Leadership in Disguise

Role of the European Commission in EC Decision-making on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round

Remco Vahl

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429819407
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

First published in 1997, this volume is situated within a general discussion in which the European Commission is the subject of much myth and speculation. While the political debate on its role in EC decision-making continues, there is still little consensus among academics on the basic nature of the institution – is the Commission an independent, supranational body, or is it dominated by intergovernmental influences?

Leadership in Disguise enters this general discussion by providing an original empirical analysis of the Commission's role during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (1986-93). Focusing on the controversial agricultural issue, the book sets out to discover how decisions were made within the European Community.

This is a systematic and thorough study of how the Commission can play a leading role in Community decision-making, and will appeal to policy-makers, students and all those seeking an insight into the Commission's role and EC decision-making.

1 The role of the European Commission

Introduction

On 15 December 1993 agreement was finally reached in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations, which took place in the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The deal was a package agreed between a record 117 countries, and covered issues as diverse as tariffs, services, agriculture and a World Trade Organization. The negotiating round broke another record by taking seven years and four months from its official start in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. The idea was to finish by December 1990, but the intended “final” conference held in Brussels broke down amid bitter conflict over the liberalization of the agricultural sector. The European Community (EC) was one of the parties in the dispute. Part of the problem was that divisions were not restricted to the negotiating parties in the Uruguay Round, where the EC and the United States were the most important economically and politically, but ran deep also between the EC’s member state governments, and involved the EC’s negotiator, the European Commission. Only after the agricultural issue was eventually solved, three years later, could the Uruguay Round be wound up. Accordingly, the deal was signed formally in the Moroccan city of Marrakesh in April 1994, and entered into force on 1 July 1995 (the relevant documents can be found in OJ No. L 336 of 23.12.94).

Throughout the Uruguay Round, the EC and its member states were represented by the European Commission. The Commission negotiated on the basis of the EC position as agreed by the Council of Ministers of the EC member states. This negotiating position was prepared by the Commission, in association with representatives of the governments of the EC member states (to whom this study will simply refer to as “member states” or “member governments”). The interplay between the Commission and the member states was of crucial importance to the EC’s ability to speak with one voice, and thus to the Uruguay Round. Based on its double function of preparing and representing the EC’s negotiating position, the Commission was bound to be an important actor in EC decision-making on the Uruguay Round.

The above sets out the empirical and general interests that have motivated this study. The negotiations on agriculture in the framework of the Uruguay Round, and the role of the EC as one of the key players, provide the empirical material. A political scientist’s way to understand the EC’s role is to study its decision-making process. EC decision-making on the Uruguay Round’s agricultural negotiations promises interesting insights into the interplay between the member states and the Commission. This is the more general focus. EC decision-making on the agricultural negotiations of the Uruguay Round deserves detailed attention in its own right, but the challenge is to contribute to this study’s wider purpose: to provide those with a theoretical or practical interest in EC decision-making with insights into the Commission’s role. On the basis of an empirical analysis of EC decision-making on agriculture in the Uruguay Round (chapters 2 to 8), an answer is provided to the following question: in what respects, and under what conditions, did the Commission play a leading role in decisionmaking? The final chapter compares the Commission’s role in different stages of the Uruguay Round, and puts forward several hypotheses on the conditions for a leading Commission role also in other cases.

Before this study turns to the Uruguay Round, the concept of a leading role is clearly defined, and the Commission’s role is put in a proper perspective. The question of what role the Commission plays in the EC is answered in general terms in the next section, which discusses the Commission’s institutional position. It not only gives some basic information on EC decision-making but also introduces the tension between the supranational and intergovernmental elements in the EC’s institutional relations, going beyond legal provisions and formal arrangements to give a realistic assessment of the Commission’s position. The general picture is made more dynamic in the third section of this chapter, where the historical context of European integration is given in order to show how the Commission’s role has evolved. The main topic is the evolution of literature on European integration and the role of the Commission. It is shown that there are basically two approaches: one that views the Commission as an independent, autonomous actor, capable of leadership in the processes of European integration and EC decision-making, and one that sees the Commission as a subservient actor that serves the interests of governments in the Community. Against this background, this chapter’s fourth section puts forward a framework for analysing the Commission’s role in EC decision-making on the Uruguay Round, and for answering the question to what extent the Commission played a leading role. The empirical part of the study is introduced in the last section, which gives information on the research methodology followed in this study.

