Scotland: the Challenge of Devolution

Alex Wright

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138740716
• eBook ISBN: 9781351727853
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Physical Sciences
• Subtopic: Geography
• Index: Geography

This title was first published in 2000. Linking politics with culture and society, this collection provides an overview of the Scottish Parliament and analyzes it in relation to UK, European and global regionalization.

Part I
Overview

1 Introduction

Alex Wright

Labour promised to deliver for Scots and it did. One of its very first priorities was a Scotland Bill giving Scotland the right to run its own affairs while still playing its full part in Britain. Whilst previous governments centralised power New Labour brought a radical new deal. The Scottish Parliament is just a part of a huge programme of reform bringing power back to the people

(Building Scotland's Future, 1999, The Labour Party).

With these words 'Scottish New' Labour set about campaigning for the 1999 elections to the Scottish Parliament. They reminded Scottish voters that promises had been kept, they implied that a 'radical new deal' would be the antithesis of 'centralised power' and they portended that this was but part of a 'huge programme of reform' the object of which was to bring 'power back to the people'. Whilst much of this can be dismissed as the kind of hyperbole that exists in any party election manifesto, it did reflect the tenor of Labour's aspirations and they were written at a moment in our history when a page had been turned. More particularly they caught the mood of the time - no longer would Scotland be governed in a way that was alien to the values and wishes of the Scottish people. As Gordon Brown and Douglas Alexander intimated in New Scotland New Britain,

The constitutional consequences of Mrs Thatcher - unintended by her though they were - are that in Scotland at least, another Mrs Thatcher can never again represent the same threat. No second Mrs Thatcher could ever inflict such damage on Scottish civic life again

(Brown and Alexander 1999 p. 10).

There is certainly a grain of truth in this, but ironically not necessarily in the way that the authors intended. Now that there is a Scottish Parliament we have an elected body which will ensure that public policy in Scotland is more democratically 'open' (Paterson 1998 p.54) and in so doing if necessary it could act as the rallying point for Scottish grievance if ever again if a UK prime minister overstepped the mark north of the Border.

But no sooner had new Labour's programme of constitutional reform got under way, than there was growing scepticism concerning its promise to redistribute power away from 'London' or more narrowly from the prime minister himself. In Wales Rhodri Morgan the popular choice for leader of the Labour administration was denied the chance when 'Millbank' interfered with the electoral arrangements, thereby ensuring that its own placeman Alun Michael was selected. A sizeable body of the Welsh electorate, already uncertain about the need for a Welsh assembly responded by voting for Plaid Cymru and Alun Michael himself was eventually forced to resign in February 2000. The selection of London Mayor has followed a similar trajectory with Ken Livingstone viewed as 'off message' by Downing Street with the result that Frank Dobson became the Labour candidate. Once again, however, events slid out of Blair's control when Livingstone resigned and declared that he would be an independent candidate, thereby splitting Labours vote. There are two conclusions to be drawn from this. First Tony Blair is naively attempting to retain executive influence despite creating new institutions of devolved government - this is inherently contradictory. Second he has misunderstood the political consequences of constitutional reform - something that has not been lost on electorates and politicians at the territorial level. At the time of writing the House of Lords reform has run into the sand with critics complaining that prime ministerial appointees have replaced the hereditary peers. Only Scotland, it would appear has been free from prime ministerial interference but even here Labour's 'programme' has not been without its set-backs.

Whilst Donald Dewar appeared to have straddled the divide between 'old' and 'new' Labour and was seen to be a 'safe pair of hands', in the run up to the elections in May the party itself was disunited (Taylor 1999 p. 152-3) and afterwards it appeared increasingly accident prone. If the resignation of Alex Rowley as General Secretary of the Scottish party just weeks after the 1999 election raised eyebrows, the dismissal of John Rafferty, one of Mr Dewar's closest aides, sparked public debate. By the first few months of 2000 the credibility of the First Minister himself was on the line as the Executive faced vituperative attacks from the tabloids and from populists like Brian Souter over its commitment to repeal Section 28 (which prevented schools from promoting homosexuality in the curriculum). Regardless of whether the original legislation was flawed, the Executive appeared inept and was wrong-footed over its handling of the fall-out that followed. Why was it, some asked, that the Executive should find itself embroiled in such a cause so early on in the Parliament at a time when much needed to be done if devolution was to prove its worth with the electorate? That was subsequently overshadowed by the escalating costs (c£200m) of the construction of the Parliament and its ancillary buildings. All-in-all it seems that the Parliament had yet to begin to meet the (longer-term) challenge posed by James Mitchell, namely that it had to 'cut out a role for itself, some autonomy, without having to spend considerable sums of money' (Mitchell J 1998 p. 76).

