Reconsidering Social Constructionism

Social Problems and Social Issues

Gale Miller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351494434
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Social Work
• Index: Social Sciences

With the impact of social interactionist and ethnographic methodology twenty-five years ago, the research agenda in social problems began to shift its focus, giving rise to the Social Constructionism movement. The present volume and the related shorter text, Constructionist Controversies, review the substantial contributions made by social constructionist theorists over that period, as well as recent debates about the future of the perspective. These contributions redefine the purpose and central questions of social problems theory and articulate a research program for analyzing social problems as social constructions. A generation of theorists has been trained in the constructionist perspective and has extended it through numerous analyses of diverse aspects of contemporary social life.The debates in this volume pose fundamental questions about the major assumptions of the perspective, the ways in which it is practiced, and the purposes of social problems theory. Their point of departure is Ibarra and Kitsuse's essay, cutting new theoretical ground in calling for ""investigating vernacular resources, especially rhetorical forms, in the social problems process.""Contributors are forceful proponents both within and outside of the social constructionist community, who take a broad array of positions on the current state of social problems theory and on the rhetorical forms that need exploring. They also lay down the general lines for diverse and often competing programs for the future development of the constructionist agenda.

PART I

Debates Within Social Constructionism

Revising the Constructionist Project

1

Reconsidering Social Constructionism

Gale Miller and James A. Holstein

The social constructionist perspective has been the most controversial—if not the most influential—development in social problems theory in the past twenty-five years. Constructing Social Problems (Spector and Kitsuse [1977] 1987) offered what is generally regarded as the quintessential statement of the approach, both transforming and revitalizing the sociology of social problems. In the book and a series of articles published in Social Problems (Kitsuse and Spector 1973, 1975; Spector and Kitsuse 1974), Kitsuse and Spector challenged conventional approaches to the field with their vision of social problems as social constructions, that is, as the products of claims-making and constitutive definitional processes.

While the constructionist approach quickly produced a flurry of empirical studies (see Schneider 1985a; Maynard 1988; Best 1989), it just as quickly became the focus of a variety of debates. Objections from the more conventional or “realist” orientations insisted that there is an objective reality to social problems, which should be the topic of sociological studies and which constructionists stubbornly deny. Charges of unacknowledged objectivism and “ontological gerrymandering” (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985) resounded from the opposite direction. Most recently, the constructionist camp finds itself divided, some arguing for the “strict” constitutive reading of Constructing Social Problems, while others argue for a “contextual” constructionism that focuses on the claimsmaking process, but acknowledges assumptions about objective conditions (Best 1989).

The purpose of this book is to reconsider the social constructionist perspective in light of new developments and emerging debates in social problems theory. Although they all express appreciation for the constructionist approach, the essays that follow offer a variety of orientations to the study of social problems. They critique previous constructionist formulations, make suggestions for advancing, expanding, or diversifying the constructionist agenda, and challenge the perspective and agenda. The book is divided into two parts.

Part I addresses contemporary debates within the constructionist camp. Its focal point is the essay by Ibarra and Kitsuse, which refocuses and redefines Spector and Kitsuse’s original programmatic position. It then considers constructionist responses to the revised position and introduces a variety of ethnomethodological concerns relating to the construction of social problems. Part II focuses on new challenges to social constructionism that emanate from a variety of related, though not wholly sympathetic, perspectives. Critical, poststructural, and representational challenges provide the basis for a wide-ranging discussion of the prospects and possibilities for the constructionist approach and social problems theory.

The Challenge of Social Constructionism

The social constructionist perspective has been controversial since its inception. Most notably, the approach breaks with conventional and commonsensical conceptions of social problems by analyzing them as a social process of definition. In their seminal paper, Kitsuse and Spector define social problems as “the activities of groups making assertions of grievances and claims with respect to some putative conditions” (1973, p. 415). Construed in this fashion, social problems are not objective conditions to be studied and corrected; rather, they are the interpretive processes that constitute what come to be seen as oppressive, intolerable, or unjust conditions like crime, poverty, and homelessness.

From this point of view, social problems are not distinctive and inherently immoral conditions; they are definitions of and orientations to putative conditions that are argued to be inherently immoral or unjust (Spector and Kitsuse [1977] 1987). The constructionist position emphasizes that the activities through which social problems are constructed are both implicitly and intentionally rhetorical. Public rhetoric and the politics of claims-making are analyzed in the myriad circumstances in which social problems construction takes place, including “demanding services, filling out forms, lodging complaints, filing lawsuits, calling press conferences, writing letters of protest, passing resolutions, publishing exposes, placing ads in newspapers, supporting or opposing governmental practice or policy, setting up picket lines or boycotts” (Spector and Kitsuse [1977] 1987, p. 79). The result is a constructionist sociology of social problems that attempts to “account for the emergence and maintenance of claim-making and responding activities” (Kitsuse and Spector 1973, p. 415).

Initially, the constructionist approach was a response and alternative to the structural functionalist approach to social problems. Structural functionalists assume that social conditions exist separately from persons’ interpretations of them. They believe that objective knowledge of social conditions is obtainable through the scientific method and that the scientific study of social conditions will demonstrate that some social conditions are truly social problems. Sociologists use the assumptions as a warrant for defining problems as real and observable social conditions, portraying their studies as objective analyses, and describing themselves as experts on social problems.

Spector and Kitsuse’s claims-making approach undercuts these fundamental assumptions by questioning the possibility of knowing the objective status of conditions. Indeed, their challenge is almost ironic because they take structural functionalists’ definitions of social problems seriously, even as they undermine them. For example, in a classic functionalist statement, Merton contends that “a social problem exists when there is a sizeable discrepancy between what is and what people think ought to be” (1976, p. 7, emphasis in original). Spector and Kitsuse appreciate several questions implicit in this definition by asking, How do people know what is and what ought to be? How do persons know that there is a sizeable discrepancy between what is and ought to be? Spector and Kitsuse’s answers to the questions emphasize the ways in which social conditions, cultural ideals, and discrepancies between them are socially constructed.

