Ethnic Conflicts and Civil Society

Proposals for a New Era in Eastern Europe

Andreas Klinke, Ortwin Renn, Jean-Paul Lehners

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429860669
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Published in 1997. After the collapse of the communist system, the political systems in Eastern Europe were unable to cope with increasing tensions between ethnic majorities and minorities. These tensions led to violent ethnic conflicts and civil wars, in particular in former Yugoslavia. In this phase of transition and nation-(re)building, ethnic groups strove for more political autonomy and even territorial secession. The newly independent states lacked democratic structures and traditions as well as civil manners that could be used for regulating ethnic conflicts. The idea of Civil Society provides both basic democratic mechanisms for a lasting co-existence in an ethnically plural society. The theoretical part of this book discusses the issues of conflict anatomy, causes for conflict, and democratic conflict resolution. The empirical part describes experiences of ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia (especially Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) in Ukraine and Romania. Experiences from Switzerland and the United States demonstrate successful examples of ethnic conflict management and illustrations of the political culture within a Civil Society.

PART III

CASE STUDIES: DOMESTIC EXPERIENCES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

4 Temptations of Transition and Identity Crisis in Post-Communist Countries

The Example of Former Yugoslavia

NADIA SKENDEROVIC CUK

1 Introductory Notes

Many analyses of the present post-communist countries are focused on their status of transition, trying to identify a process of democratization by a simplified criterion of “rule of majority”. This kind of conclusion, relying only on a fact of free elections, neglects the essence of democracy, seen as a need for establishing the inherent limits of this rule, embodied in human rights either individual or collective.

It is very difficult to determine the future development of these societies, as they are only beginning to search for possible alternatives. Project of Fukuyama about the end of history lost its attraction after only ten years, and it is still hard to think about the possible improvement of liberal democratization,¹ as a liberal market and democracy are values not adjusted to the context of growing nationalism and poverty, so actual in post-communist societies. The thesis about the clash of civilization is also very provoking and applicable, having in mind the situation in Balkans region, a place with a mixture of cultures where it is difficult to predict the dynamic of political processes. However, it is obvious that within this conglomerate of cultures there is a strong need for energy, wisdom and will to organize a common life or coexistence and to solve possible tensions and conflicts. This will be possible only under the circumstances of universal humanistic and democratic standards of behavior and organization, and this means not only an adequate institutional mechanism but a new political culture.

2 Challenges to Democracy

The failure of real socialism in Eastern and Central Europe caused the establishment of new institutions important for parliamentary democracy like parliaments, free elections, pluralism of political parties, independent media and others. Except for these formal or external elements there were not enough signs to indicate, in a definite way, a presence of stable democracy. There was a lack of substance seen in absence of human rights protection, democratic traditions and civil society values. This ambiguity – or better to say inconsistency – raised doubts about the proper nature of new political regimes.

Nevertheless many authors gave explanations in favor of the democratic character of new regimes and main arguments are found in the existence of freedom for political parties and elections through which a legitimacy for a government obtained.² Describing this new kind of democracy familiar with countries of South America and postcommunist countries, O’Donnell uses the term “delegative democracy”.³ With this unusual term he embraces both the resemblance and difference between parliamentary democracy in Western Europe and that established in ex-socialist countries. Similarity is visible in a democratic process of elections concerning supreme political institutions and by the present critique of their work. A profound difference exists in the accountability of a president which is vertical – maintaining towards voters but not towards other institutions. A process of decision making, it is much quicker then it is usually in stable democracies. This later feature, has however many disadvantages because of a probability for making wrong decisions, possible obstacles in implementing these decisions, and individualization of responsibility in a case of failure.

According to others,⁴ one can speak about “protodemocracy” as a contradiction between legislation and social reality. There are also opinions that there is an actual Post-Communist polyarchy, which means a democracy, but not within the ideal definition of this notion.⁵

Democratization in Eastern and Central Europe occurred in two stages. The first occurs in a moment of abandoning or abolishing the dictatorship, i.e., previous regime, and it is known as a transition to democracy, lasting till first free elections. After transition there is a stage of consolidation which leads, after a certain time, to the status of stable democracy. There is a tendency to accept this later phase as a procedure of giving a legitimacy to the new regime, and according to this it is still not accomplished in the majority of Post-Communist countries. However some of them are closer to this aim – for example the Czech Republic – and some of them are far away because of actual conflicts and tensions in political life – for example in Yugoslavia.

