The Axis of Evil

Iran, Hizballah, and the Palestinian Terror

Shaul Shay

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780765802552
• eBook ISBN: 9781351322461
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Terrorism
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In the nearly 25 years since the ascent of an Islamic regime, Iran has become one of the most prominent supporters of terror worldwide. Today Iran actively employs terror to achieve its international objectives. The Axis of Evil outlines the operations and goals of Shiite and Iranian terror. As Shaul Shay shows, Iran has done its utmost to conceal its involvement in terror activities and avoids leaving incriminating "fingerprints" that might prompt retaliatory action by victims of this terrorism. In consequence, most of what we know about Iranian terror activity has been gleaned from the capture and trials of Iranian terrorists or terrorists acting on Iran's behalf.

The Axis of Evil deals extensively with Iran's involvement in terrorist activity against Israel through Hizballah after the Israel Defense Forces' withdrawal from Lebanon (May 2000) and the instigation of the Al-Aksa Intifada (September 2000-2003). It examines Iran's attitude towards the State of Israel since the rise of Knomeini, confirming that Iran sees Israel as a primary source of the world's wrongdoings and the epitome of evil. In turn, Israel has become one of Iran's archenemies. Over the years, Iran has strengthened its ideological links with radical Arab and Palestinian circles. In addition, it actively supports Hizballah, which acts on behalf of Iran from its base in Lebanon and perpetrates terror attacks against Israel and against representatives of Western and Arab countries in Lebanon as well as in the international arena.

This book is a comprehensive and in-depth study of Shiite and Iranian terror activity. In addition to drawing attention to the significance of Iran's contributions to terror, it provides readers with a better understanding of Iran's activities in light of the global war against terrorism as well as the deployment of American troops along Iran's borders with Afghanistan and Iraq.

1

The Ideological and Religious Background and the Organizational Infrastructure of Terror in Iran

The Ideological and Religious Background for the Use of Terror by Iran Shiite Entities

Comprehension of the ideological and religious motives for the use of terror by Iran and Shiite entities necessitates a discussion of three main areas and the reciprocal ties among them_ First, the general phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism must be examined; subsequently, the basic principles of the Shiite faith must be studied; and, finally, an analysis must be conducted vis-à-vis Khomeini’s philosophy, which combines Islamic radicalism and fundamentalism with the unique principles of the Shia, and translates them into a policy that counts terror as one of the tools for its fruition.

Fundamentalism is a foreign term of Christian-Protestant origins, which was adopted by Western people (researchers, politicians, journalists) to define the phenomenon of radical Islamic believers. Muslim religious extremists regard the use of this term in connection to Islam as a form of Western intellectual imperialism, and the term that they commonly use to define themselves is Islamayun—Islams or Islamic loyalists (as opposed to the Muslimun, which means one whose religion is Islam, but whose lifestyle may be secular).¹ The semantic meaning of the term “fundamentalism” refers to a fervor for the principles of religious beliefs, a way of life that stems from the latter and includes adherence to all of its manifestations; adopting religious symbols in daily life, behaving according to the normative codes of Islam, or organization and activity to preserve all of these principles and their dissemination in society.² By their very existence, the fundamentalist organizations, associations, and movements embody the full scope of this phenomenon’s manifestations, signifying an ideology that facilitates its goals through the use of political means. The fundamentalist movements are essentially ideological, and their worldview is based on the holy writings of the Islam.³ This type of ideology, which is rooted in “divine revelation,” is driven by a rejection of any other ideology, as the latter is the creation of human conception, which is inherently perceived as flawed. An expression of this type of rejection can be observed in various slogans, such as “Islam is the solution” or “Not East, not West,” which are widespread in the fundamentalist propaganda. Those faithful to Islam believe that “the realization of Allah’s will on this earth,” meaning the establishment of an Islamic society and state, is the only solution to the maladies plaguing human society.⁴

Islamic fundamentalism is not made up of one single approach. It contains major differences in the interpretation of Islamic history (Sunni, Shiite), as well as in the interpretation of commandments deriving from the principles of belief and the operative approach that best serves the ideology.⁵ The fundamentalist movement may use different methods, from violent activity patterns (Jihad), severance of any connection with the infidels (Hijra), or service in the form of an organization that regards an investment in education and indoctrination (Dawa) as its ultimate goal—each group adheres to its own approach. The basic common denominator, shared by all of the movements, is the perception of Islam in its current state as a culture that is becoming extinct. This assessment feeds the sensation of urgency and pessimism, and constitutes one of the basic cultural-psychological motivations vis-à-vis their actions. Islamic fundamentalism is not a new phenomenon. Its roots lie in the previous century, and among its heralds were Jamal al Din Afghani, Muhammad Abdu, and Rashid Rida. Movements like the Salfiya had already appeared at the end of the nineteenth century within the Sunni population, and in the mid-twentieth century they became movements of mass appeal bearing a political message that spread throughout the Arab states in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁶

At the end of the 1950s, the Shia also began to awaken, and Shiite fundamentalism as an ideological-political movement started developing in the religious center of Najef, radiating its influence upon the Shiite population of Iran and Lebanon. Najef of the 1960s and 1970s became an intellectual, revolutionary melting pot, in which the radical worldview of Lebanese Shiite religious leaders was fused, the same individuals who later became the leaders of the Hizballah in Lebanon.⁷

It is possible to identify several events and processes in the history and development of Islamic fundamentalism that constituted “defining events” vis-à-vis its approach and concepts:

The Encounter with the West—The expansion of fundamentalism is thought to be rooted in this encounter, which also serves as momentum for its present escalated strength. The encounter with the West involves many facets: The military, technological, scientific, and economic superiority of the West, cultural estrangement, the Imperialist “scheming,” a modernism which alongside its blessings instigates major changes in traditional lifestyles. The problematic issues triggered by this encounter, which rapidly evolved into confrontation, make it possible to define fundamentalism as one of the forms of addressing this issue, or as the Islamic response to Western culture.⁸

