Anarchy, Order and Power in World Politics

A Comparative Analysis

Seifudein Adem

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138732223
• eBook ISBN: 9781351743532
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2002: Questioning the most fundamental assumptions of international relations theory, this absorbing work compares and contrasts domestic and international politics regarding the issues of order and disorder taking into account aspects of the two realms which have been neglected by scholarship until now. Challenging the view that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the absence of a world government and international anarchy and that durable and genuine cooperation among sovereign states becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible, under the circumstances, this text is suitable for upper-level undergraduates, graduates and scholars of international relations.

Chapter One
Introduction

We should encourage scholars to ask new questions. Problematizing the things that communities have naturalized is at least as important as important a function of science as finding the right answers. (Alexander Wendt, 1999)¹

In this book, we share Wendt's aspiration in our own way by, among other things, striving to 'problematize' the deeply 'naturalized' assumption of anarchy in International Relations (IR)² and by subjecting it to a reasonably rigorous formal analysis³ from a comparative perspective. Penetrating into the inner postulates of this assumption in this manner and examining its logical coherence and empirical accuracy is one of our principal objectives. The book also has a comparative aspect in its aspiration to analyze social order and international politics not merely on their own or only in relation to one another but also vis-à-vis social disorder and domestic politics.

It may be useful here to make our premise clear. Although only imperfectly comprehensible, a knowable objective reality does exist. On the basis of this core premise we try for instance to produce a reconstructed understanding of the issues revolving around the question of what international and domestic anarchy is and what it is not. In our endeavor to assemble the syllables that would hopefully form tentative answers, we will make consecutive use of positivist and postpositivist methodologies in an inconclusive way. That is, we first attempt to 'verify' the proposition that anarchy is the fundamental characteristic feature of international politics. Then, we try to falsify it. We do not however subscribe to a dualist/objectivist epistemology.⁴ We concede that a completely detached inquiry in social sciences is virtually impossible and values do indeed interfere with the process of observation. And yet, we should like to stress, reality as it is out there is knowable.⁵

Our perspective at once goes along with some and rejects other elements of the major approaches in IR and comparative politics. For instance, we share different propositions of the various sects of the constructivist school, which John Ruggie has classified into neoclassical, postmodernist and naturalistic.⁶ The book also endorses some elements of the arguments of the realist, idealist and neoliberal schools of IR. Like realists (as well as neoliberals), for instance, we subscribe to the idea that states follow their self-interest. We however cast out realism's ontological foundation that states exist (and interact) in a condition of anarchy.⁷ Also, we do not accept the materialistic bias of realism.⁸ The book thus adopts an eclectic approach in its theoretical orientation so much so that we do not know what to call it except to say that it is a result of an assortment of different perspectives and paradigms.⁹ In any case, we shall leave to the reader to decide at the end what school or approach has decisively influenced our analysis. That said, in this chapter we shall critically look at two influential theses in the most recent world politics scholarship as a springboard for the ensuing discussion of international anarchy.

But first a few words with regard to the subject matter of each of the other chapters of the book which, it should be mentioned from the outset, share some degree of overlap due to the comparative nature of the analysis. Chapter Two is a brief review of the literature on the assumption of'anarchy' in [R. It could also be considered as a preliminary critique of this assumption. Chapter Three is very much the continuation of the discussion we started in Chapter Two except for its emphasis on 'order' rather than anarchy. In Chapter Four, we discuss the dynamics of domestic anarchy using the whole-subject rather than point-by-point method. In Chapter Five the assumption of international anarchy is placed within the broader theoretical framework and is scrutinized in light of the features and functions of a scientific theory and the implications of this is then related to the theories of international relations. In the same chapter, we focus on the more concrete and practical consequences of the assumption of international anarchy in respect to the relations among sovereign states. Chapters Six and Seven are case studies in which specific issues both pertaining to Japan's foreign policy are discussed in the context of the transformation of power in world politics. The last chapter makes informed speculation about the future in line with the major questions raised and the arguments advanced in the preceding chapters.

Outstanding among the endeavors to develop a new and more comprehensive understanding of the future of world affairs included Francis Fukuyama's The End of History?¹⁰ and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations?¹¹ It is both the attention these theses attracted and the interest they generated as well as the grandiose nature of the subject they tackle that motivated us to critically examine here their epistemological foundation and general implication of this for their theoretical and empirical validity. As James Richardson, writing on 'the End of History' also reminded us:

[i]t is appropriate that these [end of history] themes be examined critically since the liberal discourse in which the 'end of history' image is embedded may reasonably be regarded as hegemonic at the present time - the language of those elites best placed to shape the 'international order' at the start of the millennium.¹²

The same can be said about 'the clash of civilizations' theme. Taken together, these two views are in a sense mutually contradictory as to what lies ahead in the post-Cold War era. For Fukuyama, world politics becomes less anarchic whereas Huntington believed inter-civilizational conflicts as opposed to the traditional interstate conflicts would engender a new and more dangerous type of international anarchy.

