Television in Society

Arthur Asa Berger

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780887381096
• eBook ISBN: 9781351486637
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Media Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Is television a cultural wasteland, or a medium that has brought people more great art, music, dance, and drama than any previous media? How do we study and interpret television? What are the effects of television on individuals and society, and how do we measure them? What is the role of television in our political and economic life? Television in Society explores these issues in considering how television both reflects and affects society.The book is divided into two sections. The first focuses on programming and deals with commercials, ceremonial events, important series (such as ""MASH"" and ""Lou Grant""), significant programs (a production of Brave New World on television), and the images of police on the medium. The second part of the book deals with important issues and topics related to the medium: the impact of television violence, values found on television, the impact of television on education, the significance of new technological developments, and the always thorny issue of freedom of the press. The articles are drawn together by a brilliant introductory essay by Arthur Asa Berger, who examines television as culture.

1

Campaign Commercials

L. Patrick Devlin

Ronald Reagan received almost $30 million in federal funds during the 1980 campaign. He spent $18 million, or 60 percent of it, on advertising. He spent approximately $13 million of that on television advertisements, so that 70 percent of the money that Ronald Reagan spent on advertising in the 1980 campaign was spent on television advertising. In 1976 Jimmy Carter spent 74 percent of his advertising money on television. In 1984 Reagan and Mondale spent approximately $25 million each on advertising. Candidates are spending more on television advertising. Or are they?

An analysis of the money spent on television advertising in the 1952 Eisenhower campaign uncovers some interesting comparisons. In a paper on the 1952 Eisenhower television campaign, Stephen C. Wood estimated that Eisenhower’s television spending ranged from $2 million to $6 million when all television time buying—national, state, and local—was factored in. Eisenhower’s campaign spent approximately $1.5 million on network television spots. In 1980, Reagan’s network spending approximated $6.5 million. If these two network spending figures are analyzed in terms of the 1967 base year for constant dollars, Eisenhower spent $1.9 million on network spots, Reagen spent $2.5 million. If Eisenhower spent a possible total of $6 million while Reagan spent a total of $13 million on television ads, Eisenhower actually outspent Reagan $7.5 million to $5.9 million in terms of 1967 constant dollars.

Well financed presidential candidates always have and always will spend vast sums and a major portion of their budgets on television advertising. Few corporations, aside from Procter and Gamble, McDonalds, or Miller beer, advertise year-round at the volume reached by political advertising during the months of September and October and the first week of November. During a presidential campaign commericals flood the airwaves.

Political commercials come in various time frames. They come in half-hour speeches or biographies. They come in mini programs, or four-minute-and-twenty-second segments that are sandwiched in before Johnny Carson or the evening news. More commonly they come in sixty-second or especially thirty-second segments. Political commercials can also be categorized as to type or format—documentary, talking head, man-in-the-street, cinema verité, and production idea spots.

The advantage of political advertising is that it can be controlled. Candidates may not be able to control what the opposition says or does, or control what the media televises or prints. But candidates, if they are properly financed, can control the message and image conveyed through paid television advertising. There are other advantages of political advertising.

One purpose of political advertising is to make an unknown candidate a better known candidate. Examples of unknowns using television in presidential races to become known is less frequent than in gubernatorial or senatorial campaigns. McGovern in 1972, Carter in 1976, Bush in 1980, and Hart in 1984 used television extensively to become better known during their primary campaigns. Ads are also often aimed at late-deciding or disinterested voters. Ads are unobtrusive and unavoidable invaders into peoples’ living rooms. They reach thousands, even millions in large media markets. Many of these uninvolved voters see little else of the campaign except what they may possibly see on the evening news. Lynda Lee Kaid has concluded that “political advertising is more effective when the level of voter involvement is low.” Late-deciding or uninvolved voters are the crucial 10 to 20 percent of the electorate. Normally they are reached only through television in the last stages of the campaign.

In 1972, Patterson and McClure researched the effectiveness of political ads and found that only 18 of 100 voters were late deciders. In 1972 many people had made up their minds. The ads of the campaign were found to have influenced about 3 percent of the total electorate, but there was a 23 percent spread between Nixon and McGovern in the final tally. A 3 percent impact along with a 23 percent spread is not much of an impact. In the 1976 campaign there was only a 2 percent disparity between Ford and Carter in the final tally. If the 1976 ads had affected 3 percent of the electorate, there being only a two percent spread, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of ads might be crucial.