These countries have a common “background”; a past communist regime lasting for more then half a century, being established on the ideas of Marxism, public property and public administration in economy. This heritage will be an obstacle for a long period of time, to satisfying all the requirements of market economy. The above mentioned background of these societies has also had an impact on their members where individuals lived under the “protection” of the state, and were not prepared for the risk and uncertainty of free society and competition.⁶ This expectation of “protection” could not vanish overnight, and it is even now very obvious. A spirit of non-tolerance and unreadiness for dialogue, which is today an obstacle for political pluralism, has its origin in a previous habit of political campaigns and oppression of those who had different ideas and opinions. Finally, the lack of rule of law had serious consequences on the main institutions of society as a whole.

After the failure of ancient regimes, as it is said, new institutions were founded as a precondition for further development. These institutions should gain stability and validity in order to enable a consolidation of democracy. For this it is of utmost importance to establish powerful and stable political parties which are capable of expressing, selecting, and articulating the interests of different social groups. By this criteria, some writers differentiate between institutional and temporary parties.⁷ In the first group are the parties who prove their continuity by participating in at least three elections; taking into account long intervals between elections. Their permanent presence also correlates to the stability of the political system. According to this classification, political parties in Post-Communist countries are more temporary than institutional parties. That means a longer period of time not only for institutionalization of parties but also for gaining loyalty of members to them. This identification with the party became, in Western countries, a kind of tradition, spreading over several generations. Common heritage which points out the similarity of problems in a process of democratization will soon lose its significance. As one author noted, instead of mandatory equality, peculiarities of different countries will cause a different rate of democratic stabilization of in the future. That means the difference between them lies in the process of gaining the basic consensus, which concerns at least three elements of a political system: political community in general, i.e., state, then political regime and persons of political power.

Consensus is necessary for the first segment, as its absence will be a denial of a state, and it is also needed for all the components of a political regime, as are social values, standards or structure of authority.⁸ Stable democracy presumes acceptance of these two basic levels of the political system by all of the relevant political subjects. Opposition to persons or groups with political power is in accordance with parliamentary democracy and is maintained through periodical elections. It will be difficult to understand any possible sideroads of democracy in Post-Communist countries without maintaining one social fact with potentially great influence on further development. Consensus about two basic level is much more predictable in a socially homogenous countries – those where more then 80% of whole population is of a dominant ethnic group. Countries with a smaller percentage of major ethnic groups are considered to be heterogeneous societies, as is the situation in Yugoslavia, considering that in Serbia and Montenegro 1/3 of the population are of different non-dominant ethnic groups. Consolidation is more difficult here as sharp social (ethnic, religious, cultural) divisions cause cultural and political divisions. Those are “segmental cleavages” immanent for plural societies,⁹ where, generally, small chances exist for consensus. Maintenance for subsocieties with their own parties, interests and aims lead to the breakdown of multiethnic political communities like SFR Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union. Nevertheless, consolidation is not completely excluded and is dependent on nature and mutual relations between relevant political parties. In a case of the denial of policy or its major institutions, consolidation will be impossible.

Relevant political parties are considered to be those which achieve at election, at least 5% of votes. According to the results of parliamentary elections in Serbia, there are only 5 relevant parties. Important parties are considered those not participating in elections, but with a presumed support of 5% of the voters. This happens in the case of a boycott, which is a political demonstration of a disapproval towards a state or political regime. This happened (in Yugoslavia) with the Albanian political parties, and the Party of democratic action of Muslim provenance, showing that 1/5 of the population in Serbia does not participate in political life at all. Beside this there was also a challenge to the constitutional framework of republics (Serbia and Montenegro) and of Yugoslavia as federation.

In Serbia there have been attacks on the Constitution which were made before and not after elections by the previous communist regime, in order to disable the opposition from influencing the Constitution’s content. The same was the case with the federal Constitution, which was ratified under even more peculiar conditions.¹⁰ These events slow down the process of democratization, and they are normally accompanied by a lack of confidence in political institutions. Research conducted in Post-Communist countries is proving this notion, so that there is quite a high percentage of unsatisfactory remarks on the development of democratization (In Albania 58%, Slovenia 59%, Estonia 51%, Hungary 74%, Slovakia 78%, Bulgaria 69%, Poland 49%, Romania 56%).¹¹ An attitude toward institutions is dependent on features of political culture. According to Almond and Verba, there are two main types of political cultures; parochial and participate (civil) political culture. The term, political culture of a country, presumes a distribution of orientations to the political system, its institutions, procedures and the role of individuals in this framework. Civil political culture is a part of a real democracy, although not necessarily considered as a precondition. The experience of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, and of some previous reforms in Southern Europe and Central and South America shows that democratic transformation is not inevitably doomed to failure just because of the present parochial culture. Democratic political culture is not always a condition but can also be a consequence of a successful process of democratization.

This fir...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of Editors and Contributors
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• I Introduction
• II Theoretical Approaches
• III Case Studies: Domestic Experiences of Ethnic Conflicts
• IV Case Studies: Democratic Experiences of Successful Conflict Management
• V Synopsis