International Organisations and the Politics of Migration
Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud
The last two decades have seen major shifts in the way international organisations (IOs) address migration. While state sovereignty remains central in the politics of migration, IOs are increasingly developing their visions regarding how the cross-border movements of people should be governed (or ‘managed’) and, in some cases, they have become important actors in the design and implementation of migration policy. Research on the role and functions of IOs remains scarce, however, and there are major uncertainties, concerning not only their actual influence, but also the political context in which they operate and the outcome of their initiatives. According to their advocates, the involvement of IOs would enable greater international cooperation, which would lead to policies that pay greater attention to human rights and development imperatives. Yet, at times, interventions by IOs seem to reinforce existing imbalances, as these organisations primarily tend to align themselves with the interests and agenda of developed receiving states. In addition, the work of IOs is embedded in a complex institutional setting, characterised by sometimes-problematic institutional relations between them, as well as between IOs and other international cooperation mechanisms.
1. Introduction
One of the core trends characterising the last two decades is the regionalisation and internationalisation of migration-related policy issues. At the regional level, Europe is particularly concerned with the progressive elaboration of an EU migration regime, coupled with the increasing cooperation of neighbouring countries; another key development was the creation, in 1991, of the Budapest Process [which brings together European Community (EC) and European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states with the former communist bloc]. Similar regional consultative processes (RCPs) have been launched in other world regions (Thouez and Channac 2006) and coexist with one of the first forums of this kind, the Intergovernmental Consultations (IGC) on Asylum, Refugee and Migration Policies in Europe, North America and Australia, launched in 1985. Another milestone at the international level was the 1994 Cairo Conference on Population and Development, which was followed by other similar forums—including, for example, the first United Nations (UN) High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD, 2006, followed by a second dialogue in 2013) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD, organised yearly since 2007).
While the interest of international organisations (IOs) in migration is not new, these regional and international developments have created a favourable context for them, as one of their main raisons d’être is to support states in their efforts to establish policy consultations and cooperation. IOs have consequently been able to increase their role and activities in the field of migration; this includes in particular the substantial growth of certain agencies like the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the establishment of new organisations (e.g., the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, ICMPD, in 1993), and the creation of novel patterns of cooperation between agencies, such as through the Global Migration Group (GMG) which was set up in 2006 (Pécoud 2013).1
The actual role and activities of IOs in the politics of migration remain under-researched, however. There is a growing body of work on the role of EU institutions (e.g., Boswell 2008a; Geddes 2001; Guiraudon 2003), but no comparable work on international institutions. Little is known on the strategies of IOs, on their influence on policy-making, on the worldviews they promote, or on the nature of their interventions and their actual contribution to policy implementation. This contrasts with, for example, finance, security or development studies, which have long been scrutinising the role of organisations like the UN, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) (e.g., Broome and Seabrook 2012; Wallach and Woodall 2004).
2. State Sovereignty, Immigration Policy and IOs: A Short Historical Perspective
The interest of IOs in international migration is far from new. In 1919, upon its creation, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) mentioned, in its Constitution, ‘the protection of the interests of workers when employed in countries other than their own’. This resulted in the establishment of international law instruments for the recruitment and treatment of foreign workers. There was strong resistance, however: the pre-Second World War context, characterised by economic crises and strong nationalist and protectionist tendencies, was unsupportive of the efforts to promote migrant workers’ rights (Battistella 2009). In the second half of the twentieth century, the development of human rights, along with the need for foreign labour in booming Western states, led to renewed interest in norms pertaining to migrants’ rights and to the adoption of new Conventions by both the ILO and the UN.2 Again, however, states proved reluctant to ratify and implement these treaties (Cholewinski, de Guchteneire, and Pécoud 2009), making it difficult to establish the human rights of migrants as an object of international cooperation (Pécoud 2009).
Today, international migration is commonly represented as an issue that is closely associated with ‘state sovereignty’. States, the argument goes, would engage in international cooperation over a wide range of transnational issues but, as Saskia Sassen writes, ‘when it comes to immigrants and refugees, … the national state claims all its old splendour in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders’ (Sassen 1996, 59). Even if cooperation were recognised as useful, or even necessary, in properly ‘managing’ migration, it would face the obstacle of states’ concern over the sovereign control of human mobility (Martin, Martin, and Weil 2006). States’ unilateral approach to migration would most obviously manifest itself through the one-sided way they control their borders, and by the persistence of such methods over time (see e.g., Zolberg 1997). In this view, migration politics is marked by the ‘tyranny of the national’ (Noiriel 1991) and ‘cooperation’ (including the role of IOs) is something that would have yet to emerge.
Nevertheless, this ignores the fact that, from a functionalist point of view, the international nature of migration dynamics has long made them amenable for international cooperation. The longue durée perspective not only shows that ‘the state monopolisation of the legitimate means of movement’ is the outcome of a long-standing, sometimes incomplete, and still on-going process, as governments have to cope with the influence of non-state actors (like corporations) while also struggling to develop and maintain the bureaucratic and administrative resources to successfully monitor peoples’ mobility (Torpey 2000; see also Geiger 2013). It also reveals the permanent tension between sovereignty and cooperation in migration politics. Indeed, the ILO’s early work did not arise out of nothing, but reflected the political concerns of the time with regard to the need to foster cooperation between governments, to strengthen the international legal framework in which labour migration took place, or to treat foreigners in a way that did not hurt receiving states’ diplomatic interests (Rosental 2006, 2011). Importantly, these concerns were not born solely out of humanitarian or idealistic preoccupations, but displayed a mix of social, economic and political imperatives (as, for instance, social rights could help to monitor foreigners’ presence and activities).