Ads are also used to reinforce supporters and partisans. When partisans saw pictures of Ronald Reagan on the cliffs of Normandy or of Jimmy Carter standing in front of a gigantic American flag at town meetings, these reinforced partisan feelings. For example, partisans watch half-hour programs but few others do. Only one in twenty people—primary partisans—watch half-hour programs. Their partisan feelings are reinforced, and they may give more money to the campaign because of these commercials.

Ads can also be used to attack the opposition. As Reagan’s 1980 pollster, Vincent Breglio, maintained, “It has become vital in campaigns today that you not only present all of the reasons why people ought to vote for you but you also have an obligation to present the reasons why they should not vote for the opponent. Hence, the negative campaign, or the attack strategy becomes an essential part of any campaign operation.” A mix of positive and negative ads is increasingly used to convince voters why they should vote for one candidate and not vote for the opposition.

Ads can develop and explain issues. Research, by McClure and Patterson has demonstrated that there is more substance and more information on issues in presidential ads than in television news. A sixty-second ad has, on average, five times as much information about the candidate’s position on issues than a sixty-second snippet on the evening news. Ads also have a cumulative effect. In presidential campaigns a multiplicity of ads are used and often repeated. Using thirty-second time frames voters see ten or twenty ads during the course of a campaign, with five or six of them repeated. The idea comes across not simply in thirty seconds, but in thirty seconds multiplied by the number of times voters see that thirty-second ad and are attentive to it.

Ads can soften or redefine an image. If a candidate has a reputation for not caring about unemployment or is weak on defense issues, ads can be created to emphasize these postitions and the candidate’s commitment to these areas. In 1968 candidate Nixon was redefined through television. In 1976, Jimmy Carter had been accused of not taking strong stands on issues. His advertising man created strong issue-oriented spots to redefine this hazy image through a series of ads in which Carter took strong stands.

Ads are used to target particular demographic groups. In this manner, they go hand in hand with polling. Polling tells where the potential voters are and ad demographics tell how to reach them. For example, women, blacks, males, single mothers, or union members might be targeted voters. Careful buying of airtime is used—for example, the buying of time before, during, or after key programs such as a hockey game to reach more male voters or the Phil Donahue show to reach more female voters. Polling and time buying help to maximize the potential to reach a particular category of voter.

Ads cost money but they can also be used to raise money. Appeals for money often are used at the end of half-hour or five-minute ads. McGovern in 1972 and Anderson in 1980 paid for their television commercials mainly through such appeals. In 1984, Mondale used a special five-minute commercial beamed into house parties to raise money. People did send in money so that future ads went on the air.

Ads are adaptable. They can be made. They can be revised. They can be discarded as the necessities of the campaign change. Multiple generations of spot commercials are extremely common during the presidential campaign. Often several hours of ads, including six or seven distinct generations, are made. Ultimately, ads are used because the competition uses them. Few candidates, aside from Jesse Jackson in 1984, can afford the luxury of forgoing commercials. There is an adage in campaigns stating that half of all advertising money is wasted. Since nobody in a campaign knows which half, all advertising continues.

Primitive Ads

The first advertisements I examine are labeled “primitive ads.” These were created in 1952 and 1956. The first Eisenhower campaign used three sixty-second spots and over twenty twenty-second spots with an “ask General Eisenhower” theme. A “Man from Abilene” spot was primitive because it had the announcer’s voice screaming at the viewer—“Vote for peace! Vote for Eisenhower!”—in a manner similar to the loud announcers’ techniques used in movie theaters during the “March of Time” or “Movietone News.” In his spots Eisenhower was ill at ease in front of the camera, and his voice and eyes gave him away as an uneasy communicator. In the twenty-second spots Eisenhower was asked a question by a voter and then answered. Both the unspontaneous and contrived questions and the answers by Eisenhower reading from cue cards demonstrate the primitive nature of these ads.

