The Parliament of Bangladesh

Nizam Ahmed

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351727945
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This title was first published in 2002: This comprehensive account of the growth, decline and resurgence of parliament in Bangladesh examines the 'new' parliament that have been elected in Bangladesh since the 1990s. It identifies key dimensions of their activities such as the nature of legizlation passed, the types of issues raised, the strategies that members have adopted to get things done, the techniques they have used to resolve conflicts and the measures they have taken to strengthen the parliament. Examining the role of the opposition MPs and government back benchers in the parliamentary process, Nizam Ahmed also provides an insightful guide to the factors that influence behaviour and analyzes their significance for democratic consolidation. Combining both theory and practice, this worthy contribution will prove its value as both an accessible reference and a revealing read to parliamentarians and parliamentary scholars alike.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Bangladesh is a small South Asian country. It formed part of the British-Indian province of Bengal during almost two centuries of colonial rule (1757-1947) and remained under the Pakistani 'internal colonial' rule for nearly a quarter of a century (1947-1971). In 1971 Bangladesh emerged as an independent state after nine months of war with (West) Pakistan, which witnessed one of the worst blood-baths of modern history. The (internal) colonial governments mostly relied on force and intimidation to survive in power. The doctrine of popular sovereignty did not find much prominence in the rhetoric of government politics. This is, however, not to argue that there were no attempts to establish elective institutions. To the contrary, Bangladesh had her first familiarity with representative politics during the British colonial rule. But the legislature did not have a steady growth in pre-liberation Bangladesh, especially during the internal colonial years, for various indigenous and exogenous reasons, as explained in the next chapter.

Nor did the situation improve much in the first two decades after independence. None of the (four) parliaments elected between 1972 and 1990 provided a means for the succession of government. Nor did they provide a framework for public participation in national politics and policymaking. None of the parliaments also had any real scope to assert itself. Nor could any one complete its five-year term; all of them were dissolved prematurely. The political opposition did not look upon these institutions with favour; nor was there much scope for institutionalised interaction between it and the government. Nor did the public have any positive image of these parliaments.

There has, however, been a new beginning in parliamentary politics since the election of the fifth parliament in 1991. In fact, the parliaments elected in the 1990s not only were considered to be more legitimate¹ than their predecessors; perhaps more importantly, they also appeared to be more active in adopting measures aimed at redefining their position vis-à-vis other sources of power, in particular, the executive. Many reforms undertaken in the 1990s have theoretically the potential to make parliament the centre point of politics and policy; these also have aroused new expectations about democratic consolidation in the country. Some of the changes made in parliamentary procedures and practices are also likely to have strong consequences for the political system as a whole.

However, much of what the Members of Parliament (MPs) do within the Jatiya Sangsad (JS) - as the parliament is called in Bangladesh² - mostly takes place outside the public purview and scrutiny. Nor has the JS, as observed in the preface, been the subject of any scholarly work. Whatever assertions are generally made, mostly by the press, about the performance and role of the JS can be considered to be perfunctory; these need empirical probing. Critics often overstress the 'idealistic' notion of the parliament's role and underemphasise the various factors, both institutional and cultural, which can affect its performance.

In fact, our understanding about the types of activities undertaken by the JS in the 1990s is mostly limited. Whatever limited evidence is available mainly focuses on the 'political' aspect of its role; the 'parliamentary' dimension of the activities of the members of the JS has not received any serious attention. Thus, any generalisation about its performance can be considered a variable needing substantiation. Moreover, to understand the gap between what is expected of the JS and the way it has actually fared, one needs to know not only the idiosyncrasies of the individuals or parties responsible for making the institution work; the nature of public expectations about the JS and the 'biases' generating them are also to be examined. More importantly, for a balanced assessment, one needs to know the strengths and weaknesses of the institution of parliament itself.

Decline of Parliament

It has now become conventional wisdom to begin any discussion of parliaments by referring to their decime, a concept first popularised by Bryce (1990).³ Nowhere, however, is this decline more evident than in lawmaking, traditionally considered the exclusive prerogative of the legislature. Everywhere the executive has become interventionist, taking away at least a part of the responsibility for lawmaking. As the scope and complexity of government have grown, effective control of lawmaking has gravitated to the executive and the bureaucracy. Grosser provides a succinct account of the decline of the legislature in the following way: 'Everywhere the legislative initiative has passed into the hands of administration. The legislators sometimes amend, rarely reject and usually ratify. The members continue indeed to call themselves collectively the "legislative powers" on the law books. But in most cases, they merely participate in a process of registration' (cited in Etzioni-Halvey, 1983, p.59).

Bryce, however, referred to decline not only in terms of the transfer of power from the legislature to the executive but also to the loss in the dignity and moral influence of the legislature. His notion of decline is more encompassing - all-inclusive. Referring to the House of Commons in Britain, Bryce (1990, pp.49-50) observed:

Its intellectual quality has not risen. Its proceedings are less fully reported. The frequency of obstruction and of the use of the closure to overcome the obstruction have reduced the value of the debates and affected the quality of legislation, while also lessening respect for a body which is thought to waste time in unprofitable wrangling. The independence of members has suffered by the more stringent party discipline. The results of these causes are seen in the diminished deference accorded to Parliament, perhaps also in its slightly diminished attractiveness for able and public-spirited men.

