Development, Experience and Curriculum in Primary Education (1984)

W.A.L. Blyth

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351376792
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Originally published in 1984, this book considers the ever-increasing pressure that teachers are under both to demonstrate and maintain their professional understanding and competence. Curriculum development has long been the subject of scrutiny, with some authorities arguing that the primary curriculum should be a diluted version of the secondary curriculum. Professor Blyth presents a convincing case for a primary curriculum carefully constructed to enhance the relationship between the various aspects of the child's development and total experience.

Initially examining how children in the primary age range do develop and experience the world, the book goes on to consider the implications of this for shaping the curriculum. These are traced through different aspects of the primary curriculum, from physical, moral and aesthetic development to an understanding of the social world. The book concludes with an assessment of this approach to primary education within an international context and prospects for the future.

An important work by a leading authority, Development, Experience and Curriculum in Primary Education is a guide to the professional development of primary teachers, building on their experience and judgement.

1 DEVELOPMENT

Development is a term that is used in a number of ways. It is possible to develop an argument, or a disease, or a film, or a policy. One way of describing the Third World is that it consists of ‘developing countries’. Each of these uses of the term carries with it a set of overtones and images, which together surround the notion of ‘development’. All of them do, however, imply some kind of programmed, purposive change.

One kind of development has acquired a distinctiveness of its own: it is the kind that is associated with organisms. They develop through an in-built programme which, however much it may be modified through external influences, depends essentially on a genetically determined inheritance. This is true whether the organism is a wasp or a seaweed or a kangaroo. Only over long periods do evolutionary processes noticeably affect a species. For an individual organism the direction of development is predictable and intransitive. The individual does not develop something; it just develops, purposefully and evidently.

Yet the term ‘development’ is not usually applied to kangaroos or seaweeds or wasps; it is in practice reserved for one particular organism, the human one. Child Development, as a field of study, is now a century old and has been given a high measure of academic standing over the years by seminal writers such as Arnold Gesell and Susan Isaacs.¹ Usually it considers various aspects of physical growth together with the formation of intellect and personality, taking account also of the various social and environmental influences that affect these aspects of development. Normally, a set of four aspects—physical, cognitive, emotional, social—or something similar is taken as the framework within which child development is discussed, although Peters (1969, p.5) and Alexander (forthcoming) have indicated that the interaction of these conventional categories may be more complex than is sometimes assumed. Together they constitute a major topic in human biology and psychology and indeed in wider fields including sociology, philosophy and theology, for they are concerned with theories, and evidence, about what nature is, and what human nature is. Moreover, they carry with them implications about the responsibilities that adults, especially parents and teachers, must adopt towards children. Although no one set of attitudes and responses can cover all interpretations of nature and of human nature, there is no escaping the imperative to formulate some principles on which to act. Thus Child Development, however its study may be organised, presents a practical challenge to any educator.

The first subdivision usually singled out for study in this field is physical development. This one is the most readily linked to the programmed unfolding of the organism. Skeletal, muscular and glandular development all take place in ways that resemble the development of other immature organisms. The process of development itself includes mere increase in size: this aspect is growth. It also includes the attainment of new powers such as those of sexual reproduction; this aspect is maturation. Both aspects of development proceed according to a programme that is genetically determined, proceeding by spurts and curves that are similar for all individuals but in absolute detail unique for each individual. Incidentally, we are more aware than formerly of the extent to which sexual development takes place during childhood as well as during adolescence. The actual onset of puberty itself occurs earlier than in, say, Victorian times—Tanner’s (1961) ‘secular trend’—so that, at least for girls, it is more likely to fall within the bounds of primary education.

Although the programme is unique for each individual, its actual implementation is not entirely predictable. It depends in part on those social and environmental influences that have already been mentioned. External circumstances, such as accident, or privation of stimulus or nourishment, exercise various kinds of constraints, and this is a lifelong process.

There is still one other element in physical development to be considered, and that is the active response of the organism to its environment that we call learning. Even in this physical sphere there is ample evidence that growth and maturation are immensely overlain by the outcomes of learning. Yet however much they are overlain, they cannot be discarded or ignored.

