Introduction
At the Security Council meeting on “Maintenance of International Peace and Security: Preventive Diplomacy and Transboundary Water” held on 6 June 2017, Bolivian president Evo Morales noted that since 1947, some 37 conflicts have taken place between countries related to water. He added: “If current patterns of consumption continue unabated, two-thirds of the world’s population will be facing water shortages as a daily reality by 2025” (Lederer, 2017). Growing water shortages could aggravate water conflicts among countries at the transboundary river basins. Asia, with 1.5 billion of its people living in shared river basins but very few transboundary rivers governed by treaties, is arguably most prone to water conflicts. While the risk of shared waters is widely recognized as a source of conflict (or conflict multiplier), the key to advancing transboundary water cooperation in Asia is largely in the hands of China, the upstream country for most of Asia’s major transboundary rivers.
Despite having 19 per cent of the world’s population (1.38 billion people), China has only 6 per cent of the world’s freshwater supplies. Although China is one of the top 5 countries with the largest freshwater resources, its per capita water supply is only one-fourth of the global average, making it one of the most water-scarce nations in the world. China’s water challenge is further compounded by a highly uneven spatial distribution. North China, with 65 per cent of the land area and 45 per cent of the country’s total population, has only 17 per cent of China’s total freshwater resources, whereas South China has 83 per cent of China’s freshwater resources (Li & Wu, 2016). Owing to very low precipitation, North China relies heavily on groundwater supply. At the national level, groundwater supply only makes up 18.3 per cent of China’s total freshwater supply; however, in some of the northern provinces such as Henan and Hebei, the figure can reach 50 per cent (Ministry of Water Resources, P.R. China, 2017). Worse still, water pollution has emerged as one of the most critical environmental challenges for China. A Greenpeace report in 2017 indicated extremely high water pollution levels in China’s major cities. For instance, in Beijing, nearly 40 per cent of water bodies were too polluted for any use. In Tianjin, over 95 per cent of the water supply is unfit for human consumption. Local governments throughout the country have been digging deeper wells to find clean water, yet this has become harder to come by because 80 per cent of groundwater from major river basins is “unsuitable for human contact” (Greenpeace, 2017).
To avert the looming water crisis, apart from spending billions of dollars on domestic water transfer projects such as the South–North Water Diversion Megaproject, as well as on water conservancy and pollution abatement, China has sought to utilize the water resources of the major rivers that run across Chinese borders (He, et al., 2014; Yong, 2006). As complaints from its neighbouring states increase, China faces mounting pressures to improve its management of shared transboundary watercourses, because contention over transboundary water resources could potentially undermine the stability and cooperation needed for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to succeed.
Although the stakes are very high, current research on China’s transboundary policies and practices still proves inadequate. In particular, many academic and journalistic articles outside China follow the realist approach to examine China’s transboundary practices. In many articles, China is portrayed as a malevolent hydro-hegemon, whose unilateral actions to use shared water resources could spark “water wars”. The popular “water wars” narrative has contributed to the securitization of transboundary waters.
This edited volume aims to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to systematically examine the complex reality of water interactions between China and its neighbouring countries. It provides a discussion on transboundary hydropolitics beyond the state-centric geopolitical arena to dig into political, institutional, legal, historical, geographical, and demographic factors that affect China’s policies and practices towards transboundary water issues. This edited volume also provides a collection of comparative case studies on China’s water resources management on the Mekong River with five riparian states in the Lower Mekong region: the Salween River with Myanmar, the Brahmaputra River with India, the Amur River with Russia and Mongolia, the Ili and Irtysh Rivers with Kazakhstan, and the Yalu and Tumen Rivers with North Korea. Furthermore, this edited volume aims to shed light on China’s future role in global water governance.
China’s transboundary waters
China as the water tower in Asia
“Transboundary water” does not only refer to transboundary rivers, but also includes lakes, inland waters, and aquifers (Han, 2015). China is one of the countries with the largest number of transboundary rivers on the planet, ranking third together with Chile and second to Russia and Argentina. As “Asia’s water tower”, China’s transboundary policies inevitably affect many downstream countries and communities. Table 1.1 provides a summary of China’s major transboundary rivers.
