1 Christian Responses to Religious Diversity
This chapter will begin by explicating the conceptual stage upon which the contemporary Christian theology of religions debate is being played out. Along the way, constructive proposals will be made as to the manner in which certain concepts and terms could be more precisely defined and/or developed to offer a more accurate presentation of the various options in Christian theology of religions today. The pluralist paradigm will eventually take the spotlight in this discussion. Here, it will be suggested that the most pressing conceptual problem facing proponents of the pluralist approach today involves the conflicting conceptions of the divine found within the various world religions. Finally, the discussion will narrow toward the focus of this dissertation: John Hick's religious pluralism.
The Problem of Religious Diversity for Contemporary Christian Theology
It is rare that one finds contemporary Christian theologians across the spectrum agreeing on any one thing. However, it appears that Christian thinkers of virtually every persuasion concur that the phenomenon of religious diversity and the issues it raises must be at the forefront of the theological agenda as Christianity moves into the 21st century. This recognition permeates a wide array of Christian denominations.1 If literary output is any measure, it is a sentiment that is shared by theological radicals, liberals, moderates, and conservatives alike.2 The importance of this subject is highlighted by the fact that a growing number of contemporary Christian systematic theologians and philosophers of religion feel compelled to include substantial discussions on the matter when canvassing their respective domains.3
It is not as if religious diversity itself is a new phenomenon to be faced by Christians. This simple fact does seem to be overlooked in too many contemporary discussions. Chronocentrism can rob us of an historical awareness of the rich and varied resources available in the Christian tradition for addressing these issues. For much of the early church, religious diversity, in the form of various philosophies, pagan cults, mystery religions, popular superstition, etc., was an ever-present given. As Robert Wilken has noted, the "oldest and most enduring criticism of Christianity is an appeal to religious [diversity]."4 John North has argued that it was during the time of the early church that 'religious pluralism,' which he describes as "a system of interacting competing religions between which the individual could, even in a sense had to, choose," actually developed in the Mediterranean world.5 In any case, the earliest Christian theologians were forced to wrestle with a variety of problems that stemmed from the religious diversity of the world surrounding them.6
What then, if anything, is new about the contemporary situation of religious diversity? The answer to this question is complex and not uncontroversial. According to many, it is simply the growing awareness of religious diversity in much of the contemporary world that constitutes a new state of affairs. Kenneth Cragg captures this sensibility when he writes, "[p]luralisms, of course, there have always been....The contemporary difference is that pluralisms are conscious."7 Some would add to this and say that the newness is not simply a matter of awareness, but of unavoidable mutual contact in what is quickly becoming, through modern technology, a virtual 'global village.' Thus, M. M. Thomas writes, "There have always been a plurality of religions and cultures in the world....What is new today is that they have moved from their separate, isolated existence to what may be called a dialogical existence."8 Others, however, would go a step further and identify the new moment as the embracing of a distinct attitude toward religious diversity. Langdon Gilkey nicely summarizes this view:
Plurality is not new; there have always been other religions. What is new is the dawning recognition of what I have come to call the 'rough parity' between them, and so a new relation of dialogue, of mutual respect, of the recognition of truth, of some sort of truth, in the Other, and thus a stance of listening as well as of proclaiming and instructing.9
For Gilkey and others, this sense of the "rough parity" of the world's great religions—the sense that many religions offer "the presence of truth and grace"—is so basic as to be "assumed" as the "common consciousness" within our contemporary world.10 With respect to the American religious scene in particular, Richard Wenty has recently argued for a similar interpretation of religious diversity:
the transformation of diversity into pluralism is a religious phenomenon that serves as a prevailing factor in the development of American culture. Pluralism denotes the acceptance of diversity; and this acceptance, we have observed, always works within some perception of ultimate order and meaning not confined to traditional religions.11