Physical development is the aspect of development in which children most evidently resemble other immature organisms. It is also the aspect which is most readily open to observation, not only by others but by children themselves. The other aspects of development, as we shall see, largely conceal their own future from children. It is not really possible for a child, however intelligent or socially competent or morally precocious, to imagine what he or she will be like as an adult, because the capacity to understand the direction of those aspects of development depends on processes which are themselves part of development. But it is quite possible for children to envisage being bigger and stronger and more agile and more good-looking, since these categories of growth are understood by children from their earliest years. Only in respect of sexual drives is this basis of personal knowledge largely lacking before adolescence. Therefore it is not surprising that children tend to regard development largely as physical development, and to stress to themselves and others the significance of physical feats and competences, with important consequences for other aspects of as Tanner (1961) and others have emphasised.

The second principal aspect of development usually singled out, at least for descriptive purposes, is intellectual development. It can be envisaged as an extension of physical development into a realm that is almost peculiar to human beings. For here, too, it is possible to speak of the growth of mental powers, and of the maturation of particular capacities, and most certainly of learning, for this is the aspect of development which is concerned with the capacity to learn, self-consciously, and through tasks matched to intellectual growth, the element on which Margaret Donaldson (1978) lays particular emphasis. However, it differs from physical development in one obvious but critical way. Most physical development is open to inspection: that is why children can understand its significance. Intellectual development is not. There is of course a crude relationship between the size and shape of the brain and the intellectual capacity of the organism, but this applies only in the most general terms in the evolutionary scale. Where individuals are concerned, intellectual development cannot be seen. It can only be inferred from observed behaviour. This year Julie is taller than last year, and she can use a calculator. But whereas she is invariably taller, she sometimes uses the calculator the right way and sometimes the wrong way, and sometimes she doesn’t want to use it at all. Soon, use of the calculator may become, in a significant phrase, ‘second nature’ to her, but for the time being it is difficult to point to what has changed since last year. What is more, to Julie herself it is evident that she can sometimes use the calculator, but not that she has undergone some kind of general development, whereas she can see that she can run and also jump and again, swim better because her whole physical potential has become greater.

This invisibility of intellectual development is accompanied by a greater range of theoretical explanations than in the case of physical development, at least in modern times. In the preceding paragraph it was suggested that intellectual development can be envisaged as an extension of physical development. It is also possible to envisage it as something entirely different. Indeed, the history of philosophy and of psychology during the past 200 years shows some of the controversies that have surrounded this particular issue. For it is at least possible to regard intellectual development as having very little to do with the kind of genetic programming that influences physical development. If there is a soul, or a mind, which is not entirely a function of the physical organism, then its development may follow a quite different pattern. It may even be complete from the start and not liable to development at all; requiring only interaction with the environment to bring it into play. Even if it does require development, that could be the result entirely of a learning process and not at all of something genetically determined. Although it is nowadays customary, at least, to assume that intellectual development is related to physical development, it is necessary to remember that this is not self-evident.

The evidence in favour of regarding intellectual development as similar to physical development is, of course, derived from observation and experiment. The early work of Sully, Preyer and Stanley Hall² has been followed by that of many others and in particular of Piaget and his followers³. Together they have accumulated an impressive mass of evidence in favour of the view that there is a sequence of intellectual development that is broadly similar for all children. Although any one set of views about intellectual development is—rightly—liable to constant criticism and revaluation, the case for the general assumption that intellectual powers develop much as physical powers do remains a strong one. It has in fact given rise to a whole discipline named ‘genetic psychology’ or ‘developmental psychology’ whose findings are’ widely accepted. Indeed, there is some danger that they may be too directly and mechanically transferred from one situation to another, on the assumption that the details of intellectual development are much more uniform than they necessarily are. For the establishment of a general principle does not eliminate the need for the cautious, detailed working out of its applications. Experiments with jars or marbles may give little guidance for the understanding of social relations.

The strengths and limitations of the genetic approach can be illustrated by referring to stages of intellectual development such as those that Piaget identified. Like Whitehead before him and Bruner after him⁴, Piaget denoted modes of operation which constituted a hierarchy. Starting from pre-operational thinking, he identified what are usually defined as a phase of intuitive reasoning, then a phase of concrete operations, involving trying out hypotheses to solve problems, and finally a phase of propositional thinking in which more than one hypothesis can be handled at one and the same time. He saw the individual as ascending this hierarchy by a progressive set of adjustments (assimilation and accommodation) and of ‘de-centering’ or the progressive transcending of an egocentric interpretation of the world. This enormous contribution to the understanding of intellectual development has an obvious significance for all planned learning. Yet it was not intended to depict a unitary process of development. It might apply at an early stage in life to one kind of learning, and later to another. For the same reason it could be only broadly linked with chronological age. Just as in physical development individuals move differently, so also this is still more true of intellectual development. Piaget was concerned with the understanding of a set of processes; he never claimed to have drawn up a universal, chronological map.

