The Chinese Journals of L.K. Little, 1943–54

An Eyewitness Account of War and Revolution, Volume I

Chihyun Chang

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781138758049
• eBook ISBN: 9781134986675
• Topic: Economia
• Subtopic: Storia economica

Lester Knox Little kept a detailed journal of his time in China and Taiwan. Covering the years 1943 to 1954 it provides important new insights about some of the most dramatic episodes in China's mid-twentieth century history: Sino-Japanese military and economic competition, China's domestic political struggle between the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the Chinese Communist Party, and the post-war/Cold War balance of power in Southeast and East Asia. It also contains rich first-hand materials for understanding conditions in Chongqing and post-war Shanghai, the last years of the Republic of China on the Chinese mainland and its early years in Taiwan, and a new inner history of his beloved Chinese Maritime Customs Service.

Little's account, with his insightful comments and explicit descriptions, provides us with a continuous record from the viewpoint of a capable American citizen in Chinese employ who felt responsible for his Chinese and foreign colleagues and for the modernisation of 'Free China', as well as allowing a unique insight into the heart of government during a time of intense social and political change. In addition to the original texts, this edition includes extensive explanatory notes providing detailed contextual information regarding the people and places mentioned.

Introduction to Volume I

Lester Knox Little and the Nationalists

Lester Knox Little was the last foreign Inspector General (IG) of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service (CMCS) and also the only American IG. Before him, there were two Englishmen, two Ulstermen and one Japanese. All these IGs were the ‘men of Customs’ – in Hans van de Ven’s words – meaning they were loyal to the CMCS. The understandings of the CMCS tradition varied significantly, but overall it meant its efficiency, cosmopolitanism, integrity, unity and aloofness from Chinese politics. These characteristics were constituted in the nineteenth century and became more important in the first half of the twentieth century. Little was, of course, a man of Customs, but he was also different from his predecessors.

First, he kept a very explicit diary and planned to publish it. Judging from the records in his diaries, he was always frank and consistent on what he insisted. He did not want to manipulate how historians examine his history and he was not afraid of being judged by historians. Compared to him, Frederick Maze deliberately manipulated the ‘Maze Papers’ at SOAS,¹ and Francis Aglen Kishimoto Hirokichi did not leave any autobiography, diary or memoir. Although he also kept a diary, Robert Hart was relatively reluctant to publish it.²

Second, Little followed the Nationalists to Taiwan and rebuilt the CMCS in Taipei. It seemed that he was highly loyal to the Nationalist government. The IG’s loyalty to a particular Chinese government was, actually, not a convention of the CMCS. The more consistent convention was that the staff was ‘aloof from politics’,³ and the foreign IG always served the central government of China even if the previous central government he had just served under was overthrown by the current one. This phenomenon was described as the IG’s ‘two faced’ policies by Chinese historian Chen Shiqi,⁴ but in the eyes of the CMCS staff, it was their ‘freedom from politics’.⁵

Little’s predecessors’ record of ‘freedom from politics’ was chequered – Francis Aglen served the Anhui, Zhili and Fengtian cliques respectively from 1917 to 1924, and he tried to cooperate with the Canton Revolutionaries in 1925; Frederick Maze took instructions from the Chongqing and collaborationist governments at the same time from 1937 to 1941. The reason they gave was that the CMCS was the asset of China and the CMCS’s integrity was the key to maintain its high-quality performance.

However, Little was completely different from these two IGs. Since the first day he arrived in China in April 1943, he never talked to any collaborationist governments supported by the Japanese military during WWII or to the Communists during the Civil War. He was completely loyal to the Nationalist government no matter how incompetent it was at the later stage of the Civil War. He brought key staff to Taiwan to ensure Nationalists could reconstruct the CMCS in Taiwan. The success of the CMCS reconstruction in Taiwan relied on Little’s determination, endeavour and loyalty.

However, while reading through the entries in the Little diaries, readers can easily find out that Little was actually really critical towards Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government. Because he could learn information from local Commissioners, he witnessed the real situations in Free China in detail and understood that Chiang and the Nationalists’ factionalism were the cause of the Chinese people’s misfortune.

Hence, this introduction aims to answer the question: who and what was Little loyal to and why was he loyal?

In order to answer this question, it is necessary to explore how Little positioned himself in the networks of Nationalists from 1943 to 1949. Although Chiang Kai-shek was an authoritarian leader, the Nationalist Party was a loose alliance formed by a number of factions and cliques. Chiang was merely the Huangpu clique leader, which was frequently the most powerful clique but not always.

