China, Africa and Responsible International Engagement

Yanzhuo Xu

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138037618
• eBook ISBN: 9781351711456
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

China's increasing involvement in Africa is a controversial and hotly debated issue. On the one hand, China has brought significant economic and political opportunities to the continent with large amounts of investment and infrastructure. On the other hand, however, China's interests in Africa - including international strategy for multipolarity, a boom in China-Africa trade, and a strategic focus on energy – have been challenged as a form of neo-colonialism with claims that support for authoritarian governments has come at the expense of human rights, the environment and good governance.

This book analyses China's responsibility in Africa through the lens of good governance, China's African policy, policy implementation, feedback from host countries, and feedback from international society. Arguing for a new framework for evaluating China-Africa engagement, it looks at four countries – Sudan (South Sudan), Nigeria, South Africa and Ethiopia, all of which represent typical features of China-Africa relations – to test China's impact on the country and to analyse the factors in Africa that affect China's ability to shoulder responsibility. It proves that China's responsibility in Africa is affected by both the Chinese and African environments and that China's positive or negative impacts on the host African countries are largely constrained by the political and economic situation within the host state.

Containing information from first-hand interviews with African officials, officials from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, employees from Chinese State-owned enterprises who have been assigned to Africa, and Chinese self-employers in Africa, and using fieldwork from three African countries, this book will be of significant interest to students and scholars of African and Chinese Politics, International Relations and Development.

1 Overview of the book

1.1 Literature review

Few researchers have analysed China’s international responsibility in Africa. The most relevant paper is by political scientist Dr. Sven Grimm, “China as Africa’s Ambiguous Ally – Why China has a Responsibility for Africa’s development” (Grimm, June 2011). In this paper, Grimm emphasises China’s importance to the world and provides a broad overview of the impact of China’s engagement in Africa. It inspired me to look at the differentiation between actors that take responsibility for Africa’s development. However, the paper does not clarify what responsibility means in China-Africa discourse, nor does it clarify China’s motivation behind responsibility. A body of research focuses on the enterprise-level, that is, China’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Africa, (S. Cheng & Liang, May 10, 2012; C. Yang, August 2008; Zadek et al., November 2009), but little addresses state level engagement, and much neglects the interaction between the state and enterprise levels. Therefore, in order to figure out the background of this research, two fields of literature need to be discussed. One is China’s engagement in Africa, and the other is China’s international responsibility.

1.1.1 The implication of China’s engagement in Africa

As for the hotly debated topic in international relations, there is a large body of research focused on China’s engagement in Africa. Generally, three strands of thought and two scopes inform the on-going discussion about the impact of China in Africa: these are “Sino-optimism, Sino-pragmatism and Sino-pessimism” (Adem, 2012), and the macro and microscope.

I Three strands of China in Africa

From the perspective of Sino-optimism, China’s involvement in Africa is a blessing. Africa gains much from its close relationship with Beijing because China’s economic involvement in Africa has provided great opportunities for Africa’s growth and development. Wang, Foster and others point out that China provides substantial funds for infrastructure, for example in power (mainly hydropower), transport (mainly railroads), and information and communications technology (mainly equipment supply), where traditional donors allocate relatively little assistance (Corkin, December 2007; Foster, Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak, 2009). Some have suggested that Chinese investments in Africa have provided opportunities for African countries. For example, Alden has found examples of African entrepreneurs in small and medium businesses who have benefited from Chinese investments, particularly through “the growth of informal and formal linkage with Chinese … business networks outside of government sponsorship”. He has further argued that Chinese investments in Africa are much needed, especially in the face of declining investment from Western countries, and should, therefore, be welcomed (Alden, August 1, 2005, March 1, 2005). Some researchers have paid attention to China’s technical transfers – for example, Muekalia has argued that Chinese agricultural technology will undoubtedly “increase productivity in Africa, reduce hunger and create jobs” (FAO, 2012; Moyo, 2010; Muekalia, 2004, p. 10; R. Rotberg, 2008).

From the perspective of Sino-pragmatism, China’s involvement in Africa has its strengths as well as weaknesses; whether it benefits the continent or China depends on how the host African governments take advantage of China’s activities. Brautigam compared the impact of Chinese investment in manufacturing industries among several African countries, and concluded that some countries with supportive investment environments have successfully formed a “flying geese” model with Chinese enterprises, while other countries that failed to “establish an environment that would allow either domestic industry or export-oriented firms to thrive and grow” may perceive China as a threat to local industry (Brautigam, March 2007, pp. 13–15). As for Chinese exports to Africa, Taylor argues that the cheap products made in China should not be condemned as a scapegoat for the decline of Africa’s own manufacturing sector. It is, rather, Africa’s internal problems that have caused this decline. In spite of these contentious issues, Chinese products have provided African consumers with more choices (Taylor, 2009, pp. 82–86). Adem summarised that “since the logic of capital is the same whether those in the driving seat are Europeans, Americans or Chinese” (Adem, 2012, p. 144).