China’s large dam projects for hydroelectricity and impressive water diversion facilities on these transboundary rivers have infuriated downstream countries and triggered international criticism. For instance, China’s hydro-projects on the Upper Mekong River have become one of the major sources of conflicts between China and Southeast Asian countries (see Chapters 4 and 7). Some scholars and diplomats view the Mekong River as “the next South China Sea” to derail Sino- Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations. In 2012, Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang said at the APEC meeting:
Table 1.1 Major transboundary rivers in China
We cannot deny the fact that tensions over water resources are threatening economic growth in many countries and representing a source of conflict, especially at a time when countries are accelerating their economic development. Dam construction and stream adjustments by some countries in upstream rivers constitute a growing concern for many countries and implicitly impinge on relations between relevant countries.
(Yeophantong, 2013)
Similarly, China’s plans to harness the waters of the Brahmaputra River have set off ripples of unease in the two lower riparian states, particularly India (see Chapter 9). Many Indian and international security experts have warned the world of future “water wars” between the two countries. In the case of the Ili and Irtysh Rivers, while China has shown more willingness to cooperate with Kazakhstan on transboundary river issues, soaring water demand in Xinjiang has resulted in the significant diversion of water flows from the Ili and Irtysh Rivers for China’s internal use (see Chapter 10).
Water resources scarcity and conflicts
The majority of critics outside of China have followed the realist approach to examine China’s transboundary practices (Baxter, 2014; Liebman, 2005; Menniken, 2007; Sinha, 2012; Svensson, 2012). Many articles have been written to describe China as a malevolent hydro-hegemon and warn that China’s unilateral actions to utilize the shared water resources could lead to “water wars” (Chellaney, 2011, 2013; Christopher, 2013; Economy, 2008; French, 2014; Hussain, 2014; Padmanabhan, 2014; Nickum, 2008).
Nevertheless, some scholars take a different theoretical approach which focuses on China’s overall hydropolitical approach to its shared rivers and downstream neighbours. Varis et al. (2014) focus on assessing the socioeconomic-environmental vulnerability of different river basins in China. They found that the low vulnerability level of the Chinese sections of the transboundary basins could (to a certain extent) explain China’s “thin” transboundary water policies. Kattelus, Kummu, Keskinen, Salmivaara and Varis (2015) conclude that the lack of salience of international river basins in China’s decision-making can be partially explained by geography: most border areas are relatively unpopulated and inhabited by minorities that lack economic or political clout. Biba (2014) believes that China has not acted in a manner consistent with the strictly uncooperative upstream hegemon as suggested by the theory of hegemonic stability. Instead, Biba reasons that China has repeatedly sought to reconcile its hydropolitics with its own broader policy objectives and those of its neighbours. Ho (2014) maintains that China manages its transboundary water as a subset of its broader relations with other riparian states, and this results in discernible differences in China’s approaches to its international river systems. In another study, Ho (2016) compares case studies of the Mekong and the Ganges to understand China’s and India’s hydro-hegemonic behaviour. Ho points out that the regional context and domestic politics of hydro-hegemons constrain their behaviour and determine whether they have a positive or negative leadership style.
While the existing research has greatly contributed to the understanding of transboundary water issues, both in general and in the Chinese context, certain major issues need further study to shed light on China’s transboundary policies and practices.
Unique characteristics of each river basin
Most studies on China’s approaches to transboundary water issues tend to neglect the unique characteristics of each river (or river basin). This could potentially lead to faulty conclusions in comparative studies. For instance, the absence of a water-sharing treaty between China and other riparian states (or states on a river basin) could simply be due to the absence of conflict over shared water, particularly the quantity of water in that river basin. To better understand the key factors that influence China’s responses to different basins, it is crucial to start with mapping the unique characteristics of each river (or river basin).
