The Jewish Origins of Israeli Foreign Policy

A Study in Tradition and Survival

Shmuel Sandler

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780367887643
• eBook ISBN: 9781351762717
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The conventional understanding of Israeli foreign policy has been that it is a relatively new phenomenon, with some claiming that the 'Jewish People' is an invention by mid-19th century Jewish historians, or simply an 'imagined community'.

This book disputes these claims by demonstrating that the Jews have a tradition of foreign relations based on an historical political tradition that goes back thousands of years, and that this tradition has been carried over to the State of Israel. The Jewish political tradition in foreign policy has always been defensive-oriented, whether under sovereignty or in the Diaspora. Power has generally been only a means for achieving survival rather than a goal in itself, whereas Jewish national identity has always been related to historical Zion. In order to explore the question of whether it is possible to identify patterns of international behaviour in the foreign policy of the Jews, the book begins with the Bible and continues through the period of the First and Second Temples, then looks at the long generations when the Jewish people were stateless, and ultimately concludes with an examination of the sovereign Jewish state of Israel. The underlying assumption is that an understanding of these characteristics will allow us to derive a better understanding of the Jewish origins of Israel's foreign policy, which should in turn help to eliminate many of the harshest criticisms of Israel's foreign policy.

By presenting a nuanced and intricate examination of longstanding Jewish foreign policy principles, this book will appeal to students and scholars of Jewish Studies, Israeli Studies, International Relations and anyone with an interest in the relationship between religion and foreign policy.

1Religion, identity and foreign policy

The discipline that is most relevant for analyzing the foreign policy of entities, including states, nations, and religions, is clearly international relations. Another relevant area of focus is ethnic-nationalism, a field of study developed during the late twentieth century and especially pertinent to any analysis of the historical foreign policy of Judaism. In the present chapter we will endeavor to delineate theoretical approaches that are relevant to the analysis of a Jewish foreign policy tradition.

The evolution of international relations has been conventionally accompanied by a debate between two main schools of thought. The Idealist school that dominated the discipline at its outset has been challenged by the Realist school. In essence, the two schools have continued to contend with one another, although they have both changed their paradigmatic emphasis. Among an array of theories, Liberalism and Neo-liberalism are considered as heirs to the Idealist tradition. Realism has also evolved into a more contemporary faceted Neo-Realism.

David Baldwin, in a book dedicated to the debate between Neo-Realism and Neo-Liberalism, traced the origins between Idealism and Realism to the ancient Greeks. Thucydides’ emphasis on the centrality of balance of power, reliance on self-help and similar mechanisms established Realism in contrast to the ancient stoics that saw themselves as citizens of the world. While Machiavelli, Hobbes and those who believed in the mercantilist economic system can be seen as the intellectual ancestors of Realism, Baldwin similarly identified idealists amongst early Christian philosophers who propounded ideas of economic interdependence, as well as eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophers who espoused ideas of a world civilization while rejecting the main concepts of Realism (Baldwin 1993, 11–12). In short, the Idealist–Realist contention has been extant since antiquity, arguably emerging from theological thought.

In this chapter we shall begin with a historical review of the origins of this debate. Sandal and Fox (2013, 1–4) portray a comprehensive range of approaches and theories to the role of religion in the theory of international relations (referred to as IR in this book). Instead of Fox’s attempt (2015) to relate to the rise of religion solely via secularization theory and secularism, I prefer to add a historical review. Yet, since in itself Judaism went through a secularization process, I shall switch in the next chapter from religion and replace it with the concept of tradition. However, in the present chapter, I shall confine my analysis of the relationship of religion to the evolution of international politics.

Later in this chapter we shall examine how the main schools evolved as IR became a distinct discipline in the twentieth century. The ultimate purpose is to propose IR theories that are relevant to Jewish international behavior, whether in the Diaspora or in the State of Israel. The decline and ascendance of religion in world politics in general and foreign policy in particular, is pertinent for understanding a similar trend in Israeli foreign policy.

International relations: a historical perspective

Religion was the central binding force in Europe following the disintegration of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century CE. As the universal religion of the Empire since the beginning of the fourth century, Christianity ultimately survived the collapse of Rome. Throughout the medieval period, Christianity gave Europe an identity, a fact that was carried over to the modern era. During those years some of Europe’s major confrontations were with pagan tribes that had penetrated Europe, ultimately accepting monotheism, or Islam in Arabia, which also claimed divine revelation and ultimately gave rise to the Muslim Empire. The Thirty Years War (1618–1648) and the ensuing Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) gave legitimacy to a newly-born political structure – a state based on territory – thus terminating this continental unity. In short, religion was fundamental in providing a national identity during the prestate era.

The dawn of the era of the modern state led to the emergence of an interstate system that replaced the earlier imperial and feudal orders. Prior to the emergence of the territorial state, power had been effectively divided between two entities: the Holy Roman Empire or the Church of Rome, on the one hand, and a host of feudal lords on the other. Whereas the Emperor or Pope was the legitimate and recognized leader of a united Christian Europe, actual power was decentralized among many feudal potentates. The rulers of the territorial states, to whom legitimacy was granted following the Peace of Westphalia, had already been successful in their quest for a centralized control of power. As heirs to both the Holy Roman Empire and the feudal order, the monarchs’ survival depended upon the ability of the territorial states they had created to fulfill the functions previously discharged by the previous two systems of authority.

