NATO’s First Enlargement

A Reassessment

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138681446
• eBook ISBN: 9781134798513
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This volume discusses the entry of Greece and Turkey to NATO in 1952 from the perspective of history and international relations. The chapters were originally collected in 2012 to mark the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the accession of the two states to NATO. The focus is not on the diplomatic/political events that led to the accession (a subject which has already been extensively discussed in the available bibliography), but expands on a reassessment of this event for the two states as well as for the Balkans, covering aspects of the wider post-war period and providing perspectives for the policies of Turkey, Greece and NATO until the present day. This book was originally published as a special issue of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies.

INTRODUCTION

Apropos NATO’s first enlargement

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou

Department of History, University of Athens, Athens, Greece

This Special Issue aims to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the entry of Greece and Turkey into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the ninth session of the North Atlantic Council held in Lisbon in February 1952. The accession of both countries represented the first enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance in an environment very different from the contemporary one. Nevertheless, the interplay between the two countries in their independent yet related quests to join western political and security structures after the end of the Second World War is still relevant and pertinent to this day. As Southern flank states with perilous external borders facing a variety of threats, both real and perceived, the NATO connection has served to glue them to the West. As Hatzivassiliou states in his text:

from the start, NATO was more than a simple military arrangement: it was a union of sovereign states, based on common values, political and cultural; NATO was a crucial aspect of the institutionalization of the post-war West.

As Güvenç and Özel brilliantly suggest that the fears of abandonment and entrapment have shaped the motivation of Turkey to join and remain in the Alliance to this day; the same concepts could be applied to Greece to explain its incentives regarding NATO. In other words, the need to belong to wider processes shaping and defining the West (be it NATO or the almost parallel development of European integration via the institutionalization of the European Union) best explain the perseverance of both countries to remain in and help shape a role within the Atlantic Alliance.

Though the contradictions between the two countries remain, there were times when one has supported the other in its quest to stay in the West. The Turkish opposition to British plans for Turkey to be part of a Middle East defence organization in the early 1950s rather than join NATO (as described by Yılmaz) was strongly supported by Greece (as posited by Chourchoulis and Kourkouvelas, and Hatzivassiliou) which feared being left to take care of the Southern Flank on its own.

Today, both countries recognize their divergences in a number of bilateral issues and other concerns such as Cyprus. The NATO membership has contributed over time to keep many of these from leading to a complete breakdown. The Imia/ Kardak incident of 1996 is a case in point as is the potential instability from the evolving hydrocarbon resource developments in the eastern Mediterranean. Yet, as Larrabee notes, albeit their different fortunes both countries find it in their interest to avoid a serious deterioration of relations.

Other stakeholders have also played a key role in defining the position of Greece and Turkey within NATO and the western alliance structure as a whole. Almost all authors refer to the USA and its impact throughout the 60-year period in shaping and affecting the multilayered and complex relationship of the two countries in the Alliance. The other defining factor has been the European Union to which Turkey is an aspirant and since the end of the Cold War it has been attempting to develop a defence dimension and cooperate with NATO for the use of its assets. According to Acikmese and Triantaphyllou, the stalled Berlin plus arrangements between NATO and the EU have much to do with the Cyprus issue to which Greece and Turkey are on opposite sides.

The texts encompassing this Special Issue combine both historical research and international relations analysis as their authors attempt to study, explain and define the role and place of NATO in the policy choices and orientations of Greece and Turkey. Stephen Larrabee provides an overview of relations between Greece and Turkey since the start of the Cold War and their impact on relations with the USA and NATO. The author also discusses possible new challenges and how these could impact the relations between the two countries.

Şuhnaz Yılmaz provides a historical analysis of Turkey’s quest to join the Alliance in 1952. For the author, the primary motivating factors for Turkey were the pursuit of security, Westernization and the institutionalization of its relationship with the USA through its membership in NATO. For Yılmaz, the aforementioned factors are a cornerstone of Turkey’s foreign policy to this day.

Dionysis Chourchoulis and Lykourgos Kourkouvelas provide a historical profile of Greece’s perceptions of NATO. They explain why the country has stuck with the Alliance in spite of periodic misgivings about NATO’s perceived impartiality with regard to the state of Greek–Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in particular. The authors show the diachronic value of the Alliance in terms of Greece’s Western identity commitment.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou argues that the coming of the Cold War alliances in Southeastern Europe played a major role in the stabilization of a region tormented by ongoing nationalist disputes stemming from the Eastern Question. He makes a case for the convergence in policy choices by both Greece and Turkey in joining NATO amid the cleavages of the cold war. The author also assesses the Alliance’s role as a deterrent in the periodic escalation of the bilateral differences between the two countries.