The Stevenson campaign in 1952 concentrated on half-hour speeches rather than spot commercials. In 1956 “A Man from Libertyville” was created to counteract the “Man from Abilene” approach. Stevenson discussed the high cost of living while holding a bag of groceries. The lesson learned from this spot was, if you want to be elected president don’t carry a grocery bag. Eisenhower had been wise enough not to carry grocery bags. Both the Eisenhower and Stevenson ads represent a primitive form of television advertising no longer used in campaigns today.

Talking Heads

The year of the “talking head” spot was 1960. Both John Kennedy and Richard Nixon emphasized ads that had them speaking directly to the viewer in a communicative way. The “talking head” format was as much in use in 1984 as it was in 1960. Within the general format, there are differences. For example, a Nixon spot was formal. Nixon was serious; he had a presidential image. The visual background was blank, while concentrated and complimentary lighting was used on Nixon’s face—he was almost angelic. This brightness contrasted with the photogenic darkness that Nixon displayed in the debates. In the debate footage he came across with a five o’clock shadow. The ads—in which he had a dark suit and a light face—were made to compensate for the light suit and dark face of the debates.

A Kennedy “talking head” spot was much more informal. His gestures and his voice were more conversational and he had family pictures in the background. Pictures and plaques were used just as flags or family pictures are used today to give the viewer additional information. Some ad makers want the background to be blank; others want some kind of additional information to be communicated visually. Research by Patterson and McClure found that a candidate can develop a more favorable image through issue-oriented spots like these which seek to convince the voter that the candidate has positions on civil rights or medicare and that he can thus handle the difficult problems of a presidency. These spots convey a better image than “image” spots which try to create directly a favorable feeling about the candidate’s personal qualities. Research indicates that the best way to make a positive impression on the voter is to use issues—in this case medicare or civil rights—as a vehicle or a tool to effect a positive image. The purpose of most “talking head” spots is to focus on an issue and use the candidate to convey an impression that he can handle the issue. Most importantly, he should convey the impression that he can handle the job of president.

Negative Ads

The year of the negative ad was 1964. Both Goldwater and Johnson emphasized ads that tried to tear down their opponent rather than build up themselves. Two 1964 commercials are representative of negative commercials made to provoke or bring out negative feelings already within voters. In the “Daisy Girl” spot a little girl is shown in a field of flowers. An atomic bomb explodes with a flash. President Johnson’s voice elaborates, “These are the stakes: to make a world in which all God’s children can live, or go into the dark.” “Daisy Girl” was shown once and then taken off the air because of the outcry and protest it caused, The ad had an afterlife through newspaper articles and radio and television news commentaries about it. The creator of this spot, Tony Schwartz, had a philosophy about making good political ads: commercials attempting to bring something to voters, that is, convey some information and bring something new to them, are inherently not as effective as those that try to appeal to an idea that is already within voters. The goal is not to get something across to people as much as it is to get something out of people. Nowhere in the “Daisy Girl” spot is Goldwater mentioned, but the ad evoked a feeling that Goldwater may indeed use nuclear weapons. The mistrust was not in the spot—the mistrust was in the viewer. Similarly, many voters already had feelings that we were not a very loved people, and that other countries were using us and burning our flag. A Goldwater ad used familiar riot footage with a “Yankee go Home” motif to reinforce the feeling that was already within many Goldwater-prone voters.

The first year in which color was used in presidential commercials was 1968, and color enhances the visual nature of television ads. A Humphrey ad had visual simplicity but little visual variety and excitement. Humphrey simply started small and grew visually as his accomplishments grew and were enumerated by the announcer. Nixon’s advertising people took advantage of the first year of color by creating a series of spots giving life and vitality to well chosen still photography to give the effect of visual variety. Photography is important because research has shown that people remember the visuals in spots more than the specifics of the narration. One study found that 80 to 85 percent of the information retained about television commercials is visual. Good presidential commercials have to be visual.

Memorable Ideas

Television is an excellent tool for conveying a memorable idea. In 1972, production spots were created to convey important ideas about candidates. Production spots also allow the use of graphics to make the information more memorable.

