Neoliberalism and English Language Education Policies in the Arabian Gulf

Osman Barnawi

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351997188
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Over the past two decades, the Arabian oil-rich Gulf countries have faced enormous social, political, economic, cultural, religious, ideological and epistemological upheaval. Through detailed, critical comparative investigation, Neoliberalism and English Language Education Policies in the Arabian Gulf examines the impact of such disruption on education policies in a political and economic union, consisting of six countries: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait.

Using data collected from a wide range of sources, this thought-provoking book documents the inner workings of neoliberalism across a strategic geographical area of the Islamic world. The book teases apart the complex issues surrounding the ways in which access to English has been envisioned, contested, and protected from being challenged among different players within and between the Gulf countries. Osman Z. Barnawi explores the intensifying ideological debates between Islamic culture and Western neoliberal values, and questions whether Islamic values and traditions have been successfully harmonised with neoliberal capitalist development strategies for nation building in the Arabian Gulf region.

Neoliberalism and English Language Education Policies in the Arabian Gulf will be of interest to academics, researchers and postgraduates working in the fields of language education and, more specifically, TESOL, applied linguistics, education policy, and teacher education.

1 Neoliberalism and its key concepts

What does this so-called neoliberalism mean? Today, our social, cultural, political, institutional, educational and daily lives (both public and private) are operating within the framework of neoliberalism (Chun, 2017; Connel, 2013; Harvey, 2005; Phan, 2017; Roberts & Peters, 2008). Neoliberalism now seems to be the “common-sense way many of us interpret, live in and understand the world” (Harvey, 2005, p. 3). But what does this so-called neoliberalism mean? Neoliberalism has been difficult to define, owing to the complexity, elasticity and inconsistency of its meaning; the apparent gaps between theory and reality, and disparities between the claims of neoliberalism and the practices of its advocates (Block, Gary, & Holborow, 2012; Fairclough, 2006; Marginson & Considine, 2000; Slaughter & Leslie, 1999). Generally speaking, the term ‘neoliberalism’ refers to the philosophy of economic and social transformation taking place according to the logic of free market doctrines that dictate the way economies and societies function. These free market doctrines are “rooted in much deeper structural and systemic changes in our conception of the politics and the practices of governing” (Oksala, 2013, p. 53). It is for these reasons that neoliberalism has to be understood at deeper levels, including the historic-ontological level, if we are to engage in any kind of critical discussion centred on the concept.

As an economic theory, neoliberalism first gained currency in South America, under the Chilean dictator, Pinochet, who came to power through a violent insurrection in 1973. Under Pinochet’s regime, the former agendas of democratisation and state-led industrialisation were replaced by the deregulation of markets, individualisation, self-interest, less state intervention, increasing competitiveness, massive privatisation of government assets and the like (Connel, 2013; Hill & Kumar, 2009). Harvey (2005), in his often-cited book entitled Brief History of Neoliberalism, offers a comprehensive definition of neoliberalism as “a theory of political-economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (p. 2). According to this cultural logic, individuals can enter the market based on their own interests, wants and needs. They can also leave the market whenever they want; hence, neoliberalism pushes individual interests, desires and wants to the forefront in the market economy.

The theoretical formation of neoliberalism can be traced back to the Chicago School of Economics in the 1950s. Specifically, it was formed when a group of economists and businessmen (also known as the ‘Chicago boys’, since they had all received their training at the University of Chicago) attempted to reinstitute neoclassical economics through doctrines of monetarism – placing firm controls over the money supply in order to keep the economy stable (see, for instance, Harvey, 2005, for more details on the history of neoliberalism).Within this strategy, as Holborow (2012) describes, “the theory [of neoliberalism] justified governments avoiding inflation by limiting the money supply and letting unemployment settle at ‘natural’ levels, regardless of the social hardship caused. Later, monetarism was combined with fiscal incentives in order to boost consumption” (p. 19). Fundamental to this economic rationality is the construction and projection of the operation of the market as a ‘natural process’ that takes place independently of the state; therefore, “the model of enterprise is taken much further, so that it comes to encompass the whole sphere of subjectivity, affectivity, and intimacy” (Wallenstein, 2012, p. 27). Influenced by these neoliberal doctrines, the “governmental rationality of socialism” (Foucault, 1986, p. 92) is abolished, and the relationships between the market and the state are re-institutionalised; in other words, there is minimal intervention in the market by the state. Under these conditions, as Harvey (2005) in his often cited book articulates, the role of the state in the market can be described as follows:

The state has to guarantee, for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must also set up those military, defence, police, and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary.

