EU-Russia Relations in Crisis

Understanding Diverging Perceptions

Tom Casier, Joan DeBardeleben, Tom Casier, Joan DeBardeleben

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138215061
• eBook ISBN: 9781315444543
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Relations between the EU and Russia have been traditionally and predominantly studied from a one-sided power perspective, in which interests and capabilities are taken for granted.

This book presents a new approach to EU-Russia relations by focusing on the role of images and perceptions, which can be major obstacles to the enhancement of relations between both actors. By looking at how these images feature on both sides (EU and Russia), on different levels (bilateral, regional, multilateral) and in different policy fields (energy, minorities, regional integration, multilateral institutions), the book seeks to reintroduce a degree of sophistication into EU-Russia studies and provide a more complete overview of different dimensions of EU-Russia relations than any book has done to date. Taking social constructivist and transnational approaches, interests and power are not seen as objectively given, but as socially mediated and imbued by identities.

This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners of European Foreign Policy, Eastern Partnership, Russian Foreign Policy and more broadly to European and EU Politics/Studies, Russian studies, and International Relations.

Part I

The Historical and Ideational Context of the EU–Russia Relationship

1 EU–Russia Relations in Crisis

The Dynamics of a Breakup

Tom Casier

The Ukraine crisis in 2014 pushed EU–Russia relations to the deepest point since the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the annexation of Crimea, the war in eastern Ukraine, sanctions imposed, and finally the suspension of their ‘strategic partnership’, the two actors found themselves entangled in deep and direct confrontation. The clash over Ukraine did not appear out of the blue, but was the ‘culmination of a long-term crisis of EU–Russia relations’ (Haukkala, 2015, p. 25).

The EU–Russia relationship was a marriage of convenience well before the Ukraine crisis, but gradually it had become an increasingly defunct association between partners who held incompatible images of each other and were facing increasing tensions. Analysts have sought the structural causes for the failing marriage in many different and not necessarily mutually exclusive directions: clashing interests (Mearsheimer, 2014), diverging views of the post-Cold War order in Europe (Sakwa, 2014), irreconcilable norms (Prozorov, 2006; Romaniuk, 2009), domestic factors, an integration dilemma (Charap and Troitskiy, 2013), a re-emerging Russia, and so forth. Despite the explanatory value each of these analyses may have, one crucial element needs to be explained: Why did the divorce happen when it did? Why did the breakup not occur earlier? Disagreements between Russia and the West had piled up over time and several events brought the relationship out of balance and breached trust: the NATO enlargement waves of 1999 and 2004, the Kosovo crisis of 1999, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of 2004, the energy spats of 2006 and 2009, the Georgian-Russian war of 2008, and many others. Why did the marriage of convenience survive all of these profound crises? Both partners even renewed their vows on several occasions: agreeing on the Common Spaces of cooperation in 2003 or the Partnership for Modernisation in 2010. If we want to understand the ‘gradual deterioration’ (Sakwa, 2014, p. 31) of EU–Russia relations, we also need to understand the dynamics of the relationship. In other words, we need to examine not only the structural causes of a failing marriage, but also how EU–Russia relations transformed in and through interaction.

This chapter seeks to explain the process dynamics of EU–Russia relations becoming acrimonious. How did the relationship worsen gradually? How did trust dwindle? It will be argued that a logic of competition developed in the decade preceding the Ukraine crisis. The engine driving the process was the interaction between the perceptions the EU and Russia held of each other and of the situation they found themselves in. The dynamics were driven by increasingly negative images, which led both parties to discern certain negative intentions in the behaviour of the other and to adapt their own foreign policies to this reading. This negative spiral, driven by the mutual attribution of negative intentions (Kowert, 1998), in turn legitimised more assertive policies. This dynamic explains how images radicalise and tilt to zero-sum interpretations. Charap and Troitskiy call this an ‘escalatory spiral’ (Charap and Troitskiy, 2013, p. 60). The ensuing pattern of action-reaction may be largely detached from reality.

