Partnerships and Regimes

The Politics of Urban Regeneration in the UK

Jonathan S. Davies

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781351745789
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2001. During the 1990s, urban regeneration partnerships proliferated in the UK. It is now commonplace for many individuals and organizations, including businesses, community groups, the voluntary sector and other public sector bodies, to co-operate with local authorities in a wide range of activities. Interest in partnerships between local government and local businesses has been given added momentum by the increasing popularity of urban regime theory as a tool for understanding urban politics in the UK. Regime theory is an American neo-pluralist account of urban politics which is concerned with local collaborative dynamics and processes, particularly those between local government and business leaders. It focuses on one facet of local governance, the relationship between the local authority and the business sector in regeneration activities.

1	Explaining Urban Regime Theory

Introduction

Urban regime theory has, says Imbroscio (1998a: 233/4), become the dominant theory for the study of local politics. Scholars from almost every part of the western world have used it, including the USA,¹ the country of its origin, New Zealand (Brown, 1999) and much of Europe.² Just as diverse has been the range of criticisms which regime theory has generated. It has been accused of lacking an overall theoretical framework (Feldman, 1997) and of being localist, inductive, determinist and intentionalist (Di Gaetano, 1997; Painter, 1997; Ward, 1997a,b). It is perceived as too normative, but it is criticised at the same time for operating exclusively in the middle range of theory (Imbroscio, 1997, 1998a,b). It has also been dismissed as ethnocentric (Lawless, 1994). The recent debate between Clarence Stone (1998a) and David Imbroscio (1998a,b) demonstrates that the explanatory power of regime theory remains strongly contested.

With the emergence of such a diverse and sometimes contradictory literature, the theoretical propositions driving regime theory have, on occasion, been overlooked or misinterpreted (Stone, 1998a: 250). One task of this chapter, therefore, is to provide a critical introduction to the core concepts in regime theory based on the works of Stephen Elkin and Clarence Stone, who authored the classic texts of regime theory on Dallas (Elkin, 1987a) and Atlanta (Stone, 1989).³ As well as discussing the theoretical roots of regime theory, the chapter discusses two common criticisms and develops a third. The two common criticisms are that it pre-supposes regimes (Ward, 1997a,b; Di Gaetano, 1997)andthatitis ‘localistic’ (Cochrane et al, 1996; Ward, 1997a,b; Di Gaetano, 1997). It is argued that such criticisms are mistaken. However, a key weakness in regime theory, which has not previously been discussed in the literature, is a tension between the normative and empirical elements. The normative aspirations of regime theory are rarely discussed and it is argued here that they are important. Regime theory fails because the ‘good’ of greater equality within the market economy appears to be unattainable. It is argued, therefore, that the analysis of society presented by Elkin and Stone does not support the goals to which they aspire.

The chapter is organised into six main sections. It begins by examining the abstract conditions for regime formation. It proceeds secondly to explore the empirical conditions in which regime politics are produced; and thirdly to review the processes involved in regime politics. The fourth section evaluates the empirical scope of regime theory; and the fifth considers its explanatory limits. In light of these discussions, the final section evaluates the normative tasks of regime theory.

The Abstract Conditions for Regime Formation - Systemic and Pre-emptive Power

Regime theory is a development of the critical pluralist ‘community power’ tradition of the 1950s and 1960s (Hunter 1953, Dahl, 1961), belonging broadly in the neo-pluralist tradition (Lindblom, 1977). Lindblom recognised that governments in capitalist countries need economic growth and that in a market system decisions are taken by business in which government plays no role. These decisions affect everyone, but they are not subject to democratic control (Lindblom, 1977: 175). Thus, the unrefined pluralist notion that groups have equal access to the decision making process is perceived to be flawed. This perspective underpins regime theory which subscribes to the notion of a division of labour between state and market in which ownership of productive assets rests largely in the hands of the private sector, while the machinery of government is subject to popular control (Elkin, 1987a: 18; Stone, 1989: 9). Both Elkin and Stone are concerned with the interface between the public and private sectors and, as Stone puts it, the regime is the ‘organism’ which mediates the relationship between popular control of the political process and private control of the economy (1993: 2; 1998a: 250). This concept of a regime mediating between social structures and political agents is central to regime theory.