Spector and Kitsuse also challenge structural functionalists by analyzing how professional sociologists’ conventional theories of social problems involve claims-making about putative social conditions. Like Merton, authors of social problems texts use their portrayals of “real” aspects of everyday life to justify their interest in analyzing the pervasiveness, social organization, and consequences of the conditions that they describe as manifest and latent social problems. Sociologists also act as expert consultants to policymakers, who assume that social problems exist as objective conditions and that sociologists are experts on them.

Thus, Spector and Kitsuse use the social constructionist perspective to subvert other sociologists’ claims to objective knowledge about social problems and expert status. They also point to the theoretical advantages of studying sociologists as claims-makers by arguing that constructionism provides the basis for developing a distinctively sociological approach that focuses on the social processes through which social problems are constructed. Such a sociology would examine the diverse claims-making groups and activities, and avoid its own claims-making activities. Specifically, Spector and Kitsuse’s ([1977] 1987) approach to constructionism would avoid defining “real” social problems, or distinguishing between “real” and “spurious” social problems.

One indicator of the skill with which Spector and Kitsuse have argued their position is the substantial literature on the social construction of social problems that has developed since 1973. As Schneider (1985a) states in his review and assessment of the perspective, social constructionism has influenced a wide range of theoretical and empirical studies, including those concerned with the micropolitics of trouble, institutional processing of social problems, competition between interest groups over the “ownership” of social problems, and claims-making activities by members of the news media. Taken together, the studies point to the pervasiveness of social problems construction in contemporary Western societies.

Contemporary Debates About Social Constructionism

Some contemporary controversies surrounding social constructionism recast old issues raised in Spector and Kitsuse’s debate with structural functionalists. Questions still arise concerning sociologists’ responsibilities to point out “real” social problems that are ignored by political leaders and the public. Some critics argue that definitions of social problems are important, but there is a “reality” behind them that is paramount. As Eitzen states,

[T]here is an objective reality to social problems. There are structures that induce material or psychic suffering for certain segments of the population; there are structures that ensure the maldistribution of resources within a society and across societies; there are structures that prevent certain societal participants from developing and realizing their full human potential; there are corporate and political organizations that waste valuable resources, that pollute the environment, that are imperialistic, and that increase the gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” (1984, p. 10)

Another set of debates involves Spector and Kitsuse’s contention that the examination of social problems claims-making is a distinctive field of sociological study. For example, Mauss et al. (1975) and Mauss (1989, 1992) argue that social problems claims-making is a type of collective behavior, and social constructionist studies of social problems can be subsumed within the substantive field of social movements. Mauss insists that social problems theory would be enriched by the diverse theories that make up the latter field. Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) offer a related challenge by analyzing social problems claims-making from an ecological perspective. They treat social problems claims as aspects of arenas of public discourse, and claims-making groups as engaged in competition for scarce public attention. Hilgartner and Bosk question social constructionists’ emphasis on studying the natural histories of claims-making movements, and justify their use of organization network and resource mobilization theory to analyze such movements.

Finally there are debates that raise new questions about the fundamental assumptions and goals of social constructionism. Many of the new critics argue that the constructionist perspective actually invokes a selective “objectivism” because it assumes that social construction processes are observable aspects of social worlds that exist separately from social constructionists’ descriptions of them. Social constructionists, then, act as “objective” analysts of and experts on the “real” social processes through which social problems are constructed. Perhaps the most influential of the new critics are Woolgar and Pawluch (1985), who analyze social constructionist theorizing as ontological gerrymandering.

Woolgar and Pawluch suggest that social constructionist arguments can generally be broken out into three parts. First, the analyst identifies particular conditions or behaviors. Then he or she identifies various definitions or claims made about these conditions or behaviors. Finally, the analyst highlights the variability of the definitions or claims relative to the constancy of the conditions to which they relate. The implication is that since the condition is invariant, changes in the definition of the conditions must result from the social circumstances of the definers rather than from the condition itself.

Woolgar and Pawluch note that this sort of analysis depends upon the “objective” statement about the constancy of the condition under consideration in order to justify claims about the shifting definitional process. Assumptions must be made regarding the actual existence and status of the condition if apparent change in the condition or problem is to be considered a definitional artifact. Woolgar and Pawluch argue that this selective “objectivism” represents a theoretical inconsistency in the definitional approach since it manipulates an analytic boundary to make certain phenomena problematic while leaving others unquestioned. Ontological gerrymandering thus glosses over the ways in which constructionist analysts’ descriptions of conditions are themselves definitional claims.

Woolgar and Pawluch draw two very different implications from their analysis. First, they suggest that ontological gerrymandering may be a necessary aspect of the social constructionist project. It is not a practice that can be avoided; rather, it sets constructionist theorizing apart from other interpretive approaches to social problems. The response justifies the theoretical status quo, even taking an appreciative stance toward social constructionists’ writing practices. A second and very different implication is that social constructionists should examine and reconsider their own writing and rhetorical practices. Woolgar and Pawluch suggest that constructionists “search for forms of argument which go beyond the current impasse between proponents of objectivism and of relativism” (1985, p. 224). The suggestion assumes that it is possible to write about social life and experience in ways that do not objectify the phenomena under discussion.

Responses to the Ontological Gerrymandering Critique

Woolgar and Pawluch’s critique has raised a variety of responses among social...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Part I. Debates Within Social Constructionism
• Part II. New Challenges to Social Constructionism
• Index