Genocide at the Millennium

Samuel Totten

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351517836
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Genocide & War Crimes
• Index: Politics & International Relations

"Genocide at the Millennium is the fifth volume in the acclaimed series Genocide: A Critical Bibliographical Review. This latest volume's focus is both the genocidal activity that has taken place over the past fourteen years (including that in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) as well as a critique of the international community's response to genocide and potential genocidal situations (including those of the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations).Genocide at the Millennium is divided into ten chapters. The opening chapter treats the Yugoslav genocide, discussing the causes of the conflict, the violence that ensued, the reaction of the international community, and the ramifications that are still being felt in that part of the world today. Chapter 2 provides a detailed and thought-provoking examination of the causes, results and ramifications of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Chapter 3 examines the conflict in Kosovo and the events surrounding the controversial intervention by NATO. Chapter 4 discusses the remarkable efforts and successes that various non-governmental agencies have had in addressing a wide variety of issues related to genocide. Chapter 5 examines the United Nations' efforts to address the issue of genocide at the turn of the century. The role of individual states confronting issues and cases of genocide is analyzed in chapter 6. Chapter 7 gives a solid overview of the evolution of international law as it pertains to the crime of genocide and how and why major changes in such law have begun to take place in the 1990s and early 2000s. The international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia are considered in chapters 8 and 9. The concluding chapter provides an extremely detailed and highly informative overview of key aspects of the International Criminal Court.In keeping with the multidisciplinary approach of previous volumes in the series, each of the essays and accompanying annotated"

1

Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Eric Markusen and Martin Mennecke

In 1945, when World War II ended and the full horrors of the Holocaust were revealed to the world, many people hoped that genocide would never again occur on European soil. This hope was dashed during the 1990s, when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a multi-ethnic nation in southeastern Europe, descended into a series of wars after Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991 and Bosnia and Herzegovina did so in March 1992. The subsequent war between Slovenia and the Yugoslav national army lasted only ten days and caused comparatively few casualties. It was much different in Croatia and Bosnia. The war in Croatia, which pitted Croatian Serbs who opposed independence against Croats, lasted more than seven months, cost as many as 10,000 lives, and was marked by numerous massacres and other atrocities. These included the practice of ethnic cleansing, that is, the forcible removal of an ethnic group from its territory, leaving 700,000 displaced from their homes.

The war in Bosnia (Yugoslavia’s most ethnically diverse republic with approximately 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs, and 17 percent Croats) developed into a nightmare for the different ethnic groups, which had lived there in relative peace for many years. Nationalistic, power-hungry leaders created an atmosphere of mutual fear and hatred leading to years of bloodshed and terror. The conflict lasted more than three years and caused vastly more destruction than had occurred in Croatia. It also involved ethnic cleansing, when both Bosnian Serbs and Croats removed more than a million Muslims and other non-Serbs from areas they claimed for themselves, but also when Croat forces expelled more than 150,000 Serbs from Bosnia during the summer of 1995. The international community, well informed of the massive human rights violations, chose to limit itself to indirect forms of engagement such as sanctions and attempts to negotiate a diplomatic solution. When NATO states finally intervened decisively to stop the war, tens of thousands more people had already been killed in Bosnia.

Background of the Conflict

Some commentators and in particular decision-makers argued that “ancient hatreds,” stemming from a long history of conflict and ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, were somehow responsible for the shocking mass violence (Power, 2002, 282–283). The reality, however, was quite different. Under Josef Tito, the powerful leader of Yugoslavia from 1945 until his death in 1980, politics based on ethnicity were discouraged. There was, for example, a high rate of intermarriage among the different ethnic groups, particularly in urban areas.

Rather than “ancient hatreds,” the genocidal violence of the Bosnian war reflected a lethal combination of a number of different economic and political factors.