The institutional position of the European Commission

The phenomenon European Commission still defies easy labelling. The term “international secretariat” is a totally inappropriate tag, but so is the notion of a European government, or federal executive (Nugent, 1994:85; cf Neunreither, 1971-72). The concept “international secretariat” fails to capture the extent of the powers and responsibilities of the Commission (cf Wessels, 1985:30). The term “executive” presupposes a body made up of independent persons, with independent financial resources and significant autonomous decision-making powers (cf Coombes, 1970:83-6). This combination of organizational elements carries the label “supranational” in contrast to “intergovernmental” characteristics, which include: (1) decisions are taken by government representatives; (2) no government is legally bound by decisions that are taken without its consent; this means decisionmaking by unanimity; and (3) governments implement the decisions themselves (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1989:1-7). The terms “supranational” and “intergovernmental”, used strictly, refer to the formal distribution of powers between the governments of an organization’s member states and the common bodies of that organization. However, this study wants to go beyond formal arrangements to include the actual relations between Commission and member states in EC decision-making. From this perspective, the term “intergovernmental” is used when governments dominate aspects of the organization, and “supranational” when actors such as the Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice dominate.

This section sketches the Commission’s institutional position in the European Union in order to show both the supranational characteristics and the intergovernmental controls. The designation “European Union” is now used alongside “European Community”, which has been the name of the European Economic Community since the Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht in December 1991, entered into force on 1 November 1993. Even before that date, however, reference to the European Economic Community had become outdated. The designation “European Community” was commonplace in the period covered by this study (1985-93), and can therefore be found throughout this book.

The European Community in fact constitutes the core of the European Union. In addition, there are two other “pillars”, which consist of cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy, and cooperation on judicial and home affairs. Each of these areas involves a different role for the Commission. This chapter focuses on the Commission’s role in the EC. The term “Commission” is ambiguous since it may refer both to the College of Commission members at the top of the institution and to the bureaucracy operating under the supervision of the Commissioners. In this section, the emphasis is on the role and the position of the College of Commissioners.

The foundation of the Communities and the Commission

The tension between supranational and intergovernmental elements is clearly visible in accounts of the formative years of the European Union, when the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC) were founded (Coombes, 1970:18-26, 40-45; George, 1991:1-9; Pinder, 1991:3-11). The Treaty establishing the ECSC, signed in Paris in April 1951, contains the earliest roots of the current Commission by creating a High Authority. This body received the power to take decisions and raise its own financial resources to ensure the application of the rules laid down in the Treaty. The eventual addition of a Council of Ministers of the member states notwithstanding, the ECSC was based on supranational premises.

In the second half of the 1950s, a more cautious approach prevailed in the negotiation and establishment of the EEC. One indication of this is that the vocabulary employed in the ECSC Treaty was changed: the word “supranational” was deleted from the provisions on the members of the College of Commissioners, while instead of the term “High Authority” the much less appealing “Commission” was introduced (Coombes, 1970:84; Schmitt von Sydow, 1980:18-19, 45-6). In the First General Report on the Activities of the Community (September 1958), the Commission promised to use the designation European Commission in order to avoid confusion, presumably with other “commissions” (Commission, 1958:15). There would also be stricter intergovernmental control over the appointment of the Commissioners, who would serve shorter periods than their colleagues of the High Authority (MacMullen, 1994:6-8). Much more than in the case of the ECSC, an institutional balance was envisaged between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. On the one hand, this was due to the way European integration had meanwhile been unfolding, in particular the development of the Council as the dominant institution in the ECSC, and the failure of the European Defence Community, which had been modelled along institutional lines similar to those of the ECSC. Specific requirements of the new Community, on the other hand, implied a different approach too. The sheer scope of decision-making in the new Community made it impracticable to lay down explicitly the Commission’s powers in all policy areas involved, which had still been possible in the ECSC Treaty. Consequently, more general provisions would have to safeguard the member states against an all too powerful Commission. In addition, the Commission was not granted the extent of decision-making and fund-raising powers attributed to the ECSC High Authority. In some respects, however, the EEC would be more supranational than the ECSC, notably in the field of external economic relations.