(p. 2)

It is within this market framework that “the entrepreneurial relation enters into the self, and via the idea of ‘human capital’ the individual’s entire behavior, the body as genetic capital, education as investment, marriage, love, and child rearing” (Wallenstein, 2012, p. 27) are reinterpreted and justified in the forms of investment, surplus and revenue. This economic political rationality raised some critical questions, including in what ways the state could “achieve maximum efficiency through minimum intervention”. What sort of laws, natural rights or moral rights could the state introduce into the market to justify its existence? What culture of trust is there between the state and the market and between the corporate globalists and the ordinary citizens?

Over the past 35 years, in response to the increasing complexity of social reality, many Western governments have made neoliberalism their official policy. In the words of Oskala (2013, p. 69), “all rational conduct, whatever it may be, ultimately comes under economic analysis. Economic interpretation of all human behavior is not only possible, it is understood to be the best way to make sense of it”. With this view in mind, a variety of neoliberal structural apparatuses have been constructed and employed by business-friendly governments in the West in order to liberate trade, business and interest rates and to relax the regulations governing foreign direct investment. “Controls over banking, controls over currency exchange and controls over capital movements were all loosened or abolished” (Connell, 2013, p. 100). Also, gradually, and through various strategies, “a fast-moving global arena of financial transactions, consisting of a network of national and international markets in shares, bonds, financial derivatives and currency, was brought into being”. At the same time as this has been happening, the markets have been expanding, and new markets have been created where before there were no markets (Connell, 2013; Harvey, 2005; Hill & Kumar, 2009), especially in developing countries like Africa (Grant, 2009), Asia, Southeast Asia (Phan, 2013; Pillar & Cho, 2013) and the Arabian oil-rich Gulf region (Barnawi, 2015; Phan, 2017). Fundamental needs such as drinking water, health care, public roads and other social welfare services that have long been enjoyed by societies according to the principles of citizens’ rights, social solidarity, collegiality and social alliances are now being obtained through “companies selling services in a market” (Connell, 2013, p. 100).

Neoliberalism and its consequences, including the vast erosion of major public services like education, the water supply and health care, and other services like official documents (e.g., national identification cards), parking and the like in Western countries such as Australia, the United Kingdom, United States, New Zealand and Canada, have been thoroughly discussed and documented (e.g., Connell, 2013; Harvey, 2005; Hill & Kumar, 2009; Peters, 2007). However, the practices and consequences of neoliberalism in the six Arabian oil-rich Gulf countries – Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman – remain under-explored. This is one of the critical gaps that this book is attempting to fill through an in-depth, historical, political, economic and comparative examination.

In this era of globalisation and economic growth, the central dynamic of neoliberalism operates within and between the metropole and the periphery. For global corporate capitalists, privatising public assets, dismantling economic and political borders between nations and freeing the market from government intervention are fundamental to achieving progress, freedom and prosperity, as well as addressing issues like poverty and protecting societies everywhere. Hence, the ‘democracy of people’ coupled with their freedom, prosperity and progress, has been equated with the ‘democracy of money’ (economy). As Connell (2013) explains, “neoliberalism is the latest mutation in a sprawling world-wide regime, which forged a new settlement between military, political and business elites in the global periphery, and their counterparts in the metropole” (p. 101). This shift in economic relations within and between human societies can be clearly seen in, for instance, the ‘Structural Adjustment Programme’ of the 1980s and 1990s that was imposed on many developing countries through elite international financial organisations like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Strategies like rescheduling loan payments, massive cuts in basic necessities (e.g., food and drinking water) in order to settle foreign debts, reducing wages, increasing interest rates and reimbursable advisor services (in the case of the Arabian Gulf countries, as shown next) were forcibly institutionalised by these Western international organisations in regions like Latin America, Africa and Asia. These strategies were also used effectively to address inflation and debt, to privatise state assets, and to open up the global market. The results of these neoliberal economic policies were devastating, in that a dramatic collapse of public services and economic security occurred in many developing countries (e.g., the case of Greece in 2012, and since then Argentina and the six Arabian Gulf countries, as I will show in this book). Furthermore, these economic policies have given rise to resistance and demonstrations in Latin America (e.g., Bolivia, Argentina, Venezuela and Ecuador (Grant, 2009), Europe (e.g., Italy, Spain, Sweden and the Czech Republic), Africa (e.g., Kenya and South Africa), Asia (e.g., Thailand and Malaysia) and elsewhere.

