Eithan Orkibi
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Ariel University
From âpointlessâ to âhistoricâ election
When Benjamin Netanyahu announced the intention to dissolve his government, paving the way for general elections less than two years after winning the 2013 elections, many critics and commentators expressed indifference, if not fatigue. The general impression, in the days following the legislatorsâ decision to dissolve the 19th Knesset, was that the upcoming election was âpointlessâ. As Eldad Yaniv, a Labour party activist and future Knesset candidate put it: âWhat more can you say about a bunch of politicians, elected less than two years ago to fight against the cost of living and the housing prices, who accomplished nothing and dissolved the government for no reason? And now, as they are heading towards new elections â they will explain to us, of course, why we should vote for them againâ (Walla!, December 2, 2014). Others, like former Minister of Education Amnon Rubinstein, warned against the âuntimely and unnecessary electionsâ that would alienate ordinary Israelis from politics and lead to a decrease in political participation among young Israelis (Maariv, December 4, 2014). Claiming that Netanyahuâs move constituted a âbreach of contract with the votersâ, sociologist Oz Almog went as far as suggesting a âpractical protest ⌠let us declare a voting rebellion, let us refrain from votingâ (Haredim 10, December 2, 2014).
Soon enough, however, this position was challenged by journalists and opinion makers. Denouncing the âprevailing opinion ⌠that the expected elections are totally unnecessaryâ, prominent Haaretz columnist Ravit Hecht suggested instead that âthe results of the upcoming balloting will sketch the countryâs true profileâ and called upon the âdemocratic blocâ to seize the opportunity to reshape the political landscape (Haaretz, December 3, 2014). Within the Israeli left, at least, the discontent gave way to enthusiasm. âThe importance of the 2015 election cannot be too highly emphasizedâ, declared journalist and author Ari Shavit: âwhatâs at stake is the existence of a sovereign, modern and democratic homeland, of which we can be proud and in which we can liveâ (Haaretz, December 11, 2014).
From âbye-bye Bibiâ to âBibi nationâ
Much of the enthusiasm within the Israeli left derived from the belief that Netanyahu, baptized âKing Bibiâ by Time Magazine in May 2012, was weaker than ever. âWe, in our innocence, thought he was strong. But on Tuesday night, we discovered we have a battered premierâ, wrote Yossi Verter (Haaretz, December 3, 2014). The first opinion polls made it possible for Haaretz to predict a possible âupheavalâ (December 20, 2014), and one of the journalâs popular contributors, Uri Misgav, declared âread my lips: Benjamin Netanyahu will lose the election and will not form the next governmentâ (Haaretz, December 9, 2014).
The upheaval trend was energized by an impressive movement of political activism under the popular slogan âAnyone but Bibiâ. In fact, the 2015 election campaign brought about the emergence of the largest canvassing movement in Israeli political history to date â the V15 organization. V15, formed and led by young Israeli political activists in collaboration with OneVoice Movement, raised donations and recruited volunteers in an effort to elevate voting percentage among Israeli centre-left voters, spreading the motto âsimply replace the governmentâ. To the same end, members of Commanders for Israelâs Security, an association of former senior security officials, were also mobilized and led an intensive campaign against Netanyahu, declaring that the prime Minister âis endangering Israelâs securityâ (Ynet, March 11, 2015). The unprecedented mobilization of citizens and opinion makers against Netanyahu, together with the results of the opinion polls, led both Israeli and foreign media outlets to predict that Netanyahuâs days as prime minister would soon be over. The Telegraph headline for March 14 stated âBye-bye for Bibi? Israeli election polls show Netanyahuâs gamble may have backfiredâ.
The âAnyone but Bibiâ campaign triggered a counter-mobilization. Following an impressive anti-Netanyahu rally in Tel Aviv a week before the elections, the ânational campâ gathered at the Tel Avivâs Rabin square for a demonstration of power, during which Netanyahu issued a warning of âthe possibility of left-wing victoryâ (Haaretz, March 15, 2015). Echoing the iconic rallies that took place at the same location during the 1981 election campaign, the Anti and Pro-Netanyahu rallies bore witness to the amount of passion and energy stirred by the âpointlessâ and âuntimelyâ 2015 election. The âemergency campaignâ led by the Likud party in the final stages of the election campaign reversed the momentum. Contrary to the prevailing predictions and in sharp contrast to the last opinion polls, Netanyahu gave his victory speech after leading his party to a third consecutive victory and being elected as prime minister for the fourth time in his career. Netanyahu became the âsecond-longest serving prime minister in the history of Israel, second only to David Ben-Gurionâ, to quote Haaretz columnist Asher Schechter, who quipped six months after the election: âIsrael is now Bibi nation, wholly synonymous with Netanyahu: Bibi is Israel. Israel is Bibiâ (Haaretz, October 28, 2014).
