter Asia Bureau), which within MOFA was the main section in charge of Japan’s relations with Asia, indicated that not only Vietnam but also Cambodia and Laos were at risk of ending up under communist influence. Moreover, although Southeast Asia was not considered to be under immediate threat from domestic communist movements, things could change in the longer term. The Asia Bureau linked this possible outcome to Southeast Asian countries’ weak capacity to resist communist influence, which created a fertile soil for a possible emergence of communist guerrilla. In order to enhance those countries’ capacity to resist communist influence, MOFA indicated that, in addition to strengthening their military capabilities, it was necessary to promote their economic development and avoid that nationalist sentiments became combined with communism.¹⁰ At that time, when talking about the communist threat to Southeast Asia, Japan’s main concern was the People’s Republic of China. There were indications that Southeast Asian people were “impressed in no small measure by the rapid development of Soviet Russia and the quick rise of Communist China.”¹¹ Several Japanese saw a link between the possible expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia and Japan’s own security. In May 1954, MOFA stressed that,

[t]he setting up of communist rule in China has already brought to Japan serious disadvantages, economic as well as political. Even her very existence may be menaced unless any further spread of communism in Asia is forestalled with might. The economic development of Southeast Asia is thus a question of vital importance for Japan.¹²

The Japanese concerns about Southeast Asia were largely shared in Washington. For the Americans, on the one hand, a link existed between the role of Southeast Asia to support the economic recovery of Japan and, on the other, the need to avoid that this region ended up under communist influence. In January 1951, John Foster Dulles, then special advisor to US Secretary of State Dean Acheson, made clear that,

if Japan is to be on the side of the free world, it will be necessary to assure that its industry can keep running and that it will receive sufficient quantities of the necessary raw materials, particularly coking coal and iron ore.

Therefore, Dulles stated that, “if the US were to use all of these materials for its own industry and not be willing to make reasonable quantities available to the Japanese, it would be futile to expect the Japanese to keep away from Communism.” Dulles warned that,

should the Soviets obtain the industrial power of Germany and Japan, it would place them in such a position of strength that it would be necessary for the US to spend more and produce more to offset this difference, so that it really was to the interest of the US to make it possible for Japan to stay on our side.¹³

It was Southeast Asia that was to provide those raw materials to Japan. Dulles explained that “Japan formerly had obtained large quantities of iron ore from Malaya and the Philippines and that these sources could possibly be re-activated so that the burden on the US would be lessened.”¹⁴ The following year, a “statement of policy” by the US N...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: regional conflict, Cold War, and Japan’s Southeast Asia policy
• 1 Southeast Asia in Japan’s postwar foreign policy, 1950s–1960s
• 2 US “exit” and Japanese “entry”: post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia and the Fukuda Doctrine, 1969–1977
• 3 The Cambodian conflict and the polarization of Southeast Asia: Japan’s response, 1978–1980
• 4 New Cold War and Japan’s pursuit of its regional agenda, 1981–1982
• 5 The unfolding of Japan’s “twin-track” diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 1983–1984
• 6 Changing Cold War environment and the intensification of Japan’s peace diplomacy, 1985–1988
• 7 The Cambodian peace process and the shaping of post-Cold War Southeast Asia: Japan’s role, 1989–1993
• Conclusion
• Index