Chapter 1
What could be the future of rational choice for crime prevention?
Benoit Leclerc Danielle M. Reynald
Introduction
The rational choice perspective (RCP) is currently the core theoretical approach underpinning situational crime prevention (SCP). Originating from other disciplines (e.g. economics), RCP has been adapted to assist understanding of crime events from the perspective of offenders, with the ultimate aim of prevention. More specifically, RCP was adapted in criminology to provide SCP with a theoretical framework to counteract a number of criticisms. RCP is closely connected to routine activities and crime pattern theory. Taken together, these three theoretical approaches form a model to understand and reduce opportunities of crime (Felson & Clarke, 1998). Like these other approaches, RCP does not attempt to provide a general explanation for the causes of crime. It rather offers a heuristic device to support the practice of SCP (see Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Cornish & Clarke, 1986, 2008). Alongside its extensive application across the social sciences, RCP, in particular, has also been the subject of much criticism over the years. We briefly note three critiques in particular.
Criticisms on the principles of RCP
First, RCP has been (and still is) criticised for its central assumption that crime is purposeful and rational (Cornish & Clarke, 2008). The core argument is that crime is committed with a purpose in mind, which simply means that offenders are seeking to satisfy some desire, such as making money; seeking acceptance from peers; seeking thrill, power or dominance over others and satisfying sexual needs. Thus, consistent with any form of human behaviour, committing crime is purposeful. Even if the offender (or any individual) may not be perfectly conscious of his/ her rationale behind the commission of crimes, action is simply never taken without a purpose in mind. Crime is also the product of rationality to some extent, particularly in the sense that offenders engage in some form of cost and benefit analysis before proceeding. Like any form of human behaviour, an offender decision-making process takes place regardless of its quality and the circumstances under which it occurs. In fact, it is difficult to imagine how human decision-making could lead to optimal decisions. It is not possible for people to consider all potential factors relevant to a particular decision, simultaneously or individually, and examine all potential options in anticipation of a specific outcome that may result from this decision (Hastie & Dawes, 2010).
Criticisms of the value of RCP for investigating offender decision-making
From within the circle of environmental criminologists, and psychologists interested in crime, RCP has been critiqued over the years for providing an inadequate and overly simplistic account of the psychology of offending (e.g. see Van Gelder, Elffers, Reynald, & Nagin, 2014; Wortley, 2013). While this may be true to some extent, RCP never purported to providing a theory for explaining offender decision-making. In fact, Wortley pointed out that RCP was never designed to provide a detailed account of decision-making processes of offenders. In the same instance, Wortleyâs demonstration made the case to remain vigilant when examining offender decision-making based on RCP, and that RCP should look at the field of cognitive psychology for further and thorough theoretical developments. Essential dimensions to understanding offender decision-making, such as affective states, have been recently put in the spotlight by a group of researchers to further understand offender decision-making (Van Gelder et al., 2014).
Criticisms of RCP for the sake of SCP
A number of scholars have recently argued that SCP actually suffers from its association with RCP, resulting in the validity of SCP being questioned. Put simply, the question raised is whether SCP can survive without RCP. The reality that RCP has attracted criticisms to SCP from both inside and outside the circle of environmental criminologists is not problematic as long as these critiques are constructive. We believe that what is relevant here is the outcome that these criticisms may generate in the short term, which is to stimulate thinking on how RCP could be improved to better suit SCPâs ultimate objective to prevent crime from occurring in the first place. We see these critiques as a positive development rather than a negative one and perhaps as a necessary development to push the boundaries of RCP and SCP for more effective crime prevention practices.
Where to from here?
On the bright side, criticisms have driven the development of RCP over the years. As a result, there is now a large quantity of empirical studies available with RCP as the main theoretical framework. Many crimes have been studied through the lens of RCP and as a result, increased our understanding of these phenomena, how they are committed and how they could potentially be prevented through SCP. Some studies have also provided empirical evidence for offender decision-making processes in the case of violent crimes (e.g. Beauregard & Leclerc, 2007; Thompson & Leclerc, 2013; Wright & Decker, 1997), which led the field to move beyond the unfounded claim that RCP is not suitable to study crimes that may appear irrational in the first place. Most importantly, these studies allow us to rethink how we may best approach the prevention of violent crimes. Nowadays RCP is frequently adopted to examine any form of crime, which provides a complementary view and understanding of the phenomena of crime in general. RCP assists in switching our thinking from what is typically known of individual offenders to what should be known about crime events.
