Lessons learnt from conventional military operations in the Second World War
During World War II, the Indian Army had about 2.5 million men and became the biggest volunteer army in the world. It was deployed in various theatres stretching from Hong Kong in the east to Italy in the west. In 1942, the Indian Army was scorched by the Rising Sun in South-East Asia. Nonetheless, superior material resources and sophisticated combat techniques enabled the Indian Army to go on into an offensive against the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) from mid-1944 onwards till mid-1945, when the Japanese evacuated Rangoon. In the western theatres, during 1940–41, the Indian units were able to defeat the Italian Army easily in Abyssinia and in the Western Desert. The arrival of Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps in 1941, however, changed the strategic scenario in favour of the Axis powers. But, in late 1942, the ‘Desert Fox’ was checked, and in early 1943, the ‘Fox’ was defeated in Tunisia. In late 1943 and 1944, three Indian divisions were able to pursue the much-vaunted Wehrmacht across the spine of Italy.
In East Africa, the Indian units learnt the technique of attacking after artillery fire had softened the enemy positions (Singh 1967: 55). This became the staple of Indian and Pakistan armies’ tactical repertoire after 1947. To a great extent, combat in East Africa had similarities with the fighting in the North-West Frontier. For instance, small unit patrols along the bush covered ridges reminded the jawans of stalking and picketing across the North-West Frontier.
Field Marshall Archibald ‘Archie’ Wavell’s combat techniques during the successful Operation COMPASS in 1940 against Marshal Rudolfo Graziani’s Italian Force in Libya involved march and manoeuvre in the night, and making use of the 25-pounder guns. Further, he emphasized that commanders should focus on reconnaissance and that they and their troops must be thoroughly acquainted with the topography of the terrain (Auchinleck Papers 21 September 1940). After being drubbed at the hands of Rommel, the Indian troops were taught about the superiority of German armour tactics. At the positional battle of El Alamein (October 1942), superior massed artillery fire checked the Panzerarmee Afrika’s onslaught. Better anti-tank guns and Allied air superiority enabled the Indian troops to finally check and then checkmate the ‘Fox’ in mobile battles (Roy 2016: 226; Singh 1967: 61, 63–4).
In Italy, the Indian divisions conducted what could be termed as mountain warfare under modern conditions. For reconnaissance of German defensive strongpoints, the Indian Army evolved several types of patrols. Initially, reconnaissance patrols were sent, which in turn were backed up by fighting patrols, and they were in turn supported by main patrols. Infantry learnt to use mortars and machineguns intimately. Each patrol was accompanied by wireless and gunnery officers for calling artillery support in case of need. Mortar officers were inducted at both the battalion and brigade levels. Infantry advance under indirect artillery fire and under creeping barrage was perfected. By August 1944, the Indian units became adept in launching nocturnal patrols for harassing the German lines. A similar development during this period also occurred in the Burma front. Each battalion was provided with a Forward Observation Officer for directing artillery fire. Counter-battery and counter-mortar fire supported the infantry as they moved forwards from the concentration area to the assault zones. The Indian Army infiltrated across the German defensive lines in the mountains with the aid of smoke, mortar and artillery fire. Smoke distracted German defensive fire. These combat techniques would be put to good use by both the Indian and Pakistan armies during their wars in Kashmir. A sort of combined arms tactic evolved with the jawans, artillery and tanks cooperating with each other for cracking the defensive positions of the Germans and then pursuing them. For pursuit of the retreating German rearguards, battle groups comprising of tanks and infantry were formed, which operated independently deep inside the enemy territory. The objective was to prevent the Germans time and opportunity to set up robust defensive positions (Roy 2016: 217–26).
Initially, in Malaya and in Burma, the Indian Army had no proper response to the fish hook/filleting tactics of the IJA. The roadbound Indian troops were easily outflanked and outmanoeuvred by the light Japanese infantry, which infiltrated through the jungles. The Nipponese soldiers, by establishing roadblocks at the rear of the Allied troops and by making flanking attacks, made mincemeat of the static linear defence of the British and Indian troops in Malaya and Burma in 1942. After a rigorous training regimen, the Indian Army learnt the technique of establishing perimeter defence (‘boxes’) sustained by aerial supply. The box formation was initially adopted during the retreat across the Malayan Peninsula in face of the Japanese advance. At the dawn of 19 January 1942, the 45th Indian Brigade was organized into a box formation. The wounded and the transport elements were placed in the middle of the ‘box’. The ‘box’ formation – with advance guard, flank guards and rearguard – moved slowly through the rubber plantations. This was a tactical innovation of great import. While the 4th/9th Jat held the northern perimeter of the box, the 7th/6th Rajputana Rifles Battalion formed the rearguard and later formed the flank protection column. The Japanese unsuccessfully tried to penetrate the perimeter of the box by sending small parties armed with automatic rifles. When they failed, the Japanese sent light tanks. With the aid of 25-pounder guns, the tanks were knocked out. Against the resolute defence by troops organized in box formation, the Japanese light infantry’s lightning attacks failed. What was required for a successful box formation defence to succeed was strong leadership and hardened troops who could implement infantry-artillery coordination (Malaya Campaign by Mileham). Later, in 1944, Field-Marshall William ‘Bill’ Slim would use the box formation supported by aerial resupply with great effectiveness in delaying the Japanese advance towards Imphal-Kohima.