The Nationalist Party comprised a loose alliance of different political factions and military cliques due to its long revolutionary history before 1911. From 1911 to 1949, the Nationalist Party started from a terrorist and racist body allied to the Triads before 1911 and then became a pro-Western cabinet-style political party in 1912. In the 1920s, the party was shaped into a Leninist Bolshevik revolutionary party with a strong anti-imperial base and then became a pro-UK/US authoritarian party in the 1930s. This see-sawing of political inclinations made the Nationalists very unlikely to create an ideological consensus to unify the party.

The military cliques were another cause of crisis. Before the Northern Expedition, the right wing clique and the left wing clique in the Nationalist Party had already had several major conflicts. During the Northern Expedition, the party absorbed a wide range of local warlords and had already developed deeply rooted internal grievances against each other. After WWII, these grievances did not fade away but became more serious. Actually, by the eve of the Nationalists’ retreat from the Mainland, the party can hardly be considered as a centralised, modern political party.

From 1943 to 1949, Little’s relations with the Nationalists were complicated by the fact that he met different representatives from their factions or cliques. This is not to say that these Nationalists deliberately manipulated Little’s understanding of modern China and the party, but they had their own particular interests which determined what they liked to discuss with Little.

The introduction aims to explore Little’s relations with three groups of Nationalists, namely (1) the Presidents (Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen), (2) the Financial Ministers (T. V. Soong, H. H. Kung and Wang Yun-wu), and (3) his friends (C. K. Yen and Sun Li-jen). These three different natures of relationship can help us to understand why Little chose to follow the Nationalists to Taiwan.

Little and Nationalist Presidents

From 1943 to 1949, there were actually three Nationalist Presidents, namely Lin Sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Li Tsung-jen. However, immediately after Little arrived in China in April 1943, Lin Sen passed away, so Little did not have a close relationship with Lin. The following two Presidents, Chiang and Li, were lifelong enemies since 1927 and Little had very explicit observations about them. Little even visited Li twice after Li moved to the US after 1949.

Little never thought very highly of Chiang Kai-shek although he understood that Chiang’s task was never easy. Little’s negative opinions towards Chiang might be attributed to the timing of his arrival in China. He arrived in April 1943 and the Chongqing government had already fought for six tough years. The Nationalists had fought the Imperial Army of Japan bravely from August 1937 to January 1942 but their morale but Little could not witness Chiang’s contributions to the war as he stayed in Occupied China from 1937–1941. The condition of the economy due to inflation, and the military morale were deteriorating very rapidly since 1943. Meanwhile, the American Navy had already taken superiority in the Pacific War after the Battle of Midway in June 1942. In other words, Little witnessed while the Allies were winning the war, China was losing. Little’s and the American government’s attitude towards the Nationalists changed dramatically. However, a rather unfortunate fact was neglected by Little – the US and Little joined the war in 1941 and 1943, but China had already been fighting against Japan solely for sixes years.

Moreover, the years of 1943 and 1944 also marked a nadir for Sino-American relations because the confrontation between Chiang and Joseph Stilwell escalated out of control. Little appreciated Stilwell’s endeavours in relation to China and praised him thusly, ‘Vinegar Joe is a true friend of China.’ Little also knew that Stilwell ‘apparently quarreled with everybody – Mountbatten, Chennault and the Generalissimo’ (25 October 1944). However, Little did not agree with Roosevelt’s appeasement of Chiang as he felt ‘Roosevelt has been guilty of a great deal of “improvised meddling” in the China situation’ (10 November 1944).

After he heard the news that Chiang stepped down and gave way to Vice President Li Tsung-jen, Little felt that:

At least, the door is now open for compromise and bargaining, although the Gimo has waited so long to take this step that the Communists can pretty well lay down their own terms. The great question underlying any settlement seems to me to be: will the Russians, through puppets and stooges, control whatever new government comes in, or will it be a purely Chinese show? If the former, we are in for serious trouble; if the latter, we’ll be here a long time.

(1 January 1949)

But Little still felt that:

This is good news, because, although his [Chiang’s] departure will not of itself solve China’s problems, no solution was possible as long as he stayed at the helm. I proposed a toast to the Generalissimo, and said that, while we were all glad that at last he had seen the light and stepped aside, and although he is responsible for most of the misfortunes of the country during the past 3 years, nevertheless the people of China and the Allies owe him a great debt of gratitude for what he did between 1930 and 1945, and especially for stubbornly refusing to give in to the Japs between 1937 and 1941.

