Teaming Up: Components of Safety Under High Risk

Kateri Jochum, Rainer Dietrich

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351895842
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Technology & Engineering

All accidents and incidents at the workplace, and the resulting consequences, are tied to human beings and their actions. Although their avoidance has been a crucial part of training in aviation for the past twenty years, it has been largely ignored in many other occupations with team structures similar to those in aviation. In such professions and workplaces, those involved are under high stress, with enormous workloads, simultaneously completing mental and motor tasks, facing unexpected situations involving great risk, and with uncertain final outcomes. The goal of researchers is to find ways to minimize human error and to understand the interaction amongst the members of the team fulfilling the task. Specialized training programmes, good management and clear rules that lay out which member is responsible for making decisions can be the first steps to reducing and managing such errors. This book is a major result of the Gottlieb Daimler and Karl Benz Foundation's 6th Berlin Colloquium, 'Interaction in High Risk Environments', hosted in 2002 by the Psycholinguistic Group of the Humbolt University Institute for German Language and Linguistics. This group is affiliated with the ongoing research group 'Group Interaction in High Risk Environments (GIHRE)' sponsored by the Foundation based in Ladenburg, Germany. The Colloquium brings together experts from aerospace, clinical medicine, nuclear power, psychology, linguistics and psycholinguistics, to include fields that have yet to be a major focus of scientific investigations. Together, the authors explore scientific advances with direct application to a range of high risk environments. The aim is to address the issues and root causes of error and lack of teamwork by combining the knowledge of scientific experts with experience gained in different fields of industry and public life. Chapters span space travel, risk in the cockpit, safety in medicine, nuclear submarine salvage, large construction sites, police

Chapter 1
Recovering the 'Kursk': A Feat of Technology and Teamwork

Hans van Rooij¹
SMIT Salvage BV, The Netherlands

Introduction

On the morning of 12 August 2000, a last radio message was received from the Russian nuclear submarine 'Kursk' asking permission for a torpedo launch. Shortly thereafter, an explosion occurred, and the 'Kursk' sank from periscope level to 100 metres below sea level in the Barents Sea. Despite various unsuccessful rescue attempts, all 118 members of the submarine's crew tragically lost their lives. The political pressure on Russian President Putin to recover the submarine and the bodies of the crew was tremendous, both within Russia and from the international community. In November 2000, a special mission was sent to recover the bodies from the last compartment of the submarine. Their success was limited, and directly following the mission, the weather deteriorated to levels that made it necessary for the mission to be put on hold during the winter months.

Concurrently, contract negotiations to salvage the submarine were in progress with the Russian government and Mammoet, a Dutch heavy lift company that then formed a joint venture with SMIT International, a Dutch marine salvage company. The partnership of the SMIT/Mammoet joint venture was a good combination, as it brought together technical know-how and experience in salvage and heavy transportation: SMIT, with 160 years of maritime experience and an extensive track record, including high profile salvages such as the Herald of Free Enterprise (1987), Piper Alpha (1989), and Sea Empress (1996), and Mammoet with expertise in horizontal and vertical transport of heavy objects. On 18 May 2001, all parties reached an agreement and the contract was concluded.

History

SMIT International's involvement in the field of submarine recovery goes back to more than a decade prior to the salvage of the Russian nuclear submarine 'Kursk' in 2001. In April 1989, during the Gorbachev political era, the nuclear submarine 'Komsomolets' caught fire and sunk to a depth of 1700 metres of water before it reached the bottom of the Barents Sea. SMIT International was commissioned to do a study to determine if the recovery of the submarine was feasible. The two main factors that had to be taken into consideration in the salvage plan were that the submarine was built of titanium and, more importantly, that it was carrying two nuclear headed torpedoes on board. This was of grave concern, as there was the possibility that the casings of the nuclear warheads would be eroded by the influence of sea water, thus leaking into the marine environment.

The study was done in consultation with the Rubin Central Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, which also designed and built the 'Komsomolets'. After careful analysis and lengthy consultations, SMIT International closed the contract for the recovery of the 'Komsomolets' submarine in the 1990s. However, due to the changing political situation and instability of the Russian rouble, the contract was never carried out. The 'Komsomolets' is still lying at the bottom of the Barents Sea today.

However, these early negotiations were not in vain, as they formed a framework for the rapid planning and negotiation necessary for the salvage of the 'Kursk' submarine. Our colleagues from Rubin helped us gain access to the Russian hierarchy and supported our contract discussions.

Operation 'Kursk' Phase I: Preparation, Negotiations, Conceptualization, and Risk Assessment

Structural Pressures and Difficulties

The proposed plan of salvage for the 'Kursk' was not free of limitations and difficulties. Time was of utmost importance, as there was only a small window of time in which the salvage companies could successfully recover the submarine. The planned salvage period, between the middle of June and the end of September 2001, was identified because of the favourable local weather conditions at that time. With two nuclear reactors and 23 missiles on board and the added factor of possible nuclear radiation, it was crucial that the salvage be carried out in stable weather conditions.