With a focus on images and on process dynamics, this opening chapter sets the contours for this book, and its social constructivist perspective (see also DeBardeleben, 2012; Clunan, 2009).

This chapter first outlines the substantially diverging views of Russia and the EU on post-Cold War Europe. It then highlights some key trends in Russian foreign policy and in the EU’s policies towards its eastern neighbours. The next section explores the dynamics of action-reaction to explain how a logic of competition has developed in the interaction between Moscow and Brussels, distinguishing between three stages in their relations.

Structural Causes: Diverging Views of post-Cold War Europe

From the beginning, Russia and ‘the West’ (a Cold War term in itself) have held different views of the architecture for post-Cold War Europe. Despite the ‘honeymoon’ (Pushkov, 1993) years in the early 1990s, these different expectations have formed a structural divergence in a marriage of convenience. Richard Sakwa states: ‘Two actual and potential orders in Europe interact and clash in Europe today, generating contestation in the borderlands’ (Sakwa, 2014, p. 26). One order is that of Wider Europe, based on key Euro-Atlantic structures in Europe: NATO, as the key security organisation, based on collective defence; the EU as an organisation for economic and political integration. The two organisations extended eastward, reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic community. The – at least symbolic – centre of power was to be situated in Brussels, the host to the NATO Headquarters and EU institutions, with concentric circles emanating over the rest of Europe (Sakwa, 2014, p. 27)

The Russian view of Greater Europe goes back to Gorbachev’s view of a ‘European common home’, which he presented in a speech in Strasbourg in 1989 (Gorbachev, 1989). Europe was a house with different rooms, making cohabitation and cooperation inevitable, but leaving each a sufficient degree of autonomy. This vision of post-Cold War Europe was a multipolar one (Sakwa, 2014, pp. 27–29). There would be centres of power in Brussels, Moscow and Ankara. From the very beginning Russia opposed the enlargement of NATO. Yeltsin, for example, stated in 1995: ‘When NATO approaches the borders of the Russian Federation, you can say that there will be two military blocks, and this will be a restoration of what we already had’ (Yeltsin, quoted in Tunander, 1997, p. 38). Initially Moscow had less of a problem with the EU. The Medium-term Strategy of 1999 declared the EU to be Russia’s primordial partner (Medium-term Strategy, 1999). Certain issues needed to be settled on the eve of the 2004 enlargement, inter alia the transit to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, but overall Russia saw economic opportunities in the EU. This changed later on, as Moscow increasingly opposed the dominance of the norms the EU promoted in its neighbourhood, not least liberal democratic norms. The latter were seen as establishing a form of ‘normative hegemony’ (Haukkala, 2008; Diez, 2013). In the words of Foreign Minister Lavrov: ‘There is only one criterion used [by the Western powers] to assess the readiness of a country to pass the “democratic” test – their readiness to follow in the slipstream of others’ policies’ (Lavrov, quoted in Averre, 2008, p. 33). Russia eventually became a challenger of this Western hegemony in wider Europe.

Russian Foreign Policy: Changing Strategies towards Great Power Status

Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new-born Russian Federation had the ambition to become a great power again – an ambition that has become part of its identity (Clunan, 2009). This aspiration is not an invention of Vladimir Putin. Earlier, Yeltsin stated: ‘Russia deserves to be a great power’ (Yeltsin quoted in Blank, 2012, p. 154). Under Primakov, Russia’s post-communist foreign policy took on a more coherent outlook, based on three core principles: the ambition to become a great power, the preference for a multilateral world order and a commitment to defend national interests more consistently. What has changed substantially over time is thus not the ambition to be a great power, but the way the Kremlin seeks to realise it, as well as the perception of main threats along the road. Three main trends can be discerned: from internalisation to externalisation of threats; from status quo to neo-revisionist power; from military disengagement to the economisation of foreign policy and a return to military re-engagement.