One could argue that without these waves of criticisms, the contribution of RCP (and SCP) would not be as advanced as it is today. The first wave of criticisms of the principles of RCP led rational choice theorists to articulate a clear line of argumentation consistent with the field of cognitive psychology. This period clarified our understanding of RCP and its role for SCP. The second wave of criticisms of the relevance of RCP to investigate offender decision-making has led emergent and senior scholars to rethink how best to investigate offender decision-making, a dimension that has been overlooked over the years. The third wave of criticisms of RCPâs suitability for crime prevention, as it is formulated currently, raises debate over a number of issues in relation to RCPâs association to SCP, and indirectly, taps into its robustness and value as a theoretical perspective on crime events.
At this time, we do not believe that RCP is unsuitable for SCP. We argue, however, that RCP would benefit from further development especially through looking at other disciplines as argued by Wortley (2013), and in line with Clarke and Cornishâs (1985) content of their seminal piece on RCP. Moreover, we argue that RCP would benefit from developments based on recent empirical evidence that has shed light on decision-making. On the one hand, Clarke (2014) points out that refining RCP is not an easy task as this exercise may have an impact on the practicability of SCP. Simplicity makes perfect sense for practical purposes. On the other hand, it appears that the development of RCP is a necessary exercise because understanding criminal behaviour requires an account of the intersection of cognitions and emotions which RCP currently lacks. For us, the challenge resides in finding the adequate equilibrium between simplicity and complexity, between the individual and the situation. We have designed this volume with the hope of moving RCP and SCP forward â with providing scholars the opportunity to express themselves freely on how we could best achieve this task.
The content of this volume is purposefully short because designing a project on the projected future of a criminological field requires a thorough understanding of its past and present, and most importantly, novel thinking and courage from the contributors. Chapter 2, by Wortley and Tilley, is perfectly consistent with the ultimate objective of this project. Wortley and Tilley provide a strong line of argumentation for the need to move beyond rational choice as the sole theoretical foundation for SCP, because according to them, RCP currently inhibits progress in this area and detracts from the credibility of SCP. After a solid comprehensive review and discussion of RCP, Wortley and Tilley move the focus from the concept of rationality to the notion of person-situation interaction. According to the authors, there are two ways of responding to the issues associated with RCP: 1) preserve (and refine) the cognitive choice framework by incorporating non-rational elements (e.g. affective states) â this would provide a more nuanced account of rationality; or 2) abandon the cognitive choice framework as the default for SCP and reconceptualise the role of situations in behaviour. Wortley and Tilley argue that the second path should be taken to provide new directions in research on situational generators of crime and in crime prevention practice. To support their argument, Wortley and Tilley present a theoretical framework consisting of ten tenets on the role of situations in crime that can accommodate a wide range of situational perspectives. Per example, one tenet states that situations affect an individual in multiple ways across moral, affective, cognitive and behavioural domains, which accurately showcase the powerful interaction between the person and the situation on criminal behaviour.
Taken together, the following four chapters provide a strong complement to Wortley and Tilleyâs contribution even though these contributions adopt different angles. Chapter 3, by Van Gelder, also highlights the need of a different account of RCP â consistent with Wortley and Tilley. Van Gelder argues that RCP is incomplete in providing a thorough understanding of decision-making and discusses an alternative framework which encompasses the role of affective states on offender decision-making. However, Van Gelder indicates that the role of affective states should be thoroughly introduced within RCP rather than abandoning RCP. Van Gelder logically points out that âIf visceral states change the way risk and rewards are perceived and crime is committed under the influence of such states, situational crime prevention measures could benefit if they accommodate for the influence of such statesâ (Van Gelder, this volume). Knepper, in Chapter 4, takes a different and creative direction, but still a route consistent with the study of crime events from the perspective of RCP. Knepper argues that forensics can be used not only for solving crimes but for preventing crimes as well. Using the forensic science concepts for crime prevention, which he labels forensic crime prevention, Knepper takes the reader through a five-step model: 1) description of the event, 2) class configuration, 3) counter-factual reconstruction, 4) measures of disassociation and 5) the impact of intervention â model that should improve prevention practices according to him. In Chapter 5, Manning, acknowledging the limitations of RCP as well, but in line with Clarke and Cornishâs view of RCP, argues that the purpose of RCP should be pragmatic first and foremost. He develops economic models of civil and legal deterrence to demonstrate how individuals respond in a rational way to rewards and punishment. Manning is in favour of the accumulation of knowledge through experiments for better understanding of the shaping of the ârootâ causes of crime â a role that RCP can serve he argues. In the last chapter, Elffers and Reynald take us through a difficult-to-achieve demonstration to point out that SCP is better off taking into account offender characteristics than not. According to Elffers and Reynald, each individual will perceive a criminal opportunity differently, on the basis of his/her own characteristics â in line with a number of tenets proposed by Wortley and Tilley in Chapter 2. Logically then, the contributors further point out that a change in a situation (e.g. through SCP) may be perceived differently by different potential offenders, which highlights the need for considering offender characteristics. According to Elffers and Reynald, this exercise would improve our understanding of the circumstances, for whom, and why situational measures may or may not be effective.