A Sino-pessimist perspective prevails in media, journals and research. In this view, China’s engagement is a curse for Africa and threats the development of the continent. Sino-pessimists analyse trade between China and African countries as highly imbalanced (with the exceptions of oil and other resources exports to China) in favour of Chinese exporters, which has the effect of debilitating and even shutting down local manufacturers and traders (Alden, March 1, 2005, p. 7; Draper, March 9, 2006; Wilson III, July 28, 2005). Thus, not only do Chinese imports threaten local manufacturers, but also the labour market, since the closure of local retailers and manufacturers results in thousands of job losses as well (Alden, March 1, 2005; Draper, March 9, 2006, p. 7; Zafar, 2007, p. 122). Mills and Shelton predict that, despite South African President Thabo Mbeki’s hopes, China is unlikely to promote development in Africa through more direct involvement in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), because of China’s own domestic need to alleviate poverty in rural areas. Furthermore, they forecast that, in South Africa’s case, future investments would be discouraging; increasing trade will become more challenging due to the competitive nature of the Chinese economy (Mills & Shelton, 2004, p. 37).

Furthermore, this strand holds that China’s involvement in Africa is self-serving for oil and other raw materials and that the political rhetoric of a “win-win” situation only favours China. Hellström argued that the “centrepiece of China’s African policy became ‘mutual benefit’ and ‘win-win cooperation’, roughly translating into a relationship where Chinese investments, mainly in infrastructure, were offered in exchange for African natural resources” (Hellström, May 2009, p. 8). The thirst for resources leads China to aggressively pursue shady methods in ways that can violate the democratic development and human rights of these African nations. A number of scholars have criticised China’s foreign policy towards Africa of “non-interference” in the affairs of another state, and the emphasis on state sovereignty ahead of humanitarian protection. Due to this principle, China does not attach any political conditionality to its engagement with Africa (Taylor, 2006a, pp. 956–950). According to Wilson III (Wilson III, July 28, 2005, p. 11) and others (e.g., Giry, November 5, 2004), principles such as democracy, transparency and human rights do not feature in China’s Africa policy. As Taylor has pointed out, this policy stance allows China to engage with the more despotic and undemocratic regimes in Africa (Taylor, 2004, p. 94; 2005). This lack of political requirements for China’s engagement with Africa appeals to African elites, who are often the primary beneficiaies, while there is little to gain for the ordinary populations and democratic societies in Africa (Alden, March 1, 2005, p. 7; Taylor, 2004). Alden argues that these African governments are happy to do business with China since it provides them with a new source of regime security (Alden, 2005, p. 145) when most Western companies are unwilling or unable to do business with them (Giry, November 5, 2004). Taylor summarised that Beijing has contributed towards creating a discourse in Africa that “effectively legitimises human rights abuses and undemocratic practices” in pursuit of profits and resources (Taylor, 2004, p. 99).

II The impact of China in Africa: macro and micro

Some analysts view China’s involvement in Africa from the governmental level. Van der Wath describes relations between China and Africa as “constructive, stable, friendly and co-operative” (Van der Wath, 2004, p. 73). Several authors pay attention to the flow of developmental aid from Beijing to Africa and make a comparison between the Chinese methods and amount with those aid flows from OECD members (Brautigam, 2008a; Kragelund, 2008; X. Wang & Ozanne, September 2010). Foster and others, using a database based on information released by the press, estimate that Chinese infrastructure finance commitments to sub-Saharan Africa accounted for US$16 billion between 2001 and 2007. While some of this financing appears to be concessional, most of it does not meet the OECD definition for aid (Foster et al., 2009). It was given to Africa as subsidies provided by government support programmes with low cost loans (Asche & Schüller, 2008).

Broadman’s research is one of the few studies based on microeconomic data, using a survey of both Chinese and non-Chinese firms in South Africa, Ghana, Senegal and Tanzania. He finds that China’s trade and investment in Africa tend to reinforce each other, and notes significant investments have been made in non-primary industries such as clothing, food industry, transport, building, tourism, power plants, and telecommunications (Broadman, 2007). Chen and others surveyed Chinese firms involved in the African construction sector, and found that the success of Chinese firms was due both to cost competitiveness – deriving from access to cheap capital, low-cost labour, and cheap building materials – and to political support from the Chinese government. However, the political support enjoyed by Chinese construction firms does not exempt them from the challenges faced by other construction firms in terms of economic and political instability, poor quality of local inputs and weak infrastructure in Africa (C. Chen, Chiu, Orr, & Goldstein, 2007). Kernen emphasises the importance of multiple private sector networks and the increasingly significant role of Chinese privatised companies (Berthelemy, 2011, p. 8). Gu looks at Chinese private companies in Africa through “evaluating characteristics and motivations of Chinese private firms in Africa and assesses their development impacts” and concludes, “China’s Africa Policy and its implementation in terms of private sector engagement is lacking” (Gu, 2009).