It is the state-market dichotomy which gives rise to the conception of ‘systemic’ power developed by Stone. He categorises four types of power relationship between groups. Situational power is contrasted with intentional power and direct power to indirect power (Stone, 1980: 981): Intentional and direct power is a ‘decisional’ relationship based on an ‘orthodox’ first dimensional view of power. Here, the superordinate party intentionally makes the subordinate undertake an act of her choosing. This is a form of command power, in which A exercises domination over B. Situational and direct power is an ‘anticipated reaction’ relationship where the subordinate party seeks to interpret the wishes of the superordinate. The subordinate therefore recognises the position of the superordinate party, whether or not the superordinate is aware of this. Intentional and indirect power is exercised when the superordinate party intentionally exercises influence over the decision making context, resulting in ‘non decisions’, that is, the second dimension of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). The subordinate party need not understand her position as such. Situational and indirect power is systemic power, the kind of power underpinning regime theory. Here, the superordinate party influences the decision making context, but not necessarily with intent. The subordinate party in turn is influenced by the superordinate party, whether she recognises it or not. This latter form of power, the third dimension of power, is reflected concretely in the division of labour between state and market. Systemic power is defined by Stone as:

that dimension of power in which durable features of the socioeconomic system (the situational element) confer advantages and disadvantages on groups (the intergroup element) in ways predisposing public officials to favour some interests at the expense of others (the indirect element) … Because its operation is completely impersonal and deeply embedded in the social structure, this form of power can appropriately be termed ‘systemic’ (Stone, 1980: 980/1).

For Stone, systemic power results in an indirect conflict between favoured and disfavoured groups with the former frequently concerned with economic growth, the latter with redistribution. Due to their control of productive resources, business elites are likely to have a privileged influence on the urban policy agenda. Local officials are the ‘bearers’ of these structural constraints and community power is articulated in the behaviour of these officials (Stone, 1980: 982).

The concept of systemic power is used by Stone to show how business interests tend to prevail in economic development policy because it is in the interests of public officials to respond to business concerns. They tend to respond to economic pressures before any conflicting electoral demands (Stone, 1980. 987). Systemic power therefore derives from a combination of structural business advantage and an economic-rational perspective on official behaviour, which purports to explain how officials come to be the bearers of systemic structures. For these reasons, liberalism and democracy stand in dynamic contradiction to each other, a contradiction which Elkin (1985b: 210) places at the heart of market societies. The state and its agents embody these contradictions.⁴

While this perspective undoubtedly owes much to Lindblom’s formulation, Stone traces it back to Hunter’s classic (1953) work Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers. He attributes to Hunter the development of a perspective on power not dissimilar to his own which he terms ‘pre-emptive power’, defined as ‘a capacity to occupy, hold, and make use of a strategic position’ (Stone, 1988: 83). Pre-emptive power is a derivative of systemic power in that the state-market division identified in regime theory tends to endow business, more than any other group, with the capacity for pre-emption, the capacity to occupy a strategic position. Systemic power creates the conditions in which pre-emption occurs, but pre-emption itself is dependent on the exercise of those capacities. It is, therefore, an ‘intentional and active’ form of power (Stoker, 1995: 64/5).

These two concepts, systemic and pre-emptive power, represent the key to understanding regime theory. If systemic power is understood as a tendency in liberal-democratic societies for politicians to accord a privileged role to the controllers of productive assets (business) (Elkin, 1994: 124), then the realisation of this tendency is dependent on the exercise of pre-emptive power by the controllers of productive assets. As pre-emptive power is intentional, the possibility of revolt by ‘dissatisfied publics’ is not ruled out (Stone, 1988: 89). The outcomes predicted by regime theory are therefore provisional, based on Stone’s understanding of ‘structuring’ (1989: 10), drawn from Abrams (1982) and Giddens (1979).

Politics must not be romanticised as a sphere of free agency. While not tightly controlled by deterministic laws, there are recurring tendencies in political behaviour that must be reckoned with (Stone, 1990: 230). Agents are not, therefore, subordinate to structures, they act on them and change them. The practicalities of regime politics outlined by Elkin and Stone in their respective studies of Dallas and Atlanta follow from these propositions.

The Empirical Conditions for Regime Politics

Elkin’s work on Dallas draws on and develops Stone’s concept of systemic power (Elkin, 1985a,b; 1987a). His account of regime politics in Dallas depicts systematic governmental bias toward business interests. This bias does not arise as a consequence of economic determinants, but through political and institutional structures which privilege parts of the business sector. Elkin thus avoids what he describes as ‘reductionism’ in public choice theory and ‘determinism’ in Marxism (1987a: 8).

Because the dispersal of political power in Dallas is a consequence of the ‘division of labour between state and market’ (Elkin, 1987a: 18), control of economic performance does not lie with local officials. The city government must ‘induce’ but cannot ‘command’ economic activity. Elkin demonstrates that the system is biased against the emergence of local policies on behalf of other interests and that city government is predisposed to work on behalf of business. This situation, he says, represents a failure of popular control in Dallas. Elkin’s claim, that the policies of city government in the US are biased toward business interests through institutionally mediated structures, is explained in three principal ways.

Local Government Dependence on Local Capital

City governments in the USA are highly dependent for revenue from tax raised locally and from bonds which they issue to private buyers in order to fund capita] projects. It follows that elected officials must convince the business community of their fiscal prudence and their commitment to promoting economic growth. In a healthy economy, city bonds are more attractive to investors and property values will rise, improving the city’s fiscal position. It is argued that land use policies can generate a high ‘bond rating’, since development increases land value, a sign of underlying economic strength and of the correct ‘attitude’ among local officials (Elkin, 1987a: 38). Locally dependent businesses and the city government therefore share an interest in collaboration. The city seeks to mobilise business resources, while owners of fixed capital, local land owners in particular, need to work with the city administration to secure new investments. The city government therefore has a direct interest in prioritising growth to fund its services and capital projects. Antipathy to business is an invitation to ‘fiscal trouble’ (Elkin, 1987a 30/31).

