Chapter 1
Thriving on a pale blue dot
Criminology and the Anthropocene
Cameron Holley and Clifford Shearing*
Introduction
We, Homo sapiens, have had a varied history during our brief time on this planet of ours. So many of the things we have done, and continue to do, to each other and to other fellow earthlings, have been unspeakably horrible as well as heartrendingly caring â we have been a Janus-faced lot (Harari, 2014). Through all of this we have not only survived but have thrived on âourâ tiny âpale blue dotâ â the term that was used to describe the iconic image captured by the spacecraft Voyager 1 as it turned its cameras, at astronomer Carl Saganâs request, one last time to Earth as it moved beyond our solar system, appropriately, on Valentineâs Day 1990.
We have done well in creating well-being for ourselves as earthlings.
Our thriving has been particularly evident during a temperate climatic period on the planet that geologists have dubbed the âHoloceneâ â meaning, âwholly newâ. This short period of some 12,000 years since the last Ice Age has seen us reach into every corner of our planet as we created safe spaces for ourselves in which to live, work and play. Enabling this accomplishment has been a planetary infrastructure of âecological servicesâ (Costanza et al., 1997) that have sustained us as biophysical beings. Rockström (2009) has conceived these services as constituting a âsafe operating space for humanityâ that has been made possible by a set of âplanetary boundariesâ (Steffen et al., 2015) that defined the environments of the Holocene.
For us humans, these planetary boundaries have been the foundation of our biophysical survival as a species, along with many other species. Many of us have conceived of these boundaries as âNatureâ, a realm that we took advantage of, and took for granted. A world that we thought of as a warehouse of unlimited resources available for our use (Verbeek, 2005) and that we thought we did not, and indeed could not, influence. Nature was the work of Gaia and Gods, not our work. Certainly, many indigenous peoples had conceptions and rules that recognised our interconnectedness with the natural world (Adamson and Davis, 2017; Williams, 2013: 261), but what many in the Global North barely glimpsed, and did not fully understand or acknowledge, was that Nature constituted our biophysical security. Without Nature there would be no âusâ.
While we lived in and took advantage of Nature, our realm of accomplishment was âthe socialâ (Rose, 1996). This was a domain of existence that Durkheim (1950) conceived as an independent realm, that we constituted, that was entirely apart from biophysical Nature â two sui generis realities. While we humans constituted âthe socialâ, we had little, if any, influence over Nature â or so we thought. It was within this âway of seeingâ (Smith, 1987) that the âsocial sciencesâ, including criminology, emerged. The natural sciences studied Nature, while we social scientists studied the results of the human work that constituted the social worlds within which we had our being as âsocial animalsâ. Within this conception humans, as earthlings, had been influential in shaping the social world, but with respect to the world of Nature we have been, in Harariâs (2014) words, decidedly âinsignificant animalsâ.
This framing has quite suddenly been overturned via, what Pat OâMalley (this volume) has termed, a âcollapse of nature into societyâ â a collapse that was admittedly a long time in coming. The Greek tragedy author Sophocles long ago reflected how âmanâ easily âwearies even the noblest of gods, the Earthâ (quoted in Heidegger, 1999: 146â147). And as others have documented more fully (Williams, 2013; White, Rudy and Gareau, 2016), the history of the social has repeatedly been nudged by questions of animal equality (Bentham, 1907), restrained economic growth (Mill, 1909) and our humbling existence as but one part of an evolving planet (Darwin, 1859). These ideas were reinforced by the rise of twentieth-century environmental perspectives advanced by scientists and social scientists (e.g., Leopold, 1949; Carson, 1962; Lovelock and Epton, 1975; Singer, 1975; Merchant, 1980). These many modern environmental thinkers increasingly positioned Nature as relevant to society, as well as questioned the Cartesian dualism between them (see Lidskog and Watertonâs [2016] discussion of environmental sociology; see Williamsâs [2013] discussion of wild law). Leopold (1949: 205) nicely illustrates this in his arguments for a new âland ethicâ noting: âman is, in fact, only a member of a biotic team.â
Notwithstanding this long and formidable body of thought, humans quickly became rapacious consumers of âancient stored sunlightâ (Hartmann, 2013) as a source of energy to enhance our well-being. With the advent of the Industrial Revolution an acceleration commenced, driven by a contingent coupling of a fossil fuel (initially coal), the steam engine and manufacturing of goods through machines (Marks, 2006). What we did not realise initially, but now know, is that through our harnessing of fossil fuels, and the release of carbon into the atmosphere that this involved, we humans became, virtually overnight, very significant animals indeed. So significant that we have become influential âgeological actorsâ (Chakrabarty, 2009) who are, not only part of Nature, but have fundamentally shaped planetary systems. This is exemplified by anthropogenic climate change and a veritable array of declining indicators of biodiversity and ecosystem health (UNEP, 2012; Clark, 2014). The âunintended consequenceâ (Merton, 1936) of our actions has been to fundamentally undermine âplanetary boundariesâ, the âsafe planetary spaceâ and the âecological servicesâ upon which our well-being had depended in huge and consequential ways â as our changing climate now makes clear.