First, in the 1990s Russia saw the main threats to its security as internal (Snetkov, 2012). The National Security Concept of 2000 illustrates this well, with an estimated 80% of the threats mentioned being domestic (Kontseptsiia, 2000). In the 1990s Russia had been plunged into chaos. Its economy collapsed, resulting in a disastrous recession with two digit negative growth figures. This eventually culminated in the financial crisis of 1998. Politically, Yeltsin’s second term in office (1996–1999) was characterised by political instability. In terms of security, Russia fought two domestic wars in Chechnya. There was a clear understanding that for Russia to become a great power again, it had to sort out internal problems first. This changed radically after the start of the new millennium, when Russia rode the waves of rising oil prices. Increasingly Moscow externalised its main security threats (Snetkov, 2012), with greater emphasis on the dangers of NATO enlargement, the anti-missile shield, American interventionism, the EU’s Eastern Partnership and, in general, a West unwilling to take Russia’s interests seriously. Medvedev stated in 2007: ‘We aren’t trying to push anyone to love Russia, but we won’t allow anyone to hurt Russia. We’ll strive to win respect both for the citizens of Russia and for the country as a whole’ (Medvedev, 2007). Over time the foreign policy discourse has become increasingly anti-Western. This has reached a peak over the Ukraine crisis, with Russia and the West now finding themselves in a direct confrontation. In his Crimea speech, Putin refers to a neo-containment policy of the West: ‘we have every reason to assume that the infamous policy of containment, led in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries, continues today’ (Putin, 2014).

Secondly, Russia moved away from a status quo position to a neo-revisionist stance. In the early 1990s, Russia was seeking to be a great power by becoming part of the dominant international community of Western states. This pro-Western policy was embodied by Foreign Minister Kozyrev (1991–1996). Although cracks appeared in this policy from the very beginning, and despite concerns over NATO enlargement, the relationship was that of master (the West) and pupil (Russia). By working with the West, Russia hoped to be recognized as a ‘normal great power’ (Tsygankov 2005). Larson and Shevchenko (2014) refer to this as a ‘social mobility’ strategy for status enhancement. However, Russia perceived that this recognition was nonetheless denied and that the West continued to trample on the country’s interests, resulting in increasing frustration in Moscow. Under Putin, Russia’s foreign policy eventually evolved towards a neo-revisionist stance (Sakwa, 2014; Sakwa, 2012). The dominant perception that developed in Russia was of a non-representative international system, dominated by the US. Over time Moscow’s ambition evolved toward a goal of making international structures of governance more inclusive and less American, but without overhauling them completely. Accordingly, under Putin’s leadership, Russia set out ‘to ensure the universal application of norms’ (Sakwa, 2014, p. 31), rather than pursuing an alternative international order. The following quote by Lavrov at the Munich Security Conference is illustrative of the neo-revisionist stance:

We categorically reject the allegations of those who accuse Russia and the new centres of global influence of attempting to undermine the so-called “liberal world order”. This global model was pre-programmed for crisis right from the time when this vision of economic and political globalisation was conceived primarily as an instrument for ensuring the growth of an elite club of countries and its domination over everyone else. It is clear that such a system could not last forever. Leaders with a sense of responsibility must now make their choice. I hope that this choice will be made in favour of building a democratic and fair world order, a post-West world order, if you will, in which each country develops its own sovereignty within the framework of international law, and will strive to balance their own national interests with those of their partners, with respect for each country’s cultural, historical and civilisational identity.

(Lavrov, 2017)

Yet, with the Ukraine crisis, it could be argued that Russia has moved further towards a revisionist approach, in as far as the annexation of Crimea is seen as violating key norms of which it claimed to be one of the main defenders: sovereignty and non-interference.