The remaining aspects of development, as usually depicted, may be considered together, though logically they are distinct. These are personality development (or emotional development) and social development. Personality development is the more inclusive term, covering various kinds of purposive and emotional behaviour, while social development refers more specifically to interaction in social situations. Yet the two are linked, because there are few aspects of personality that can be detected otherwise than in social interaction.

All the uncertainties that apply to intellectual development apply at least as markedly to personal/social development. They, too, can only be inferred from observed behaviour. They, too, can be regarded as dependent on the same kind of genetic programme as physical development; or alternatively, they may be looked upon as almost entirely the consequence of learning. Moreover, whereas the weight of evidence about intellectual development is in favour of the genetic interpretation, however much it is open to environmental modification, there is no such agreement about personal/ social development.

There is not even agreement about the nature of the genetic interpretation itself. One genetic view is that personal/social interaction becomes richer and more complex as the organism develops, just as in the case of physical development. But alongside this there is the rather different view derived from psychoanalysis. That view also permits of stages, like the Piagetian stages of intellectual development, but it also depends on assumptions about the unconscious mind that are derived from the clinical work of Sigmund Freud and his followers and from others in a similar traditions⁵. These assumptions are even less open to observation and verification than those that are usually made about the intellect; in fact, they are virtually metaphysical in nature, though evidently useful in interpreting some kinds of mental disturbance. However, by claiming that a kind of sexuality is characteristic of the early years, to be followed by a period of ‘latency’ and a sexual revival in adolescence, they have sometimes appeared to set up a model of development that is discontinuous and thus incompatible with the description of progressive development that is now generally accepted in the physical and intellectual spheres.

The ideas of those who take a different genetic view of personal/ social development show, in this field, a fairly close parallel with the generally accepted sequence in intellectual development. Piaget himself has contributed substantially to this field too⁶, and his work has been importantly extended by others such as Kohlberg. Stages have been postulated in moral development: in fact, in social development with a component of moral understanding and imperative. Specific attention will be paid to this issue in Chapter 5, but in a general consideration of development it is noteworthy that the same advantages and limitations apply here as in the case of intellectual development. On the one hand it is important to explore the justification for saying that there are recognisable stages in social development. On the other hand it is essential to remember that there is no one rigid chronological sequence that can be applied to every individual or group. Meanwhile, other theories have been developed from insights into anthropology and social psychology by influential writers with very different emphases such as Erikson (1950) and Havighurst (1953), both of whom have been more concerned with a sequence of social orientations and competences than with specifically moral development. Together, these theories have provided a stimulus for much research and for at least some policies relating to the place of childhood and youth in society.

Meanwhile there is also disagreement among those who regard personallsocial development as something learned rather than genetically determined. It is here that ideological considerations tend to arise. A Marxist view is bound to give primacy to one major set of social circumstances, the ownership of the means of production, as the major determinant of these aspects of development. It is, however, also possible to emphasise the decisive importance of family and small-group contexts in the development of particular individuals, as do those with an interactionist perspective. Thus, both the genetic and the environmental approaches are themselves subdivided, though there remains between these two major approaches one clear distinction. The former places emphasis on innate characteristics; the latter does not.

Any brief summary of this kind must do scant justice to the range and subtlety of the issues involved, but it may serve to indicate the nature of the uncertainties surrounding any theories of child development. For it is illegitimate to approach problems of education and teaching without at least some consideration of these issues.

Some Development Approaches to Primary Education

Part of the legacy of educational thought which permeates current thinking is derived from writers and thinkers who have, for one reason or another, based their approach to education on developmental considerations. In order to understand the present situation more fully it will be helpful to turn next to a brief examination of some of their views, which are still influential.

Before any of these is considered in detail, it is important to remember the obvious point that child development is a process that continues throughout life, whereas formal education is a limited, temporary, intermittent procedure. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Figures
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Preface
• 1. Development
• 2. Experience
• 3. Curriculum
• 4. One Approach to Primary Education: An Enabling Curriculum
• 5. Development, Experience and Aspects of the Formal Curriculum
• 6. An Example: The Interpretation of The Social World
• 7. Development, Experience and the Wider Curriculum
• 8. Children’s Response to the Primary Curriculum
• 9. Teachers for an Enabling Curriculum
• 10. An Enabling Curriculum in Perspective
• Appendix I. An Enabling Curriculum for Primary Education
• Appendix II. Examples of Autobiography and Fiction
• Bibliography
• Index