Contemporary British Identity

English Language, Migrants and Public Discourse

Christina Julios

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351161183
• Subtopic: Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

Against the background of an increasingly diverse British society, this book traces the evolution of British identity in the twentieth century. Debates exploring the nature of Britishness and multiculturalism are here deconstructed through a linguistic lens, which considers the role played by the English language in shaping Britain's national identity. Within this context, two significant historical events are considered: the expansionism of nineteenth century British Empire, and the subsequent rise of the United States to the position of world superpower. In charting the development of British nationhood over time, the book identifies three contrasting public narratives, each reflecting society's perceptions of the identity question at particular points in time: a discourse of laissez-faire at the turn of the century; a discourse of multiculturalism in the ensuing decades; and a discourse of integration during the closing years. The book raises fundamental questions about who we are as a nation and how we got here. It also provides clues as to the direction the prevailing public discourse on British identity is likely to take in the twenty-first century.

Part 1
Language and Identity

Chapter 1
Introduction

The British Citizenship Question

Defining British identity has long been the subject of much debate. Questions such as what does it mean to be British? Which values does Britishness enshrine? is the English language an integral part of our national identity? Invariably generate strong views and lengthy academic discussions; but few satisfying answers. Writing in 1912, Sargant already mused that ‘every schoolboy might be expected to know what is meant by British Citizenship. But the fact is that the answer to this seemingly elementary question is far from easy’ (Sargant 1912, 7).¹ nearly ten decades later, we are still struggling to pin down this elusive concept. Delivering a recent Millennium Lecture in 10 Downing Street on ‘Britishness in the 21st Century’, Professor Linda Colley, a leading British historian at Princeton University, reflected on the difficulties Britain continues to face when trying to define who we are as a nation:

Politicians and pundits shape existing national identities. They rarely by themselves invent or sustain them. And while it may be valuable to try to identify core national values, it is in practice difficult to do so in a way that commands broad assent, unless you descend to uttering platitudes. This is particularly the case in a multi-national, multi-cultural, infinitely diverse polity like Britain (Colley 1999).²

Professor Sir Bernard Crick, former Chair of the government’s Advisory Board on Naturalisation and Integration (ABNI) and the acknowledged architect of British nationality and citizenship policy, has similarly wrestled with the complexity of this concept:

Britishness is, to me, an overarching political and legal concept: it signifies allegiance to the laws, government and broad moral and political concepts – like tolerance and freedom of expression – that hold the United Kingdom together. But there is no overall British culture, only a sharing of cultures. Britishness is a strong concept, but narrower than many suppose. Do we not speak of and recognise at once English, Irish, Scottish and Welsh novels, plays and poems? And whatever Fifa [International Federation of Association Footbal] may think, we see nothing odd in fielding four national football teams. And we recognise an immigrant literature in English, though even the authors sometimes find it hard to name (Crick 2004).³

Among the countless attempts made at articulating the idea of Britishness over time, perhaps the basic definition offered by the Collins Concise Dictionary of the English Language succeeds in encapsulating the core of our national identity. The three main meanings thus attributed to the term ‘British’ include it relating either to ‘Britain’, her ‘inhabitants’ or ‘the English language’ as spoken and written in Britain (Collins Concise 1990, 137).⁴ Significantly, it is the latter characteristic that has nowadays come to be perceived as a particularly crucial indicator of Britishness. Unlike their predecessors, our elected representatives have indeed gone further than ever before in spelling out the essence of British citizenship as an English-speaking model (Home Office 2004).⁵ In 2006, as part of his ‘Our Nation’s Future’ lecture series, Prime Minister Blair firmly placed the English language at the very heart of Britain’s national identity:

We should share a common language. Equal opportunity for all groups requires that they be conversant in that common language. It is a matter both of cohesion and of justice that we should set the use of English as a condition of citizenship. In addition, for those who wish to take up residence permanently in the UK, we will include a requirement to pass an English test before such permanent residency is granted (Blair 2006).⁶

Despite such efforts to delineate our national identity contour, the essence of Britishness continues to elude us. The reason being, Richardson reminds us, the very multifaceted nature of this notion:

