The Politics and Complexities of Crisis Management in Ukraine

A Historical Perspective

Gregory Simons, Mykola Kapitonenko, Viktor Lavrenyuk, Erik Vlaeminck

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781317020523
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Ukraine gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. In the decades between the end of the cold war and the crisis of 2014, the country suffered a large decline in agricultural and industrial production, plunging economic indicators into a sharp decline and leading to large-scale poverty and hardship.

This collection by leading scholars from the region explores the various crises affecting Ukraine since independence. Valuable crisis management research is made available from both Russian and Ukrainian sources and the on-going crisis in Ukraine put in context and analysed.

This accessible volume interacts with many disciplines including political science, security studies, crisis management and communication studies; and should prove useful to both students and researchers.

1 Irregular migration management as a crisis in Ukraine

Nataliya Oliynyk¹

Introduction

After declaring its independence from the Soviet Union in August 1991, Ukraine had to develop from scratch a migration management system where one had not previously existed. In the Soviet Union, while the internal borders were open, the external borders were heavily secured. For decades, permission and a good justification was required for Soviet citizens to go abroad, as was the case for foreign nationals to enter the Union. No such thing as irregular migration existed, as the movement of persons across the borders was managed from the capital and not at the border. Although massive (internal) population migration occurred during much of the Soviet period (Shelley, 1981: 77), for Soviet republics there was no need to develop a separate policy, strategy or institutional structure for migration management.

Although by 1990 approximately 100,000 Ukrainians had already left the country (Shamshur, 1992: 259), during the early years of Ukraine’s independence, management of irregular migration did not develop into a strategic aspect of its domestic policy, mainly due to the fact that Ukraine was a donor and a transit country (Polyakov, 2004: 18) rather than a destination for migrants. As a country of origin for many migrants, Ukraine, with its scarce economic resources, never prioritized policies on the prevention of emigration by its nationals or their protection and reintegration upon return, let alone policies with respect to the management of irregular immigration.

Though not under much scrutiny from the international community in the early 1990s, Ukraine’s migration policy appeared on the agenda of its neighbours and of the European Union (EU) during the mid-’90s; when faced with rapid economic slowdown, thousands of Ukrainian nationals started to look for opportunities (legally or illegally) abroad. The European community further increased its focus on Ukraine in the early 2000s, when talks about EU enlargement started with Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – immediate neighbours of Ukraine, where a visa-free regime already existed. This led to an increase in irregular migration flows through Ukraine towards the EU, which in turn triggered the initial set of steps towards the development of a State migration management mechanism.

This chapter focuses on the detention of irregular migrants as an aspect of the overall State migration management policy at that time.

Focus of the study

The focus of this study is the riots that took place in 2002 in Pavshyno, a Temporary Detention Facility for irregular migrants, in the Mukachevo region, Transcarpathian oblast. These riots are regarded as an acute crisis caused by the lack of a responsible and human-rights oriented State policy on migration management, viewed in this study as a creeping crisis. The chapter concentrates on the causes that led to the acute crisis, its mitigation, the lessons learned and the post-crisis actions of the government. The time-frame of the study begins in 2002, when the acute crisis occurred, and includes major developments that took place until 2007. Only limited attention has been paid to the events that happened before 2002.

Defining the crisis

According to Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Charles, creeping crises are pathogens within a social or political system that take a very long time to develop into a full-scale crisis. The danger may be there for all to see, yet the gravity of the situation is not recognized or dealt with in a timely and effective manner. This eventually leads to protracted crises, which, in a quick succession of events, can reach peak moments where the latent danger materializes and transforms into an acute crisis. (Rosenthal, ‘t Hart and Charles, 1989: 27)

In the chosen case study, the definition of crisis consists of three basic criteria: first, a threat to basic values; second, an uncertainty; and third, time constraints. (Sundelius et al., 1997) In the acute crisis, that is, the riots themselves, the values under threat were the security and the safety of detained migrants and the people surrounding them; its uncertainty lay in the outcome of the measures undertaken by the authorities and, further, in the fate of the migrants; while time pressure referred to the need to tackle the crisis promptly to solve the conflict and restore the normal flow of events.