In doing so, we have placed our survival, and that of other earthlings, in jeopardy (Lovelock, 2006; 2015). This, in Kleinâs (2014) telling words, âchanges everythingâ. For criminology, and security studies more generally, this means that we now need to rethink our most foundational assumptions â our Durkheimian heritage. We can no longer treat our âsafe planetary spaceâ as independent of us. We can no longer treat the harms that we have previously attributed to Nature â ânaturalâ disasters â as natural. These harms, and the planetary boundaries that we have relied upon for our safety, must now be âproblematisedâ (Foucault, 1980) in radically new ways. What earth scientists have recognised (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Crutzen, 2002), and what social science must now recognise, is that Nature is in large part a human âaccomplishmentâ (Garfinkel, 1967). This recognition has given rise to the claim that the Earth has now entered a new geological age, a human age, the âAnthropoceneâ (Steffen, Crutzen and McNeill, 2007).
The Anthropocene signifies a new role for humankind: from a species that had to adapt to changes in its natural environment, to one that has become a driving force in the planetary system (Crutzen and Stoermer, 2000; Steffen et al., 2011; Biermann, 2014: 57). Although it is far from a settled concept (Ruddiman, Crucifix and Oldfield, 2011; Hamilton, Bonneuil and Gemenne, 2015; Lidskog and Waterton, 2016), the naming of the Anthropocene increasingly serves to indicate a recontextualisation of human history as âa mere moment in Earthâs deep timeâ, while insisting that we acknowledge the profound consequences of the scale and speed of the global change that human actions have wrought (Beck, 2014: 404â405).
Responses to the proclamation of this new human age have varied significantly (see Dalby, 2016; Corlett, 2015: 38). Some view the Anthropocene and its consequences in a ânegativeâ light (Hamilton, 2015), others see âbright spotsâ (Ellis, 2011; Bennett et al., 2016), while still others have come to focus their attention on a new awareness, succinctly captured by Steffen et al. (2011: 756) who state: â âbusiness-as-usualâ cannot continue.â It is this latter view that provides the girders for this book, and it suggest that our collective approach to criminology research and practice must change (Corlett, 2015: 38).
An increasing body of work has come to examine, explore and critique the concepts, consequences and solutions within the Anthropocene. However, according to Lövbrand et al. (2015: 212) much of this work has been underpinned by âmarginal and instrumental roles granted to the social sciences and humanities ⊠producing a post-political Anthropocene narrative dominated by the natural sciences and focused on environmental rather than social changeâ (see also Lidskog and Waterton, 2016). This has led to increasing assertions like those made by Viñuales (2016: 5) that the Anthropocene âcalls upon all disciplines, the entire body of human knowledge about the world, to analyse what is happening and how to face itâ. This is a call that some in the social sciences are beginning to answer (Lövbrand et al., 2015: 212; Lidskog and Waterton, 2016). Scholars have focused on institutional responses (Biermann, 2014; Dryzek, 2015), legal questions (Biber, 2016; Galaz, 2014; Kotze, 2016; Vidas et al., 2015), concepts of agency (Latour, 2014), critiques of the human-centred Anthropos (Grear, 2015) and the entangled relations between natural and social worlds (Lövbrand et al., 2015: 21; Harrington and Shearing, 2017; Lidskog and Waterton, 2016).