It is not easy to identify the values, processes and customs which are distinctly British; not easy, having identifying them, to be in all respects proud, grateful and loyal; not easy to be recognised and accepted fully by other people who are British; not easy to establish and protect public policies and laws which recognise and rejoice that there are many different ways of being British, with sources of strength in different continents, religions, histories, languages (Richardson 1992, xi).⁷

Since the 1970s, Ward argues, there has been a sense of crisis about Britain’s national identity, ‘being British is no longer seen as innate, static and permanent. Indeed, it is seen as under threat’ (Ward 2004, 1).⁸ Part of the problem lays in the very fluid nature of national identity, which far from remaining constant – as often presumed – it has been recognised to be periodically constructed and deconstructed. Britain’s collective identity comprises multiple layers of meaning as well as overlapping and often conflicting loyalties, while forever evolving in a relentlessly changing world.

British citizens come in all shapes, ages, genders and colours; they belong to various social strata and economic backgrounds; speak hundreds of different languages and self-ascribe to a wide spectrum of cultural and political traditions, faiths and religious beliefs. Yet, although powerful the forces that pull these individuals apart may be, they all share an even stronger communal bond that brings them together as one British nation. British citizens, Parekh points out, are not only private individuals, but ‘members of particular religions, ethnic and cultural communities, which are comparatively stable as well as open and fluid. Britain is both a community of citizens and a community of communities’ (Runnymede Trust 2000, ix).⁹

The key to resolving the national identity question ultimately lays in reconciling the always overlapping and sometimes incompatible values each of us abides by in our public and private lives; as Prime Minister Blair explains ‘people want to make sense of two emotions: our recognition of what we legitimately hold in common and what we legitimately hold distinct’ (Blair 2006).¹⁰ Given the unfathomable complexity of our needs as private individuals, profound personal and cultural differences, beliefs and lifestyles; it seems that the only viable way for us to coexist and function at a public level – and thus as fully-fledged members of British society – is by ‘integrating at the point of shared, common unifying British values’ (Blair 2006).¹¹ In the end, the Prime Minister reasons, it is not what characterises us as ‘people’, but what defines us as ‘citizens’ that makes it possible for our British civil society to operate. It follows that the public sphere must inevitable take priority over the private one: our rights and responsibilities as British citizens and the common values, traditions and language we share as such ought to supersede any others. The question then becomes one of defining what those inalienable British values are.

The abiding product of our country’s past, so-called ‘British values’ reflect the principles upon which our nation’s social order has been built over centuries. As Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer, has put it:

What has emerged from the long tidal flows of British history – from the 2,000 years of successive waves of invasion, immigration, assimilation and trading partnerships; from the uniquely rich, open and outward looking culture – is a distinctive set of values which influence British institutions (Brown 2006).¹²

Having endured the test of time, such values are now well-established moral, ethical and civil standards against which all others are measured, namely: a belief in universal Human Rights, equality and democracy, respect for Britain’s heritage and traditions as well as compliance with the ever supreme rule of law. In the words of the Chancellor, these are ‘the values of liberty, responsibility and fairness – shared civic values which are not only the ties that bind us, but also give us patriotic purpose as a nation and sense of direction and destiny’ (Brown 2006). Under the banner of ‘Citizenship Studies’ such principles are now officially inculcated to school children across the country, as part of the National Curriculum. From an early age, pupils are taught a variety of civic disciplines such as Human Rights, diversity, government and democracy, the role of the media in society and globalisation (Curriculumonline 2002).¹³ the aim is to encourage children to relate and engage with each other, their immediate community and British society at large; ultimately becoming informed active citizens, guided by sound principles of freedom, equality and social justice. By instilling in the younger generation the need to focus on our common values, rights and responsibilities as British citizens, as opposed to our personal differences as individuals, Citizenship studies only reinforce the pre-eminence of the public sphere over the private one. After all, the Prime Minister reminds us, it is our public persona that makes British citizens out of otherwise nondescript individuals:

when it comes to our essential values – belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, respect for this country and its shared heritage – then that is where we come together, it is what we hold in common; it is what gives us the right to call ourselves British. At that point no distinctive culture or religion supercedes our duty to be part of an integrated United Kingdom (Blair 2006).¹⁴