Using the rhetoric of ‘power sharing’, ‘self-organising’, democracy, social justice and mutual accountability, corporate globalists are implementing neoliberal globalisation policy agendas in various parts of the world. Central players in the neoliberal economic globalisation process, like the USA, for instance, have pursued and justified their visions of a “democratic military [policy]” and an “economic empire” through “phony deals and self-serving efforts”, as Cavanagh and Mander (2004) in the book ‘Alternative to Economic Globalization: A Better World Is Possible’ aptly describes it. To give a notable example, it is now well known that it was in the interests of U.S. free market corporations, and not, as claimed, in the interests of global security and stability that the invasion of Iraq took place:

By now the whole world has understood the falseness of the claims underpinning the Iraq war. We have learned about the “neoconservative” passion (among officials who are now high up in the Bush administration) to invade Iraq ten years before 9–11, and to reshape the Middle East into a free-market globalist framework intended to keep those resources flowing to the United States.

(p. 11)

What is evident from this scenario is that the very concept of freedom has been equated with free markets and free trade. At the same time, in serving U.S. interests (mainly economic), everything is justifiable and possible. One result of the false ‘unjustifiable’ invasion of Iraq was that the U.S. government was confronted with a crisis of credibility at national, regional and international levels on the one hand, and enormous deficits in the federal budget and national trade on the other. Ironically, in order to keep its market freedom and its interests in Iraq alive, the U.S. government “imposed new rules for foreign investment in a “free” Iraq: rigidly neoliberal, highly beneficial to U.S.-based global corporations, but not so good for Iraqi freedom”. These new rules include the privatisation of state corporations (e.g., the phosphate and sulphur mines), the deregulation of the market in Iraq, and a forty-year investment signed between foreign investors and the Iraqi government, subject to unlimited renewal. It is under such neoliberal policies that leading U.S. companies have won contracts in Iraq, including Bechtel with a $2.8 billion investment, the Washington Group with a $2.1 billion investment and Perini with a $1 billion investment. It was also at that time that former U.S. President George W Bush announced the formation of the ‘New U.S. – Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA)’ (see Cavanagh & Mander, 2004 for further details).

Likewise, guided by the concepts of the free market, free economy and the like, the six Arabian oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have entered into a technical collaboration agreement and consultations with international financial organisations such as the IMF, WTO and the World Bank. In the case of agreement between the GCC countries and the World Bank, for instance, it was stated,

The World Bank, through Reimbursable Advisory Services (RAS), and upon demand, delivers advisory services including technical assistance and implementation support in its core areas of [assumed] competence. As the name implies, the Bank is fully reimbursed for the costs of RAS services delivered to GCC countries.

(World Bank, 2015)

In light of this agreement, the Arabian Gulf countries will pay $30 million to the World Bank as RAS, and the cost is expected to reach $45 million by 2017. As a result of this GCC-World Bank agreement, governments of the Arabian Gulf countries have also formed regional level cooperation with the GCC Secretariat General, the Gulf Monetary Council, and with the GCC Organization for Industrial Consultations to cement their integration as GCC countries (see also World Bank, 2016 report on the GCC: Economic Outlook for more details). Noticeably, recent tumbling oil prices in the world market (especially when the price of oil went from over $100 to below $40 per barrel in mid-2014), coupled with China’s market crash in 2015, have had a catastrophic impact on all Arabian Gulf countries at social, political and economic levels. In Saudi Arabia for instance, by Royal Decree, several major government bodies and ministries have been restructured, and massive cuts have been made in wages. At the same time, top construction companies such as the Saudi Binladin Group and Saudi Oger Ltd have declared bankruptcy. In the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on the other hand, the UAE Prime minister and ruler of Dubai has endorsed a bankruptcy law that decriminalises bounced cheques, which offers flexible solutions for businesses faced with financial hardship (e.g., rescheduling accumulated debts and restructuring businesses). The Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar has stated that owing to drops in oil prices, the ‘government no longer provides for everything’, thereby signalling a powerful message to Qataris that austerity measures are the next inevitable government plan (Kovessy & Khatri, 2015). The governments of Bahrain and Kuwait immediately raised petrol prices (by more than 50 per cent in Bahrain and up to 80 per cent in Kuwait) as part of their wider structural economic and fiscal reforms, thereby causing heated debates and demonstrations among their nationals. Top officials in Oman, in contrast, called for economic diversification, and treated the economic crisis as an opportunity to move forward (further details of the impacts of the oil crisis on each GCC country will be discussed in the respective chapters).