We put the question of the implications for criminology of the Anthropocene to leading thinkers within criminology. This edited volume presents their answers. In this chapter, we aim to outline some of the fundamental questions posed by the Anthropocene for criminology, and briefly summarise how these issues were tackled by our authors. This discussion provides a framework for our subsequent examination and reflection on the bookâs chapters and what they suggest are the core implications for criminology of the Anthropocene.
The challenge of the Anthropocene
Our starting point for this book was that the Anthropocene may require a fundamental rethinking of safety and security. Indeed, the safety and security that Earth systems have provided can no longer simply be regarded as the work of Nature, and as something that we humans must simply live with. We are now revealed as a geological force that has shaped and continues to shape these systems. And this, to return to Klein, changes everything. And it most certainly may change, and has already begun to change, criminology, an area of enquiry whose fundamental topic has been safety and security (Shearing, 2015).
The appreciation that we humans are influential biophysical agents invites us, as criminologists, to ask what criminology could be, and should be, in the Anthropocene. As we develop new criminological imaginations (White, 2003), we have no choice but to start from where we are now, and pull ourselves up by our bootstraps (Shearing, 2015: 258). As we do this pulling, we need, as Larner (2011: 320) has noted, to be wary of âtotalizing and epochal thinkingâ and to seek instead ânuancedâ and diverse responses that acknowledge the complexity, dynamism and uncertainties inherent in the Anthropocene (Shearing, 2015: 258). And as we do so, we will no doubt recognise continuities, as well as disruptions, before we will be able to innovate in ways that will carry us beyond our present (Shearing, 2015: 258).
To push the limits of existing criminological knowledge this book asks:
- What has already been achieved in criminology and what remains unanswered for confronting the key intractable problems of the Anthropocene?
- What might criminology be in the Anthropocene?
- What does the Anthropocene suggest for future theory and practice of criminology more generally?
The chapters in this book seek to contribute to this research agenda by examining, contrasting and interrogating different vantage points, aspects and thinking within criminology.
In Chapter 2, Brisman and South set the scene for exploring criminologyâs contribution to the analysis and debate that flows from the Anthropocene. Acknowledging that criminology has only very recently begun to consider these matters in any substantial way, their contribution to this debate begins with an overview of some of the issues raised by the idea of the âAnthropoceneâ, before considering dominant conceptualisations of the environment as âresourceâ and âprivate propertyâ. Underscoring the anthropocentric acceleration of the theft of lands and oceans, their chapter turns to a discussion of how resource scarcity and climate change will continue to be criminogenic, what this means for the idea of âenvironmental securityâ and the risk that the Anthropocene will accentuate, rather than do away with, the humanânature dualism.
Following Brisman and Southâs chapter, the issue of a criminogenic Anthropocene and criminologyâs response to it is taken up by two chapters which centre around notions of criminal responsibility for ecocide. In Chapter 3, White raises and discusses the international crime of âecocideâ to target contributors to climate change. Critiquing capitalismâs response to global warming, White contends that current political and social measures are not adequately addressing climate change. Finding that both nation-states and corporations must be held responsible for global warming, he argues that contemporary policies and practices can be considered criminal, and its perpetrators therefore as âcarbon criminalsâ.
Chapter 4 continues the interrogation of criminal responsibility, with Haines and Parker analysing attempts to criminalise environmental damage, specifically in the context of climate change. Drawing on a unique combination of green criminology, regulatory studies and a case study analysis, they examine the normative and legal project of criminalisation of business conduct that breaches ecological limits (âecocideâ). They conclude that, whilst there is considerable benefit in both normative and legal attempts to criminalise, it is also necessary to understand the complexity and fundamental economic logic of current regulatory regimes.
OâMalley, in Chapter 5, offers something of a rejoinder to the preceding calls for more, and more informed, regulatory and criminal responsibilities in the Anthropocene. Centred around Benthamâs rejection of traditional criminal sanctions of imprisonment, OâMalley explores innovative approaches to environmental crime in the Anthropocene. Raising the question of what regime of sanctions should be embraced in this age characterised by chronic issues of natural resource depletion, he concludes that financial sanctions (thr...