Serhat Güvenç and Soli Özel present a historical overview of the factors shaping Turkey’s membership in NATO and explain the security dilemmas that have led the country to vacillate between the pursuit of autonomy and Westernization. In their analysis of the challenges faced by Turkey since the end of the Cold War, the authors consider the relevance of the dynamics of geography and regional considerations, the transatlantic context, NATO’s restructuring and transformation, and Turkey’s domestic milieu to explain the strategic choice of the current elite to remain committed to the Alliance.

For their part, Sinem Akgul Acikmese and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou examine how the Cyprus conundrum continues to affect the relationship between NATO and the European Union, and how Turkey finds itself in the middle of the deadlock between the two. Although the Cyprus factor is not the sole determinant of the inability to advance with the security arrangements that are necessary to be implemented between the EU and NATO, the authors conclude that only with the accession of Turkey to the European Union could the differences in the NATO–EU tandem be resolved.

Thanos Dokos assesses the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean, and projects it about a decade into the future, evaluating NATO’s possible roles, and presenting the view from Athens. He argues that the region remains one of the most disturbed areas of the globe, and will continue to be part of an extremely fluid political, economic, demographical and technological environment. The Eastern Mediterranean touches upon NATO’s security interests; therefore, the alliance will need to be active in subjects in which it maintains high quality expertise (such as hard security problems), and at the same time further its own better understanding of the strategic perceptions of the region and the global south generally.

A careful reading of all contributions suggests that the rationale of membership by Greece and Turkey to NATO 60 years ago is still valid to this day as both define their strategic choice through the search of belonging to the West and not being left on their own to deal with their strategic challenges in a part of the globe which remains disturbed, dangerous but also interesting for the student of international relations. Both countries have had periodic misgivings about the value of membership as they have perceived, justifiably or not, that the Alliance has not always best served their interests or defended their positions, in particular, though not exclusively, vis-à-vis each other. Nevertheless, albeit the subdued celebrations in both Athens and Ankara honouring the Alliance’s first enlargement 60 years ago, the imperatives for membership have not changed for either country. Neither have the misgivings.

Greek–Turkish relations in an era of regional and global change

F. Stephen Larrabee

Distinguished Chair in European Security, Rand Corporation, Washington, DC, USA

This article examines the changing dynamics of Greek–Turkish relations since the end of the Second World War. The initial sections focus on tensions during the Cold War and their impact on relations with the USA and NATO. Subsequent sections examine the origin and impact of the thaw in relations between Athens and Ankara since 1999; the changing role of the Cyprus issue; and new regional security threats. A final section discusses prospects for future relations between Greece and Turkey.

Relations between Greece and Turkey have undergone an important change in the last two decades. During the Cold War, tensions between Greece and Turkey posed a serious threat to security in the eastern Mediterranean and the cohesion of NATO’s southern flank. Cyprus, in particular, was a critical source of bilateral and Alliance discord. Since 1999, however, relations between the two countries have significantly improved.

The rapprochement between Athens and Ankara has diminished an important threat to security in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, domestic and external security has become more closely intertwined. Today, the main threat to Greek security is posed not by Turkey but by the deterioration of Greece’s economy.

Turkish foreign policy, meanwhile, has witnessed an important transformation. The end of the Cold War has reduced Ankara’s dependence on the USA and opened up new opportunities in areas that were largely off-limits to Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War. Ankara has sought to exploit the new flexibility afforded by the end of the Cold War to expand its geographic reach and interests, especially in the Middle East, Caucasus and Central Asia. Ankara’s more active engagement in these areas has stimulated concerns in some western capitals that Turkey is turning its back on the west and orienting its policy more closely with the Muslim world (Larrabee 2010).

Energy questions have also begun to occupy a more prominent place in the security dialogue between the two countries and stimulate new regional alignments. The discovery of gas reserves off the coast of Cyprus has not only complicated the efforts to find a settlement of the Cyprus issue but also sparked new tensions and political alignments in the eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, old tensions – particularly differences over the Aegean – threaten to undermine the rapprochement between Athens and Ankara that has taken place since 1999.

This article examines the changing dynamics of Greek–Turkish relations since the end of the Second World War. The initial sections focus on tensions during the Cold War and their impact on relations with the USA and NATO. Subsequent sections examine the origin and impact of the thaw in relations between Athens and Ankara since 1999; the changing role of the Cyprus issue; and new regional security threats. A final section discusses prospects for future relations between Greece and Turkey.

The Cold War: the erosion of alliance solidarity

Greek–Turkish bilateral relations in the aftermath of the Second World War were heavily influenced by the Cold War and the struggle between the USA and the Soviet Union to shape the post-war political order in Europe. Fear of Soviet expansionism prompted Greece and Turkey to join NATO in 1952. Initially, both countries were willing to subordinate their national interests to the needs of alliance solidarity.