Another object of early international cooperation concerns asylum seekers and refugees. The position of a High Commissioner for Refugees was first created in 1921 by the League of Nations, which marked the beginning of a process that culminated in the creation of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950 and the adoption of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Loescher 2001). This also resulted in an institutional fragmentation that exists to this day. For historical and political reasons (framed by World War II [WWII] and the East–West confrontation), attention was mostly focused on the creation of a regime for refugee protection. The ILO nevertheless kept its labour migrants’ rights mandate, which indicated the sharp discrepancy in the treatment of refugees and (labour) migrants by IOs and governments. To further complicate the picture, yet another IO was created in 1951, but outside the UN system: what is now the IOM was initially called the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME), designed as a temporary Europe-centred organisation with a focus on logistics and transportation (rather than on protection). The IOM only became a permanent organisation in 1989 (Georgi 2010).
These developments resulted in at least three different policy/legal categories, and in a kind of division of labour between IOs: migrant workers’ rights (promoted by the ILO and later by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)), refugees and asylum (through the UNHCR), and logistical and other practical services to governments (by the PICMME/IOM). This configuration was the object (and result) of much debate. The ILO, as the oldest agency with experience in migration, was in favour of a comprehensive approach in addressing the rights and protection of all those on the move. This was to some extent in line with Europe’s reality in the post-WWII context, which saw a high number of displaced people—but with no clear distinction between refugees and migrants. Yet, some influential governments, including those of the USA and the UK, resisted the idea of giving too much influence to a single institution, particularly in light of the fears surrounding a ‘communist influence’ in UN institutions that characterised the Cold War context. This is also why, until today, the IOM remained outside the UN system. This resulted in a piecemeal approach and a (deliberately) fragmented situation (Karatani 2005).
3. IOs in Migration Politics: The Post-Cold War Context
The post-Cold War period saw a number of changes in the relationship between IOs and migration politics. There were at least two interrelated dynamics at play: (1) the end of the East–West conflict raised hopes regarding the emergence of a consensus on certain transnational issues and the elaboration of new mechanisms to regulate them at the international level; and (2) the search for these new mechanisms simultaneously resulted from fears surrounding the decline of states’ influence and capacities in a world that gradually became understood as a ‘global village’. The collapse of Communist states, along with the penetration of capitalism and the intensification of market deregulation, created an environment in which sovereignty was perceived as under threat—hence the search for solutions to the ‘crisis of the nation state’ and for new modes of ‘global governance’ that motivated, among other things, the creation of the Commission on Global Governance in 1995.
International migration was one of the issues, even if not the focal one, which exemplified these concerns. It became understood, both by some analysts and by policy-makers, as a destabilising factor for states and societies. In Europe, fears over massive East–West migration, along with refugee flows from the Balkans, illustrated how migration and refugee movements could create security challenges. So-called ‘new’ types of migration emerged in academic and political discourses, including ‘human trafficking’ and the role of smugglers in facilitating irregular migration (e.g., Salt 2001), or the impact of climate change in forcing people to migrate (Gemenne 2011). These notions melded with preoccupations over perceived migration or refugee ‘crises’ (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1992; Loescher and Loescher 1994; Weiner 1995) and in debates regarding the ability of states to control migration (Freeman 1994; Sassen 1996).
International debates on migration started to display a dual and ambivalent nature. On the one hand, the interest in inter-state cooperation reflected the search for new strategies to control and limit migration. Mechanisms such as the IGC or new IOs like the ICMPD were designed for states to exchange information, join forces and react rapidly to migration challenges. The ‘internationalisation’ of migration politics was then above all a strategy to preserve national/sovereign control over human mobility. On the other hand, however, debates were also marked by the felt need to develop genuinely ‘global’ and concerted migration policies; the intention was to go beyond narrow, control-oriented concerns and to address broader imperatives (like the development of sending regions, the need for migrant labour in developed economies, or the rights of migrants), and therefore to move migration away from the security/control extent to, eventually, ‘manage’ it in a cooperative and comprehensive manner. The work of Bimal Ghosh (1993, 2012) for the Commission on Global Governance was quite influential in promoting such views. Despite (or thanks to) its ambivalent nature, interest in these issues translated into several major initiatives. Following the 1994 Cairo Conference, migration became the focus of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM, 2003–2005), while other global forums were set up (including the UN HLD and the GFMD).
From a neofunctionalist perspective, the ‘problems’ themselves and the interdependencies they create between states do not alone explain why IOs become legitimate actors; the key point is the extent to which there is an agreement between states to foster political integration. Thus, international migration may currently be in the process of turning into a truly ‘global’ issue, not necessarily because it has become ‘more international’ or because we live in the ‘age of migration’ (Castles and Miller 2009), but rather because it is being recognised by states as a topic worthy of attention at the international level. This is why, for example, ‘the UNHCR … grew much faster than the number of refugees in the world … The UNHCR’s growth … could not have been fuelled exclusively by the technical demands imposed by a greater refugee population. It was fuelled as well (perhaps primarily) by an increasing political consensus among states that they had an ethical responsibility to ameliorate the plight of refugees’ (Barkin 2006, 32).
In this respect, the ‘migration crisis’ (whether real or perceived) played a central role, by highlighting the limits of unilateral state interventions and the necessity for governments to cooperate in achieving their goals; this prompted a renewed interest in bilateral agreements (Adepoju, Van Noorloos, and Zoomers 2010) and in multilateral initiatives, at the regional and international levels. IOs thus became a more important element in states’ strategies, which in some...