Transformative stability
At first glance, the election results suggest a period of political stability: after a long period of political upheavals and power shifts, Likud dominance and Netanyahuâs tenure as prime minister seem relatively stable. This, in itself, could be regarded as a transformative moment in Israeli politics: for the first time since the 1990s, to his supporters and opponents, Netanyahuâs leadership represents an era, not a myriad of political opportunities and strategic plans. The popular saying among Israelis â âthere is no alternative to Bibiâ â meaning that the opposition systematically fails to provide a worthy opponent to Netanyahu, clearly demonstrates the charismatic appeal of Israelâs current prime minister, whose leadership can no longer be understood solely in terms of the political competition between âleftâ and ârightâ.
While it seemed that Israeli voters hesitated between two well-defined alternatives, the right-wing Likud and the left-wing Avoda (running as the Zionist Union), the 2015 election proved the importance of the Israeli centre. Two centrist parties, Yesh Atid and Kulanu, promised, each in its own way, to address civil and economic issues, rather than prioritizing the IsraeliâPalestinian conflict at the top of their agendas. Given Netanyahuâs preoccupation with the Iranian nuclear project, one could safely argue that only a few months after Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, the IsraeliâPalestinian conflict had been marginalized into the background of the election campaign.
Thus, although the 2015 election, considered by many as completely unnecessary or as a mere referendum on Netanyahuâs leadership, did not bring about any major political changes, it did, however, reflect some important transformations in Israeli politics. These included the increase in political participation and voter turnouts; the reshaping of political agendas and perceptions of national leadership; shifts in identity politics and representation; new trends in campaign usage of media and new media; and novel expressions in political language and discourse. Each of the essays gathered in this special issue of Israel Affairs demonstrates different aspects of the Israeli 2015 election as peculiar moment of transformative stability.
The essays in this volume are divided into four sections. The first offers a detailed account of the campaign and analysis of the results. Manfred Gerstenfeld follows the emergence and the development of the campaign, describes its major trends, moves and turning points, and highlights the unique characteristics of the 2015 elections. Analysing the increase in voter turnout, Nir Atmor and Chen Friedberg examine differences in political participation among geographical and economical centres and peripheries. Looking at the allocation of seats at the Israeli Knesset, Dganit Ofek and Assaf Meydani combine various theoretical and methodological approaches to create a new model of coalition formation, and hint at the role of ideological differences and distance between political parties in the formation of governments and coalitions.
The second section deals with political identities and figures of leadership. Doron Navot and Aviad Rubin bring insights from Hobbesâs political thinking in order to explain Netanyahuâs recurrent electoral success, which they locate in his rhetorical ability to articulate the nature of civil and political rights in the context of an ongoing struggle for survival and self-determination. Udi Lebel and Guy Hatuka examine the decline of the Labour party, arguing that the partyâs gradual demilitarization, as manifested in the decreasing number of members of the Israeli security elite among its ranks, contributed to the marginalization of the party. Studying the new centrist party, Kulanu, headed by Moshe Kahlon, Nissim Leon traces the political transformation and evolution of the Mizrahi middle class. Leonâs analysis argues that Kulanu plays a historic role in translating upwardly mobile Mizrahism from a language of social marginality and political radicalism, to a model of Israeli political partnership. Focusing on the Israeli Arab vote, Arik Rudnitzky assesses the recent developments in the political behaviour of Israelâs largest minority. Analysing the creation of a unified political party, the Joint List and a series of historical achievements in terms of political representation and voter turnout, Rudnitzky shows that the recent election results indicate that the Knesset has once again become a significant venue of political participation for the majority of the Arab public. Closing this section is a contribution by Michal Alon-Tirosh and Dorit Hadar-Shoval, who studied perceptions of identity and political leadership among Israeli children, thus revealing the extent to which current power relations and social hierarchies are internalized and expressed by Israeli younger generations.