Of all the aspirations that greeted the new Parliament, foremost was the desire that it would not be a clone of Westminster. There were a variety of aspects to this. It was expected that Holyrood would be less confrontational and this was reflected in the semi-circular design of the Parliament's debating chamber at its temporary home on the Mound. This contrasts with Westminster where Government and Opposition sit opposite each other but it does not follow that debate will be any less lively. Despite the civility of proceedings in the debating chamber the SNP has shown itself to be an effective and mature opposition that has enthusiastically harried the Liberal Democrat - Labour coalition which forms the Scottish Executive. There was also the hope that there would be a different style of politics at Holyrood - less sleaze and greater inclusivity. Underpinning this was the notion that those that now governed Scotland would recognise that circumstances had changed. Yet, as David Millar observes in Chapter 2, maybe we have been too optimistic.

Twelve months after the May elections in 1999 the electorate was not slow to register its disappointment with Labour. The Party lost the Ayr by-election in the spring of 2000 - albeit that as a 'marginal' it was a vulnerable seat - and by April the SNP had overtaken Labour in the polls for the Scottish Parliament (The Herald 03/04/00). Mid-term blues maybe, as Bernard Crick observed. But he also warned that this was an indication of a sharp loss of confidence in the authors of constitutional change as a result of an incomprehension of devolution by Millbank and its misguided mission to treat its core supporters across the whole of the UK as 'Middle England' (The Herald 05/04/00). Belatedly, the Prime Minister conceded "Essentially you have to let go of it with devolution" (The Times 11/04/00).

'Britain' remains integral to Labour's modernisation plans, as Tony Blair has been at pains to emphasise recently, but Scots understandably identify more with Holyrood than ever was the case with Westminster. This cannot be merely attributed to its physical proximity but the fact that it is the collective and legitimate democratic voice of Scotland - something that has been absent until now. So what will become of Scottish allegiance to Britain? Gordon Brown, the British Chancellor has argued that 'Britishness' is not so much concerned with institutions but shared values and historical experience between the component parts of the Union. That being so and drawing on the work of Johnathan Sacks in the Politics of Hope he then observed that the 'British' were moving from a 'contractual' political settlement based on political institutions which have been established out of self interest to a 'covenant society' based on shared values and a common purpose (The Times, 10/01/00). Although there are a great many similarities, Scotland is different compared to England - albeit to a lesser extent in terms of its values than by virtue of the national dimension to its political culture (Brown et al 1999) - added to which there are considerable variations within Scotland itself. Does Tony Blair's Government really possess the vision and political nous to appreciate that Scottish politics is distinct from the rest of the UK and that this led to devolution?

Despite Blair's promise to stop 'meddling', the impression persists that Labour has misunderstood or chosen to ignore the consequences of devolution. Brown and Alexander viewed constitutional reform in terms of 'a new relationship in which the individual is enhanced by membership of their community, and the state enables and empowers rather than controls or directs' (Brown and Alexander 1999 p.36). But 'enable' and 'empower' are little more than political jargon that disregards the discrete functions of the various branches of government - something that John Fairley and Greg Lloyd examine, respectively, in Chapters 7 and 8. Scotland now has an additional tier of democratically elected government and this will have all sorts of repercussions not just for citizens but also for the various institutions that were there before. What will the effect be on local government, for instance? Will some of its powers be re-assigned to the Scottish Executive and if so will local government be the worse for it? Quangos long demonised by opposition parties during the era of the Conservative 'Raj' look vulnerable on the surface because they too might be subsumed by the Executive. More latently there may be good reason for retaining them if it enables the Executive to circumvent non-aligned local councils. Transcending that though is the real politic that relations between Scotland and the UK have changed irredeemably and so too has the character of Scottish politics - the elite in London will be more constrained north of the Border than has been the case hitherto.