Thanks to the recommendations of the Infantry Committee set up in June 1943, the 14th and the 39th Indian Divisions were organized as jungle warfare training divisions. As a result, by early 1943, the Indian units in Burma had become jungle proficient (Marston 2007: 111–12). At the operational level, air transportation came in a big way during the Imphal-Kohima Campaign. The 5th and 7th Indian Divisions were transported by air along with 25-pounder guns and ancillary units from Arakan to Imphal. This put an end to Renya Mutaguchi’s ambitious U GO offensive against British Raj forces in Manipur and the Naga Hills. At the ground level, aggressive patrolling (known as Tiger Patrols) ended the myth of Japanese Superman (Singh 1967: 87, 89). In late 1944, the 19th Indian Division in Burma trained the good shots in the units in sniping, which hitherto had remained a Japanese speciality (19th Indian Division 3 November 1944). Interestingly, small unit aggressive patrolling proved to be of great use to the Indian Army during its counter-insurgency operations (COIN) in Kashmir and in North-East India after independence.
Before the beginning of World War II, the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF) flew Wapiti biplanes. In 1939, the RIAF acquired Hawker Audaxes biplanes and took over the duty of coast watching from the Royal Air Force (RAF). In 1942, the Indian pilots learnt to fly the Blenheims and Lysanders in Burma. The Indian pilots made use of innovations to use these aircraft as dive bombers and learnt the tactic of strafing the Japanese infantry (Saigal 1977: 122–23, 132, 153–54). This combat technique would be used by the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Kashmir during the First India-Pakistan War.
During World War II, the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) mostly operated in the Bay of Bengal. The RIN sloops conducted anti-shipping patrols and engaged in convoying troop transporters. The RIN also carried out minesweeping roles. In addition, ships were deployed for anti-smuggling patrols (Singh 1986: 93–4). During Operation PAWAN (1987) and especially in the new millennium, anti-smuggling activities along with armed constabulary are emerging as the principal duties of the Indian Navy.
Training in the British-Indian army after the Second World War
Because the British-Indian Army gave birth to both the Indian and the Pakistan armies, it is necessary to understand its training regimen, as its ethos percolated down into its two successor armies. ‘“Training” is not simply a matter of learning; it is above all establishing identity with the group who carry out their skills collectively’ (Collins 2004: 91). Indeed, a common view is that training is about developing the skills of the individual soldier, but it is much more than that. Training serves as a means of socializing the individual to the group and to the small military group in particular (King 2006, 2013). Training works to bind the members of a group together. Moreover, through this mechanism, the cultural roots of the British military are regenerated and re-instigated generation after generation. Of course, cultures evolve; nonetheless, the processes by which this culture has been transmitted and maintained were inherited and maintained by both the Indian and Pakistani militaries.
As early as 28 August 1945, the commander-in-chief of India informed the commanders of the North-West Army, Eastern, Central and Southern Commands that the end of the Second World War would result in massive demobilization – and that the Indian Army should prepare itself for sporadic unrest resulting from the unsettled political and economic conditions in India. In addition, the units deployed along the North-West Frontier should continue to train in waging small wars (L/WS/1/781 28 August 1945: 1). Training for waging conventional war, nevertheless, was not altogether neglected.
In March 1946, the 1st Indian Armoured Division was concentrated in the Secunderabad-Ahmadnagar area. This division had three brigades: the 2nd, 4th and 14th Horse. Its headquarters unit had Sherman V tanks and its three brigades were equipped with heavy Churchill tanks. The 11th PAVO Cavalry was equipped with light Stuart tanks. The training of the Lorried Brigade and the divisional troops emphasized infantry-tank cooperation. To save wear and tear on the tracked vehicles, much emphasis was put on tactical exercise without troops (TEWT). TEWT involved the rapid concentration of a division involving movement by day and night; flexibility of the divisional organization to enable mixed groups of different strengths to be quickly assembled and pushed forwards; crossing of an obstacle and then subsequent deployment; action involving combat with enemy armour and infantry carrying flame throwers; cooperation between tank and infantry; and cooperation with air, involving maintenance by air and tank-aircraft intercommunication (Training Directive 1st Indian Armoured Division, 19 March 1946: L/WS/1/781). Several elements of these training mechanisms were actually copied from the operational techniques of the Afrika Korps, against whom the 4th Indian Division fought in the Western Desert. This sort of training aided the Indian and Pakistan armies to conduct armoured combat during the 1965 India-Pakistan War.