The third section takes a closer look at the functions and roles of media and new-media during the election campaign. Sharon Haleva-Amir offers an in-depth analysis of the current trends and developments in the usage of internet campaigns, namely the extension of social media usage beyond Facebook, the influence of web culture on campaign style and tactics, and the predominance of entertainment in e-campaigns, at the expense of ideological discourse. Dana Weimann-Saks, Yaron Ariel, Vered Malka and Ruth Avidar focus on the interaction between âoldâ and ânewâ media. Using agenda-setting theory, their study concludes that topics that generated salience and media interest on television stirred similar interest and discussions in social networks. While television maintained its status as the leading news medium, their analysis demonstrates how new media platforms enabled a multiplicity of voices and messages and made it more difficult for candidates to control media and public agendas. Looking more closely at campaign activity on Facebook, Nili Steinfeld uses a new methodology of discourse network analysis, in order to highlight the leading themes and positions expressed online by the candidates, thus allowing for a more accurate understanding of the precise functions of Facebook in current Israeli electoral campaigns.
The fourth section is dedicated to political discourse and persuasion. Mira Moshe analyses the metaphors we vote by in order to uncover dynamics of emotional mobilization of voters. Focusing on some of the scandalous moments of the campaign, her analysis argues that both Likud and Zionist Union leaders and speakers constructed symbolic representations of each other as enemies and metaphorically framed the elections as a symbolic battlefield. David Kleczewski and Ruth Amossy offer a systematic analysis of the partiesâ rhetoric, focusing on two types of arguments: pragmatic versus value-based arguments. Their analysis concludes that the two largest parties, Likud and Zionist Union, both put forward security considerations, thus using arguments derived from potential negative consequences and appeals to fear. In contrast, their analysis shows that the two parties on the right and left â The Jewish Home and Meretz â who most conspicuously rivalled with the Likud and Zionist Union on matters of foreign policy, adopted value-based reasoning strategies and adopted ideological argumentation. Closing the collection is Rafi Mann, who explores an important novelty of the 2015 elections: the emergence of a new comic political discourse, in which humour was used as a central campaign strategy. Showing how senior Israeli politicians turned into comedians in the effort to mobilize supporters, Mannâs essay raises an important question which is relevant for the current political discourse: what are the ramifications of reducing the ideological discussion to a nutshell of simplistic viral discourse?
Acknowledgement
The guest editors of this special issue would like to warmly thank Vincent Reyes for his editorial assistance.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
The run up to Israelâs 2015 elections: a political history
Manfred Gerstenfeld
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel
ABSTRACT
The 19th Knesset dissolved itself on 8 December 2014. New elections were set for 17 March 2015. Polls taken immediately after the dissolution of the Knesset showed major public disaffection with Netanyahu. Yet in polls on hypothetical run-offs against other party leaders, Netanyahu was seen to win in all cases. Labour and Hatnuah ran together. So did four Arab parties. A new party, Kulanu, led by Moshe Kahlon, joined the contenders. Several parties held primaries. In the campaign, online videos played an increasingly important role. Polls during the final days and exit polls turned out to be unreliable. The Likud became the largest party in the 20th Knesset with 30 seats.
On 2 December 2014, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu fired both Finance Minister and party leader of Yesh Atid (âthere is a futureâ) Yair Lapid, and Justice Minister and party leader of Hatnuah (âThe Movementâ) Tzipi Livni. Netanyahu stated in a televised programme that unlike the previous government, this government was contrarian in nature from its very inception. Netanyahu claimed that Lapid and Livni had conspired to overthrow him by attempting to form an alternative government jointly with some of the opposition parties.
Netanyahu also said that Livni â who had criticized her dismissal â had, in May 2014, against the cabinetâs decision met with Palestinian President Abu Mazen. Netanyahu added, âLivni and Lapid have one thing in common â they talk about new politics, but in practice, they practice old policiesâ (Haaretz, 2 December 2014).
The next day, the 19th Knesset decided to dissolve itself in the first reading. It left a small opportunity open for reconciliation between the parties before the second and third readings. Out of the 120 lawmakers, 84 voted for dissolution, and none voted against (The Jerusalem Post, 3 December 2014). The date for the elections for the 20th Knesset was set for 17 March 2015, about two years since the previous elections. The definitive decision to dissolve the 19th Knesset was taken on 8 December by a vote of 93 for dissolution, and zero against (The Times of Israel, 8 December 2014).
Gloves come off
Within days of the election campaign the gloves came off. Lapid told Netanyahu, âyou have no idea what it does to the citizens of Israel because you live in your aquarium, and for a long time now, you donât know who the people are and what really troubles themâ (Times of Israel, 8 December 2014).
The usually polite International Relations Minister Yuval Steinitz (Li...