In 1972 as other candidates were pictured on the evening news trudging through the snow in the New Hampshire primary, President Nixon was shown on his trip to the Soviet Union. Five-minute travelogues were created to emphasize that Nixon was the first president to visit our former enemies, China and the Soviet Union. These spots stressed that with Nixon we would have a greater chance of having peace with our former enemies. As McGovern became more the issue in 1972, three anti-McGovern spots were shown more frequently. These negative spots were found by Thomas Patterson to reach low- and moderate-interest voters for several reasons. First, they were perceived as entertaining or funny. If people perceive an ad as entertaining or funny that helps them to look at it. Second, committed vote switchers—Democrats who were going to vote for Nixon—had their attitudes reinforced. The idea spots provided reasons for their decision and gave them comfort in knowing that there were many others like them. Similarly, McGovern voters wanted to reduce military spending. When they watched an anti-McGovern commercial about that, it was consistent with and reinforced their perception of the candidate.

In political advertising, selective perception is constantly working. If pro-Nixon voters viewed the defense spot they might say, “I knew that about McGovern. That is terrible. That is why Nixon needs to be reelected to save this country.” Undecided voters might look at that defense spot and say, “I didn’t know that about McGovern. Is he really going to do that to the air force? Is he really going to do that to the navy?” McGovern voters might look at that defense spot and say, “Right on George! We need to reduce the military.” Selective perception allowed different people to take away different ideas from that single commercial.

Nixon’s “turn around” spot is also visually important. It is another idea spot, but with additional visual simplicity. McGovern is shown repeatedly rotating—physically and intellectually—from one position in one year to an opposite position in the following year. The announcer ends with, “What about next year?” Voters did not have to remember one specific instance of a McGovern change—not one issue, not one statement from the spot. The impression given was that McGovern had frequently switched his stance. The expectation of future switches was the important idea to get across. That was achieved through a rotating picture.

When the polls showed that literally millions of Democrats were defecting to Nixon, Tony Schwartz, the creator of the Lyndon Johnson “Daisy Girl” commercial, was hired by McGovern. Schwartz created five spots of which “Voting Booth” is representative. This ad was only shown twice—too infrequently to do much good—but the spot represents the best of what Schwartz classified as an “idea” spot. The real problem for McGovern was millions of defecting Democrats. Schwartz tried to reach them in a catchy, stream of consciousness way. He showed an indecisive man in a voting booth thinking out loud, pondering the choices. The speed of the ad made it captivating, yet at times statements could be missed because they were not heard the first time around. Crucial statements were: “This hand voted for Kennedy;” “Me vote for Nixon? My father would roll over in his grave;” “The fellas say they are but maybe they’re not;” “My gut feeling, my gut feeling, McGovern.” These statements represent the kind of emotional idea that the ad tried to evoke.

Cinema Verité

Filming a candidate in real life settings interacting with people is a technique called “cinema verité.” In 1972, McGovern’s principal ad creator, Charles Guggenheim, did not believe in the ethics or effectiveness of negative advertising. Guggenheim was an award-winning documentary filmmaker who preferred to film McGovern in real settings interacting with real voters. Guggenheim used the cinema verité technique to show McGovern as a concerned and compassionate candidate. This for...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter 1. Campaign Commercials
• Chapter 2. 1984—The Commercial
• Chapter 3. Television Ceremonial Events
• Chapter 4. Huxley on Television
• Chapter 5. Real Police on Television Supercops
• Chapter 6. Cultural Bias in “M*A*S*H”
• Chapter 7. The Politics of “Lou Grant”
• Chapter 8. Sagan’s Metaphysical Parable
• Chapter 9. Decoding “Dallas”: Comparing American and German Viewers
• Chapter 10. Violence and Aggression
• Chapter 11. Researching Television Violence
• Chapter 12. Defending the Indefensible
• Chapter 13. Smoking Out the Critics
• Chapter 14. Proliferating Violence
• Chapter 15. Networks Hold the Line
• Chapter 16. Assessing Academic Achievement
• Chapter 17. Facts, Fantasies and Schools
• Chapter 18. Reading Performance
• Chapter 19. Dubious Facts and Real Schools
• Chapter 20. Mass Media Values
• Chapter 21. Television, Mass Communication and Elite Controls
• Chapter 22. Fantasy and Culture on Television
• Chapter 23. Direct-Broadcast Satellites and Cultural Integrity
• Chapter 24. Free Press for a Free People
• Chapter 25. Screening Nuclear War and Vietnam
• Coming to Terms with Television: An Annotated Bibliography
• About the Contributors