A third crucial evolution in Russian post-communist foreign policy was from global military disengagement to economisation and back to military re-engagement. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia abandoned it ambition to project military power around the globe. It closed military bases in Cuba and Vietnam, ultimately maintaining the naval basis of Tartus as its only base outside former Soviet territory. De facto, this indicated a reduction of Russia’s ambitions to the regional level, commonly referred to in the 1990s as the Near Abroad. Of course, the country maintained its nuclear capacity, at parity with the US, but predominantly as a deterrent, not as an instrument for the advancement of its interests around the world. In the first years of Putin’s presidency, Russian foreign policy underwent a clear ‘economisation’. The objective for Russia to be a great power had to be achieved by economic means, not least using strategic natural resources, such as oil and gas. This was embedded in the consensus that had grown by the end of the 1990s, that Russia first needed to deal with its internal problems and economic chaos, as mentioned above. The economisation became the hallmark of Putin’s early presidency and was also given voice by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov (1998–2004). Arguably, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the economic retaliation and military build-up in its aftermath, the primacy of economic relations got eroded. Important decisions in 2016 indicated how Russia is increasingly eager to restore its capacity to project power beyond the Near Abroad. Moscow considered reopening military bases in Cuba and Vietnam. More significantly, it actively intervened in the Syrian war in 2015, becoming a major game changer in the conflict. In so doing, Russia did not shy away from largescale use of military force. These actions coincided with a very assertive rhetoric about its nuclear capacity, as well as showcasing new advanced weapons.

Russia’s ambition to become a great power again after communism has thus been following fundamentally new strategies in the three ways described: the externalisation of threats, neo-revisionism and return to global military engagement. The reasons for this change are complex and under investigation in this chapter. No doubt they are a mixture of domestic and international factors. At the domestic level, Russia left the chaos of the 1990s behind and started a slow process of economic recovery. Helped by high oil and gas prices, its economy grew steadily. By 2007 Russia had regained 1991 production levels. In other words, it had taken Russia 16 years to recover economically from the collapse of the Soviet Union (Macfarlane, 2006). This gave Russia additional means, additional confidence and renewed strength. Also, the instability of the 1990s was replaced by a protracted period of political stability under Putin.

Several international developments contributed to a consensus that Russia should defend its interests more consistently (Kontseptsiia, 2000). In particular, three events in 1999 contributed to the perception that the West was exploiting Russia’s weakness: the first post-Cold War NATO enlargement, the strategic concept of Washington (allowing NATO to operate outside its own territory) and the US-UK Kosovo intervention (for which there was no UN Security Council mandate). Some analysts have described these events of 1999 as a watershed (Light, Löwenhardt & White, 2000). Further enlargement waves of NATO, as well as the US decision to deploy an anti-missile defence shield along the alliance’s eastern border further soured relations between Moscow and the West. To a considerable degree relations with the EU developed in the shadow of Russian-American relations. As will be demonstrated below, the geopolitical interpretation of NATO’s objectives spilled over to Russia’s reading of the EU’s intentions as well.

Finally, it should also be noted that a new coalition in Russian foreign policy has been formed (Tsygankov, 2016). It has triggered a new, more assertive and anti-Western policy, actively challenging ‘NATO-centric egotism’ (Lavrov, 2016) on multiple fronts.

The EU’s Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours

The ‘big bang’ eastern enlargement of the EU of 2004 and 2007 extended the structures of West European economic and political integration to former communist countries. The former satellite states of the Soviet Union, as well as three former Soviet republics (the Baltic states) acceded to the EU. This posed a new dilemma for the EU, addressed by the United Kingdom’s then-Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw. In a letter to the Spanish presidency he warned of new d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms
• Introduction: A Transnational Approach to EU–Russia Relations
• PART I: The Historical and Ideational Context of the EU–Russia Relationship
• PART II: EU–Russia Bilateral Relations
• PART III: EU–Russia Relations in a Regional Context
• PART IV: The Multilateral Context of EU–Russia Relations
• Conclusion
• Index