What have caused such decline are many and numerous. Several explanations are offered: the mass electorate, the state's intervention in the economy, the growth of bureaucracy and mass party, the need for strong and rapid executive decisions in an age of economic and international crisis, the growth of organised groups and of the government as a whole, and the concentration of public attention and loyalty on heads of government through mass media (Norton, 1985a, pp.4-5; 1993a, pp.2-3; Williams, 1968, p. 11). Although the differential impact of these variables is difficult to specify, it is nevertheless often argued that the growth of organised party system has had the greatest influence. As Bryce (1990, pp.49-50) observed, 'As party organisations are stronger, the discretion of representatives is narrowed; they must work with their leaders. The member who speaks as he thinks is growing rare in English-speaking countries'. The party not only chooses the candidates and sets the agenda but party leaders occupy the central position of government and decide what measures are to be laid before the legislatures for approval (Norton, 1993a, p.2).

It is, however, to be mentioned here that if the party has caused ailments to parliament, it has also helped the latter to become more representative. In fact, the rise of organised mass parties has led to the replacement of 'social leaders' - whose political power is based on social position - by 'public persons' - those who base their power on expertise and political skills - (Lee, 1963) in legislatures; while representative bodies have become more accessible now than before. Among the other variables causing the decline of legislatures, the emergence of large-scale bureaucracies is especially important. One noted political scientist has even gone to the extent of arguing that bureaucratic politics rather than party [and parliamentary] politics has become the dominant theatre in the modern state (Rourke, 1976, p. 184).

A Critique of the Decline Thesis

Recent reappraisal, however, suggests that the decline is neither uniform nor absolute. Nor is the theory of decline now universally accepted. Wheare observes that parliaments have not declined in an absolute sense because they now-a-days influence many more questions than they did in the past. To quote Wheare (1965, pp.221-2), 'Legislatures, indeed, do more than they did before and legislators work longer hours and interest themselves in a wide range of subjects. Absolutely their powers have increased ... In terms of time devoted to lawmaking and the quality of its legislative output, the legislature may not have declined absolutely; it is only in relation to the executive that it can said to have declined'. He, however, cautions that the increase of powers by the executive has not been the result of taking away from legislature things which it did before (Wheare, 1963, p.221).

Longley and Agh (1997, p. 11) argue that parliaments are certainly not on a decline in the new democratic or newly democratising political systems; to the contrary, parliaments have been the model and mother institutions of democratisation. Parliaments have, in the past three decades, become more influential bodies globally. Referring to the ubiquity of parliaments, Patterson and Copeland (1994, p.1) proudly observe: 'We are living in an age of parliaments'. Damgaard (1992) notes that parliaments in different Scandinavian countries have never declined. Loewenberg (1971, p. 19) has observed that repeated prophecies of the demise of parliament have proven to be premature, if not clearly mistaken. He argues, 'Old parliaments survive and new ones are constantly established. The institution seems to be one of the most enduring and widely applicable inventions of political man' (Loewenberg, 1971, p.19). Patterson and Copeland (pp.10-1) observe that parliaments are certainly much stronger now than before; they further argue that the contemporary strength of parliamentary institutions stems from internal changes in rules, in committee structure, in party government and in leadership.

Some have therefore observed that the allegations concerning the 'decline' of legislatures in contemporary regimes are based less upon an analysis of the functions which such institutions can and do perform than upon misinformed judgements about what they should be doing or what they are alleged to have done during heady movements in the past (Sisson and Snowiss, 1979, p.46). Even Bryce also argued that notwithstanding decline, legislatures are still an indispensable part of the machinery of government in large democracies. Legislatures are multi-functional bodies; there is more to parliament than lawmaking. One leading parliamentary scholar has convincingly argued that when viewed in terms of their other consequences [than legislation], legislatures may not have declined; indeed, in fulfilling some, they may have become significant actors in the political system (Norton, 1994a, p. 16).

The Resilience of Parliament

One of the important factors accounting for the resilience of parliament is its ability to undertake a range of functions which are considered useful and necessary. Bagehot (1983) provides one of the earliest classifications, identifying five basic functions of the legislature: elective function, expressive function, teaching function, informing function and legislating function. Loewenberg and Patterson (1979, pp.43-67) refer to three broad functions of legislature: linkage, recruiting legislative and executive leaders (similar to Bagehot's elective function) and conflict management.

The 'recruitment' function is, however, unique to legislatures in parliamentary democracies; the executive and the legislature remain separate from each other in presidential systems. The other functions are performed in varying degrees by all legislatures. By linkage, Loewenberg and Patterson refer to communication that exists between legislators and their governments. Mill and Bagehot stressed the importance of the legislature as a medium of communication between the people and the government and as an institution making governments responsive to the people and the people willing to comply with the decisions of the government (Loewenberg and Patterson, p.43). Legislatures resolve conflicts by involving in lawmaking and policymaking activities, which have binding effect on the society.

