Part I
Empirical Study of Democratic Support
1 Democratic Consolidation and Mass Support
Introduction
The primary purpose of this research is to investigate the relationship between economic conditions (including popular perceptions of financial well-being) and mass support for democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. I argue that such support is necessary for the Central and Eastern European countries to remain democratic. Thus, this research falls under the broad rubric of the study of democratization.
The literature that examines democratization covers a plethora of definitions, explanatory factors, historical forces, and processes.1 Why has so much of the scholarly community turned its attention to the study of democratization? In part, the focus is due to the undeniable empirical global trend toward democratization, which permits social scientists to reexamine the established theories regarding democratization as well as to develop strategies that might encourage the consolidation of newly democratic regimes. Furthermore, as Huntington (1991, 58) argues, democracy is 'the only legitimate and viable alternative to an authoritarian regime of any kind'.
Many theoretical, conceptual, and methodological issues surround the analysis of democratization. Definitions and measurements of democracy or democratization often vary according to what question is posed and what approach is taken. This chapter analyzes the literature that concentrates on the democratic consolidation process and the role of mass support in that process. It concludes with a systems approach toward the analysis of democratic support in Central and Eastern Europe.
Theoretical Frameworks of the Study of Democracy
The study of democracy is broad in scope; however, some predominant approaches have emerged in the literature. Shin asserts that 'there are four stages in democratization: 1) decay of authoritarian rule, 2) transition, 3) consolidation, and 4) the maturing of democracy' (1994, 143). This delineation is useful in its abstract logical sequencing; however, it is important to keep in mind that not all democratizing states follow this linear sequence. Rather, as Diamond argues (1992), some transitions fail immediately, while others decay rather than consolidate. Research has addressed all the stages of democratization, and the stage under examination is determined by the question that is posed. Reisinger asserts that 'the study of democratization is actually the study of two potentially distinct questions: What facilitates the replacement of one or another form of authoritarian rule with democratic institutions, norms, and procedures? And, what facilitates the consolidation of democracy?' (1997, 53). Thus, the following literature review will concentrate on the prevailing theoretical groupings that address these questions. (My research clearly focuses on the second of Reisinger's questions.)
Democratic Pre-Conditions
In the mid-1960s comparative sociology and politics began a reassessment of the study of social and political change. Currently, the predominant frame-work for examining the relationship of economic development, socio-cultural progress, and political institutional change is offered by the Modernization school. Seymour Martin Lipset's 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy' posits that socio-economic development is a 'requisite' to democracy (1959). Lipset's (1960) findings indicate that societies characterized by higher levels of industrialization, urbanization, education, and wealth tend to be democratic. This hypothesis is supported by many empirical studies (Lipset,1959; Jackman, 1973; Bollen, 1979, 1983; Bollen and Jackman, 1985; Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck, 1987; Arat, 1988; Gosnick and Rosh, 1988). In short, these scholars argue that the higher the level of socio-economic development, the more democratic the state. These studies have largely focused upon the institutional components of democratic systems.2
The empirical connection between socio-economic development and democracy has become what Burkhart and Lewis-Beck describe as an 'iron law' of political sociology (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994, 903). They argue that 'economic development consistently emerges as a statistically and substantively significant influence on democracy' (1994, 903). In addition, Brunk, Caldeira, and Lewis-Beck contend that economic development accounts for more variation in democracy than any other independent variable (1987, 468). The most commonly cited reason for the importance of economic development is that well-being for the mass public increases the demand for political advantages of democracy (Dahl, 1989). Development, particularly economic development, creates a more complex and diverse society in which authoritarian rule is difficult to maintain (Lipset, 1960; Dahl, 1989; Huntington, 1991). In other words, as the masses reap the rewards of economic prosperity, they become less concerned with survival and more concerned with political freedom. Thus, a population's wealth becomes a calling card for democracy.