On the normative level, the new principle that replaced the Holy Roman Empire and religion in general was the doctrine of sovereignty. Although rooted in divine beliefs, which developed as the central abstract principle of the territorial state, the doctrine of sovereignty was a combination of both external autonomy, vis-à-vis other rulers, and the ability of the state to impose order on the territory it controlled. In religious terminology, this concept is identified with the Almighty, who is the acknowleged “Sovereign of the Universe.” The ruler, or “prince” for all intents and purposes, represented the highest secular authority within the territory he controlled. In such a state system, both the role of the divine and the norms of international behavior were, in effect, marginalized.

A legal code delineating the rights and duties of states in relation to each other emerged in parallel to the doctrine of sovereignty. The Treaty of Westphalia, in addition to making the state the main proponent in the new inter-state system, on the basis of Hugo Grotius’ De jure belli ac pacis [On the Law of War and Peace] (1628) codification, also adopted rules and procedures concerning state behavior. While realizing that secular law alone could not achieve the goal of restraining and regulating war, Grotius was determined to separate international law from religion. While he introduced Christian elements into the jurisprudence of international law, he is, nevertheless, considered the father of secular, or natural, law. Developing during the subsequent centuries into a system of international law by introducing rules and procedures, as well as limitations on state behavior; international law became identified with a more cooperative approach in international relations. In contrast, the Realist school, as we shall see, stressed that the decentralized character of international law was effective only where two conditions existed: complementary interests between states and the distribution of power (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 296). As such, consideration of religion and regional entities were minimized.

The period between the Treaty of Westphalia and the end of the eighteenth century was a golden age in terms of the management of the balance of power within the international system. A religious leader such as Cardinal Richelieu advanced the concept of raison d’état that allowed for cooperative alliances between Catholic and Protestant princes. Ideas articulated by Jean Bodin and Thomas Hobbes in their celebrated treatises provided the theoretical justification for dynastic sovereignty, as well as the contractual logic that formed the basis of the state and of the international order (Herz 1957; Puchala 1971, 27–34).

Religion was further marginalized in the post Westphalia era as the American and French revolutions destroyed the ancién regime, as that era came to be known. John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, the two political philosophers who had the greatest influence on these revolutions are considered, together with Immanuel Kant, to be the founding fathers of political liberalism. While not articulating the national idea expressly and deliberately, they indirectly gave birth to a new legitimizing principle – that of self-determination. Principles like “inalienable rights” that are inherant in individuals, and “the general will,” were the underpinnings of the doctrine of popular sovereignty. The dramatic spectacle of a people rising up against their monarch and replacing him with trappings of popular sovereignty provided not only a new form of legitimacy, but also diminished even further the small role played in the ancien regime by the divine. Following these revolutions, even the hitherto sacrosanct divine right of kings was rejected. Moreover, in France and the United States of America, both of which had turned into two different models of democracy, a new relationship between church and state evolved. One of the major losers in the French Revolution was the clergy, whereas in the United States the clergy had been separate from government from the very beginning.

The decline of monarchical legitimacy and the rise of the doctrine of popular sovereignty led to demands for self-rule by varied ethnic nationalities. The diminished role of religion further added to the strengthening of ethnic identity. Europe was replete with stateless ethnic groups, many of them with collective memories of glorious ancient pasts. As a result, during the nineteenth century, the ideas behind the American and French revolutions, generated national revolutions based on ethnic nationalism. In contrast to the preceding 150 years, when territorial states were established around principalities most of the new states represented a common ethno-national heritage. However, many of these groups were either mixed in with other disparate ethnic groups, or internally fragmented into many separate entities, as in the case of Germany and Italy. The heritage of such ethnic groups was, to a large extent, loaded with religious expression. The Balkan nations, for whom Christianity was a major agent in their identity, revolted against Ottoman–Muslim rule and tried, with a limited degree of success, to revive ethnic identities that had been dormant for centuries (Albrecht-Carrie 1972, 12). The states they established on the ruins of the Muslim Ottoman Empire had a national basis as opposed to a religious one.

Italy and Germany both serve as strong examples of this trend. They were both ethnic nations that had merged into large sovereign states, thereby altering the balance of power in Europe – and eventually resulting in two world wars. The country of Belgium was created in the wake of a common uprising by two different nations and religious sects because of the geopolitical security interests of the great powers at the time. Despite their failure in the short run, the revolutions of 1848, the “spring of nations,” amply demonstrated that national movements were an all-European phenomenon. Yet, the momentum largely belonged to concentrated stateless ethnic groups, not dispersed peoples. As we shall see, in national movements occurring throughout the continent, the Jewish people were largely excluded due to their lack of a territorial base.

