Communities of Individuals

Liberalism, Communitarianism and Sartre's Anarchism

Michael J. R. Cross

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138703506
• eBook ISBN: 9781351787154
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This title was first published in 2001: This book examines the liberal-communitarian debate from a new perspective. Communitarians argue that liberal theory neglects the significance of communities for the lives of their members. An examination of that argument reveals that there are deficiencies in the communitarian account of community. Identifying and remedying those deficiencies is the key concern of this book. Uniquely, this book addresses the deficiencies using Sartre's anarchist theory derived largely but not exclusively from an interpretation of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre champions the individual yet criticises liberalism. The tension arising from these two apparently disparate positions makes for a fruitful argument, enhanced by the connections made with Aristotelian and feminist theory, Hobbes and Rousseau. Finally, a method is developed for inquiring into the nature of associations which, it is argued, should interest communitarians concerned to avoid deficiencies in their account of community.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction: an overview of the argument

The communitarian account of community is deficient in a number of important respects. The purpose of this work is to expose those deficiencies and remedy them. The communitarians who are to be the focus of this work, namely, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, have argued that liberal political theory has neglected the significance that communities have for the lives of their members in three main ways. These are, with respect to the three named writers, first, as constitutive of the identity of individuals; second, as a source for the conception and the pursuit of the good life for human beings; third, as a forum for the generation of shared meanings concerning social goods and their just distribution. The argument in this work will be that, in their own way, the communitarians, and not just the three who have been named for the sake of providing a focus, have also neglected the community.

The communitarian attack on liberal political theory, and particularly the Kantian-Rawlsian strain of that theory, has largely been met by a defence that has turned on arguments demonstrating, more or less successfully, that the communitarians had neither fully nor correctly understood the aspect of the liberal position that has been attacked. That defence of liberal theory has been mounted by, amongst others, Amy Gutmann (1985), Gerald Doppelt (1988, 1989), Will Kymlicka (1989, 1990, 1991), Allen Buchanan (1989) and, of course, Rawls himself (1985, 1988, 1993). However, a large part of the communitarian campaign consists of a number of assertions about the nature of community and about the nature of the relationship between the community and the individual. It is this aspect of the debate that will be examined in this work. So it is that the focus in this work will be on the understanding that communitarianism has of itself as a theory of community. The argument will be that in extolling the virtues of community, the communitarians have not fully understood their own position, or at least that they have failed to convey that understanding in the fullest sense. Varieties of liberal theory, having been briefly described, will be directly addressed only in as much as communitarian criticisms of that theory are, in themselves, revealing of the communitarians’ views of community. This will serve the purpose of developing those criticisms and, relatedly, views of community.

In order to establish and remedy the deficiencies in the communitarian account of community, communitarian criticisms of liberalism and claims for community will be examined from what might, as a first impression, be regarded as an unusual perspective. The perspective will be that provided by an interpretation of Volumes 1 and 2 of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason. Central to this perspective will be an interpretation of Sartre’s notion of praxis, understood as a way of portraying certain dimensions of human activity, which not only points to, as Sartre says, a dialectical process but which is also, as he does not say, one that is normative in character. The argument will be that one particular way of understanding the natures of different sorts of communities can be achieved through the application of this interpretation of praxis and understanding the different sorts of relationships that it yields. Moreover, what will emerge is a dialectical method of inquiring into the nature of different sorts of communities and it will be argued that this method of inquiry should be of interest to the communitarians.