Physical confrontation with the infidels—This stems from the overall experience of the encounter with the West, but it contains significant inherent influences both because of the emotionally charged aspect of these confrontations, but also due to the pointed emphasis placed on the inferiority of the Islamic East vis-à-vis the West.⁹

Thus, fundamentalism represents a radical ideology, which negates the existing order and expresses an aspiration for a more just society. This constitutes a struggle for social and economic change as part of an overall battle to bring Islamic peoples back to their authentic roots. Fundamentalism combats a failing socioeconomic reality as well as modernism, which cannot meet the materialistic and social expectations that it arouses, and seeks a cure for the social maladies at the root of Islamic societies, according to traditional, authentic standards rather than foreign, Western, and modern standards.

The awakening of Shiite fundamentalism is a part of the general phenomenon of Islamic fundamentalism, whose origins we have already discussed, but the Shia is unique in its sensation of historical discrimination which is not only the result of its backwardness and discrimination vis-à-vis the West, but is also due to the fact that the Shiites have been an oppressed minority in the Muslim world for hundreds of years.¹⁰ The sensation of discrimination is rooted in the Shiite “Foundation Myth,” which is based on the issue of the historical injustice perpetrated against the House of Ali after the death of the Prophet, when the former was deprived of his right to assume power in the Islamic world. The controversy with the Surma and the feeling of ongoing political, social, and economic discrimination fuelled and empowered Shiite fundamentalism, which awakened and surfaced under Khomeini’s leadership.

Basic Principles of the Shia

The basis of the Shia (or its literal translation, “the Ali Faction”), and at the focus of the controversy with Sunni Islam, is the belief that the lawful heir of the Prophet Muhammad is his son-in-law and cousin Ali Ibn-Talb, and that the reign over the Muslim community must be placed in the hands of his descendants. The basic principles of the Shia are closely linked to the events surrounding the Prophet Muhammad’s death (in the year 632). According to descriptions in Sunni historical sources, Muhammad died without appointing an heir or establishing procedures for the election of a ruler. After a brief power struggle Muhammad’s father-in-law, Abu-Backer (who ruled 632–634) was appointed the role; he was subsequently declared the first caliph (calipha actually means a substitute—i.e., the Prophet’s substitute). With his demise, the reign passed on to Omar Ibn-al Qattab (634–644) and after him to Othman Ibn-Afhan (644–656)—both were Muhammad’s sons-in-law and members of his tribe (Koriesh). The characteristics and method of appointing the first three caliphs became a Sunni tradition that served as a model for establishing the laws related to handing down the rule in the following centuries.

This concept of the nature of government is poised at the roots of the controversy between the Shiites and the Sunnis; the latter claim that Muhammad appointed a certain person as his successor (none other than Ali Ibn-Talb), an appointment rooted in divine command. According to the Shiite point of view, the reign of the first three caliphs was merely arbitrary theft of the Prophet’s birthright from its legal owners; this is the source of the Shiites’ feelings that they were the victims of injustice from the very start.

Ali did rule for a short time (656–661), but he was assassinated and his eldest son Hassan lost control to the first Umai ruler Muaviya (661–680). About twenty years later, Ali’s second son Hussein tried to claim the throne, but he was brutally murdered with his family by the army of the Umai ruler Yazid Bin Muaviya at the Battle of Carbala (October 680). The murder of Hussein made a deep impression on the consciousness of the Shiites and became the root of the martyrdom that is so characteristic of their worldview. According to their outlook, Hussein intentionally chose death as an expression of his love for Allah and out of his desire to defend his faith.¹¹

The participation of the faithful believers in the pain of Hussein and his family is considered a religious command, and for hundreds of years the Shiites commemorate the events at Carbala with ceremonies that culminate with the Ashura (the tenth of the month of Mukharam, which according to Shiite tradition is the anniversary of Hussein’s death). The ceremonies include a reconstruction of the battle, the recitation of lamentations, and processions in which the participants afflict themselves until they shed their own blood. According to the traditional Shiite concept, this battle symbolized the end of the era of active opposition, as from that time most of the community leaders sided with passive behavior (Kaud), leaving the time for the realization of their goals in the hands of Allah. With the practical relinquishment of the achievement of their political goals, those leaders began to develop the religious dimension of their claims with great fervor; this is the basis for the development of the Shia as a religious movement rather than just a political party.

One of the prominent Shiite philosophers was Jaafar al Zadek, one of Ali’s descendants, who recorded the principles of the Shiite religious rulings in a composition called “The Four Hundred Basic Elements,” a document that served as a basis for literature related to Shiite religious rulings that subsequently developed. At the heart of the Shiite religious theory that took shape in the days of al Zadek and his disciples was the principle related to devotion and loyalty to the Imam (the leader), from the descendants of Ali and his wife Fatma (the Prophet’s daughter). According to this belief, starting with Hussein (Ali’s son), the reign is to be passed down from father to son. As the identity of the Imams was predetermined by divine command, the Shia obviously dismisses the principle of appointing a ruler, which was the ruling of the Sunni religious scholars. The Imams are privileged to rule not only due to the fact that they are descendants of the Prophet’s fam...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of tables and Figures
• Introduction
• 1 The Ideological and Religious Background and the Organizational Infrastructure of Terror in Iran
• 2 Categories of Iranian State Terror
• 3 The Modus Operandi of Iranian/Shiite Terror
• 4 Targets of the Iranian/Shiite Terror
• 5 Iran and Terror—Financing and Policy
• Index