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1 Introduction
Interoperability with the United States Navy (USN), as the world’s predominant naval power, is the goal of many navies. It is especially important for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Royal Navy (RN) given the so-called special relationship that Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) share with the United States (US). The debate over which nation can lay claim to the special relationship with the US has clouded the fact that in the maritime sphere, interoperability amongst the RAN, RN and the USN is equally important. Both the RAN and the RN have drawn ever closer to the USN as Commonwealth ties have diminished over the preceding decades. However, historical and cultural ties have ensured that the RAN and RN share a special bond.
The military history of the twentieth century contained a large number of examples of at least two, but frequently all three of the RAN, RN and the USN operating as coalition partners in a range of conflicts around the world. That trend has continued into the twenty-first century. The increasing prevalence of multinational operations has ensured that the ability to work together as one entity, or, more importantly to interoperate, has been pushed to the forefront of naval planning in all three nations. Although it was considered an esoteric issue prior to the Second World War, interoperability with likely coalition partners is now one of the most pressing concerns for the RAN, RN and USN.
John Deni has concluded that ‘there is significant evidence that increased interoperability – especially at the operational and tactical levels – has enabled the United States and its coalition partners to achieve their objectives more effectively and more efficiently’.1 The significance of interoperability necessitates an assessment of how it has been achieved and whether it can be improved. Notably, Gary Weir has proposed: ‘If navies intend to keep the ocean open….combined maritime operations regularly informed by official and professional historical perspective must become a permanent and essential part of naval practice.’2 This book takes up Weir’s challenge to provide an assessment of the achievement of interoperability between the RAN, RN and the USN.
In order to provide a detailed analysis of interoperability issues over a prolonged period, this book focuses on the topic of naval gunfire support (NGS) and the pertinent aspects of coalition operations that influence the capacity of the navies to achieve interoperability in that capability. Key issues such as command and control, communications, equipment standardisation, intelligence, logistics, planning, rules of engagement (ROE), tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and training are all addressed. NGS is not a capability that practitioners can separate from the wide range of factors that keep ships in an operational state and performing effectively. However, space constraints do not allow for a detailed examination of issues that are entirely relevant to the successful operation of a warship – such as the clothing and feeding of sailors – but that are not directly connected to the provision of NGS. While it could be contended that NGS is merely the tip of the iceberg in naval cooperation, the analysis of a single capability demonstrates both the scale of the challenges that the three navies have faced and provides an exemplar for assessing the success achieved in enacting interoperability.
Interoperability
Economic and political concerns, which demand the cautious deployment of forces, are increasingly militating against unilateral action. However, the desire to economise force contributions by forming coalitions is counterbalanced by the necessity of military effectiveness, which has ensured that interoperability has historically been, and will continue to be, an essential aspect of multinational undertakings. The perception of Australia, the UK and the US as natural allies due to historical and cultural ties as well as various treaties, has limited serious debate over the level of interoperability achieved by the three nations.3
In effect, interoperability ‘is a measure of the degree to which various organizations or individuals are able to operate together to achieve a common goal’.4 In many regards, interoperability between a nation’s service branches can be just as, if not more, important than interoperability with coalition partners. However, the prevalence of multinational operations means that interoperability with coalition partners is fundamental to the success of contemporary endeavours.
Although standardisation is a significant consideration for multinational operations, it does not necessarily equate to interoperability. There are three levels of standardisation – compatibility, interchangeability and commonality – that influence the manner in which coalition forces interact with each other. In the first instance, compatibility denotes the capability of products, processes and services to be utilised without causing unacceptable disruptions. Interchangeability represents the capacity of one product, process or service to replace a comparable equivalent to achieve the same end. Finally, the attainment of commonality signifies the achievement of identical doctrine, procedures and equipment.5
The frequent equation of standardisation with interoperability has fostered the misnomer that interoperability is merely the product of equipment commonality. In advocating the need for Australian forces to be interoperable with the American military, Admiral Dennis Blair, then Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Command, declared: ‘This is not a sales pitch for buying American equipment, in fact it is mostly not about equipment. It is about having compatible concepts of operation and doctrine, it is about training together, and having command, control and communications systems that talk with each other.’6
The term interoperability actually encompasses multiple facets of warfare, which are interconnected and equally important. A 2004 review of operational interoperability between the armed forces of Australia and the US emphasised:
There are multiple levels of interoperability – strategic, operational, tactical, and technical – and the boundaries of each of these are often blurred…many of the issues identified at the operational level required solutions that could only be addressed at the strategic/policy level.7
The inevitable overlap of the different layers of interoperability has created a complex situation that needs to be addressed during each coalition maritime operation.