As for the creeping crisis, i.e. the management of irregular migration taken in the context of the given acute crisis, the three basic criteria need to be approached more broadly.

The following values were relevant:

• The human rights of irregular migrants, in particular those of migrants in detention, and a human rights-based approach to migration management in general;
• Considerations of the safety and security of the population;
• Cooperation among the relevant State agencies; and
• The implementation of commitments by the State in the area of migration.

Uncertainty lay in:

• Understanding the link between poor migration management and the risk for the safety and security of the State;
• Balancing between pressure from the international community to provide decent conditions of detention to irregular migrants and the lack of willingness, financial resources, capacity and experience with respect to the subject matter;
• Establishment of an efficient migration management institutional mechanism; and
• Inconsistency between the intentions to establish an effective migration management system, the lack of allocated means, the consequent dependency on donors and the lack of sustainability.

Actions which needed to be taken promptly to prevent similar crisis situations from happening in the future, i.e. time constraints, referred to:

• The creation of immigration detention facilities of adequate quality;
• Setting up of clear procedures for the detention of migrants, including time limits;
• Adopting a legislative basis; and
• Setting up an institutional system for effective migration management.

Background to the case

Irregular migration in Ukraine

Due to relatively high living standards, Ukraine had always been an attractive country for migrants from other parts of the Union (Shamshur, 1992: 266). Due to migration and emigration, Ukraine was even one of the busiest areas in the Soviet Union during the 1960s (Isajiw, 1979: 59). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to its strategic geographic location, essentially unsecured border with Russia, visa-free travel for citizens of CIS states and a lack of effective readmission agreements, as well as insufficient law enforcement, Ukraine became a transit and buffer zone for various migration flows (predominantly from South Asia, Africa and CIS states) towards the EU, as well as a destination country of second choice for asylum seekers and migrants (Zimmer, 2010: 343).

Estimates of the number of irregular migrants in Ukraine, made during parliamentary discussions on the draft law “On Immigration” in 2000, offered a figure of 1.6 million persons.² The number of persons detained grew dramatically towards the end of the 1990s, from 148 in 1991 to 14,646 in 1999 (Polyakov, 2004: 19). In 2000, the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior estimated that between 20,000 and 30,000 undocumented migrants were living in Ukraine; other organizations, however, put the number much higher, at 500,000 to one million (Zimmer, 2010: 345). The United Nations estimated that up to six million undocumented migrants were residing in Ukraine in 2003 (Uehling, 2004: 82). Between 1991 and 2003, the Ukrainian Border Guards arrested more than 91,000 people, while the Ministry of the Interior detained about 10,000 people (Zimmer, 2010: 345). Although most irregular migrants were detained on the western border, some were also apprehended on the eastern border with Russia.³

The first refugee law was drafted in 1993, but was not implemented until 1996. Presidential Decree No. 837 of 11 September 1996, “On the Comprehensive Target-specific Program for Combating Crime for 1996–2000”, defined the strategy to combat irregular migration, as did the Programs for “Combating Irregular Migration for 1996–2000”⁴ and “Combating Irregular Migration for 2001–2004”.⁵ In 2002, Ukraine ratified the Geneva refugee convention and became a member of the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Movements into Ukraine occurred by land, air and sea. Although non-nationals used Ukraine primarily for transit, the country was also a destination for some irregular migrants, particularly those who arrived with knowledge of Russian. In many cases, migrants entered Ukraine regularly, holding a tourist or other type of visa, and then moved onwards individually or with the assistance of organized networks and intermediaries through routes that took them to other destinations in Central and Western Europe.

Although the numbers of migrants were not comparable to those in many EU countries, they created significant challenges for Ukraine’s scarce resources, particularly with respect to reception, detention, care and services, registration and return.