So what is the future of RCP for SCP? This volume provides criminology with some sense of the direction that RCP and/or SCP could or should take in the future, but at the same time, and as expected, this portrait remains without doubt rather incomplete, and most critically, unresolved. The future of RCP for SCP is âunfinished businessâ. Predicting the future directions of a field is a tremendous task but nonetheless relevant and certainly essential. We believe that by stimulating debates, reflection, explanations, creativity and vision, we can genuinely assist in moving the field forward. We hope that the contributions of this volume can shed some light into what could (or what will) be the future of RCP for SCP. It is hoped that this volume can provide some theoretical foundation onto which it is possible to construct the future of RCP for SCP or crime prevention practices in general.
References
Beauregard, Ă., & Leclerc, B. (2007). An application of the rational choice approach to the offending process of sex offenders: A closer look at the decision-making. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of Research and Treatment, 19, 115â33.
Clarke, R. V. (2014). Affect and the reasoning criminal: Past and future. In J.-L. Van Gelder, H. Elffers, D. Reynald, & D. Nagin (eds), Affect and cognition in criminal decision making: Between rational choices and lapses of self-control (pp. 20â41). London, UK: Routledge.
Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling offendersâ decisions: A framework for research and policy. In M. Tonry & N. Morris (eds), Crime and justice: An annual review of research (Vol. 6, pp. 147â85). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1986). The reasoning criminal: Rational choice approaches on offending. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (2008). The rational choice perspective. In R. Wortley & L. Mazerolle (eds), Environmental criminology and crime analysis (pp. 21â47). Cullompton, UK: Willan.
Felson, M., & Clarke, R. V. (1998). Opportunity makes the thief: Practical theory for crime prevention. Police Research Series Paper 98. London, UK: Home Office.
Van Gelder, J.-L., Elffers, H., Reynald, D., & Nagin, D. (eds) (2014). Affect and cognition in criminal decision making: Between rational choices and lapses of self-control. London, UK: Routledge.
Hastie, R., & Dawes, R. M. (2010). Rational choice in an uncertain world: The psychology of judgement and decision making (2nd edn.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage.
Thompson, C., & Leclerc, B. (2013). The rational choice perspective and the phenomenon of stalking: An examination of sex differences in behaviours, rationales, situational precipitators and feelings. In B. Leclerc & R. Wortley (eds), Cognition and crime: Offender decision-making and script analyses (pp. 70â100). Crime Science Series. London, UK: Routledge.
Wortley, R. (2013). Rational choice and offender decision making: Lessons from the cognitive sciences. In B. Leclerc & R. Wortley (eds), Cognition and crime: Offender decision-making and script analyses (pp. 237â252). London, UK: Routledge.
Wright, R., & Decker, S. (1997). Armed robbers in action: Stick-ups and street culture. Boston, MA: Northeastern University Press.
Chapter 2
Does situational crime prevention require a rational offender?
Richard Wortley Nick Tilley
Introduction
Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Imre Lakatos (1978) show that major scientific ideas rarely perish at a stroke. Despite Popperâs (1959) emphasis on falsification, theories can be readily and rationally preserved by ad hoc adaptations, and qualifications that effectively inoculate them from attack. Moreover, as even Popper himself conceded, this often makes good sense for the advancement of science. Theories would perish before their potential was realised if they were jettisoned at the first sign of trouble. The full articulation of a theory takes time. Initial formulations can be crude. Moreover, even when a theory begins to fail in the natural sciences â when âanomaliesâ as Kuhn describes them appear â that has not marked the point at which confidence in existing paradigms is lost and something new sought.
Lakatos refers to âprogressive problem shiftsâ to describe adaptations to theories that are fruitful in that they produce new findings. He refers to âdegenerating problem shiftsâ that preserve a theory but are not progressive and do not generate new findings. For Kuhn, the accumulation of anomalies leads eventually to a crisis of confidence and the pursuit of a new paradigm. Lakatosâ formulation is less rooted in âmob psychologyâ and refers instead to a change of direction that makes sense for the advancement of knowledge.
We use a Kuhnian/Lakatosian framework as a way of interpreting the history of situational crime prevention (SCP), the importation of the rational choice perspective (RCP) into it, criticisms of SCP that focus on RCP and responses to those criticisms. We argue that even if it was once helpful, RCP will no longer do as a fundamental underpinning of SCP and is now holding it back. We conclude with a new set of ten tenets for SCP that no longer makes RCP central. Our aim is not to propose a new theory for SCP but rather to describe the role that situation...