Germany and East-Central Europe

Political, Economic and Socio-Cultural Relations in the Era of EU Enlargement

Steve Wood

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351157421
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This innovative volume analyzes historical, strategic and domestic political influences on the character and dynamics of the European Union's eastern enlargement. Its main focus is on interactions between Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, in political-diplomatic, commercial-economic and socio-cultural fields. The book also examines the wider European and international contexts to show that as enlargement advanced, we also witnessed an increase in the potential for conflict among EU members, old and new. Steve Wood provides an eclectic and topical appraisal, which identifies the German state as the crucial actor in both the enlargement venture and parallel processes of bilateral reconciliation. The book is recommended to those with interests in contemporary Germany, Central and Eastern Europe, and European integration.

Chapter 1
Introduction^*

1.1 Theme and Arguments

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been widely regarded as the locomotive for major economic and, increasingly, political developments in Europe. Germany’s political leaders consistently justified its integrationist policy direction and provision of around 60% of net transfers to the European Union (EU) by reference to a consolidation of peace and security, and to its trade interdependence with EU states. The EU has undertaken its largest ever enlargement to include eight and later at least two more countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).¹ Focusing on the period leading to these states formal accession, this book examines relations between Germany and, principally, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. These three comprise East-Central Europe (ECE). The book incorporates political-diplomatic, economic-commercial, and socio-cultural fields, and correlated bilateral and multilateral contexts. Whilst aiming for topicality it also is mindful of powerful historical influences on contemporary European politics. It pursues the following enquiries: What were the motivations for German policies towards these countries and EU enlargement? What developments or forces assisted or countered them? What characterises popular attitudes to common themes in Germany and ECE? What effects do different sectors and actors have on processes of integration and on bilateral relations? What reciprocal effects are there with wider international affairs? What benefits and costs does enlargement present for Germany?

It is argued here that whether advocating enlargement, now steered to accommodate national preferences in a more insistent manner, promoting private sector engagement, or encouraging civil and intellectual exchange, the German state, under successive governments, has been the crucial actor in the processes of CEE transition and accession to the EU. This was not primarily an exercise in altruism although it involved considerable fiscal transfers. The Schroder government had to absorb huge pressures from within and outside the German polity to maintain an enlargement course. It did so because the alternatives were perceived as untenable, and only then with detours. From 1989–90 CEE was seen as a possible security threat due to the uncertain internal situation of individual states and the region as a whole. The widening of NATO to include the three ECE states was a substantial step towards resolving that challenge. The region was also viewed as offering enormous opportunity if its transition could be effectively managed. After a promising start, the heralded economic potential was muted, for a variety of reasons, while the costs of enlargement-related measures rose. Financial strains exacerbated by a flat German economy aggravated disputes among old and new members about funding and distribution of the EU budget. There was not much convincing evidence that, on balance, the venture would soon produce positive returns for the German public. In 1988 the FRG would have paid almost any price to have the eastern half of Europe join the then European Community (EC). A decade and more later, perceptions about enlargement, its potential effects on and opportunities for Germany were more pessimistic.

Germany’s political and administrative elites understood societal concerns about the challenges and possible negatives of enlargement. Their interpretation of German imperatives was different. Germany did not pursue enlargement primarily because it was ‘driven by the motivations, and inhibitions of a civilian power’² though it certainly had motivations and inhibitions. The post-war German political class was averse to popular influence on foreign affairs and sensitive to external perceptions. Its behaviour reflects an evolving ‘two-level game’. Firstly, where there were actual, latent, or impending controversies between Germany and other states, the German demos, or pertinent sections of it, had to be neutralised to obviate potential disturbance. In recent years, without actually passing control to the public, a more identifiable ‘domestic politics’ scenario emerged. Germany is more assertive in its European policy, as internal sources of pressure translate into preferences exerted as a state vis-à-vis other states. Disinclinations and counter-demands from the German electorate in general, and certain interest groups in particular, caused conditions and delays to be imposed on entry candidates, and wrangling intensified with other EU members. Concurrently, representations (sometimes solely rhetorical) were made by political figures on behalf of specific groups in Germany or collective ‘national interests’. This was the internal component of a political strategy to avoid a derailing of enlargement, and with it perhaps terminal damage to bilateral relations. It manifests an inverse ‘domestic-driven realism’,³ projected from inside out.

Secondly, after having embarked on a project that promised rapid gains as well as stabilising possible threats, Germany (and other EU states and institutions) had to respond, in less buoyant circumstances, to intense pressure from Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) demanding to be admitted sooner rather than later. The latter employed, inter alia, the EU’s own rhetoric of ‘community’ and ‘solidarity’ to this end.⁴ Underlying the external component in Germany’s European strategy was an essentially geopolitical concern that had persisted in its foreign policy thinking since the 1950s and was pervasive through the Kohl era: that without maintaining a dynamic of integration, Germany would sooner or later find itself confronted by an alliance of states less concerned about institutionalised cooperation. Should such a scenario emerge, the potential membership would be augmented by newly sovereign CEE states, some of which had experienced historically traumatic relationships with Germany.