In order to breathe life into the framework of objectives and policies included in the Rome Treaty establishing the EEC (referred to hereafter as “the Treaty of Rome”), the Commission would take initiatives in the interest of the Community, while the Council, representing the interests of member states, would take the decisions on all important issues (Bassompierre, 1988:13-14). To avoid inaction, deadlock, and noncompliance when decisions were eventually taken, an important role was nevertheless reserved for an independent body. This body would be initiating specific policy proposals, coordinating member states’ policies, facilitating agreement between them, and fulfilling certain functions regarding the implementation and supervision of EC legislation and agreements (Coombes, 1970:78-83; Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1989:16). This structure was upheld by the Treaty establishing a Single Council ánd a Single Commission of the European Communities, which realized the merger of the “executives” and Councils of the ECSC, Euratom and the EEC into one European Commission and one Council of Ministers (also known as the Merger Treaty). It was signed in 1965 and entered into force on 1 July 1967.

Dependence and independence of the Commission

The Community Treaties have given the Commission its own institutional role and position. At the basis lies the formal imperative of independence as it is currently enshrined in the EC Treaty (the Treaty of Rome as amended by the Treaty on European Union). In practice the formally supranational position of the Commission has been subject to intergovernmental influences that have been relevant to its functioning. Article 157 (1) of the EC Treaty states that the Commission members “shall be chosen on the grounds of their general competence” and that their “independence is beyond doubt.” Independence must enable Commission members to perform their duties in the general interest of the Community. It consists of the duty for Commissioners not to seek or take instructions from any government or other body, and for member states not to try to influence Commissioners (Article 157 (2) EC Treaty). In general, the Commission alone is responsible for interpreting and executing its responsibilities, subject to its accountability to the European Parliament, judicial review by the European Court of Justice, and the need and duty to take into account the interests of member states and interest groups.

The issue of independence has been closely connected to the appointment and reappointment of Commission members. According to the EC Treaty, the members of the Commission are appointed by common accord of the governments of the member states (Article 158 (2) EC Treaty). The “common-accord” procedure emphasizes the formal independence of the Commission in relation to individual member states. In addition, by substituting governments’ common accord for agreement in the Council of Ministers, the procedure reflects the Commission’s independence and equality vis-à-vis the Council (Nugent, 1994:86; Schmitt von Sydow, 1980:85). In reality, Commissioners are actually nominated less by “common accord” than by their respective governments. As a rule, such nominations are never rejected, and the Commission is basically the sum of nominees put forward by government. The required “general competence” of a Commissioner is left almost to the discretion of individual governments, and personal and political preferences play a large role in their choice (Dinan, 1994:207; Donnelly and Ritchie, 1994:32).

It is not entirely correct that the Commission is merely the sum of individual nominees put forward by member governments. First, the nomination of the President of the Commission is not for an individual government to decide, but occurs by common accord of the EC’s heads of state and government and, following the Treaty on European Union (TEU), after consulting the European Parliament (EP) (Article 158 (2) EC Treaty). Second, the TEU has laid down that the governments of the member states shall consult the incoming President about the other Commissioner nominations (Article 158 (2) EC Treaty). Third, since the TEU entered into force, governmental discretion in nominating Commissioners has been constrained by the requirement of EP approval of the incoming Commission (Article 158 (2) EC Treaty). The TEU has codified the practice, dating back to the 1980s, of incoming Commissions taking the oath before the European Court of Justice only after presenting themselves to the European Parliament (Dinan, 1994:208; cf Lodge, 1989:36). From 1995 onwards, Commissioners and the EP have the same five-year term of office (cf Article 158 (1) EC Treaty). These provisions in the EC Treaty could add to the Commission’s legitimacy, and loosen the intergovernmental grip on its composition somewhat.