Nowhere has this conflict between the private and the public realms, between our personal individual choices and our overriding collective responsibilities been more apparent that in the recent controversy over ‘gay adoptions’. Faced with impending antidiscrimination legislation allowing same-sex couples to adopt children, the Catholic Church has argued for Christians’ moral objections to such practice to take preference over the rule of law. in a letter to the Prime Minister, Cardinal Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, Archbishop of Westminster, stated the case for Catholic adoption agencies to be exempt from equality legislation, which at the time had not been yet enforced:

The Catholic Church utterly condemns all forms of unjust discrimination, violence, harassment or abuse directed against people who are homosexual. Indeed the Church teaches that they must be accepted with respect, compassion and sensitivity. We, therefore, recognise many elements of recent legislation – including much in the Northern Ireland Regulations – that takes steps to ensure that no such discrimination takes place. What, then, is the problem? It is that to oblige our agencies in law to consider adoption applications from homosexual couples as potential adoptive parents would require them to act against the principles of Catholic teaching … We believe it would be unreasonable, unnecessary and unjust discrimination against Catholics for the Government to insist that if they wish to continue to work with local authorities, Catholic adoption agencies must act against the teaching of the Church and their own consciences by being obliged in law to provide such a service (Murphy-O’Connor 2007).¹⁵

Echoing this sentiment, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Rowan Williams, and the Archbishop of York, Most Rev John Sentamu, wrote in turn a joint letter to the Prime Minister warning him of the dangers of pressing ahead with gay rights legislation at the expense of people’s religious convictions:

Many in the voluntary sector are dedicated to public service because of the dictates of their conscience. In legislating to protect and promote the rights of particular groups the government is faced with the delicate but important challenge of not thereby creating the conditions within which others feel their rights to have been ignored or sacrificed, or in which the dictates of personal conscience are put at risk. The rights of conscience cannot be made subject to legislation, however well meaning (Church of England 2007).¹⁶

In a similar vein, the Anglican Bishop of Durham, Dr Tom Wright, went as far as to say that the government’s proposed legislation on same-sex adoptions ‘completely fails to take into account the views and beliefs of all those involved … the idea that new Labour can come up with a new morality which it forces on the Catholic Church after 2,000 years; I am sorry, this is amazing arrogance on the part of the government’ (Gledhill 2007).¹⁷

Predictably, such strong views provoked a backlash from secularists, gay and lesbian lobby groups as well as likeminded Parliamentarians. The Lesbian and Gay Christian Movement (LGCM)’s Chief Executive, the Reverend Richard Kirker, for instance, called for Cardinal’s Murphy O’Connor’s Pleas ‘to be rejected, and for one, non-discriminatory set of rules to be approved which – as in Northern Ireland – assure equality to suitable gay or lesbian couples seeking to adopt children, where this is in the child’s best interests’ (Kirker 2007a).¹⁸ As he put it:

There is no doubt that the Catholic hierarchy are themselves uncomfortable with their stance which is demonstrably inconsistent in that they are happy to allow single gay people to adopt or an unmarried atheist heterosexual couple, while rejecting same-sex families bringing up their children in the Catholic faith. But it is understood they have been pushed to this point by Rome (Kirker 2007b).¹⁹

Several Cabinet Ministers publicly expressed their rejection of any exemptions under the law; with Harriet Harman, Solicitor General, having gone on record as saying ‘We will stay true to our commitment in tackling sexual discrimination in terms of sexual orientation … You can either be against discrimination or you can allow for it. You can’t be a little bit against discrimination’ (Bright and Kampfner 2007).²⁰

In the event, the pleas of the Catholic Church’s leadership failed to sway the government’s position, as media headlines such as ‘Cabinet rejects Exemption on Gay Ad...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• PART 1 LANGUAGE AND IDENTITY
• PART 2 MIGRANTS AND THE PUBLIC DISCOURSE
• PART 3 CONCLUSION
• Bibliography
• Index