Following Tito’s death, no leader emerged with sufficient power and motivation to unify the diverse peoples of Yugoslavia and suppress reemerging ethnic tensions. At the same time, the Yugoslav economy began to experience many serious problems, stemming from the accumulation of a massive foreign debt that required repayment, as well as widespread mismanagement of major industries. Unemployment steadily increased, the relatively high standard of living to which Yugoslays had grown accustomed became harder to sustain, and people grew nervous about their futures.

Out of this instability and insecurity emerged ruthless, nationalistic leaders, notably Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and Franjo Tudjman in Croatia. In the late 1980s, Milosevic took control of numerous institutions of state power, including the powerful secret police, and recruited people for the paramilitaries that later conducted many of the atrocities against Bosnian Muslims. In Croatia, Tudjman, a deeply committed advocate of a “Greater Croatia” inhabited exclusively by Croats, consolidated power in much the same way. Once in power, Tudjman pushed through new laws that were openly discriminatory against Serbs, who comprised 12 percent of the population of Croatia.

Both Milosevic and Tudjman quickly took control of the public media in their respective domains and turned them, particularly television and radio, into effective propaganda tools that aggravated fears and tensions between Serbs and Croats and demonized Muslims. At the same time, both leaders suppressed independent media and marginalized individuals and political parties that believed in multi-ethnic coexistence.

One of Milosevic’s most effective tactics for manipulating public opinion in Serbia was the revival of dark memories of World War II during which the Croatian government, allied with Hitler and known as the Ustasha, killed hundreds of thousands of Serbs, as well as Jews and Gypsies. Many documentaries on the Croatian genocide against Serbs were aired on television in Serbia; mass graves of murdered Serbs were exhumed and the bones reburied amidst pomp and ceremony. At the same time, the Tudjman regime was engaged in “rehabilitating” the genocidal Ustasha regime. For example, the Croatian parliament selected for the new national coat of arms a design very similar to that used by the Ustasha. Moreover, streets in Croatia were renamed after Ustasha leaders. When Tudjman revived symbols from the World War II Ustasha era and made public statements sympathetic to the regime, it reinforced the power of Milosevic’s propaganda not only among Serbs in Croatia, but in Bosnia as well.

The 1991 war in Croatia, finally, contributed to the viciousness and, ultimately, genocidal character of the war in Bosnia in several ways. As noted earlier, the practice of ethnic cleansing began in Croatia, establishing a pattern that was repeated many times in Bosnia. The war in Croatia also spawned some of the paramilitary units that later engaged in the destruction and “cleansing” in Bosnia. Finally, atrocities perpetrated by Croats were utilized by Serb propaganda to create fear among Bosnian Serbs that similar fates awaited them should Bosnia become independent.

Overview of the Genocide

In March 1992, on the day after the Bosnian referendum for independence, Serbs in Sarajevo erected barricades across city streets in what was to be the first step toward a division of the Bosnian capital into Serbian and non-Serbian sections. Quickly, Sarajevo became a city under siege, and its citizens suffered terribly from innumerable artillery attacks, sniping from the surrounding hills, and deprivation of food, water, electricity, heating oil, and other necessities. The Bosnian Serbs also destroyed such cultural monuments as the National Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the national museum, and many of the mosques in Sarajevo. Such systematic destruction of cultural institutions can, according to the judges of the ICTY, serve as circumstantial evidence of Serb desire to destroy Muslims as a group; hence, of genocidal intent (Krstic Judgement, 2001, paragraphs 574–580).