(21 January 1949)

After Chiang stepped down, Little started to put his faith in the Guangxi clique leader, Acting President Li Tsung-jen, but he also knew that ‘it will not be easy, and the Communists’ terms will be hard, because they have all the cards’ (8 January 1949). At this moment, Little still hoped that Li could ‘make peace with the Communists’ to protect the integrity and continue the CMCS. He stated:

If a coalition government is established, I see no reason why the Customs should not continue. Whether the new government will want us to remain, and whether I shall care to remain, are questions that time will answer in due course, and are minor questions. The important thing is that the Service will not be split, but will be intact and ready to carry on as we have done for 95 years, if we are wanted.

(22 January 1949)

After Li took over the Nationalist government, Little had ‘great admiration for Li Tsung-jen’ (25 February 1949) and followed the Financial Ministry to Canton. Little’s opinions towards Li were also shared by British Ambassador Ralph Stevenson and American Ambassador J. Leighton Stuart (18 March 1949). Little even praised that:

Li Tsung-jen is making heroic efforts to prevent a break-down of the peace negotiations. He has done a great job since he took charge, and has emerged as an outstanding leader. If there is a bust, it will not be his fault … Li Tsung-jen can hold on; he has done a good job, and is the only leader so far who can raise a standard to which honest men can repair.

(8 and 25 April 1949)

But when Li realised that the peace negotiations had failed/were failing, Li went to Hongkong and then to the US. Little felt that:

This looks as if he has thrown his hand in – as Fang Tu has predicted might happen. Or possibly he will sulk in his tent. Anyhow, the next few days or weeks will see the finish of the Nationalist government on the mainland.

(20 November 1949)

After he realised that Li would not come back for the Nationalists, Little again worked under Chiang for bringing the CMCS to Taiwan. Chiang was very grateful because at the end of 1949, most of the civil servants of the Nationalist government had already deserted their posts or switched to the Communist side. The American IG still refused to talk to the Communists and insisted on bringing the CMCS with the Nationalist government. Hence, Little was invited by Chiang to his residence.

The interview lasted 45 minutes, and the Gimo could not have been more gracious to President Truman. He looked well, and was perfectly calm and entirely free from any sign of nervousness or worry. He obviously has a great reserve of strength – spiritual, perhaps – or a complete lack of sensibility. His calm poise at a time like the present struck me forcibly. I could not help admiring him, even though he must be held principally responsible for the tragedy through which China is passing.

(22 October 1949)

This was the last time Little met Chiang as the IG and he never changed his opinion towards Chiang in his life. After he retired from the CMCS, Little came back to the US but he started another sort of relationship with Li Tsung-jen. As he had an extraordinary knowledge of Chinese politics, Little was put in charge of helping the Nationalists to build up Free China’s ‘anti-Communists’ coalition. And the first task was to reconcile the confrontation between Chiang and Li.

Little was invited by Ling Tao-yang to visit Li (4 September 1951). On 12 September Little went to visit Li:

The object of my visit was to point out to Li Tsung-jen the necessity for unity among all free, anti-Communist Chinese. He, of course, hates Chiang Kai-shek like poison. The “President” (as he was addressed by Dr. Ling) took all I said in a polite and courteous manner. He said he agreed entirely with what I said, but that it would be difficult to bring about. We were there 1-1/2 hours. Dr. Ling told me that I had planted a seed which may produce fruit. I hope so.

(12 September 1951)

After this interview, Little asked around if Li and Chiang could ‘bury the hatchet’. But even Archbishop Yu Pin thought it was ‘very difficult’. Little was ‘most discouraged’ because he felt that:

If that anti-Communist Chinese cannot unite under a common banner at such a critical time as this, how can they expect whole-hearted support from the United States? How can they expect to retain the confidence of Chinese on the mainland? How can they expect to drive the Communists from power?

One month after Little’s visit, Li sent his ‘secretary and brain-trust’, Kan Chieh-hou, and Kan told Little that Li ‘spoke highly of the conversation’, ‘any reconciliation must provide Li with an “important place” in the government’, and Li thought that Little ‘may have the key’. Little then suggested Wedemeyer was the best candidate for this task and Kan asked Little to set up a dinner for them (16 October 1951).

A week after Kan’s request, Little went to visit Wedemeyer and suggested that he ‘meet Marshal Li Tsung-jen and urge the necessity of a united Chinese anti-Communist front’. Wedemeyer ‘agreed to see L...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Foreword
• Preface: A forty-year delay to publish Lester Knox Little’s diaries
• Introduction to Volume I: Lester Knox Little and the Nationalists
• Diaries
• Appendix I: Summary of Ting’s letter to H. H. Kung, 28 March 1944
• Notes