Both Fukuyama and Huntington raise a number of interesting and thought-provoking issues and deserve credit for their contribution to the scholarship in this respect. In a sense not intended to disparage them, our task in this chapter is, however, to point out what appears to be the most apparent weaknesses in their theses. We shall start with a brief assessment of the whole idea of the end of history. An appraisal will then be made of Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations'. In both cases, this chapter employs critical method to single out the flaws in the analyses of the aforementioned scholars. It does not however offer an alternative explanation but is limited to clearing out errors, confusions and false assumptions. The task of offering an alternative view is deferred till the last chapter.

It is worthwhile noting from the outset that the clash of civilizations and the end of history theses represent hypotheses that are poles apart in spite of their tacit commitment to a dualist and objectivist epistemology and a 'realistic' ontology. The question that may hence arise is whether it is justifiable to deal with such mutually deviating hypotheses in one research note.¹³ Indeed, this chapter does not attempt to strictly compare the two; but the reason has to do less with their incomparability than with our own preferred focus. In theory, the fact that two theories are logically incompatible does not make them ipso facto incomparable.¹⁴ With that note in mind, it is to the examination of the core arguments of Francis Fukuyama that we shall now turn.

The End of History

Francis Fukuyama's main thesis was that the collapse of communism affirms 'the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism'.¹⁵ Fukuyama did qualify his assertion:

[t]his is not to say that there will no longer be events to fill the pages of Foreign Affairs' yearly summaries of international relations, for the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world.¹⁶

Our major interest here is in the main issues that radiate from the aforementioned proposition.

True, communism has collapsed. Where Fukuyama went wrong, it seems, was when he assertively implied, just because of that, liberalism has proved its superiority over the other ideologies and that with the collapse of communism the world is increasingly moving toward the ideology of economic and political liberalism. He was implying the superiority of the liberal values when he wrote that: '... what we may be witnessing is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.'¹⁷

Before advancing further, it is important to note that one can identify at least two major flaws with the aforementioned conjectures and line of reasoning: one analytic and, the other, empirical. Not only does Fukuyama allude to the 'superiority' of liberal values but also he seems to have taken the truth of this hypothesis to be self-evident. Needless to say, not everybody would accept this without sufficient clarification, substantiation and qualification. Similarly, it is open to question if, since the end of the Cold War, more and more people are embracing (or have embraced) liberalism as understood and defined by Fukuyama-in the sense of a popular sovereignty along with a formal guarantee and protection of individual rights.¹⁸

L.J. Diamond¹⁹ has argued that it is essential to differentiate between what he labeled 'electoral democracy' and 'liberal democracy'. According to him, these are the two visibly divergent trends following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and Africa, the spread of electoral rights and the continued disrespect for liberties that are supposed to be a postulation for a meaningful exercise of them. Diamond put together an array of empirical data to demonstrate that the spread of 'democracy' cannot be equated with the spread of 'liberalism'.²⁰ Mass participation in the political process can at times challenge certain liberal values as recently demonstrated in Algeria and Turkey. James Rosenau and Mary Durfee are also perhaps closer to the mark when they wrote: '[t]he world's peoples are not so much converging around the same values as they are sharing a greater ability to recognize and articulate their values.'²¹ A caveat is in order here. Writing as they were six years later than the 'end of history', Rosenau and Durfee had of course the benefit of hindsight. On the other hand, Fukuyama was engaged in a predictive, and by implication, prescriptive, endeavor which naturally allow relatively little latitude. Samuel Huntington seems in this regard closer to the mark when he asserted: '[d]rinking Coca-Cola does not make Russians think like Americans any more than eating sushi makes Americans think like Japanese.'²²

To the aforementioned questionability of the empirical validity of Fukuyama's argument, we can add a critique of his logic of analysis, that is, in regard to the question as to how his arguments proceed from an unwarranted assumption to a foregone conclusion. His assumption is that communism was defeated by liberal democracy. His conclusion, as mentioned above, is that liberal democracy is superior to all other ideologies. The fact may be that communism's defeat was due more to its inadequacy to sustain itself and achieve its ideals than to its exhaustion subsequent to putting up a good fight. As we all know, communism, while opposing liberalism, strived to perfect it. No wonder then some analysts viewed the Cold War as a 'civil war within the Western ideology'.²³ It does not, therefore, follow that one is superior to the other. The assumption as well as the conclusion that presumably follows from it are therefore problematic for, in spite of their familiarity, they are no more than unproven hypotheses.

Again, even if one perceives that liberalism is superior to other ideologies, it may be argued, that such a perception is true only if the world is viewed through a Euro-centric and rationalistic lens. As Peter Berger argued:

... capitalism may come to be quickly associated with soaring inflation and unemployment, severe material hardships, the collapse of public order... again, in such situat...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 IR and the Assumption of Anarchy
• 3 Social Order and World Politics
• 4 Anarchy in Domestic Politics
• 5 The Assumption of International Anarchy: Implications
• 6 Transformation of Power in World Politics: A General Case Study in Soft Power
• 7 Japan's Policy Towards Africa: A Specific Case Study in Soft Power
• 8 Conclusions
• Bibliography