I have, to this point, consciously chosen to talk of religious 'diversity' rather than religious 'pluralism.' A chief concern of this chapter shall be to assist in clarifying several terminological issues that have served to cloud the discussion of religious diversity. The first concerns the word 'pluralism.' As Francis Clooney has remarked, 'pluralism' is "a word of many meanings."12 Some simply use the term descriptively as a synonym for 'diversity.' Here religious 'pluralism' is intended to denote the fact that a plurality of religions exists, or, perhaps, that they exist in mutual contact with each other. Some scholars are careful to designate this use of the term as "descriptive pluralism," or "phenomenological pluralism."13 Others, however, use the term normatively to denote a particular intellectual and/or attitudinal response to religious diversity. In this case, 'pluralism' refers to "an interpretation of plurality, an evaluation of religious and cultural diversity."14 Specifically, a pluralist interpretation of religious diversity would, with Gilkey, affirm the 'rough parity' of the world's religious traditions. The terms "normative pluralism," "philosophical pluralism," "dogmatic pluralism," and "extramural pluralism" have all been used to describe this perspective.15
Clearly, terminological equivocation within the field at this point can lead to miscommunication and misunderstanding. Some, conflating and confusing the two distinct issues, have pointed to the "fact of religious pluralism," by which they mean both that the world is religiously diverse and that an interpretation of'rough parity' is thus in order.16 To avoid any such confusions in this study, I shall reserve use of the term religious 'pluralism' for the normative judgment that there is a rough parity among the world's religions. I shall use the term religious 'diversity' to signal the fact that a plurality of religions exist in the world, often in conscious contact with each other.17
Christian Responses to Religious Diversity: Types of Theology of Religions
Over the last several decades, a variety of ideal-typical schemas have been proposed by which to classify the various Christian theological responses to religious diversity. In the early 1960s, Hans Kiing could be found contrasting an "ecclesiocentric" approach (i.e., "No salvation outside the Church") with a "theocentric" perspective, wherein he emphasized the "great and gracious, all-embracing intra" that is God's desire to save all humanity.18 In 1969, Owen Thomas offered ten models by which to classify different approaches that Christians had taken to the question of other religions. These included: rationalism (Herbert of Cherbury), romanticism (Schleiermacher), Relativism (Troeltsch), Exclusivism (Barth), Dialectic (Brunner), Reconception (Hocking), Tolerance (Toynbee), Dialogue (Tillich), Catholicism (Küng), and Presence (M. Warren and John Taylor).19 By the early 1970s, John Hick had made a move to a pluralist interpretation of religious diversity. At this time he presented something of a threefold typology built around an astronomical analogy: an ecclesiocentric 'Ptolemaic' view, various Christocentric 'epicycles' (developed to be sure, but Ptolemaic nonetheless), and a theocentric 'Copernican' perspective that represented a "revolution" in Christian theology of religions.20
In a seminal article in 1976, J. Peter Schineller proffered a fourfold typology that revolved around the intersection of Christology and ecclesiology. The following options emerged: (1) "Ecclesiocentric universe, exclusive Christology" (i.e., Jesus and the church as the constitutive and exclusive way of salvation); (2) "Christocentric universe, inclusive Christology" (i.e., Jesus and church as constitutive but not exclusive way of salvation, or Jesus as constitutive but church nonconstitutive way of salvation); (3) "Theocentric universe, normative Christology" (i.e., Jesus and church normative but not constitutive way of salvation); and (4) "Theocentric universe, nonnormative Christology" (i.e., Jesus one of many ways of salvation).21 A key to understanding the significance of Schineller's classifications is the distinction between 'constitutive' and 'normative.' Schineller explains:
To say that Jesus is the constitutive mediator of salvation is to say that he is not only normative but the indispensable one. Without him there would be no salvation... .'Constitutive,' therefore, means that without this historical incarnation, life, death, and resurrection, no person would be saved.22
In a 'normative Christology,' on the other hand, Jesus functions as the 'norm' or standard by which to measure various soteriological aspects in other religions.
In his important 1985 volume, No Other Name?, Paul Knitter proposed a fourfold typology that mirrors Schineller's in significant ways: (1) The "Conservative Evangelical" model (i.e., "one true religion"); (2) the "Mainline Protestant" model (i.e., "salvation only in Christ"); (3) the "Catholic" model (i.e., "many ways, one norm"; this model represents a Rahnerian-like, post-Vatican II perspective); and (4) the "Theocentric" model (i.e., "many ways to the center").23 Unfortunately, Knitter chose rubrics for his models that identified a particular form of Christianity with a certain view of other religions. The fact that each of these forms contained within them adherents of at least one of the other perspectives practically ruled against the widespread adoption of Knitter's typology.
The Standard Threefold Typology: Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism
In 1983, Alan Race advanced a new threefold typology,24 This schema was quickly adopted by leading scholars in the field, including Hick and Knitter.25 His three types—'exclusivism,' 'inclusivism,' and 'pluralism' (Race himself argues for the pluralist perspective)—would soon become the three standard paradigms by which to discuss the basic options in...