Ethnic Cleansing and Mass Killing

While the citizens of Sarajevo were beginning their long ordeal, Serbs began massive attacks against Muslims living in eastern and northern Bosnia. In early April 1992, paramilitary units crossed the river from Serbia into the city of Bijeljina, and began a campaign of terror. Aided by military forces from Yugoslavia, they murdered many defenseless civilians and drove the rest from their homes and businesses, which were then systematically looted, and, ultimately, destroyed. This pattern of violence was extended throughout Bosnia, wherever Serbs believed they had the right to “cleanse” territory of non-Serbs. While ethnic cleansing was committed by all war parties, the Bosnian Serbs (and their allies from Yugoslavia) proceeded in such a systematic manner and on such a vast scale that a number of observers concluded because of these circumstances that the Serbs perpetrated genocide against Muslims (for example Burg, 1997, 428). This particular intent could also be inferred from the fact that non-Serbs identified as intellectuals, professionals, or political leaders were often singled out for summary execution. This specific targeting of an integral and significant part of the Muslim population can constitute genocide according to the definition of genocide entailed by the UN Genocide Convention (Jelisic Judgement, 1999, paragraph 82).

Detention Camps and Sexual Abuse of Muslim Women

During the spring and summer of 1992, the Bosnian Serbs also established many so-called detention camps in which as many as 10,000 people were eventually killed. Often these camps were overcrowded and the inmates underfed. Beatings, torture, sexual assault against both men and women, and murder of individuals and groups of detainees occurred repeatedly. However, not only Serbs operated camps in which many atrocities were committed. Croatian and Muslim forces also killed, tortured, and otherwise abused captive Serbs and others in a number of camps. Regarding the Serbian camps it should be noted that the ICTY has dismissed genocide charges against two Serbs, one being Dusko Sikirica, the former commander of the infamous Keraterm camp, related to their misdeeds at Serb camps. The Tribunal found that the relatively low number of executions and the arbitrary composition of the inmates did not establish genocidal intent (Sikirica Judgement, 2001, paragraphs 65 et seq.; see also Mennecke/Markusen, 2003, 331 et seq.).

The scale and systematic nature of sexual abuse against thousands of women captured by the warring parties deserves special mention. Girls and women were raped in their homes when their towns and villages were attacked by paramilitary units, often in front of parents and other family members. Other women were sexually assaulted while being interrogated by police and confined in detention camps. Gang rape was common. In a number of camps, women were held captive for extended periods of time and used as sex slaves. All sides in the Bosnian conflict perpetrated such atrocities. However, there is a general consensus that the vast majority of the perpetrators were Serbian and that the vast majority of victims were Muslims (see for example Naimark, 2001, 167).

According to one study, these rapes took place on orders from Serb authorities and in many cases with the explicit purpose of impregnating the women. Beverly Allen (1996) has argued that such rape served the Serbs as one more means of destroying the Bosnian Muslims and, hence, was a tool of genocide. This line of argumentation has also appeared in the case-law of the ICTR (Akayesu Judgement, 1998, paragraphs 731–734), but has not been utilized by the ICTY.

Safe Areas and the Srebrenica Massacre

By the spring of 1993, tens of thousands of Muslims were confined in three enclaves in eastern Bosnia—Srebrenica, Gorazde, and Zepa—that were surrounded by Serb-controlled territory. Even though the United Nations Security Council declared these enclaves to be “safe areas,” their inhabitants were frequently exposed to Serb terror. In addition to shelling the towns and villages in the enclaves, Serb authorities often refused the United Nations permission to deliver food, medical supplies, and other humanitarian necessities. The populations of the enclaves were swollen by desperate refugees from areas that had already been “cleansed” by Serb forces, thus aggravating the overcrowding, hunger, and inadequacy of medical resources.

In July 1995, Serb genocidal violence culminated in the largest massacre in Europe since World War II. It occurred in the UN protected “safe area” of Srebrenica, where approximately 40,000 people had eked out a bare existence since the spring of 1993. After encountering no resistance from either the Muslim fighters, who subsequently attempted to flee the town into Muslim-controlled areas, or the tiny contingent of Dutch UN soldiers responsible for protecting it, the triumphant Serbs entered the area on July 6.