Different river basins have different physical and environmental characteristics: political, institutional, and legal frameworks; water demand and use patterns, and water-use efficiencies; and economic and management capacities. Figure 1.1 shows that transboundary rivers can be broadly divided into three major types: (1) transborder rivers, (2) border rivers, and (3) mixed rivers (i.e. a major river with many tributaries and multiple crossings at the border). This distinction has crucial implications. Countries with rivers running across the boundary might face resource-scarcity conflict, whereas countries where the river forms the border might face conflict caused by fluid and fuzzy borderlines (Gleditsch, Furlong, Hegre, Lacina, & Owen, 2006). In addition, empirical evidence suggests that water scarcity is positively related to conflict between countries that share a transborder river rather than border river (Gleditsch et al. 2006; Voza, Vuković, Carlson, & Djordjević, 2012), though some scholars argue that even upstream-downstream asymmetries appear to have a very small or no significant effect on international water cooperation and conflict (Beck, Bernauer, Siegfried, & Bohmelt, 2014). Nonetheless, a major river could consist of multiple tributaries. Some might be border rivers. Others might be transborder rivers with China either upstream or downstream. The rest could be mixed rivers.
Figure 1.1 Different types of transboundary rivers.
Source: Own construction.
Next, China certainly enjoys upstream advantages in most of the major transboundary rivers (such as the Brahmaputra, Mekong, Irrawaddy, and Salween) that pass through its territories. But in several cases, China occupies the downstream part of a transborder river or a tributary. Upper and lower riparian status could lead to very different approach by a state towards the shared water resources. While downstream states are in certainly in a disadvantaged position when it comes to non-navigational use of water, their negotiation power can be significantly enhanced with the control of the estuary of the river, which could be an important navigation channel, as in the case of the Amur (see Chapter 5), the Yalu (see Chapter 6), and to a lesser extent, the Mekong (Dore, Lebel, & Molle, 2012), given the desperate need of China’s landlocked provinces to gain access to seas (Li Z., 2014).
Lastly, even under the most common upstream-downstream asymmetries, with China upstream, certain criteria must be met for transboundary rivers to become a source of interstate conflicts. According to Isaac and Shuval (1994), the likelihood of conflict can be determined by four key factors: (1) the degree of water scarcity, (2) the extent to which water supply is shared by more than one region or state, (3) the relative power of the basin states, and (4) the ease of access to alternative freshwater resources. The concept of the degree of water scarcity should go beyond water quantity to include water quality and other important aspects of rivers: fishing, navigation, and hydropower generation (Brochmann & Gleditsch, 2012).
Still, water could be a source of conflict multiplier, as in the case of China-India border disputes. Both India’s and China’s hydropower projects and potential water diversion plans are carried out in problematic areas where cooperation on transboundary water issues and regional economic development is undermined by ongoing territorial disputes (Feng, He, & Wang, 2015; Kattelus et al., 2015). When water issues intertwine with border disputes, more severe conflicts can be induced than the issues of water quantity.
Role of subnational actors
Even though the central government has the crucial role of defining formal governance structures and even informal interaction in transboundary water issues, an overemphasis of its role is inefficient for two major reasons. First, decision-making processes in transboundary water governance are highly dynamic due to different actors operating at multiple governance levels. How water is controlled and managed within each of the countries involved can shape the hydropolitical dynamics at particular transboundary river basins quite differently (Beach et al., 2000). Second, the state-centric approach does not explain how a particular national policy or approach to a transboundary water issue develops nor how it influences international power dynamics because the scalar relationships and interactions between regional, national, subnational actors are overlooked (Dore et al., 2012; Fox & Sneddon, 2007; Hirsch, 2016; Sneddon & Fox, 2006; Suhardiman & Giordano, 2012; Warner, 2012; Zawahri & Hensengerth, 2012). Yeophantong (2017) and Moore (2017a,b) noted that water policy does not always occur as a top-down, linear process when conflicts of interest and contending mandates occur between rival agencies, even in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. Instead, subnational units (i.e. provinces and cities) play an important role in water resource management, and their interests often vary considerably from those of their parent nation states (see Chapter 2).
China is often regarded as a unitary, centralized state, or even as an authoritarian state with formal authority residing at the central government. The relations between the central government and local governments, however, are far more complex than the concept of a unitary stat...