These reactions invite us to question further the agendas of elite international financial institutions like the IMF, the WTO and the World Bank in the Arabian Gulf region. Had advocates of global neoliberalism at the World Bank, for instance, failed to read the future of oil in the market economy? Were they rather being “ideologically selective” (Fairclough, 2006) in their neoliberal advocacy (policy) agendas? Ironically, officials of international financial institutions like the IMF are advising governments in the GCC countries to adopt various aggressive austerity measures in order to realise significant improvements in their economic performance:

[These] measures could include reorienting public spending, strengthening the role of private sector competition, developing backward and forward linkages across sectors with a comparative advantage, and implementing labour market reforms to incentivize private sector employment of nationals and improvements in productivity.

(IMF, 2014, p. 4)

Government-run (or protectionist) economies have long been prevalent in the social-economic and political structures of societies in the Arabian Gulf countries. At the heart of the neoliberal capitalist model of development is the question of in what ways privatisation, individualisation, increasing competitiveness, labour market reforms, budget cuts, secularism, liberal democracy and other Western free market doctrines might influence the cultural traditions, educational values, political and economic aspects of this strategic geographical area of the Islamic world – the Arabian Gulf region. The economic and political movements of Muslims have for a long time been based on Islamic readings of socialism – conceptualising “society as a space in which people – including strangers – come together and associate not in competition with one another but in a convivial manner” (Zaman, 2014, n.p.). The influence of these interpretations was evident, for instance, in the movements of the Tartar-led Waisi in Russia in the first decades of the twentieth century, in Turkey, and the Pakistani People’s Party led by Zulfikar Bhutto in 1967(Atasoy, 2009; Moudouros, 2014; Zaman, 2014). Muslim societies have usually upheld “a collective identification with Islam as a source of national culture and regarded Islamic ideals and cultural practices as central to spiritual transformation” (Atasoy, 2009, p. 7). On what basis, therefore, could governments in the Arabian Gulf harmonise Western neoliberal doctrines with Islamic traditions and values, which embrace social solidarity (or tadamun in Arabic), collegiality, collectivism and social alliances among their nationals? What sorts of cultural and ideological articulations as well as institutional laws/regulations are required in order to realise such socioeconomic transformations? As Holborow (2012) warns us, since “neoliberalism often presents as a uniformly imposed social order, it is important to distinguish between the doctrine and what happens in practice, between what it says about economies and how economies actually develop” (p. 15).

The diverse political re-orientations, normative standards, and other neoliberal economic policies being adopted by the governments of Arabian Gulf countries in collaboration with international financial organisations such as the IMF, WTO and WTB, together with the consequences of these policies, will be discussed in Chapter 3, as well as in the chapters that address the case of each country. Having discussed neoliberalism and its key concepts earlier, I will now look at the ways in which these complex concepts work in the field of education – the ways in which the ideology of neoliberalism is being projected and imposed in education policies in terms of taking into account issues such as modernity, social good versus economic good, democrat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Table
• Preface
• Organisation of the book
• Acknowledgements
• 1. Neoliberalism and its key concepts
• 2. The Arabian oil-rich Gulf countries today
• 3. Islam, neoliberalism and education in the GCC region
• 4. Researching neoliberal English language education orientations in the Arabian Gulf countries
• 5. Neoliberalism and English education policy in Saudi Arabia
• 6. Neoliberalism and English language education policy in the UAE
• 7. The architecture of a neoliberal English education policy in Qatar
• 8. Neoliberal English language education policy in Oman
• 9. Neoliberalism and the English language education policy in the ‘new Kuwait’
• 10. Neoliberalism and the English education policy agenda in Bahrain today
• 11. A comparative investigation of English education and neoliberal education policies across the Arabian Gulf countries
• 12. The future of English education in the Arabian Gulf region
• References
• Index