This 'liberal' Modernization hypothesis has withstood examination of increasingly sophisticated statistical analysis, and, as Brukhart and Lewis-Beck conclude, 'it is clear that economic development substantially improves a nation's democratic prospects'. However, exceptions to this empirical pattern have led some scholars to question the applicability of the thesis outside Western Europe and North America (O'Donnell, 1973, Diamond, 1992). Diamond (1992) argues that Lipset's own data reveal that Central and Eastern European states had achieved greater economic development than Latin American democracies. Prior to the collapse of Communism, the cases of Central and Eastern Europe were considered anomalous to the Modernization hypothesis. The Central and Eastern European states had achieved high levels of economic development, but they were non-democratic. However, the transitions of 1989 corrected for these anomalous cases.
The Modernization school appears to have two weaknesses with regard to examining the relationship between economics and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. First, Lipset's hypothesis failed to explain why the Central and Eastern European countries did not become democratic until 1989. Why is it that the democratic transitions did not occur earlier? Second, more importantly, the Modernization school fails to account for democratic regime persistence; rather, it concentrates upon the emergence of democratic institutions. This criticism was leveled at the Modernization school in the 1970s when the second 'wave' of democracy was followed by a 'reverse' wave of democratic breakdown.
In what way can the Modernization school's view of the relationship between development and democracy further our understanding of the consolidation process in Central and Eastern Europe? Dahl (1971, 78)) argued that
as countries with hegemonic systems move to high levels of economic development (for example, the USSR and the Eastern European countries) a centrally dominated social order is increasingly difficult to maintain. For if our argument is correct, economic development itself generates the conditions of a pluralistic social order. The monopoly over socioeconomic sanctions enjoyed by the hegemonic leaders is therefore undermined by the very success of their economy: the more they succeed in transforming the economy (and with it, inevitably, the society) the more they are threatened with political failure.
This analysis can be appropriately applied to the collapse in 1989; however, it lacks explanatory and predictive power regarding consolidation. The Modernization hypothesis applied to Central and Eastern Europe is, according to Reisinger (1997, 58), that 'the most economically developed Eastern European and post-Soviet societies should have been the first to experience public pressure for democratization and should possess the best prospects for consolidating their democratic systems'. However, this has been only partially supported.3 By extending the hypothesis to include consolidation, it can be argued that those states that were highly developed before transition contained the necessary preconditions for the continuation of democracy. Thus, development under Communist rule would have provided fertile soil for the maintenance of democracy.
Structural and Historical Approaches
The literature in this grouping is quite diverse theoretically and empirically. It has moved away from the necessary and sufficient conditions put forth by Modernization research. In general, this grouping examines the relationship of the state to society and/or the relationship of political change to external factors. Thus, this literature can be broken into a two sub-categories: 1) theoretical arguments addressing internal, domestic factors (such as civil society, the market, and class divisions) that foster democracy, and 2) studies that investigate external factors (international and economic pressures and 'snow-balling' or diffusion) that lead to a breakdown in authoritarianism and the facilitation of a democratic regime.
The first set of theoretical arguments concerns the relationship between the state and society. Civil society is often pointed to as a necessary ingredient for both the breakdown of authoritarianism and the consolidation of democracy. Civil society, as defined by Keane (1988, 14), is 'an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities-economic and cultural production, household life and voluntary associations-and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercising all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions'. In terms of the removal of authoritarian regimes, the necessary pre-conditions that Lipset spoke of โ economic development, industrialization, urbanization, and education โ lead theoretically to a strengthening of the independent organizations and associations. Civil society offers individuals alternative means of pursuing interests and eventually challenging authoritarian rulers, who consequently find it increasingly difficult to control their societies. Thus, civil society plays a critical role in the breakdown of authoritarianism (Diamond, 1992; Ekiert, 1991; Inkeles, 1991; Karl, 1990; Putnam, 1993).
Tocqueville considered civil society to be the foundation of democracy and believed it plays a clear role in the maintenance of a democratic regime. The existence of non-state associations and organizations helps to counter-balance the power of the state. Reisinger (1997) points out that 'modern state institutions concentrate so much potentia...