Yet Brian Taylor alluded that the London wing of the Labour party could 'play down the distinctive nature of Scottish politics' and they viewed their counterparts in Scotland as 'perverse in stressing the Scottish political dimension' (Taylor 1999 p. 151). If that is so why was it so keen on devolution? In practice Labour had little option but to press ahead with a Scottish Parliament. Electorally it would have been folly not to do so, given the strength of opinion in Scotland coupled with the value of Scottish seats to Labour - and - there was also the legacy of John Smith the former leader who was committed to devolution - which Blair inherited.

Even so, there was a strand of opinion within the Labour party which was opposed to the 'Balkanisation of Britain' (Taylor 1999, p. 149). So constitutional change was subsumed in new Labour's ideology of 'Modernisation'- this was not intended to pander to nationalism it was to be 'regenerative'. Modernisation of the Labour party itself went hand in hand with modernisation of the British state but revealingly, Blair's closest advisors apparently devoted little thought to Scotland or Wales. Phillip Gould, a member of Blair's inner sanctum made virtually no mention of Scotland whatsoever in his book The Unfinished Revolution (save the debacle over the Parliament being compared [erroneously] to a parish council - 'probably the least successful day' of the 1997 UK election campaign (Gould 1998 p. 361)) nor was there much, if any, mention of Wales. Devolution was first and foremost an idea rather than an ideal for 'London' Labour, inasmuch as Gould explained: 'Tony Blair was obsessed with winning the battle of ideas ..... Ideas which have the power to dominate the political agenda' (Gould 1998 p.231). Constitutional reform, therefore was a means to an end - an election victory for Labour - and in so doing it would act as the saviour of a British state that could no longer survive as a unitarist polity. As Jack McConnell a minister in the Scottish Executive later observed, 'In the new century, modemisers must renew and rebuild to make the new parliament succeed and stabilise the UK' (McConnell 1999, p.68).

Devolution it can be said therefore is as much about 'stabilising' the UK as 'empowering' Scots, or the Welsh for that matter. Whilst Brown and Alexander viewed it as 'no half way house' to separatism (Brown and Alexander 1999 p.46), James Kellas who writes in Chapter 3 of this book has his doubts. He is not the only one. James Mitchell noted, not only is the Scottish Parliament on sufferance but so too is the British State itself. 'If the perceived failure of Britain lies behind the demand for Scottish constitutional change, then it might be expected that perceived continued failure will result in increased demands' (Mitchell 1998, p.81). Tom Nairn, who for some time has predicted the demise of the British state, argued that the Scottish Parliament co-existed with a 'faltering multi-national state' where 'constitutional renovation [has] been loudly spoken of, but then half abandoned in disarray leaving all the most crucial modernisation-problems in limbo. No formula for 'stability' is visible here (other than robotic conformity to the will power of Blair's 'project')' (Nairn 2000 p.256). That may be true but devolution is the product of a 'negotiated process' involving compromise and bargaining that has long been the hallmark of the relationship between the UK and Scotland (Paterson 1998 p.54). If devolution fails to meet the aspirations of Scots when so much has been promised by the UK and Scottish Governments then the existing constitutional arrangement would be unfinished business.

Labour's open-ended programme has engendered its own terminology. Some commentators refer to it as 'asymmetrical government' (e.g. England is yet to enjoy devolution) and they argue that not only does it have historical antecedents but that it may be the most 'practical' solution to variable demands...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• List of Tables
• List of Figures
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• PART I: OVERVIEW
• PART II: THE 1999 ELECTION AND POLITICAL PARTIES
• PART III: INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: SCOTLAND-UK
• PART IV: INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS: IRELAND - EU - GLOBAL
• PART V: PRESSURE GROUPS AND CIVIC SOCIETY
• PART VI: DEVOLUTION, ECONOMICS, AND THE UK TERRITORIAL PROJECT
• Index