Due to the weather spectrum in the Barents Sea during those months, there was only a 20 per cent chance of acceptable weather conditions required for a safe lift. According to the contract, the 'Kursk' was to be lifted prior to 15 September 2001. In essence, this time frame was too tight, and statistically speaking, SMIT/ Mammoet were up against great odds from the onset of the project.

The salvage of the 'Kursk' was much more complicated than any other salvage undertaken to date due to the fact that there were numerous parties involved, each with its own separate agenda. The Russian government and President Putin were determined that the 'Kursk' be salvaged. On the other hand, there was the Russian navy - the owner of the submarine - and other crucial players such as non-governmental organizations like Bellona in Norway and Greenpeace, all of whom wanted to be involved in the project.

Additional pressures came in the form of negative media coverage; there were few parties who believed that it was actually possible to lift the submarine. These doubts translated into a great deal of additional work and stress for the company. Internally, the SMIT/Mammoet staff and their families were constantly worried by the alleged risks - in particular, the possibility of exposure to nuclear radiation during the salvage operation. As was later verified, these fears were unfounded: the level of radiation recorded on site was no higher than the normal background levels in the area.

The most significant aspect of the entire salvage was the technology required to execute the operation. Many aspects of the 'Kursk' salvage were first-ever achievements, as the scale and complexity of the project required the development of new technology and equipment especially for the operation.

The SMIT/Mammoet joint venture was very effective, and the two companies complemented each other very well. SM1T was familiar with Mammoet, but the two companies had never worked together prior to this project. With the tight time frame within which to complete the project, it was important that everyone worked towards a single goal. There was no time for mistakes, and there was certainly no time for human relations disputes.

'Kursk': Facts and Figures

Figure 1.1 Cross section of the 'Kursk' submarine

Figure 1.1 shows a cross-section of the 'Kursk' submarine. The 'Kursk' is 155 metres long, 18 metres in diameter, and has an underwater weight of 11,000 tons. It consists of nine compartments: a forward torpedo room (Figure 1.1.b-A.), sleeping accommodation (Figure 1.1.b-B.), a control section (Figure 1.1.b-C.), a reactor compartment (Figure 1.1.b-D.), turbines (Figure 1.1.b-E.), and the gear boxes (Figure 1.1.b-F.).

Figure 1.2 Seismographs from 12 August 2000 as collected by Spitzbergen and NORSAR

The complexities of the project lay in the submarine's torpedoes. There were torpedoes that were unaccounted for, a reactor compartment with two water high-pressure reactors, and a reactor control room. In addition, there were 23 cruise missiles on board, and the condition of these warheads was unknown. Due to SMIT's experience with the 'Komsomolets', in which they were only informed a year after negotiations had begun that two nuclear weapons were on board, they had lengthy discussions with the Russians in order to determine whether there were indeed nuclear weapons on board the 'Kursk'.

The explosion in the submarine's torpedo room, which ultimately led to its sinking, also compromized the structural integrity of the submarine. In order to conceptualize a plan for unexpected circumstances, we first analysed the cause of the 'Kursk' accident and assessed the damage. We believed it was sailing at periscope depth when the first explosion occurred in one of the forward torpedo compartments. The submarine lost buoyancy and about 135 seconds later a second and even larger explosion occurred, which led to its sinking.

We were able to come to such conclusions due to the seismographic data (Figure 1.2) made available to us from Spitzbergen and from the NORSAR in Norway. From the shape of the seismographic graph we were also able to tell what kind of explosions they were and the different types of materials involved in the explosions. It was through the use of this information that the 'Kursk' was located.

Risk and Safety Assessments

In every salvage operation, safety is of primary concern. However, due to the time line of this particular project, we had to begin preparations while the safety assessments were still underway. Therefore, an opt-out clause was negotiated into the contract. If the assessments had yielded a negative safety conclusion, or if questions ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• List of Figures
• 1 Recovering the 'Kursk': A Feat of Technology and Teamwork Hans van Rooij
• 2 The Right Staff: The Team Component of Space Travel Reinhold Ewald
• 3 Teams under Pressure: A Case Study of Police Conflict Management Eckhard Gremmler
• 4 Luck of the Draw? Human Safety on Large-Scale Construction Sites Franz Remitter
• 5 Simple Speech: Improving Communication in Disaster Relief Operations Dietrich Ungerer
• 6 Risk Perception and Risk Management in Aviation Judith Orasanu, Ute Fischer and Jeannie Davison
• 7 Managing Threat and Error to Increase Safety in Medicine Robert L. Helmreich and J. Bryan Sexton
• Index