Introduction1
It is not every day that nations obtain a new constitution. This is why 27 January 2014 signifies an important milestone in the history of modern Tunisia.
Its [the constitution’s] promulgation is viewed as the highlight of a new beginning, a new alliance, new expectations. The idea of the constitution is attractive, it seduces with its emancipatory, normalising, reconciling, unifying and stabilising character.
(Derdaele n.d., p. 1)
The 2014 Constitution is the fruit of a sovereign desire for a new founding, primarily represented by an elected assembly, the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), whose mission was to elaborate the new, post-revolutionary constitution. The new text, adopted by the NCA on 26 January 2014, generated great excitement within the political bodies that adopted it and was met by the approval of the international community. It was regarded as a text which guaranteed the functioning of democratic institutions, thereby protecting freedom and human rights (Ben Abdesselem 2014, p. 5). This positive reception was particularly due to its extensive and diverse provisions, which deal with a number of rights and freedoms such as: the status of women (Art. 46); freedom of conscience (Art. 6); the role of young people (Art. 8); the right to culture (Art. 42); and the creation of independent regulatory bodies (Art. 125). Each chapter of the constitution can be said to present a compromise between a multitude of traditional and modern aspirations, particularly concerning the position of Sharia (Art. 1), Tunisia’s civil status (Art. 2), and the freedom of expression (Art. 6). This compromise is indicative of the transitional experience and can also be argued to have had an impact on the constitutional foundations of Tunisian foreign policy. This chapter therefore examines the 2014 Constitution as the outcome of a democratic elaborative process and poses the question: What new legal foundation does the 2014 Constitution provide for Tunisia’s foreign policy?
In order to determine what is ‘new’ and to illustrate the elaborative process which took place, this chapter also looks at the Tunisian Constitution from 1 June 1959 as well as provisional, publically authorised versions of the new constitution. The analysis is based on classical understandings of both the role of the constitution as well as the definition of foreign policy. In this context, the constitution is seen as the so-called supreme norm as it appears in Kelsen’s pyramid of norms, i.e. that from which other norms ensue (Kelsen 1928). The constitution’s supremacy stems from how it came into existence as well as its content, which essentially aims at organising public authorities and their mutual relations (ibid.). It can therefore be said to lay the foundation for the state’s foreign policy, understood here as, ‘(t)he course of action that officials of a national society follow to present or modify a situation in the international system so that it may be compatible with the different objectives defined by themselves or their predecessors’ (Rosenau 1968, p. 197). What is more, foreign policy can be said to encompass ‘the orientations, commitments, and actions that characterise the international role of a state’ (Holsti 1970, p. 233).
In the following, the above-mentioned constitutions are compared, placing a particular focus on the role of said officials and possible orientations or commitments expressed in the documents. The 1959 Tunisian Constitution, which is a reworked version of the constitution of the Fourth French Republic (IDEA 2016) and the 1958 constitution of the Fifth French Republic are also referred to, in order to better illustrate how the 2014 Constitution evolved. The comparison is divided into three parts: the preamble, i.e. the overall basic principles; the designated shapers of Tunisian foreign policy (executive and legislative roles); and the role of the Constitutional Court.
The preamble: laying the general guidelines of Tunisian foreign policy
The institutional transformation process in Tunisia began between December 2010 and January 2011 and, as is the case in transitions, was shaped by a plethora of constituting facts (of a socio-political nature) and constituting acts (of a judicial nature). This interplay of political events and judicial acts was evident despite the brevity of the transitory period (Abbiate 2014, p. 2) leading to the promulgation of the 2014 Constitution. This process started with the wish to devise a new constitution in order to demonstrate a clear break with the previous regime – at the national as well as at the international level. This decision was expressed in the Decree-law no. 2011–14 of 23 March 2011 relating to the provisional organisation of the public authorities, also referred to as ‘Small Constitution’.2 It contained 19 articles and was defined as a constituting act, generating a new legality and thereby providing the foundation of a new constitutional order (Ben Achour and Ben Achour 2012, p. 722). However, it was a general, concise text and did not contain any specific provisions dealing with foreign policy. The text only briefly mentions the president’s role as guarantor of the state’s independence and the integrity of the territory in the preamble. Apart from that, Article 9 establishes the president’s high command of the armed forces as well as the accreditation of own and foreign diplomats.
