The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The politics of stalemate

Karl Cordell, Brendan O'Leary, Stefan Wolff

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367139162
• eBook ISBN: 9781351869980
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is one of the longest unresolved conflicts of modern times. It has brought about the early and violent deaths of tens of thousands of people, and blighted the lives of millions more. It is symbiotically linked to the wider crises that continue to engulf the wider region.

The purpose of this volume is to elucidate both the nature of the conflict, but perhaps more importantly to make some tentative proposals with regard to how the conflict may eventually be peacefully concluded. The contributors offer their prognosis in light of the fact that both Israeli and Palestinian society is becoming increasingly polarised and prey to fanatics who argue that the conflict will and should be solved by the complete destruction of one side by the other. In short, this volume seeks to provide rational counter-arguments to fundamentalist bile that questions the fundamental humanity of the opposing side.

This book was originally published as a special issue of the journal Ethnopolitics.

Introduction

KARL CORDELL^* & STEFAN WOLFF^**

^*Plymouth University, UK; ^**University of Bath, UK

Of all the conflicts that blight the global stage, that between Israel and the Palestinians is perhaps the most prominent and intractable. Framed in overlapping ethno-national and religious terms, it has affected the lives of millions since the competing, mostly territorial claims of Zionism and Arab, including Palestinian, nationalism arose in the nineteenth century. The conflict is regional in its scale and has taken various forms ranging from outright warfare between Israel and various of its Arab neighbours in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, as well as Israeli military action against Lebanon in 1982–1985 and 2006; a terrorist campaign against Israel spearheaded by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO, founded in 1964 as an umbrella organisation of various Palestinian factions); two Palestinian Intifadas (or uprisings) 1987–1991 and 2000–2005; and more recently low-level, but near-constant tit-for-tat violence of rocket attacks from the Hamas-controlled Gaza strip and Israeli incursions and use of air power, interspersed with intensely violent episodes such as the 2008 Gaza war.

Up until the (late) 1980s, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, rather than its wider Arab-Israeli counterpart, was a struggle largely between the Israeli security forces and organisations within the Fatah-dominated PLO. This formerly essentially national liberation struggle has undergone some important changes over the past three decades. The rise of Islamic Jihad (founded in 1981) and Hamas (founded in 1988), the dawning of al-Qaeda and more recently of the Islamic State (IS, aka ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) all signify a break with an (unfulfilled) nationalist narrative of self-determination. Rather the rise of the aforementioned groups marks the growth of atavistic hostility towards and an increasing alienation from mainstream politics. As a consequence increasing numbers of Palestinians are drawn to an essentially militant pan-Islamic message that seeks to portray the conflict as an existential struggle between two incompatible religious doctrines and their competing territorial claims. This rise of ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ has been mirrored in Israeli society, particularly among settlers in the West Bank, with the growth of explicitly anti-secular variants of Zionism that are united in their rejection of the possibility and necessity of accommodation between Israelis and Palestinians.

It is this most recent turn of events that provides the immediate impetus for Brendan O’Leary’s lead piece to this volume. He begins from the premise that the status quo is neither morally acceptable nor sustainable. He offers no preference regarding any prescription in terms of either a one-state or two-state solution, but argues that solutions based upon (consocational) models of power-sharing merit serious examination by those parties who do have a commitment to achieving a morally acceptable and politically sustainable solution to the on-going crisis, whether that be within the context of a one-state or two-state solution. Indeed, he is at pains to stress that if what remains of the centre ground in both camps does not pause to reconsider entrenched positions, then those for whom ‘solutions’ are conceived of in terms of absolute destruction of the other will continue to gain adherents. As such his introductory essay provides a platform for the other contributors to engage with, who in so doing, simultaneously and just as importantly offer their own insights with regard to potential solutions to the enduring impasse between Israelis and Palestinians and whose main points are sketched out in the paragraphs immediately below. The volume closes with a short essay by O’Leary in which he reflects on the comments and contributions of his interlocutors.

The responses to Brendan O’Leary’s lead piece are led by Omar Dajani. His analysis is based upon the fact that in recent years that the Palestinians and Israelis have become ‘divorced’ from one another and that this situation is untenable, especially as the ‘divorce’ has not come about through mutually acceptable and agreed negotiation. Like O’Leary, he is cognisant of how difficult it would be in a (hypothetical) two-state solution to ‘divide the assets’, especially with regard Jerusalem in general and the Holy Basin in particular. In attempting to reach beyond conventional proposals, he considers a range of possible alternatives to the current impasse including the parallel states project and the two states in one space proposals. He acknowledges that for a whole host of reasons both are fraught with difficulty, not least due to their sheer originality and concludes his contribution by indicating a slight preference for investigating further the two states in one space alternative on the grounds that it is slightly less fraught with difficulty than the idea of creating two parallel states. Ultimately, his argument is constructed around the belief that the increasing separation of the two populations has not only made matters worse, but that ultimately that it dooms them both.