In summary, the assessment of China in Africa varies from case to case, country to country, and perspective to perspective. To be good, neutral or bad depends on various factors, notably, from what perspective (the traditional OECD donors; Chinese central government; Chinese enterprises; African government or African people) and what the criteria used to evaluate China’s presence and actions in Africa (comparing it with the West, China in the past, or with other emerging economies). The three strands of thought “Sino-optimism, Sino-pragmatism and Sino-pessimism” provide a panorama through which to look at both China’s contributions to and negative impacts on Africa. However, no matter if the praise or criticism is drawn from the perspectives of either the West or Africa, little concern is given to China’s strengths and limitations within this continent. Since China’s policies in Africa are driven by multiple factors, one could hardly get the whole story and a relatively balanced judgment without broader considerations. Secondly, the research on Macro and Minor engagement are separated from one another, with either central policy or enterprise activities discussed. It lacks, therefore, a dynamic connection between the two layers. Many Chinese scholars have pointed out the fact that China is not as a monolithic entity as outsiders may expect (Taylor, 2009) (see also reslin, 2007, p. 61). This argument fits into the China-Africa discourse as well. A fragmented China has become involved in Africa, and vice versa: different layers (central government, enterprises and individuals) shape the image of “China” in Africa. In this case, it is worth discussing the dynamic interaction between different Chinese actors in Africa. Thirdly, Taylor emphasised,

When talking of ‘Africa’, we are required to generalise even as we recognise that each state in Africa is different and, as a consequence, that the way in which Chinese engagement with any particular African country will always be contingent on the latter’s political economy.

(Taylor, 2009, p. 9)

However, most of the research on China in Africa is either assessing ‘Africa’ as a whole or discussing specific bilateral relations, such as China-Angola, China-Nigeria or China-Zimbabwe, and so forth. Few have paid attention to comparisons between African countries.

1.1.2 The concept of international responsibility

As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the assessment of China’s engagement in Africa requires balanced criteria, the recognition of a fragmented “China”, and a diversified “Africa”. Locating China-Africa into “international responsibility”, a new norm in international relations, could help to complement the existing research and provide a multi-layer and multi-perspective evaluation.

“International responsibility” is a new concept in the international relations field. Most of the research, which uses the term, is from the field of international law. Obviously, China’s “international responsibility” in this book will not focus on the juridical aspect. Instead, it is more like “international ethics”, which concerns the obligations between states in an era of globalisation. At the same time, it acknowledges the national interests within the boundaries and avoids the empty rhetoric of morality among countries. Since there is no existing systematic theory on “international responsibility”, Chapter 3 will explore the term.

Based on the existing literature, this book aims to fill these gaps and to create relatively objective criteria that could better evaluate China’s involvement in Africa. Considering the limitation of the literature, the assessment of China’s impact on Africa in the context of “international responsibility” is divided into two parts: the first is “international responsibility”, and the second is “China-Africa” on the basis of “international responsibility”. At the same time, it attempts to understand China-Africa relations in a more complex context, including both policy and economic activities, both a fragmental China and a diverse Africa.

1.2 Research questions and hypotheses

This book considers China’s international responsibility in Africa. The assessment of China’s impact on Africa in the context of “international responsibility” should be divided into three parts: The first requires criteria of China’s “international responsibility”. The second is, “What are the influential factors in China-Africa” on the basis of international responsibility? (Policy) The third is, “How does the context of China-Africa relations shape the conduct of international responsibility?” (Implementation) This requires three hypotheses and their related research questions.

I International responsibility

Hypothesis I: The term ‘international responsibility’ is flawed because it does not take into account the developing countries’ perspectives, such as a state’s capability in shouldering responsibility and the varied character of states’ interaction on economic development. (Chapter 3 will answer the research questions of hypothesis I.)

Question 1. What is international responsibility? Question 2. What are the criteria of international responsibility?

II China-Africa

Hypothesis II: According to some of the literature, China’s behaviour in Africa is not responsible since China places its own economic and political interests ahead of the African societies’ interest in development. Based on the discussion of influential factors, Ch...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of maps, figures, and tables
• Acknowledgments
• List of abbreviations
• Foreword
• Introduction
• 1 Overview of the book
• 2 Methodology
• PART 1 Framework part
• PART 2 Case studies
• PART 3 Conclusion: discussion of case studies
• Appendix I
• Appendix II
• References
• Index