In general, the commissioned officers’ training focussed on personnel management and physical fitness (L/WS/1/781, 2 June 1945). The training for the junior leaders focussed on the cooperation of all arms, a quick and sound appreciation of tactical problems in different terrain, development of leadership and individuality, and the inculcation of high morale (Appendix A L/WS/1/762, 13 March 1946). The first post-Second World War course for regular commissions started in the Indian Military Academy on 25 February 1946. At that time, the commandant was Brigadier A.B. Barltrop (Cariappa Papers 11 April 1946: 208). Field-Marshal Claude Auchinleck was full of enthusiasm for retaining and if possible raising the combat effectiveness of the Indian Army. On 18 April 1946, he informed Brigadier K.M. Cariappa (later Field-Marshal) that some airdrop exercises must be started at Kohat in the Northwest Frontier of Pakistan. Such training exercises would aid the IAF and the PAF during the First India-Pakistan War, the subject of our next chapter. In fact, on 8 June 1945, India’s general headquarters initiated Operation MINVERVA, an exercise in which the troops were trained in aerial transportation. MINVERVA would enable the independent Indian Army to transport ground units to Srinagar at the beginning of the First India-Pakistan War. Further, Claude Auchinleck (commander-in-chief of India) thanked Cariappa for the suggestion that a propaganda film must be made in order to attract suitable candidates for a regular commission in the Indian Army. Auchinleck noted, however, that making such a film would be a complicated and costly business (Cariappa Papers 18 April 1946: 209; L/WS/1/781 8 June 1945: 1–3). On 16 May 1946, Major-General R.A. Savory, Adjutant-General India informed Cariappa that the army production unit under the director of services of cinematography at GHQ would soon be closed down and that production of a propaganda film by the commercial sector would take at least a year (Cariappa Papers 16 May 1946: 229).
In September 1946, Cariappa and General J.N. Chaudhuri were selected by Auchinleck for the course at the Imperial Defence College. The college trained young officers of all the three branches of the armed forces, as well as the civil servants (Cariappa Papers 29 September 1946: 238). The exit of most of the British officers as a result of decolonization enabled quick promotion for most of the Indian and Pakistani commissioned officers. In August 1947, Cariappa was promoted to the rank of major-general (Cariappa Papers 14 August 1947: 256). He later became the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) of India from 1962 to 1966.
The principal preoccupation of the Indian Army after the end of the Second World War and till the beginning of partition-related violence during the summer of 1947 remained the traditional one: fighting Pathans (Pashtuns) along the North-West Frontier. Even today, the conduct of small war remains a major duty for both the Indian and Pakistan armies.
In mid-January 1946, the 10th Indian Division was deployed at Rawalpindi as general headquarters reserve. In case of large-scale tribal disturbances, this division was to be deployed along the North-West Frontier. It was to operate as a complete unit or in brigade groups, as required. Lieutenant-General J.G. Swayne, chief of general staff (CGS), noted that the 10th Indian Division had experience in mountain fighting in Italy against the Germans. The techniques learned there, combined with the use of modern weapons, would be implemented for modernization of North-West Frontier warfare (L/WS/1/781 17 January 1946).
In May 1946, Cariappa was commanding the Bannu Brigade, which was deployed in the area stretching from Mari Indus to Mir Ali to Tal Bridge. It fought the Waziris led by Mizra Ali Khan, the Faqir of Ipi. Hindu men and women were kidnapped from Bannu area. The road Shinki-Isha Corner-Tal was repeatedly damaged, and the bridges were blown up by the Faqir’s men. Besides following coercive measures, Cariappa tried to appease the wily Mizra Ali Khan, but it was in vain (Cariappa Papers 3 May 1946: 219–220). The Faqir of Ipi was intent on continuing the jihad against the British-Indian government and would continue to wage it, even against the Pakistan Government. On 10 May 1946, Cariappa received a letter from Ipi (also known as Haji Sahib), which could be translated as
… believing in the Holy Quran… and in the Quran there is a command for holy war (that is, jihad). Therefore we Muslims, people of Waziristan are prepared to sacrifice our men, women including families and wealth until we have gained freedom from this inhumanly Government. Those who… help our enemy, whether Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs or Christians will suffer at our hands. This is lawful in our religion.
(Cariappa Papers: 225)
Conflict along the North-West Frontier continued to flicker as India and Pakistan became independent.