By way of supranational as opposed to intergovernmental check on the Commission, the Commission is accountable to the European Parliament for its policies. The EP has the power to dismiss the Commission as a body by two-thirds of the votes cast if this is also an absolute majority of all EP members. So far this has never happened, although there have been some attempts to oust the Commission (Westlake, 1994:231). Given the far-reaching consequences of adopting a censure motion against the entire Commission, and the EP’s traditionally limited powers with regard to the appointment of a new Commission, dismissal has not been an attractive weapon (Freestone and Davidson, 1988:79). An individual Commissioner can be sacked only by the European Court of Justice, in the case of serious misconduct or if the Commissioner “no longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his duties” (Article 160 EC Treaty). The only other case in which Commissioners can be judged individually is at the time of reappointment by the governments of the member states, and then only if Commissioners wish to be reappointed.

Although it is dubious whether the reappointment of Commissioners can formally be opposed on the basis of the policy they defend only, the wish to be reappointed limits the independence of Commissioners (Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, 1989:110). In such cases, the “influence” of member governments on Commissioners is not a matter of “instructions” (cf Article 157 (2) EC Treaty), but of anticipation. In addition, the preferences of individual governments can be reflected inside the Commission simply because the national background of Commissioners leads them to defend a position that governments recognize as a national interest. A solid national base is not a disqualification for a Commissioner (Dinan, 1994:212). Commissioners are expected to be well-informed about the interests and preferences of their member state, in order to avoid Commission decisions that are harmful or unacceptable to Community members. Not only is this perfectly legitimate, it also helps to legitimize the Commission, as long as the identification with the national position does not go too far (Donnelly and Ritchie, 1994:35). Too much of a national outlook makes a Commissioner vulnerable to criticism from fellow Commissioners and member states. Nevertheless, all Commissioners go beyond the defence of purely European interests to a greater or lesser extent (Grant, 1994:109-12).

In order to minimize the side-effects of nationality, the Treaties have made the Commission as a whole responsible for Commission decisions, and accountable to the European Parliament. Joint responsibility should not only safeguard the Commission’s independence but should also improve the quality of decisions (Ludlow, 1990:10). To facilitate decision-making, the Commission may decide by an absolute majority of its members (Article 163 EC Treaty), and on occasion, this can turn out to be an important option in Commission decision-making (Grant, 1994:104). The collegiate nature of the Commission holds certain advantages for the member states, notably that “their” Commissioner will have a say on all important matters that are discussed in the Commission (Ludlow, 1990:9-10). Evidence is sketchy on how close relations between Commissioners and “their” governments are, and generalization is hampered by variation between Commissioners and policy areas. Several examples could be given where Commissioners have been divided along the lines taken by their respective governments, without necessarily indicating governmental interference (Dinan, 1994:209, 212; Grant, 1994:111).

The EC Treaty reflects the relevance of nationality when it stipulates that each member state must have at least one national in the College of Commissioners. There is also a maximum number of two (Article 157 (1) EC Treaty) - France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain provide two Commissioners each. The importance of nationality is illustrated further by keen interest shown by member governments in the distribution of Commission portfolios (Dinan, 1994:209, 212). This is the responsibility of the newly appointed Commission, and its President in particular, but there are obvious instances of direct governmental pressure (Ludlow, 1990:11-12). In addition, there are several unwritten rules for dividing the pie. Thus large member states get important portfolios for “their” senior Commission member, although not all combinations are equally acceptable. For instance, it has been noted that France traditionally does not provide the Commissioner for Agriculture (Dinan, 1994:209). At the same time, the Director-General for Agriculture has often been a toplevel French official (Petit, 1987:116). Likewise, th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations and acronyms
• 1 The role of the European Commission
• 2 The run-up to the Uruguay Round
• 3 Protecting the Common Agricultural Policy while liberalizing agricultural trade: from Punta del Este to the Mid-Term Review
• 4 Decreasing room for manœuvre for the Commission: from the Mid-Term Review to the Houston G7 summit
• 5 Gearing up for the final phase: from Houston to Heysel
• 6 Gelting the Uruguay Round back on track: towards the Draft Final Act
• 7 Breakthrough: “Blair House” and beyond
• 8 The final hurdles: making “Blair House” acceptable
• 9 Conclusions
• Annex I Votes in the Council of Ministers
• Annex II Brief chronology of EC decision-making on agriculture and the Uruguay Round
• References