Why use the argument in the Critique as the basis for correcting the communitarian idea of community? There are four answers to that question. First, it will be seen that the Critique does address particular issues that are neglected by the communitarian account of community. Indeed, although it is not immune from criticism, the extent to which the Critique is, through its employment of a view of praxis in order to address those issues, seen to be adequate to the task of addressing that which communitarianism neglects, and has been selected for its adequacy, is the extent to which a critique of the Critique will not be developed. However, in order to achieve the aim, what will be developed, in ways that will be specified, are certain themes in the Critique. Second, Sartre is interesting because, like certain communitarians, he is critical of classical laissez-faire liberalism, or what he and others call bourgeois liberalism, on the grounds that it leaves individuals isolated and powerless. Yet he remains a champion of the individual and of individual freedom and thus has something in common with the tradition of which he is so critical.¹ This is interesting because the tension generated by these two positions yields a sensitivity in understanding the status of individuals and communities relative to each other that is greater than that to be found in much of communitarian writing. Third, it will be seen that the communitarian project can be supported by other, ostensibly non-Sartrean, schools of thought. However, it will also be seen that these schools of thought can themselves be informed by a view of praxis that is derived from the Critique and, moreover, that they also have something to offer this view of praxis. Fourth, what emerges from the Critique is a particular view of a dialectical method of inquiring into social experience and specifically into the nature of associating and associations. As has been said, it will be argued that this is a method of inquiry that should be of interest to communitarians.

The tension that is mentioned in the second of the points given above is particularly significant in that it reveals the existence of the very clear arguments from anarchism that are to be found in the Critique. The usual literal meaning of anarchy, absence of rule, is ambiguous. It is, however, a useful ambiguity for those critics of anarchism who, seizing upon a particular understanding of the absence of rule, are able to point out that anarchism in practice would literally mean living in a condition where nobody acknowledged any rules, a state of lawlessness, a state of chaos. To define anarchy as the absence of a ruler or a sovereign is only a little more helpful, even though that is precisely the definition supplied by Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.² Crucially, there is the identification of a ruler with a sovereign. So what anarchism opposes is the domination of society by a sovereign body, for example, a monarch, a president or a ruling central government and since a ruling central government can be regarded as the personification of the State³ then it also opposes the idea and the existence of the State. It is, in fact, the idea of domination combined with coercion that is crucial. Sovereign bodies can and do impose their wills on others but it is the mere fact that they can that renders them anathema to anarchists.

A society that is ruled by a sovereign body will, more probably than not, be a society in which the involvement in that society’s political affairs by the citizens is minimal. The citizens of that society may, at times determined by the sovereign body and within the parameters that it controls, vote. However, as we shall see, the purpose and the practice of voting in that context is not unproblematic. Other forms of involvement in political affairs, for example, through the media, are also likely to be controlled. In the case of involvement through the media the control could be exercised by the owners of the medium in question or by whoever can influence the owners, such as central government. So, moving away from what anarchism opposes, what anarchism proposes is the maximum involvement of the citizens in political affairs.

Maximum involvement in political affairs on the part of the citizens is thought to be the antidote to the authoritarianism that anarchists believe to be inherent in rule by a sovereign body of the type just described. This is not to say that anarchism opposes all forms of authority. As Errico Malatesta explains,

Anarchism is society organised without authority, meaning by authority the power to impose one’s own will and not the inevitable and beneficial fact that he who has greater understanding of, as well as ability to carry out, a task succeeds more easily in having his opinion accepted, and of acting as a guide on the particular question, for those less able than himself.⁴

It is acknowledged, therefore, that someone can be an authority on a particular question. Michael Bakunin makes the same point, though with even more caution. In ‘God and the State’ he writes,

Does it follow that I reject all authority? Far from me such a thought. In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, or railroads. I consult that of the architect or engineer. For such a special knowledge I apply to such and such a savant. But I allow neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the savant to impose his authority upon me. I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticism and censure. I do not content myself with consulting a single authority in any special branch; I consult several; I compare their opinions and choose that which seems to me to be the soundest. But I recognise no infallible authority, even in special questions.⁵