Our next contributor, Leila Farsakh, makes clear that in her opinion, the results of the Israeli general election of March 2015 have all but eliminated the possibility of there being an (equitable) two-state solution. She further argues that in effect Israel is establishing a form of apartheid in both Israel proper and the Occupied Territories as evidenced by the ‘separation barrier’ and the overall tenor of Israeli policies on the West Bank designed to reduce contact between the two populations to the ‘necessary minimum’. She acknowledges that the changed situation has revived interest in a potential one-state solution, and, like O’Leary, acknowledges that if we are to move forward, power-sharing will have to become a fact of life, whether it be in a one- or two-state framework. Much of her analysis focusses upon a re-appraisal of two key historical documents that have been considered foundational to each party’s understanding of the one-state solution. The first is Palestine: A Bi-national State, written by Martin Buber, Judas Magnus, and Moses Smilansky in 1946. The second document is Fatah’s Towards A Democratic State in Palestine For Muslims, Christians and Jews published in 1970. Her illuminating analysis of historical documents in concert with her appraisal of above all the system of apartheid she claims to be under construction, leads her to conclude that it is only through mutual recognition of the rights of the other that any possible solution can be achieved. Her conclusion is that even though few such chances remain for an equitable solution they may be best realised through consideration of the creation of a single state that at as part of its foundation explicitly accords dignity and security to all its citizens irrespective of their faith.

In turn, Omar Dahbour acknowledges that the two basic choices presented are those of the one-state or two-state varieties. Although doubtful as to how the current impasse may be overcome, he points to two possible scenarios that might aid the cause of progress. One is that if and when US hegemony starts to wane, new possibilities for negotiation might present themselves, if only because such a scenario might give Israeli politicians pause for thought. The second relates to increasing environmental pressures. He points out that both sides continue to use population growth as a ‘weapon’ to create ‘facts on the ground’. Whereas such a ‘policy’ might have some kind of crude appeal to elements on either side of the divide, inexorable population growth leads to inevitable and increasing environmental stress. He argues that in theory the mutual need to develop strategies for survival in such a scenario might conceivably lead to the creation of common ground with regard to environmental and then later more comprehensive political cooperation. He acknowledges the existence of countervailing pressures such as continuing Jewish immigration and the increasing Israeli stranglehold on (Palestinian) water resources. However, he also points to the fact that looming and irreversible ecological collapse might just spur both domestic and international actors to start moving away from entrenched positions. Like O’Leary, he envisages that in such a scenario, power-sharing and perhaps federal solutions could and should have something to offer.

In his contribution, Scott Lucas challenges Brendan O’Leary’s analysis in two main ways. First, he critiques both current Israeli and Palestinian positions, as well as the stance and attitudes of other states that have an active interest in the region. For Lucas, the question then becomes of how to breathe life into a ‘peace process’ that exists in name only. In his opinion, given the particular intransigence of the current Israeli administration, he argues that the Palestinians would be best served by utilising the offices and reach of international and regional organisations in order to gain greater legitimacy for their cause and in so doing accrue greater international political and economic capital. Second, he argues that ultimately Israel’s apparent stranglehold upon the tenor and scope of negotiations can be undermined if such legitimacy and capital is accompanied by intra-Palestinian reconciliation. In turn, the increasing international presence of the Palestinians might force mainstream Israeli politicians to re-think their position, or face growing international opprobrium and isolation. For Lucas, only at that point can serious consideration be given to the question of what kind of state, or states, might emerge from the process of change.

Our next contributor, Uriel Abulof, is particularly interested in the concept of binationalism. He argues that for this notion to have any real political purchase we need to define it in the clearest possible manner. Abulof’s incisive analysis carefully distinguishes binationalism from the related concepts of dual citizenship and what he terms ‘civic-ethnic’ amalgams. He tacitly acknowledges that although the status quo brings benefits to Israel and its Jewish citizens, such benefits incur moral and political costs. In a cautious manner, he argues, in concert with O’Leary, that although binationalism has so far been largely illusory in terms of its political potential, if properly refined and articulated, it just might open up the possibility for dialogue that in turn has the potential to provide for a mutually acceptable solution.

Our final contributor, Benny Miller, acknowledges Brendan O’Leary’s intellectual prowess, but rejects all solutions that are based on power-sharing, whether they be framed within a one- or two-state solution. Miller acknowledges the intricacies and delicacies of the overall situation, but comes down firmly in favour of a two-state solution on the basis that ultimately, if handled correctly, it is the most predictable in terms of its potential positive outcomes. For Miller, the conflict is ethno-nationalist in character, exacerbated by an obvious ‘state to nation imbalance’. The best way to end that imbalance is to create a viable Palestinian state whilst simultaneously ensuring that neither state constitutes an existential threat to the other. For Miller, a carefully engineered two-state solution is at least theoretically possible, but not with the features proffered by O’Leary.