Legislation required all irregularly staying “non-citizens”, as defined by the relevant legislation, to be removed from the territory of Ukraine either voluntarily or through a forced expulsion. If an expulsion order was issued, the person had to leave the territory within the period indicated in the order. In case of failure, forced expulsion (deportation) was ordered. A foreigner had to be detained while the preparations were carried out for the forced expulsion. There were no alternatives to detention in Ukraine. Detention was used as a measure of first, and not last, resort. The numbers of irregular migrants apprehended at the border by Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGS)⁶ suggested the need for migrant detention facilities with a capacity for hosting hundreds of persons for periods up to six months, which was the maximum period of detention in such a facility, according to Ukrainian legislation. Instead, detained irregular migrants resided in ill-prepared SBGS barracks in Pavshyno, suitable for a maximum of 360 persons (the number of detained persons was 7,330 in 2003, 8,344 in 2004 and 5,696 in the first six months of 2006), or in temporary custody facilities of the Ministry of the Interior (MoI), together with Ukrainian nationals detained for administrative offences (the number of detained foreigners was 5,385 in 2003, 3,659 in 2004, and 3,113 in 2005).⁷

Chronology

Pre-crisis

Whereas irregular migration through Ukraine in the early 1990s was not very numerous, this increased in the late 90s–early 2000s, coinciding with European Union accession talks with ten new states, some of which were immediate neighbours of Ukraine. The problem of detention of irregular migrants arose with the increase in migration flows. In 2001, the first temporary detention centre was opened in the village of Pavshyno in the Mukachevo region of the Transcarpathian oblast. Prior to this, migrants were placed in tents right at the area of the Border Guard units which had apprehended them. The cost of the facility construction was 270,000 UAH (US$60,000). As the only migration detention facility in the country, Pavshyno was financed from the local SBGS budget, without a separate budget line, and never received allocations from the State budget.

Before the riots, Pavshyno, originally the old barracks of the Soviet army had broken windows and no heating, shower or hot water.⁸ Designed for a maximum of 360 persons, the facility hosted as many as 700 irregular migrants in the spring of 2002.⁹ The Report of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)¹⁰ stated that conditions in Pavshyno were often unbearable. The occupancy rate at the rooms where migrants were detained, for example, was 17 persons per 17 m².

One of the major pre-conditions which led to the crisis was the often very long identification procedure and the feelings of frustration and hopelessness it created among detained migrants. Some were detained for more than eight months without knowing what would happen to them. Hardly any legal or social help was available at that time. In a similar context, it has been observed that inadequate funding/staffing of responsible authorities has adverse effects on the adequacy of the asylum procedures (Zimmer, 2010: 347).

Acute crisis

In the summer and autumn of 2002, unrest broke out on several occasions among detained migrants in the Pavshyno facility. On 2 September 2002, mass disturbances took place among the migrants. Almost two hundred detainees tried to storm the guarded checkpoint. Border Guards, assisted by a special militia (police) unit, managed to quell the unrest in four hours. Within one week, on the night of 9 September 2002, another riot resulted in the fleeing of 253 irregular migrants from the detention centre. They cut the electric current and broke the de-energized gates. This was the fourth and the most critical unrest that occurred in the centre as well as the highest number of runaway irregular immigrants in Ukraine. Border Guards and the militia managed to return all those who escaped by morning, stating that the runaways surrendered wilfully and no coercion was used.

Aftermath

Before the escape took place, after the second riot, the commandment of the local SBGS unit arrived at Pavshyno with the aim of investigating the causes of the conflict. A group of detainees encircled them, took away their communication equipment and held them hostage for three hours. The detainees released the officials only after the hostages promised to fulfil their requirements, among which were the improvement of nutrition, the shortening of the detention period and the possibility of seeing their children and wives, who were held in another detention facility in the town of Mukachevo.

Key decisions in this crisis situation were taken, first of all, at the local level by SBGS and MoI units. The task was simple: put an end to disturbances and prevent other possible problems through the strengthening of the guar...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: the politics and complexities of crisis management in Ukraine
• 1 Irregular migration management as a crisis in Ukraine
• 2 The first Russian–Ukrainian gas conflict (2005–2006)
• 3 Non-violent Orange Revolution and violent Euromaidan: theoretical and comparative perspectives with other democratic revolutions
• 4 Yanukovich statements on Ukraine–NATO relations: an internal crisis with external outcomes
• 5 Mass media coverage of the Ukrainian political crisis
• 6 Journalism under threat: the Gongadze murder in Ukraine
• Appendix One: reports on the Gongadze Inquiry
• Conclusion
• Index