Beginning on July 12, more than 20,000 women, children, and elderly people were put on busses and driven to the front line to Muslim-controlled territory. The following days, more than seven thousand boys and men were systematically slaughtered in a carefully planned operation. Thousands were carried on buses to execution sites where they were mowed down by automatic weapons and machine guns. After the mass shooting, killers walked among the corpses, looking for survivors, who would be shot with a pistol. After the slaughter, trucks were brought in to collect the bodies and haul them to mass graves.

The Response of the International Community

The United Nations played a central role in efforts by the international community to reduce the suffering and to end the conflict. In November 1991 and again in February 1992, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces to Croatia, and in September 1992 it was agreed to send peacekeepers to Bosnia. Although nearly 40,000 soldiers from thirty-nine different nations were eventually sent to Bosnia, their ability to protect endangered civilians and provide humanitarian assistance remained limited because of insufficient resources, their restricted rules of engagement, and interference from the warring parties.

For example, there were only 250 lightly armed Dutch combat soldiers, low both on fuel and ammunition, stationed in Srebrenica to protect tens of thousands of refugees against a Bosnian Serb force of about 2,000 well-equipped soldiers backed by armor and artillery. Moreover, the chain of command established between the UN and NATO in regard to airstrikes proved slow and cumbersome.

The United States, which was the only remaining superpower following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, opted not to play a major role in efforts to stop the conflict during the early years. However, during a more active phase in 1994, the United States asserted diplomatic pressure on Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, which had started fighting each other in 1993, to work together against the Bosnian Serbs. Nonetheless, the United States administration chose to maintain a policy of disengagement in spite of information about gruesome and massive violations of basic human rights. In fact, both the Bush and the Clinton presidencies were marked by strong efforts to avoid the “g-word” by emphasizing the different, unique character of the Holocaust from what was taking place in the former Yugoslavia and by underlining that “there are atrocities on all sides” (Power, 2002, 247 et seq. and 391 et seq.).

When the world learned about the Srebrenica massacre, there were intensified efforts by the international community to stop the violence. After yet another mortar attack on Sarajevo in late August 1995, NATO began launching air strikes against Serb military targets, seriously degrading Serb capabilities. At the same time, Muslim and Croatian offensives recaptured some of the territory that had been seized by the Serbs. Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs’ ally and supporter, Slobodan Milosevic, hoping to get the United Nations to lift the heavy economic and cultural embargo that had been placed on Yugoslavia because of its support of the Bosnian Serbs, had essentially abandoned them and worked actively to negotiate a peace settlement. Finally, in November 1995, after intense negotiations organized by the Contact Group—an international ad hoc body to foster a diplomatic solution comprising the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia—peace talks held at a U.S. Air Force base near Dayton, Ohio, brought the war to an end.

Accountability for the Perpetrators

Throughout the twentieth century, most perpetrators of genocide and crimes against humanity have gone unpunished. However, a year after the war broke out in Bosnia, this historical truth suddenly seemed to be altered: On May 25, 1993, The United Nations Security Council established, by means of Resolution 827, the ICTY to investigate war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed during the war. The prosecution at the ICTY has since charged more than a dozen persons, all Serbs, with the crime of genocide. Three indictees—Goran Jelisic, Dusko Sikirica, and Milomir Stakic-have been found not guilty on this charge (while they were convicted for war crimes and crimes against humanity), but Radislav Krstic, a general in the Bosnian Serb army involved in the mass executions that took place after the fall of Srebrenica, was found guilty of genocide (Mennecke/Markusen, 2003, 331 et seq.).

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Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1. Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina
• 2. The Rwanda Genocide
• 3. Genocide in Kosovo
• 4. The Role of Nongovernmental Organizations in Addressing the Prevention, Intervention, and Punishment of Genocide in the 1980s, 1990s, and Early 2000s
• 5. The United Nations and Genocide: Prevention, Intervention, and Prosecution
• 6. The Role of Individual States in Addressing Cases of Genocide
• 7. The International Legal Prohibition of Genocide Comes of Age
• 8. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: The Repression of Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina
• 9. The United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
• 10.The Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
• Contributors
• Index