Strategic level interoperability has been defined as the ability of senior officials to ‘make decisions based on informed and factual assumptions concerning likely responses of allies and friendly nations’ and the capacity of senior defence officials to ‘quickly and predictably work together in parallel crisis action planning, or on the formulation of combined deliberate plans’.8 The importance of strategic level interoperability is continually increasing due to the ever-evolving nature of situations that coalition forces will face on the battlefield. The requirement for multi-dimensional responses in a fast-paced strategic environment will necessitate continual and effective planning and preparation. Indeed, the multi-threat environment ensures that issues relating to doctrine, force structures, acquisition processes and the overall synchronisation of attitudes are becoming progressively more pivotal.
Operational level interoperability has always been of fundamental importance for coalition operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has defined operational interoperability as: ‘The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks.’9 Effectively, that is the capacity to operate directly alongside a multinational partner or as a different part of the coalition command structure. At the tactical level, interoperability is the achievement of the objective ‘within given constraints and with the maximum possible efficiency and economy of force’.10 Often, tactical level interoperability is equated to the ‘fungibility’ of forces.11 Thereby, units should be capable of being interchanged without detriment to the overall effort.
At the technical level, communications and logistics constitute the critical aspects of interoperability. Essentially, technological interoperability relates to ‘the mechanics of systems, their technical capabilities and the interfaces between organisations and systems’.12 Evidently, interoperability encompasses a complex matrix of issues, which all require equal consideration. A Multinational Interoperability Working Group report aptly concluded:
Requirements for coalition interoperability transcend ‘simple’ questions of equipment commonality and compatibility…The subject requires consideration of all factors impacting interoperability, to include doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, people, and facilities. Planning for and achieving maximum interoperability in the non-materiel aspects of military operations can and should be a key focus of multinational cooperation initiatives.13
Effectively, the successful enactment of interoperability involves the capacity of equipment and personnel from different nations to work together both harmoniously and effectively. Thereby, doctrine, equipment, TTPs and training are standardised or sufficiently similar to preclude the existence of barriers to interoperability.
There are also human and cultural elements of interoperability, which have become increasingly important. Indeed, interoperability – even if grounded in standardisation – can be undermined by the absence of a collaborative spirit. The term ‘transactional interoperability’ has been used to address behavioural, ethical and cultural factors, but the notion of ‘cultural interoperability’ has also found favour.14 Cultural interoperability has been defined as the ‘the shared way by which multinational military coalitions or alliances “do business”’.15 The increased significance of cultural or cognitive interoperability has been demonstrated by the emergence of the intersecting concepts of ‘co-operability’ in the US; ‘einheit im denken’ [unity in thought] in Germany; and ‘interoperability of the mind’ in the UK.16 Tim Blad and David Potts outlined: ‘This implies a depth of common military education and training to produce officers of quality who approach problems in the same way – it does not imply a lack of originality or flexibility of mind, but rather a confidence and mutual understanding based on shared military education and values.’17 That mutual understanding and, ideally, a multinational mind-set can be generated in a range of ways, including the conduct of exercises, personnel exchanges and the deployment of liaison officers. At the very least, even if cultural interoperability cannot be achieved, regular interaction can create an element of perceptive interoperability – the ability to understand and respond to the intentions and actions of a multinational partner – which can facilitate multilateral operations.
In the context of NGS, ships, observers and naval gunfire liaison officers (NGLOs) must be able to work together effectively in order to achieve the required result through combined action. The level of efficiency should ideally be increased, or at the very least, not diminished by the involvement of a coalition partner. The provision of NGS should be achieved with the greatest possible economy of force and successfully accomplished regardless of the nationality of the various links in the chain, be it the ship, the observer, the NGLO or the supported arm. In most instances, interchangeability is the hallmark of the successful achievement of interoperability. In areas where standardisation has not been achieved, deficiencies should be rectified with workarounds, although the requirement for ad hoc measures should be minimised to the greatest possible degree. Each of the navies should be sufficiently equipped and trained to provide an analogous level of performance, and capable of being exchanged with counterparts from another nation without significant difficulty.
The quest for interoperability has proven to be a complicated and protracted process, which has required Australia, the UK and the US to undertake corrective action ...