All our contributors are seasoned academics who are fully aware of the enormity of the task. None would be so immodest as to claim that they are offering an immediate blueprint for a settlement of this long-running conflict. However, it is certainly reasonable to argue that the ideas considered and proposals put forward in this volume are coherent and as such merit serious discussion and consideration. Perhaps, the real question is who should be leading such discussion and consideration? The academic community has its part to play, but ultimately it is for politicians and their circles of advisors to meet the challenge. If conflicts like the Israeli–Palestinian one require local leadership, international diplomacy, and institutional design, our volume offers a contribution to the latter addressed to those who have both a direct interest in achieving a settlement of Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and who simultaneously have the ability to frame the terms of the debate. The Israeli and Palestinian leaderships—politicians, entrepreneurs and civil society activists alike—need to muster the political will to do so and their international partners need to offer them incentives to act accordingly and discourage them from absolving themselves (and each other) from the responsibility to negotiate and implement a morally acceptable and politically sustainable settlement. Any such solution will have to be based on a mutual recognition of the inviolability of human dignity, the acceptance that security is a right that should be enjoyed by all and which is necessary in order to create a viable future for all to share. The bleak alternatives involve ‘solutions’ based on the complete defeat and/or destruction of one party by the other, which are as alarming as they are morally unacceptable.

Power-Sharing and Partition amid Israel–Palestine

BRENDAN O’LEARY

University of Pennsylvania, USA

ABSTRACT This paper reviews the deep difficulties entailed in achieving a two-state solution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. It shows that there are equally deep difficulties in seeking to achieve standard power-sharing prescriptions in the region. The status quo, however, is neither acceptable nor likely to be stable in the medium term. A power-sharing perspective may, however, productively assist in making a two-state solution work better, and, paradoxically, may also assist the credibility of those who advocate a one-state solution.

Introduction

The most feasible and therefore optimal democratic arrangements for a deeply divided place with antagonistic peoples include cross-community power-sharing based on the principles of parity, proportionality, autonomy and veto rights. This is the premise of the founder of the contemporary theory of consociation, Arend Lijphart (Lijphart, 1969; Lijphart, 1975; O’Leary, 2005). No exponent of this theory has ever suggested that power-sharing is a panacea for all forms of national, ethnic, religious or linguistic conflict, or easy to negotiate and implement. Consociationalists have usually recognized that in specific circumstances ‘consociation is not enough’, and that to succeed it must be supplemented with additional policies and other principles of conflict resolution or of conflict management (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006; Taylor, 2009; Weller, Metzger, & Johnson, 2008). This is especially true when conflicts have strong and rivalrous national self-determination components, and when the antagonists have mobilized co-ethnics and co-religionists inside and outside the relevant sovereign entity.

Moreover, consociationalists recognize that sometimes the territorial elimination of conflict, either through a negotiated secession or through a just partition¹ may credibly offer better prospects of conflict resolution for the majority of the antagonists among the affected communities than any form of power-sharing. The alternatives that consociationalists are never prepared to tolerate are genocide, ethnic expulsions, coercive assimilation or systems of discriminatory control, in which certain peoples are ethically and ethnically ranked over others (McGarry, O’Leary, & Simeon, 2008).

Analysis of any conflict working with the above premises normally begins with an assessment of whether power-sharing principles might be helpful in a given conflict. If the assessment is negative, analytical efforts are made to find additional institutional or policy transformations or negotiated exchanges, which might make power-sharing more viable. Lastly, analysis will shift towards triage, perhaps to seek the best form of territorial elimination of the conflict, preferably compatible with human rights protection, justice, security and some of the usual coda of international law.

In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, analysts who are not partisans, usually quickly conclude that power-sharing within a common state is impossible. They usually do not consider what else might be considered to make power-sharing more viable. Instead, they conclude that what should be on the agenda is the modalities of ‘the last partition’, what diplomats call the ‘final status’ negotiations. Such conclusions are not reached foolishly. A conflict that is over one hundred years old, and that has been endlessly analysed,² has developed a rich literature, which suggests why power-sharing has few prospects in this case. The final partition seems to be the smart policy conclusion.

But it is certainly worth asking whether this conclusion is mistaken. Working backwards we might ask, what if a last, tidy and durable partition cannot be accomplished? Or, what if the net costs of such a partition outweigh any conceivable net benefits? Less radically, it is appropriate to ask whether there are any modes of power-sharing that could usefully precede or accompany any proposed final status agreement establishing two states. Perhaps power-sharing ideas are the best ways to make the idea of the common state, the principal alternative to the two-state solution, more viable? There is a burgeoning literature among ‘post-Zionists’, and among Jewish and Palestinian intellectuals, on the merits of one, single or common state (Tilley, 2005). This literature has old lineages.³ It often seems to be based on heroic assumptions about the merits of civic integration under the formula of equal citizenship and the privatization of cultural differences, and hard to be...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Pages
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Power-Sharing and Partition amid Israel–Palestine
• 3. Divorce Without Separation? Reimagining the Two-State Solution
• 4. A Common State in Israel–Palestine: Historical Origins and Lingering Challenges
• 5. Self-Determination and Power-Sharing in Israel/Palestine
• 6. Escaping the Two-State Cul-de-Sac: The ‘Regional’, the International, and a New Environment for Israeli–Palestinian Negotiations
• 7. Mirage or Vision: Binationalism in Theory and Practice
• 8. Israel–Palestine: One State or Two: Why a Two-State Solution is Desirable, Necessary, and Feasible
• 9. For the Long-Run: Avoiding the Temptations of the Status Quo, Rancour, and Self-Pity
• Index