The text devised the provisional functioning of the state’s institutions leading up to the election of the NCA on 23 October 2011. The NCA was established on 22 November 2011 and dedicated its first months of activities to the elaboration of its procedural rules which were approved on 22 January 2012. It also organised the public authorities anew, which was provided for in the constituent law no. 6–2011 in December 2011. Also known as ‘Small Constitution 2’, it represents the fundamental act during the transitory period (Abbiate 2014, p. 4). It encompasses 28 articles, including Article 11, which more specifically refers to foreign policy than the first provisional text,
(t)he President of the Republic exercises the following functions: The representation of the Tunisian State. The state’s foreign policy is defined in concert and in consensus between the President of the Republic and the head of government.
This ‘Small Constitution’ constituted the basis of the judicial framework for the functioning of the state’s different institutions, including the NCA, which was endowed with different powers (legislative and constituent) by Article 2. The main task was devising the constitution. On 26 January 2014, the new constitution was adopted with 200 votes in favour, 12 against, and four abstentions.3 This was largely thanks to the laborious work of the NCA, civil society, and the National Dialogue (Redissi and Boukhayatia n.d., p. 1) and, more precisely, the six constituent commissions whose mission was to draft the constitution’s chapters. The first constituent commission, the Commission of the Preamble, the General Principles and of the Constitution Revision, was in charge of drafting the preamble which dealt with the general orientations as well as Tunisia’s foreign policy regarding other international actors. In the process of drafting the preamble, the commission had three basic principles upon which it based its work and which are reflected in the constitution’s preamble, taking into account Tunisia’s history, core values, and religion. Fundamentally, the preamble constitutes,
the bedrock of all articles of the Tunisian Constitution, that was the result of a long process that generated debates and controversy in the context of a deep political and institutional crisis and remarkable dedication by civil society.
(Othman 2014, p. 3)
This explains the attention to detail during the drafting of the constitutional text which was often marked by tension or great political and ideological divergence, which ultimately produced the necessary, constant search for compromise. A good illustration is the controversy that surrounded the drafting of the preamble’s fifth paragraph concerning the ‘cultural and civilisational belonging of Tunisia’. Two amendments were suggested on the topic before agreement was reached. This procedure can be viewed as representational of the general spirit of the 2014 Constitution, based on
a compromise between an affirmation of an Arab-Muslim identity argued for by the conservatives and an opening argued for by liberals and progressives.
(Ben Abdesselem 2014, p. 6)
As Othman observes, a civil state has no choice but to adopt a democratic governmental system, leaving no room for any type of ideological polarisation (Othman 2014, p. 3). What is more, concerning the position of Islam in the legal framework, the basic understanding is that there is no contradiction between a state ruled by law and Islam as a material source for legislation. Similarly, the compromise between the religious identity of Tunisia and the reference to a universal conception of human rights (Articles 1 and 2) can be found in the fourth paragraph of the preamble:
Based on the elevated status of humankind and desirous of consolidating our cultural and civilisational affiliation to the Arab and Muslim nation, building on our national unity that is based on citizenship, fraternity, solidarity, and social justice, committed to strengthening Maghreb unity as a step towards achieving Arab unity, towards complementarity with the Muslim and African peoples, and towards cooperation with all the peoples of the world, desirous of supporting all victims of injustice, wherever they are, defending the peoples’ right to determine their own destiny, to supporting all just liberation movements, at the forefront of which is the movement for the liberation of Palestine, and opposing all forms of colonisation and of racism.
(2014 Constitution, preamble)
This passage reconciles two important types of basic principles of foreign policy: unity and cooperation between states on the one side and the acknowledgement of the principle of self-determination on the other. The principle of unity allows Tunisia to position its political actions and illustrate its vision of a future together with all people of the world: among the Arab Maghreb Union, the African Union, cooperating with the whole world whilst respecting the principle of self-determination. The latter is underlined, for example, by acknowledging a constitutional status for the movement of the liberation of Palestine, with the aim of fighting all types of occupation and racism. This shows the singularity of the 2014 preamble when compared to the Constitution of 1959 which was neutral on this point, as it did not specify any particular points of identification or issues.
The preamble can therefore be considered to be the result of a long and complicated procedure. Two opposing trends dominated the drafting of the constitution: the traditional and the modern, which both influenced the final version. It is important to note that the provisions contained in the preamble have the same force as the rest of the constitution. Nevertheless, Othman (2014, p. 3) notes that the choice of words in the preamble is vague enough to leave ample room for interpretation, even claiming that there is an absence of logic.