Packenham (1990) has referred to several hitherto unexplored yet extremely important areas of parliamentary activity which the 'decline of the legislature thesis' has apparently overlooked. He identifies eleven important functions and groups them into three categories: legitimation (latent, manifest and 'safety valve' or 'tension release'), recruitment, socialisation and training (recruitment, socialisation, training) and decisional or influence functions (lawmaking, exit functions, interest articulation, conflict resolution, administrative oversight, and patronage). Norton (1993a, p.8) observes that 'although Packenham's delineation of functions is neither original nor unique, it has nevertheless marked a major advance; it is significant for its breadth, sophistication and empirical support'.

Packenham, however, has rank-ordered the various functions in a different way than most of his contemporaries or predecessors. He places decision functions at the bottom of the category but legitimation tops his list. Whiie the significance of manifest legitimation, which constitutes the core defining function of legislature (Norton, 1993a, p.131), has long been recognised, the notion of 'latent' legitimation introduced by Packenham deserves special attention. It refers to the type of legitimacy that a parliament can confer by meeting regularly and uninterruptedly. The mere existence of the legislature can provide a counterweight, forcing the executive to be responsive to its demands and priorities (Hague and Harrop, 1982, p. 158). Latent legitimation can produce among the relevant populace and elites a wider and deeper sense of the government's right to rule than would otherwise obtain (Packenham, p.87). It derives from engaging in activities which serve to raise popular and elite acceptance of the right to govern, even though these activities are not geared explicitly to conferring approval and are not always clearly understood by legislators themselves as conferring legitimacy (Norton, 1993a, p.131).

It is, however, to be observed that some of the functions, to which reference has been made above, are not unique to parliament; there are other organisations which also share the activity of legislatures, at least to some extent. For exampie, the 'elective' function (of making government) in parliamentary democracies is now performed more by political parties than by the legislature; while the teaching and informing functions have essentially been taken over by the press and the media. Television, for example, is now a far more potent educative and informational medium than parliament could ever hope to be (Jackson, 1987, p.38). Similarly, in modern times, there are many links between the people and the government that do not involve the legislature, there are processes of recruitment of leaders that take place outside the legislature and management of conflict is a basic function of just every governmental institution (Loewenberg and Patterson, p.66). What, however, makes parliament distinctive and indispensable is the fact that it alone enjoys the popular and formal legitimacy to undertake all these tasks (Norton, 1993a, p.202). It has structural characteristics that make it both highly adaptable to diverse political environments and sufficiently effective in the performance of various political activities to be worth mentioning (Loewenberg and Patterson, p.66).

Parliament and Policy

That the legislature performs a number of functions other than lawmaking does not imply that the latter function (legislation) is unimportant. Nor can the case for the legislature rest on grounds other than lawmaking. In fact, lawmaking is still considered one of the most important functions of the modern legislature. This becomes evident when one looks into the nature of time-use by the legislature. A significant portion of time of the legislature is still spent on deliberation over legislation, although it may originate from many sources. Everywhere the formal authority to make laws rests with the legislature. It also retains the power to veto secondary regulations made by the executive and the bureaucracy and the acts authorising them. Although rarely exercised, this power has more than symbolic importance, especially in restraining the executive. Since a right and obligation of all legislatures is to legislate on the matters they are privileged to or must act on, no action on these matters has legitimacy without their concurrence (Smith and Musolf, 1979, p.28).

Nor can it be argued that the various (non-legislative) functions that the legislature performs do not have any policy significance. In fact, legislatures can influence the process of policymaking in several subtle ways. Olson and Mezey (1991, p.1) observe that through public debates, the private interactions of their members with the executive, the linkage activities that they perform on behalf of their constituents and activities in regard to oversight, legislatures as collective bodies and their members individually seemed to have a greater impact on the contours of public policy than had been perceived by the earlier generation of scholars. However, the types of policies that may come up for deliberation in legislatures may vary substantially from one system to another. They tend to be more active on issues affecting the distribution of benefits and on the propagation of values but less active on issues of either security (foreign or internal) or macro-economic policy (Olson and Mezey, p.1).

One thing also to be remembered here is the stage at which the legislature is generally involved in policymaking. If public policymaking is considered to be a four-stage process, beginning with the initiation of policy, followed by formulation and deliberation, and assent, and terminating with implementation (Norton, 1993a, pp.52-3), one can see that only a few parliaments are involved in the formulation stage. Most of the legislatures, especially in parliamentary democracies, are 'reactive' bodies, and are engaged in the third stage of policymaking. In most modern political systems, especially those following the Westminster model, the responsibility for policy initiation and formulation rests with the executive and the bureaucracy. It is usually after a policy is approved by the executive that it comes for deliberation in the parliament.

Deliberation over policy occurs in different places in different legislative systems. In some parliaments, deliberation is better informed than in others. In particular, the subjects on ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Development of Parliament in Bangladesh
• 3 Toward a New Beginning: Parliament in the 1990s
• 4 Legislation
• 5 Parliamentary Surveillance
• 6 Parliamentary Committees
• 7 Constituency Representation
• 8 Opposition Politics
• 9 Government Backbench Politics
• 10 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index