Economic Growth and the Mobility of Capital

Elkin believes that large segments of capital in the USA are mobile (Elkin, 1987a: 32/33). He draws a distinction between mobile capital and fixed, locally dependent capital. The latter comprises enterprises whose success is closely associated with the economic vitality of the city in which they are located. These enterprises include banks, developers, real estate agencies, large stores and property management firms. Their behaviour, says Elkin, is ‘best understood as an effort to enhance the value of their fixed assets by attracting mobile capital to the city’. Many fixed assets, that is non-mobile capital, are parcels of land. Businesses controlling these assets thus favour land use schemes to increase their value (Elkin, 1987a: 32-42). City governments favour these schemes which are designed to improve their fiscal base.

Among other things, local politicians are tied to preserving the value of local land uses because both are deeply concerned to hold and attract mobile capital. Those who hold fixed capital in land need to attract high-intensity use to maintain and enhance its value. And local politicians wish to have the political benefits that a vibrant local economy will send their way (Elkin, 1994: 137).

Thus, for Elkin, the policy arena around which growth alliances most commonly form is that of land use. This proposition depends on the (contestable) assumption that land and property values are key indicators of economic health and the ability of city governments to obtain credit.

The Role of Local Officials in Regime Politics

The third feature Elkin identifies is a predisposition toward the business agenda among officials, elected and unelected. Politicians depend on privately backed electoral coalitions. ‘Reputation’ is the key to political success, which, in turn, depends on the support of the business sector (Elkin, 1987a: 37). Elkin shows how important business can be to a political campaign, highlighting the case of a business backed incumbent whose campaign fund totalled $400,000 and a challenger without business backing who managed to raise $20,000 (Elkin, 1987a. 77). Dallas is run by a ‘City Manager’, a professional civil servant. Senior officials, like politicians, tend to have an interest in maintaining business support for instrumental reasons associated with career opportunities. Elkin shows how city managers in Dallas had intimate connections with the business leadership of the City. Furthermore, he argues that the professionalisation of city government effectively routinises, or excludes from politics, decisions which could become controversial were they to be handled by elected politicians (Elkin, 1987a: 70). Issues of importance to the wider community are thereby excluded from the agenda, placed instead within the remit of professional bureaucrats who are better insulated than politicians from popular demand (Elkin, 1987a: 85-8). The predispositions of public officials for Elkin are structured by the regime itself which in this context is a set of relations in which the agent is embedded (Elkin, 1985b: 197).

Elkin endorses Stone’s explanation for the way public officials tend to prioritise economic growth, suggesting that the ‘reach’ of popular control is limited by its inability to change the way growth is pursued. The democratic side of liberal democracy is thus limited (Elkin, 1985b: 190-193). Because officials are instrumentally rational, liberal-democracies cannot cope with too much democracy, which could result in officials undermining the growth agenda which sustains the system (Stone, 1980: 987). Given these conditions and the emphasis on agency in the concept of pre-emptive power, how do urban regimes work?

The Mechanics of Regime Politics

Stone’s (1989) story of regime politics in Atlanta develops his analysis of systemic power.

… the question that systemic power directs us toward, but does not itself answer, is how, in the face of complex and sometimes divisive forces, an effective and durable capacity to govern can be created (1989: xi).

Stone’s study of Atlanta focuses mainly on the internal dynamics of regime politics. His objective is to break what he sees as the impasse between pluralism and elitism in the earlier community power debate (Stone, 1988). He begins from the perspective that all groups have an interest in production and that production requires collaboration. Governance, in this case production, is only possible given cooperation between different interests. In Atlanta, governance is dependent on business resources and so developmental interests prevail in public policy (Stone, 1989: 219-233). A governing regime is thus comprised of those institutions or actors with the resources necessary for governance (Stone, 1993: 11). Access to a governing regime is dependent on the possession of such resources together with the will and the capacity to combine them with other resources (Stone, 1989:4). Stone’s study of Atlanta is about who participates and how they come together to produce urban regimes. Regime politics are thus about agents, the relationship between them and the way they generate the capacity to act. Stone (1989: 6) provides a succinct definition of the urban regime:

An urban regim...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Boxes
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Explaining Urban Regime Theory
• 2 Regeneration Partnerships and Regime Governance
• 3 Barnsley - A Coal Town
• 4 Rotherham - A Coal and Steel Town
• 5 Hull - The City of East Yorkshire
• 6 North East Lincolnshire - A Port and Chemicals Economy
• 7 Partnerships Compared
• 8 Conclusion - Regime Governance Revisited
• Bibliography
• Index