At the high political level Germany and Poland progressed in the reconciliation that is inextricable from the enlargement process. Though far from conflict-free they advanced further than German-Czech political relations, which were at best reserved and intermittently hostile through the period from communist collapse to EU accession. This contrasted with encouraging developments in commerce and industry. Hungarian-German affairs were not without occasional tensions but were on the whole very optimistic, extending to societal attitudes generally more cordial than with Poles and Czechs. In these cases progress made in economic matters or (for Poland) at state-state and EU institutional levels was not matched by close engagement and mutual interest between the national civil societies. Where this occurred it was inevitably supported in some way by state or EU assistance, most of it ultimately from the German budget. Financial input, information campaigns, and new opportunities did not stimulate a widespread enthusiasm for enlargement in Germany. In Poland and the Czech Republic there was still insecurity regarding Germany and integration with it. This was motivated by vocal expellee groups, the prospect of land purchases or restitution, and signals in media, politics and the electorate that Germany’s ‘culture of restraint’ was changing to reflect a more openly pursued self-interest.

1.2 Method and Organisation

The research method and organisation combines four areas: history and identity; politics at international and domestic levels; economic-commercial affairs; socio-cultural interactions. I apply a version of ‘process-tracing’, comprising wide-ranging and recurring interviews, supplemented by official documentation and media reportage.⁵ This is enhanced by engagement with the literature on international relations, comparative politics, political economy, history and cross-cultural sociology.⁶ The interview material was acquired between 1994–2003. Among the sources are the German foreign and economics ministries, the foreign ministries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Austria, embassies and consulates, the Bavarian State Chancellory, German industry and trade chambers (IHK/AHK) and other business representation, political and private foundations, Goethe Institutes (GI) in Germany and ECE, and German minority and expellee organisations. Other sources include Eurobarometer surveys, European Commission and ministerial reports and statistics, speeches and bulletins.

Following this introduction, chapter two outlines a historical perspective in which the influence of national identity and the significance of geo-political boundaries and land ownership are explored. These subjects have a strong resonance in ECE and in the foreign policy thinking and agendas of these states. Germany and Germans are prominent in this complex of identity-territory-politics, which may become more, and not less sensitive, as formal integration, including greater economic liberalisation and a common legal regime, proceeds. These themes are taken into chapter three, which considers Europe from International Relations perspectives. An overview of the enlargement process and its effect on the EU system is then followed by coverage of political relations with reference to bilateral and institutional settings. Chapter four focuses on commercial and economic affairs, particularly the activities and links of German private enterprise and state actors. Many commentators accented rising trade volumes and German investment in CEE as central features. Dependence on the German economy did not eliminate all impediments deriving from political considerations and may have precipitated new ones. This influenced the involvement of German commerce and industry. Germany’s recession also had adverse effects.

Chapter five firstly analyses linkages between culture, commerce and foreign policy. CEE had special significance for the concerted application of these three pillars of German foreign relations. While much fiscal and political capital was invested, a moderate involvement by the German private sector, local caution about the extent of German influence, and difficulty in (or absence of) demonstrating the value of such endeavours to the German public, limited the effects. The chapter then turns to para-public agencies and programs, civil associations, scholarly communities and grass-roots interaction. Although not always entirely successful, some form of public sector involvement and funding is crucial and explains the German state’s extensive presence in exchange between civil societies. It also raises questions about the latter’s capacities to cooperate without state support. German minorities are considered in chapter six, primarily in a case study on Silesia. Encouragement for the Germans there to take on a ‘bridging’ function in Polish-German relations met with qualified success. The German minority now has an established position in Polish society and politics though some strains between it and the majority persevere. These are also present in the minority’s relations with the German state, its chief benefactor and again critical to achieving and maintaining amenable inter-ethnic relations.

Attitudes in the German polity and the domestic politics of eastern enlargement are analysed in chapter seven. The German elite consensus about the imperatives of Germany’s position in Europe conflicted with the preferences of a majority of the public. Increased constraints were exerted on the SPD-Green (Social Democratic Party-Alliance 90/Greens) government and ‘Europe’ was confirmed as a theme that could now be and was politicised. The insistence by the government on certain conditions in the accession treaties, and delays in announcement of a date for the candidates’ entry to the EU, were among the broader European or international consequences of disfavour in the German polity (and other current EU members). However, as a discussion about referendums developed, the possibility of one occurring was kept off the agenda. Costs and benefits of enlargement for Germany are appraised in chapter eight. Without extensive reform in, especially, agricultural and structural policies, and a simultaneous boost in growth, the material returns that Germany will derive from enlargement are not certain to outweigh the costs. In the period under review, clear demonstrations of how the average German will positively benefit through enlargement were rare. Statements in favour often referred to moral-historical obligations or to negative benefits; presuming that unfavourable developments that might otherwise occur would be prevented. The concluding chapter considers bilateral relations and EU enlargement in a wider international context. It compares national and European interests and how they may develop in the medium term, and analyses the influence of important external actors.

Summarising the main arguments of the book: the German state, as directed by incumbent political leaderships, is the decisive actor in European integration and enlargement. The chief motivations behind German support for eastern enlargement were the political elite’s interpretation of Germany’s geopolitical situation; their view of it as a sine qua non for bilateral reconciliation; and initial perceptions by German business and politics that CEE offered immense commercial-economic potential including as a transit to Russia. Negative factors...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Charts
• List of Abbreviations
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction
• 2 History, Identity and Europe’s Political Geography
• 3 East-West Integration: States, Institutions, Interests and Norms
• 4 Economics and Commerce
• 5 Culture, Society and the State
• 6 German Minorities in CEE with a Case Study of Silesia
• 7 Political Elites, Public Opinion and Democratic Processes
• 8 Is Eastern Enlargement of the EU a Beneficial Investment for Germany?
• 9 World in Flux
• Bibliography
• Index