However, as the perception of the Soviet threat waned, each side began to give greater priority to their national interests. Tensions were sparked, in particular, by differences over Cyprus. The USA had no strong strategic or political interests in Cyprus per se. Its main concern was to prevent the Cyprus dispute from damaging the cohesion of NATO’s southern flank and block the expansion of Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean. While Greece sought to encourage the ‘internationalization’ of the dispute, Washington wanted to see the dispute resolved ‘within the NATO family’.¹

In the 1963–1964 Cyprus crisis, the USA succeeded in preventing a Turkish invasion of the island, though at considerable cost to its relations with Turkey. President Johnson’s letter to Prime Minister Inonu warning Turkey that the USA might not come to Turkey’s assistance if Turkish actions provoked Soviet intervention sent shockwaves through the Turkish political establishment and resulted in an effort by Turkey to diversify its foreign policy and reduce its dependence on the USA.

The Cyprus dispute erupted again in July 1974 when the military Junta in Greece attempted to overthrow Archbishop Makarios, the legally elected head of the Republic of Cyprus. The US failure to prevent the Turkish invasion of the island provoked widespread anger in Greece and led to a sharp deterioration of US–Greek relations. Under strong domestic pressure, Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military wing of NATO (Greece quietly returned to the military wing in 1980).

US relations with Turkey also seriously deteriorated in the aftermath of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. The arms embargo imposed on Turkey by the US Congress in 1975, under strong pressure from the Greek lobby, infuriated the Turks, who suspended US access to the air base at Incirlik and the use of several communications facilities on Turkish soil. The crisis reinforced the trend in Turkey toward broadening its foreign policy and reducing its dependence on the USA which had begun after the 1963–1964 Cyprus crisis.

This process of strategic emancipation was given greater impetus by the end of the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet threat removed the main glue that had been the driving force behind Greek and Turkish ties to the USA and NATO. No longer as dependent on the USA, both countries began to pursue less ‘US-centric’ foreign policies. With Greece’s entry into the European Community, its policy became more ‘Europeanized’ while Turkey began to broaden its ties to the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Greek–Turkish rapprochment

Bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey witnessed a significant improvement in 1999. A detailed discussion of the thaw cannot be given here. However, two factors deserve brief mention. The first is the crisis precipitated by the ‘Ocalan affair’. Revelations that the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, Abdullah Ocalan, considered a terrorist by Turkish authorities, had been smuggled into Greece and then given sanctuary in the Greek embassy in Nairobi greatly embarrassed the Greek Government and led to the dismissal of several high-ranking Greek officials, including Foreign Minister Theodore Pangalos. Pangalos was replaced by George Papandreou, who adopted a much more conciliatory policy toward Turkey.

The second factor was the impact of ‘earthquake diplomacy’. In the aftermath of the Ocalan affair, the two countries initiated a quiet dialogue designed to explore ways to improve relations. This dialogue was given important impetus by a devastating earthquake in Turkey in August 1999 and a much smaller one in Athens several weeks later. The rapid and generous support by Greece to the victims of the Turkish earthquake had an important psychological effect on the Turkish public. In the wake of the earthquake, each side began to see the other in human terms rather than as an enemy. This helped to breakdown old stereotypes. At the same time, it provided domestic cover for diplomatic initiatives on both sides and helped to insulate them from strong domestic criticism.

In the aftermath of the earthquakes, Greek–Turkish relations gained new political momentum. As part of its new engagement policy, Greece abandoned its effort to block Turkish entry into the EU and became one of the strongest supporters of Turkish EU membership. This policy shift was based on the premise that a more ‘Europeanized’ Turkey was in Greece’s long-term interest and would make it easier to resolve outstanding issues.

Today, bilateral relations between Athens and Ankara are better than they have been since the Atatürk-Venizelos era in the 1930s. Trade has increased visibly, as have tourism and people-to-people exchanges. Energy cooperation has also intensified, bolstered by the opening of a $300-million gas pipeline that creates an energy corridor connecting the rich natural-gas fields in the Caucasus with Europe.

The Aegean issue

However, relations continue to be marred by differences over the Aege...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction: Apropos NATO’s first enlargement
• 2. Greek–Turkish relations in an era of regional and global change
• 3. Turkey’s quest for NATO membership: the institutionalization of the Turkish–American alliance
• 4. Greek perceptions of NATO during the Cold War
• 5. Revisiting NATO’s stabilizing role in south-eastern Europe: the Cold War experience and the longue durée
• 6. NATO and Turkey in the post-Cold War world: between abandonment and entrapment
• 7. The NATO–EU–Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum
• 8. The evolving security environment in the eastern Mediterranean: is NATO still a relevant actor?
• Index