Anarchists reject dominating, coercive, authoritarianism of all kinds but especially of the kind that it believes to be inherent in rule by a sovereign body. This is because, like liberals, they are champions of individual liberty. However, and here we must identify the anarchism that is of interest to this work, the insights from certain types of anarchism are valuable in the context of the liberal-communitarian debate because they come from types of anarchism that also champion community. In fact, it is precisely because they are the champions of one that they are also, at the same time, the champions of the other. So, what might loosely be called social anarchists can be identified by their recognition of the need for voluntary associations, since it is within those associations that the freedom of all the associates can be guaranteed. Malatesta argues that it is, ‘By the free association of all, a social organisation would arise through the spontaneous grouping of men according to their needs and sympathies … This organisation would have for its aim the greatest good and fullest liberty of all.’⁶ Bakunin provides an explanation. He argues that, ‘Man completely realizes his individual freedom as well as his personality only through the individuals who surround him and thanks only to the labor and collective power of society.’⁷

The arguments of Malatesta and Bakunin are endorsed by Proudhon who also reminds us of a useful distinction. Proudhon argues that, ‘political theory will for us be the result of mutual guarantees. It is through guaranteeing each other’s liberty that we will be able to do without this government’.⁸ At this point an objection in the form of a question could be, “What is distinctly anarchistic about the connection between community and liberty?” After all Karl Marx argues that,

Within communist society, the only society in which the original and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this development is determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all.⁹

This is confirmed in The Communist Manifesto where we read that, ‘In place of old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.’¹⁰ However, the distinction of which Proudhon reminds us concerns his desire to do without the government and the State which it personifies. Each of the anarchists with which I am concerned favours voluntary associations, associations formed out of the free actions of individuals, associations which leave individuals free to join or not. Each of these anarchists opposes the State. When Peter Kropotkin defined what I have called social anarchism as ‘the No-Government system of Socialism’¹¹ he was, because he regarded the government and the State as synonymous, referring to his opposition to the State. Marx did not oppose the idea of the State. He thought that the State would be a necessary condition for the development of the kind of society that he envisioned. It would be a communist State, certainly, but a State nonetheless.

So, in addition to opposing rule by a sovereign body and proposing the maximum participation by individuals in the governance of their community, a further distinctive characteristic of the anarchism with which we are concerned is that it advocates the free association of people agreeing to associate and agreeing to co-operate. It is in such associations that, to paraphrase an earlier quotation from Malatesta, needs can be satisfied and beyond that the good for human beings, including the good of liberty, can be pursued. Notions of agreement and co-operation in order to satisfy needs and pursue the good introduce two other characteristics of this species of anarchism.

The first of those other characteristics is that anarchism does not mean the absence of all forms of government, but it does mean self-government. The forms of government that are acceptable according to anarchism are those that are not authoritarian and coercive and self-government is most likely to fit the bill. Self-government implies self-regulation and that in turn implies that, contrary to critics of anarchism, there will be rules. Moreover, practically, where there are rules there will be sanctions for breaking the rules. However, in line with the notion of maximum participation in associations, these will be rules and sanctions which people will formulate for themselves and which they will, actually and freely, agree to abide by. Indeed, introducing the second characteristic and in a desire to avoid the imposition of rules and sanctions by a sovereign body, every competent adult would have an equal opportunity to take part in the formulation of rules and sanctions. Perhaps not everybody would want to take advantage of that opportunity but those who do will be able to do so as the equal of everyone else.

The second of those other characteristics of this species of anarchism, therefore, concerns a certain kind of equality. The equality that is at issue concerns the sameness of people regarding the possibility of their participation in the government of the community and so also regarding their exercise of power. Consequently, in this regard, everyone has equal statu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Foreword
• 1 Introduction: an overview of the argument
• 2 Praxis, needs, scarcity and methodology
• 3 The communitarian case for community
• 4 Associations and the natural environment
• 5 Forms and terms of association: series
• 6 Forms and terms of association: groups
• 7 Praxis, communitarianism and beyond
• 8 Conclusion: the dialectic and the communitarian community
• Bibliography
• Index