In the nineteenth century there were attempts to bring religious fervor back into the international European system. Tsar Alexander I of Russia contrived an alignment in September 1815 with Austria and Prussia, that came to be known as the “Holy Alliance.” Britain refused to join the Holy Alliance and instead preferred the “Quadruple Alliance,” considered by some scholars as the beginning of a European entity (Albrecht-Carrie 1972, 7). Another demonstration of the secular nature of the international system was the alliance between Britain and France with the Ottoman Sultan against Russia during the Crimean War (1853–1856). Ironically, the trigger to that war was a quarrel between the Russian Orthodox church and Western Christian missionaries over the holy places in Palestine. Britain saw in the Tsar’s support of the Russian Orthodox Church a continuation of Russia’s southward encroachment, and hence supported Muslim Turkey against Christian Russia. The international system that prevailed between the Congress of Vienna and World War I has been dubbed by some theoreticians as the Concert System, or a “managed” balance of power (Kissinger 1957; Hoffman 1968, 109–114). Indeed, the great powers of the nineteenth century tried to restore a balance of power mechanism so as to avoid an ordeal like the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars, but this time as a coordinated, rather than in a natural equilibrium. Most significantly, they did not support the Christian bond in Europe.

The international system that emerged following the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 was considered to be revolutionary. It has been thus viewed because the main actors did not recognize the legitimacy of one another and hence disagreed on the rules of the game (Hoffman 1968, 114–122). Following the disastrous results of each of the two world wars there has been an attempt at more institution building – including the League of Nations in 1920 and its associated institutions between the two world wars – than ever before, as the heterogeneity of regimes contributed to a growing disorder. Most responsible for the disorder were the revolutionary regimes in several of the major powers.

The twentieth century was undoubtedly the most secular era in the history of international relations. The totalitarian philosophy of some of the major powers (e.g., Nazi Germany starting in 1933 and the Soviet Union throughout most of the twentieth century), their atheist ideology, as well as revolutionary global ambitions, left no place for the divine. Even the emergence of the State of Israel in 1948 was detached from a religious context and the ruling parties were from the Labor (Socialist) Camp. So were the Arab states who sought secular regimes such as the Ba’ath in Syria and Iraq, or the Socialist regime of Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt. But the secular nature of the system also had another source.

The new principle of legitimacy that emerged from Versailles was that of self-determination. The polity that emerged in the wake of World War I, the nation-state, was a merger of two distinguishable authority systems bound together by a common denominator – the national interest. If the essence of the state is its functional performance, than the constituting factor of an ethnic state is in its historical origin. Based on this distinction, the national interest, the most celebrated concept employed by Realism, received a new dimension in the new international system that emerged following World War I.

It was President Woodrow Wilson who advanced the ideas of international institutions coupled with the right of self-determination, an ideal which would seemingly empower peoples and disallow greater space for religion to influence foreign policy in world politics. With time, idealism ultimately became identified as the liberal approach to international relations.¹ In contrast, World War II and the Cold War empowered realpolitik, which was expressed via the two approaches of classical Realism and Neo-Realism, stunting any possible analysis and inclusion of religion into international relations. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it was anticipated that with the victory of liberal-democracy, universal ideals would come to dominate international relations (Fukuyama 1992). As we shall see below, the role of religion in foreign policy was also anticipated to continue its decline in such a liberal world. Samuel Huntington, however, did not accept Fukuyama’s optimistic predictions and developed his “Clash of Civilizations” theory (1993, 1996).

A more direct reference to the growing role of religion was Mark Juergensmeyer’s The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State (1994), that also predicted a continued conflict but on a different basis. Instead of the former ideological East–West confrontation, the new emerging confrontation as he saw it, would be between religious nationalism and secular nationalism, or, as he prefered to define it, two competing “ideologies of order” (Juergensmeyer 1994, 30–39).

While there were some early signs of religion returning to the sphere of international relations, it was the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington that made religion difficult to ignore. Following the attacks, many sought to uncover religion’s underlying role in foreign policy (Toft, Philpott and Shah 2011).

To be sure, sociologists and theologians had started paying attention to religion because of the emergence of fundamentalist religious beliefs as a global phenomenon (Marty and Appleby 1991). However, international relations as a discipline had still found it diffcult to include religion in its frames of reference (Fox and Sandler 2004).

Contending approaches in IR theory in the twentieth century

As indicated above, the academic discipline of international relations took form during the course of the twentieth century against the backdrop of two disastrous world wars, as well as the Cold War which can well be considered another world war. While statesmen sought to come to grips with the right ways to avoid these ordeals, scholars were searching for a suitable approach in which a stable international framework could be created.

Idealism versus Realism

As we have seen, both the Idealist and the Realist schools had existed as intellectual schools at the least as far back as...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Religion, identity and foreign policy
• 2 A Jewish approach to foreign policy
• 3 Jews and territory
• 4 From community to state
• 5 The foreign and national security policies of Israel
• 6 Palestinian and religious politics ascendant
• 7 The Holocaust and the nuclear option
• 8 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index